The treatment of the British military war dead of the Second World War by Spark, Seumas
The Treatment of the British Military War 
Dead of the Second World War 
Seumas Spark 
PhD 
The University of Edinburgh 
2009 
This thesis has been composed by the candidate, the work is the candidate's own, 







Author's Notes viii 
Glossary of Abbreviations ix -xi 
Preface xii 
Introduction 1 -9 
Part One 
Chapter One: Frontline Burial Policy and Practice 10 -43 
Part Two 
Chapter Two: The Origins of the Army Graves Organisation and the 
First Stage of Army Graves Operations: September 1939 -June 
1944 44 -97 
Chapter Three: The Second Stage of Army Graves Operations: June 
1944 -July 1949 98 -164 
Chapter Four: Keeping Track of Missing RAF Personnel: September 
1939- December 1945 165 -200 
Chapter Five: The Location and Identification of Missing RAF 
Personnel: December 1945- September 1949 201 -30 
Part Three 
Chapter Six: The Establishment of the IWGC and its Second World 
War Task 231 -75 
Chapter Seven: Visiting the Dead: Pilgrimages to British Second 
World War Graves 276 -96 
Conclusion: Reflections on the Burial of Second World War British 
Military Dead 297 -315 
iii 
Appendices 
Appendix One: MRES Skeletal Chart 316 
Appendix Two: MRES Tooth Chart 317 
Appendix Three: MRES Civilian Questionnaire (Translation) 318 -19 
Appendix Four: MRES Area Search Certificate 320 
Appendix Five: MRES Burial Detail Acceptance Form 321 
Appendix Six: Suggested Designs for Headstones 322 
Appendix Seven: Stone of Remembrance Letter 323 
Appendix Eight: Second World War Headstone 324 
Appendix Nine: Percentage of CWGC Funds Supplied by Member 
Countries, 2007 -08 325 
Appendix Ten: IWGC Second World War Burials and 
Commemorations in Selected Countries 326 
Bibliography 327 -51 
Illustrations 
Figure 1 34 
Figure 2 39 
Figure 3 52 
Figures 4 -12 151 -55 
Figures 13 -29 156 -64 
Figure 30 223 
Figure 31 224 
Figure 32 225 
Figures 33 -37 257 -60 
iv 
Figures 38 -45 261 -66 
Figures 46 -61 267 -74 
Figure 62 275 
Figure 63 313 
ABSTRACT 
Almost nothing is known about the treatment of the British military dead of the 
Second World War. It is one of the few aspects of the conflict that has not been 
afforded attention by scholars. This is remarkable given that death is the most 
profound and important consequence of war. Drawing on extensive and previously 
unused sources in the National Archives and the Commonwealth War Graves 
Commission, the thesis endeavours to correct this oversight by examining the 
treatment of the military dead in the European, Mediterranean and African theatres of 
the 1939 -45 conflict. It does this in parts, reflecting the three stages of the burial 
process. In the first part British burial policy and frontline burial practice are 
examined. The operations of the army and air force graves services, which were 
responsible for confirming the location and identity of the dead, are studied in the 
second part. The third part considers first the manner in which the Imperial War 
Graves Commission commemorated the British dead in battlefield cemeteries, and 
then the pilgrimages undertaken to these cemeteries by bereaved relatives in the early 
post -war period. The successes and failures of the burial process cannot be assessed 
without this perspective. The research shows that shortcomings in the planning and 
administration of burial and graves operations resulted in the loss of the remains and 
identities of thousands of British servicemen. The fact that the bodies of so many 
others were recovered, and accorded identified interment, is credit to the work of the 
military graves services and the thesis seeks to recognise their contribution to this 
hitherto- unexplored aspect of the 'People's War'. 
vi 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I thank the Overseas Research Student scheme and the University of Edinburgh for 
funding my postgraduate study, and the Royal Historical Society and the Economic 
History Society for providing research trip grants. For assistance rendered, I am 
grateful to the staffs of the National Library of Scotland, the National Archives, and 
the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. At the last -named institution I offer 
particular thanks to Maria Choules, Chris Lofty and Ian Small. The following 
friends have helped me complete this thesis and to them goes my gratitude: Chiara 
Barattieri, Vincent Bombail, Fiona Carmichael, Ben Fuller, Jen Harrison and Martin 
Rorke, Andrew and Tracey Henderson, Lynsey Hunter, Ken Inglis, Martin Lamb, 
Mamie Lewis, the Mayer family and Patrik Sneyd, Tim Pritchard, Michael Reynolds 
and family, Sabine Roeth, and Malcolm Skene and Amanda Gu. My sincere thanks 
go also to the Lyall family, especially to Loraine and Steven for their remarkable 
hospitality and welcome. I greatly appreciate the assistance and patience of my 
supervisors, Jeremy Crang and Paul Addison. Bill Gammage read a draft of this 
thesis, one of many kindnesses he and his wife Jan have extended to me since 2001 
when it was my privilege to study under him. Donald Bloxham provided advice, 
encouragement and a comfortable stretch of floor when I needed a place to stay. His 
friendship is held dear. I am profoundly thankful to my parents and sisters for their 
love and support. Much of the thesis is owed to them. Just as my family was a key 




Some of the quotations in this thesis contain mistakes. Except where necessary to 
clarify that the mistakes are not mine, these have been left unacknowledged for 
fluency of reading. 
All photographs and illustrations are Commonwealth War Graves Commission 
copyright unless otherwise stated. 
viii 
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AAG Assistant Adjutant General 
ACC Allied Control Commission 
ACI Army Council Instruction 
ACS Army Council Secretariat 
ADGRE Assistant Director Graves Registration and Enquiries 
AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters 
AGRS American Graves Registration Service 
AGS Army Graves Service 
AMP Air Member for Personnel 
AOC -in -C Air Officer Commanding -in -Chief 
BAFO British Air Forces of Occupation 
BAOR British Army of the Rhine 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
BEF British Expeditionary Force 
BMM British Military Mission 
BNAF British North Africa Force 
CAS Chief of the Air Staff 
CCMU Cemetery Construction and Maintenance Unit 
CMGRE Central Mediterranean Graves Registration and 
Enquiries 
CWGC Commonwealth War Graves Commission 
DADGRE Deputy Assistant Director Graves Registration and 
Enquiries 
ix 
DAG Deputy Adjutant General 
DDGRE Deputy Director Graves Registration and Enquiries 
DGRE Directorate of Graves Registration and Enquiries 
DPS Directorate of Personal Services 
DPW Directorate of Prisoners of War 
EAF East Africa Force 
GCU Graves Concentration Unit 
GHQ General Headquarters 
GRC Graves Registration Commission 
GRE Graves Registration and Enquiries 
GREAF Graves Registration East Africa Force 
GREMEF Graves Registration and Enquiries Middle East Force 
GRO General Routine Order 
GRU Graves Registration Unit 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross 
ICRV Interdepartmental Committee on Relatives' Visits to 
War Cemeteries 
IWGC Imperial War Graves Commission 
IWM Imperial War Museum 
JWO Joint War Organisation 
L of C Line of Communication 
MEF Middle East Force 
MP Member of Parliament 
MRES Missing Research and Enquiry Service 
x 
MREU Missing Research and Enquiry Unit 
MRG Missing Research Group 
MRGR Missing Research Graves Registration 
MRS Missing Research Section 
NLS National Library of Scotland 
NWGC Netherlands War Graves Committee 
POW Prisoner -of -War 
PRO Public Record Office 
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force 
RAF Royal Air Force 
RASC Royal Army Service Corps 
RCAF Royal Canadian Air Force 
RMG Russian Military Government 
RNZAF Royal New Zealand Air Force 
SACMED Supreme Allied Command Mediterranean 
SEAC South East Asia Command 
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
TCD Trinity College Dublin 
TNA The National Archives 
UDF Union Defence Force 
YMCA Young Men's Christian Association 
xi 
PREFACE 
`Killing is the end of war; we have almost forgotten it in these velvet days, and 
starting our engine of war, are shocked that death plays so busy a part amongst the 
mechanism.' 
* ** 
`The stars dead heroes in the sky 
may well approve the way you die 
nor will the sun 
revile those who survive because 
for the dying and promising there was 
these evils remain: 
when you are dead and the harm done 
the orators and clerks go on 
the rulers of interims and wars 
effete and stable as stars.'2 
* ** 
`Because a decent burial of the dead is a condition for the continued peace of the 
living; without it, the spirit of the departed returns by night and torments the 
survivors.' 3 
`Linesman', The Mechanism of War, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1902), pp. 182 -3. 
2 From `The Offensive' by Keith Douglas in Keith Douglas, Alamein to Zem Zem, (London: Editions 
Poetry London, 1946), p. iv. 
3 Ryszard Kapu§ciñski, Travels with Herodotus, (London: Penguin, 2008), p. 129. 
xii 
Introduction 
Stan Brine does not know exactly what happened to the bodies of those of his 
comrades who were killed at the frontline in the north -west Europe campaign of 
1944 -45. He does know that eventually they were buried, for he has visited their 
graves many times over the years, but not how their remains passed from the 
battlefields where they died to the cemeteries where they are interred. To this 
mystery Brine often has sought answers, but his conversations with other ex- 
servicemen have been unproductive and his reading on the Second World War 
unenlightening. All he has discovered from the copious material he has read is that 
the burial of British military dead is one of the few aspects of the conflict to have 
escaped the attention of scholars. This is extraordinary given that death is one of the 
only certainties of war, and its most important consequence.' 
Thesis Objectives 
British military frontline dead were buried in three stages. First, corpses and body 
parts were collected from the battlefield and interred. Second, the Army Graves 
Service (AGS) and the Royal Air Force (RAF) Missing Research and Enquiry 
Service (MRES) - the military graves services - confirmed the location and identity 
of the dead. Third, the Imperial War Graves Commission (IWGC) made beautiful 
the battlefield cemeteries in which they were buried. While some ex- servicemen 
have written of their experiences of interring the frontline dead or seeing it done, the 
performance of this task and the rules which governed its completion by British 
Stan Brine, One Up, Two Up, Brew Up (Book 3), (Unpublished), pp. 163 -4; Author's information. 
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personnel have not been the subjects of academic study. Even more obscure is the 
detail of the second stage of the burial process. Very little has been written on the 
MRES and less still on the AGS, while the few references to these organisations in 
secondary literature are usually isolated and vague.2 More is known of the IWGC, 
although not with regard to its role in relation to the military graves services. Indeed, 
many historians have credited the IWGC for work done by the AGS and the MRES.3 
Nor have the three stages of the burial process been studied together and as 
components of a continuum. 
This thesis aims to fill these gaps in military historiography. In so doing it 
endeavours to demonstrate that the initial failure to plan adequately in the pre -war 
period for future burial and graves operations, and the subsequent failure to correct 
quickly the inadequacies of policy and practice once these had been exposed by the 
experiences of conflict, retarded the efficient interment of the Second World War 
dead and resulted in the identities and remains of thousands of servicemen being lost. 
That so many other British personnel were accorded identified burial is due 
principally to the men of the military graves services who, undeterred by widespread 
institutional indifference, sought to satisfy the expectation of the public that its dead 
be buried well. The thesis seeks to acknowledge their hitherto -unrecognised 
contribution to the `People's War'. 
2 Philip Longworth, The Unending Vigil: A History of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, 
(Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2003), pp. 177 -8; Carl Shilleto, The Fighting Fifty- Second Recce: The 52nd 
(Lowland) Divisional Reconnaissance Regiment RAC in North -west Europe, September 1944 - March 
1946, (York: Eskdale, 2001), pp. 167 -8; Dilip Sarkar, Missing in Action: Resting in Peace ?, 
(Worcester: Ramrod, 1998), p. 23. 
3 For example, see Sarkar, Missing in Action, pp. 21, 24. 
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 An Historical Perspective 
The remains of British servicemen had not always been attended in death. On 16 
March 1908, Monsieur Wauthier, an official from the Givet commune in northern 
France, wrote to Sir Francis Bertie, the British ambassador in Paris: 
[y]our humble servant takes the liberty of making known to Your 
Excellency that a considerable number of British soldiers and sailors lie 
in unnamed graves in the military cemetery of this garrison. These men 
died here in captivity as prisoners of war at Givet (Ardennes) from 1803 
to 1814. The cemetery ceased to be used as such in 1850.4 
Wauthier continued: `[t]he old military cemetery in question today bears no mark 
showing what its original character was. It lies by the road running from Givet to 
Dinant, which is followed by many tourists, and it might be well to remind them that 
at that place lie many of their compatriots who died for their country.' 5 
The matter of erecting a memorial to the personnel buried at Givet was referred 
to the War Office, the Admiralty and the Office of Works, the last -named department 
being responsible for the maintenance of certain British cemeteries in countries 
overseas.6 In discussion, one War Office authority argued: `it would look rather 
"mesquin" to drop the matter altogether now that it has reached this stage, & would 
not impress the French authorities, local and other, with the patriotic sentiments of 
the British Army. They think a good deal more of this sort of thing than we do.'7 
Other British officials took a different view. One observed of the dead interred at 
Givet: `[t]heir names, their ranks, their services have been forgotten for many years, 
and I do not see what advantage would be gained by doing now what, if done at all, 
4 TNA, PRO WO 32/9025, 
5 Ibid. 
6 TNA, PRO WO 32/9025, 
TNA, PRO WO 32/9026, 
spirited. 
Wauthier to Bertie, (Translation), 16 March 1908. 
Army Council to Office of Works, 7 May 1908. 
Internal Minute, December 1908. Mesquin means stingy and mean- 
-, 
J 
should have been done long ago.'8 This opinion prevailed and in January 1909, Sir 
Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, advised Bertie that no monument would be 
raised.9 
This decision demonstrated that Britain had not been greatly affected by the 
movement, which had arisen in the mid -nineteenth century, to afford equal attention 
to all servicemen who died in battle. Approximately 100,000 Union soldiers killed in 
the American Civil War of 1861 -65 had been buried in identified graves in specially - 
constructed cemeteries, while the Treaty of Frankfurt, which formally ended the 
Franco -Prussian War of 1870 -71, stipulated that the erstwhile belligerents should 
`engage to respect and preserve the tombs of soldiers buried in their respective 
territories.' 10 Yet in the Boer War of 1899 -1902, British authorities made little effort 
to care for their dead. By its end it remained more common for the corpses of British 
servicemen killed on the battlefield to be abandoned or thrown into mass burial pits 
than interred in identified graves.11 As shall be seen, this was to change during the 
First World War, and by the Second World War the principle of identified and 
honourable burial for all servicemen was part of British military doctrine. The 1939- 
8 TNA, PRO WO 32/9025, Internal Minute, Undated. 
9 TNA, PRO WO 32/9026, Grey to Bertie, 13 January 1909. 
10 Article XVI of the Treaty of Frankfurt, 10 May 1871, cited in Robert I. Giesberg, The Treaty of 
Frankfort: A Study in Diplomatic History, September 1870- September 1873, (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), p. 292; Thomas Laqueur, `Among the Graves', London Review of 
Books, 30, 24 (2008), 3 -9; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. xx; Luc Capdevila and Danièle 
Voldman, War Dead: Western Societies and the Casualties of War, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2006), pp. 22 -3, 42 -3; James Stevens Curl, A Celebration of Death: An Introduction to Some of 
the Buildings, Monuments, and Settings of Funerary Architecture in the Western European Tradition, 
(London: B. T. Batsford, 1993), pp. 317 -8. For more information on these subjects, see Annette 
Becker, `War Memorials: A Legacy of Total War ?' in Stig Förster and Jörg Nagler (eds.), On the 
Road to Total War: The American Civil War and the German Wars of Unification, 1861 -1871, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 658 -60; Michael Sledge, Soldier Dead: How we 
Recover, Ident, Bury, & Honor our Military Fallen, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 
pp. 33 -4, 202; William F. Ross and Charles F. Romanus, United States Army in World War II: The 
Technical Services: The Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany, 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1965), p. 213. 
II Capdevila and Voldman, War Dead, pp. 8, 43; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. xxi; Joanna 
Bourke, Dismembering the Male: Men's Bodies, Britain and the Great War, (London: Reaktion, 
1996), p. 226. 
4 
45 war was the first conflict in which Britain fought where this principle applied 
from the outset. 
Parameters 
This thesis is divided into three parts, with each stage of the burial process addressed 
in turn. In the first part an examination of the origins and dictates of British burial 
policy is followed by case studies of frontline burial practice in the Second World 
War. The operations of the military graves services are the focus of the second part. 
It considers the work of the AGS and the War Office Directorate of Graves 
Registration and Enquiries (DGRE), which held overall responsibility for graves 
matters, and then the events that led to the formation of the MRES in 1945 and its 
operations thereafter. The discussion in the second part begins in 1914 for the 
character and development of the military graves organisation cannot be understood 
without reference to its original incarnation during the First World War. The third 
part of the thesis examines the operations of the IWGC, but only insofar as these 
built upon the work of the AGS and the MRES. To this end it proved necessary to 
study the events surrounding the formation of the IWGC in 1917 - when its 
principles were forged - but it remains that chapter six is not a history of the 
organisation. This part of the thesis considers also the pilgrimages undertaken in the 
early post- Second World War period by relatives of the war dead to battlefield 
cemeteries on the Continent. It was for these Britons that the military graves services 
and the IWGC laboured, and thus this perspective is necessary in order to assess the 
successes and failures of the burial process. These judgments are proffered in the 
conclusion. 
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In addition to the aforementioned, a further parameter is that consideration is 
given only to the African, Mediterranean and European theatres of the Second World 
War in which British forces fought. The Asian theatre is excluded because there are 
relatively few primary sources on the conduct of graves operations there. The 
interment of military personnel in Britain is not examined because the focus is on 
foreign battlefields. Nor is the treatment of Royal Navy war dead considered. Of 
this topic there is little to discuss for most sailors were buried at sea or lost there 
without trace, and those bodies that washed up on land became the responsibility of 
the army.12 Finally, this work is concerned with the commemoration of British 
military war dead only in relation to the battlefield cemeteries developed by the 
IWGC. 
Historiography 
This study makes extensive use of primary documents held at the National Archives 
(TNA) in London and the Commonwealth War Graves Commission (CWGC) in 
Maidenhead (the IWGC changed its name to the CWGC in 1960). These two 
institutions are the main repositories of information on the DGRE and the military 
graves services.13 TNA and CWGC documents also provide the foundation for the 
chapters on the IWGC and war graves pilgrimages, although in these chapters 
12 Some information on the treatment of British naval dead can be found in J. L. S. Coulter, The Royal 
Naval Medical Service: Volume II Operations, (London: HMSO, 1956), pp. 85 -88; and C. H. Joynt, 
`The Royal Naval Medical Services' in Sir Arthur Salusbury MacNalty and W. Franklin Mellor (eds.), 
Medical Services in War: The Principal Medical Lessons of the Second World War, (London: HMSO, 
1968), pp. 36 -7. 
1' The records of the Imperial War Museum (IWM) proved of surprisingly little use for this thesis. An 
enquiry by the author of the National Army Museum met with a referral to the TNA. Persistent 
requests to consult the archives of the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfiirsorge, the German war 
graves organisation, elicited no response. The author placed an advertisement in the British Legion 
magazine in an attempt to contact veterans of the AGS and the MRES, without success. This was 
disappointing but not surprising, for these organisations were served by relatively few men. 
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additional primary material is drawn from newspapers and the record of 
parliamentary proceedings in Hansard. 
The personal accounts of men who served at the frontline proved valuable in 
writing the first part of the thesis, particularly as most official and regimental 
histories avoid overly morbid matters. For example, the Nottinghamshire Sherwood 
Rangers Yeomanry Regiment spent more time at the frontline than any British 
armoured formation, and suffered considerable casualties, but the history of its 
Second World War operations does not explain how the regimental dead were 
collected and buried.14 
There are few secondary sources of direct relevance to this work. ' 5 The only 
known study to deal specifically with the military graves services is Missing Believed 
Killed, a recently published book on the MRES by Stuart Hadaway.16 Its existence 
was discovered after this work had been researched and written and thus it had no 
bearing on the production of the thesis. In any case, Missing Believed Killed has 
limited value as a source. The text, which is aimed at a popular audience, contains a 
number of mistakes and generalisations, while its focus is on MRES field operations. 
The genesis and establishment of the organisation, for example, are not discussed in 
detail. 
On the IWGC, scholarly writing is restricted to The Unending Vigil, Philip 
Longworth's history of the organisation first published in 1967, and A Distant Grief 
released in 2007, in which Bart Ziino devotes a chapter to its formation and early 
14 T. M. Lindsay, Sherwood Rangers: The Story of the Nottinghamshire Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry 
in the Second World War, (London: Burrup, Mathieson, 1952). 
15 Historians such as John Keegan and John Ellis have written of the misery and horrors of the 
frontline, but rarely of what became of corpses. For example, see John Keegan, Six Armies in 
Normandy: From D -Day to the Liberation of Paris, June eh- August 251x', 1944, (London: Pimlico, 
2004); John Ellis, The Sharp End of War: The Fighting Man in World War II, (London: Corgi, 1982). 
16 Stuart Hadaway, Missing Believed Killed: The Royal Air Force and the Search for Missing Aircrew 
1939 -1952, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2008). 
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development.17 Effectively these sources were helpful only in confirming what the 
author of this thesis had already established through his archival research. Two other 
books which purport to tell the history of the IWGC were of little use. The 1989 
publication Courage Remembered, by Major Edwin Gibson and G. Kingsley Ward, 
is a bizarre mixture of history, vignettes and travel advice for the modern pilgrim, 
and what historical information it contains has largely been borrowed from 
Longworth.'8 Julie Summers also draws heavily - in places very heavily - on The 
Unending Vigil in her 2007 book Remembered. Its usefulness was limited further by 
its being essentially a pictorial history of the IWGC /CWGC.19 
One secondary source which did promise much was War Dead: Western 
Societies and the Casualties of War by Luc Capdevila and Danièle Voldman. In the 
preface to this 2006 book, the authors state their concerns to be `the fate of those 
killed in war, through what happens to their remains (bodies, fragments of bodies, 
bits, ashes, the absence of any remains), as well as with the attitudes of survivors and 
their feelings in the face of tragic events.'20 However, the first of these topics is 
discussed only briefly, and in an excessively French -centric and superficial manner. 
As one reviewer noted, `this is primarily a study of the impact of the First World War 
upon mourning and commemoration.'21 In this regard their book is typical of much 
" Philip Longworth, The Unending Vigil: A History of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission 
1917 -1967, (London: Constable, 1967); Bart Ziino, A Distant Grief Australians, War Graves and the 
Great War, (Crawley: University of Western Australia Press, 2007). Other editions of The Unending 
Vigil are Philip Longworth, The Unending Vigil: A History of the Commonwealth War Graves 
Commission 1917 -1984, (London: Leo Cooper, 1985); and Philip Longworth, The Unending Vigil: A 
History of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2003). 
18 Major Edwin Gibson MBE and G. Kingsley Ward, Courage Remembered: The Story Behind the 
Construction and Maintenance of the Commonwealth's Military Cemeteries and Memorials of the 
Wars of 1914 -1918 and 1939 -1945, (London: HMSO, 1989). 
iv Julie Summers, Remembered: The History of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, 
(London: Merrell, 2007). 
20 Capdevila and Voldman, War Dead, pp. xiii -xiv. 
2' Ian F. W. Beckett, `War Dead: Western Societies and the Casualties of War', History, 92, 307 
(2007), 418 -9. 
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other writing by historians on military war dead. The work of Jay Winter, the late 
George Mosse, and scholars past and present of the Annales school, for example, has 
generally focused on the 1914 -18 conflict and responses to death rather than the act 
of interment.22 The Italian academic Giovanni de Luna has taken a broader 
approach, but his scholarship is concerned more with theories of the body than 
empirical subjects such as the manner in which corpses are buried.23 
Definitions 
It is necessary to clarify distinctions of meaning between bereavement, grief, and 
mourning. These terms, often used loosely and sometimes interchangeably, are not 
synonyms. A bereaved person has experienced the death of someone he or she knew 
and cared about. One emotional response to this occurrence is grief. Once the shock 
of bereavement has subsided, grief can be channelled into rational acts of mourning, 
of which war graves pilgrimages are an example.24 
22 For example, see Jay Winter, Remembering War: The Great War Between Memory and History in 
the Twentieth Century, (New Haven: Yale, 2006); Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: 
The Great War in European Cultural History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); 
George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of The World Wars, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990); George L. Mosse, `National Cemeteries and National Revival: The Cult of 
the Fallen Soldiers in Germany', Journal of Contemporary History, 14, 1 (1979), 1 -20; Stéphane 
Audoin -Rouzeau, `Corps Perdus, Corps Retrouvés. Trois Exemples de Deuils de Guerre', Annales: 
Histoire, Sciences Sociales, 55, 1 (2000), 47 -71. 
23 Giovanni de Luna, 11 Corpo del Nemico Ucciso: Violenza e Morte Nella Guerra Contemporanea, 
(Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 2006). 
24 Adrian Gregory, The Silence of Memory: Armistice Day 1919 -1946, (Oxford: Berg, 1994), pp. 19- 
20. Bart Ziino defines these ternis similarly. See Ziino, A Distant Grief p. 13. See also Geoffrey 
Gorer, Death, Grief and Mourning in Contemporary Britain, (London: Cresset Press, 1965), p. 131; 





Frontline Burial Policy and Practice 
Section I: Frontline Burial Policy 
The 1906 Geneva Convention and the 1909 Field Service Regulations 
The first significant item of policy to deal with the treatment of dead bodies in 
wartime appeared on 6 July 1906 when the Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field was published in Geneva 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Included in it were two 
articles in which reference was made to the burial of the dead, no mention having 
been made of this subject in the first Geneva Convention of 1864.1 Article 3 of the 
1906 Convention dictated that it was the duty of every belligerent to protect the 
bodies of the dead from `ill treatment' and to examine them carefully before their 
`interment or incineration', while Article 4 directed belligerent nations to `forward to 
the authorities of their country or army the marks or military papers of identification 
found upon the bodies of the dead', as well as any personal items such as valuables 
and letters.2 The British government ratified the Convention on 16 April 1907 and 
the War Office published a summary of it in the Field Service Pocket Book issued 
that year.3 
I See Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, 
Geneva, 22 August 1864. See also Articles 19 and 20 of The Laws of War on Land, Oxford, 9 
September 1880. 
2 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, 
Geneva, 6 July 1906, Chapter I, Articles 3 -4. 
3 Field Service Pocket Book (Provisional), 1907, (London: HMSO, 1907), pp. 152 -158. See also 
Report to the Army Council on the Conference Held at Geneva 116 June to 6rh July, 1906, for the 
10 
To ensure that the British army did not have to rely solely on the Geneva 
Convention for information on burial, the War Office produced its own guidelines. 
In 1909 a stipulation, similar in form and style to Articles 3 and 4 of the 1906 
Geneva Convention, was included in Field Service Regulations. Inserted into a 
miscellaneous chapter, titled `Office Work, Casualties, Invaliding, Despatches, 
Diaries, Code and Cipher', it read: [a]nyone concerned in burying a soldier, or 
finding a body after an action, will remove the identity disc and pay book, or, if a 
civilian, his pass, and will note the number of the equipment and rifle, or any other 
means likely to assist identification. Such person is responsible that this information 
is sent, with the least possible delay, to the base record office (or as specially ordered 
from general headquarters).'4 An associated paragraph contained information on 
how to dispose of the effects of the deceased, and an acknowledgment that the 
Adjutant General's department was responsible for [b]urying parties and places.'5 
For the first time, the burial of the military dead was, officially at least, an accredited 
responsibility within the British army. 
The 1923 Field Service Regulations 
The momentous experiences of the Great War prompted the War Office to review its 
extant burial policy, and in 1923 revised and expanded directives were issued in 
Field Service Regulations.6 These sought to formalise practices which would ensure 
Revision of the Geneva Convention of 22nd August, 1864, for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded in War, 31 October 1906. 
4 Field Service Regulations, Part II, Organization and Administration, 1909, (London: HMSO, 1913), 
p. 133. 
5 Ibid., pp. 38, 133 -4. 
6 In 1920 a new edition of Field Service Regulations was published to supplant that of 1909. The 
National Library of Scotland (NLS) holds Volume II of the 1920 regulations but has no record of 
Volume I. TNA holds neither volume for that year. (The stipulations on `Organization and 
Administration', including those on burial, were printed in Volume I of Field Service Regulations, 
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that each British serviceman killed in conflict was given a distinct and identified 
burial. In the aftermath of the Great War the importance attached by the next -of -kin 
to the preservation of individual graves had been made clear to the War Office, and 
thus a specific chapter was included on `Clearing the Battlefield; Graves 
Registration; Prisoners of War; Salvage, and Enemy Dead'. Authorities also used 
the new edition of Field Service Regulations to make a delineation between the role 
of the frontline soldier in effecting burial, and the responsibilities of a DGRE, which 
would be established in the Adjutant General's branch in time of war and whose 
personnel would select suitable cemeteries, preserve the records of burials, and 
provide the means of identifying individual graves.? However, it was the difference 
in tone that proved the most striking difference between the 1909 and 1923 Field 
Service Regulations. Clearing the battlefield of bodies was now deemed to be `an 
important part of the duties of the staff', while the `importance of collecting the 
effects of the dead ... and of the greatest care in their preservation and disposal' was 
something to `be impressed upon all ranks.'8 
The new Field Service Regulations stated that commanders in the field had a 
duty to make the best possible arrangements for attending to dead bodies. This 
meant arranging for the interment of corpses, preferably using labour provided by 
survivors from the same formation as those killed, and helping to determine the sites 
of battlefield cemeteries once the direction and situation of the battle had been 
while those directives concerned with `Operations' were outlined in Volume II.) Furthermore, the 
NLS holds only Volume II of the 1929 and 1935 Field Service Regulations. This suggests that 
Volume II may have been issued singly in 1920, 1929 and 1935. 
Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Organization and Administration, 1923, Provisional, (London: 
HMSO, 1923), pp. 39 -40, 42 -3, 258. 
8 Ibid., pp. 253 -4. 
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assessed.9 In selecting these locations, officers were to ensure that the dead were 
interred as near to the frontline and place of death as possible, and to remember `that 
burial in isolated or scattered groups of graves is to be avoided as far as the 
exigencies of the operations p e r m i t . ' ° 
While it was conceded in the regulations that opportunities for searching for and 
identifying the dead would be mediated by circumstance, the importance of 
examining corpses before burial was emphasised." For reasons of hygiene and the 
morale of comrades, these inspections were to be completed at the first opportunity 
in order that the dead could be interred as expeditiously as possible. The officer 
commanding a burial party - or another serviceman if no officer were present - 
would remove the red identity disc and pay book (AB 64), as well as all other 
personal and government -issue possessions found on or near the body. (The green 
identity disc was to be buried with the remains.)12 It was particularly important to 
locate at least one of the identity discs, worn on a cord around the neck, or the 
soldier's pay book - in which all his personal particulars were listed, including a 
record of bodily scars and defects noted on enlistment, contact addresses for next -of- 
kin, and a short will detailing to whom personal effects and notification should be 
sent in the event of death - for these items, which servicemen were required to keep 
on their person at all times, provided the strongest evidence for confirming 
identities.13 If these were missing, burial parties were otherwise to take note of ̀ any 
detail which may assist identification, such as a cap badge, shoulder title, number of 
9 Ibid., pp. 253 -4, 259. 
10 Ibid., p. 259. 
11 Ibid., p. 254. 
12 Ibid. AB64 is an abbreviation of Army Book 64. The RAF equivalent was Form 64. If only one of 
the two identity discs were found, it was to be left on the body. 
D Field Service Regulations, Volume 1, Organization and Administration, 1923, Provisional, p. 230; 
IWM, 87/35/1, R. R. Ryder. 
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equipment', and also to record `the exact spot on which the body was found and the 
apparent date of death', and the precise position of graves.t4 
Officers supervising interment would be responsible for cataloguing all such 
identification details on Army Form W 3314, the official burial return. Three copies 
were to be made and posted, one each to the War Office, the DGRE, and the Deputy 
Adjutant General (DAG), 2nd echelon. The regulations stated the importance of the 
position of interment being `given as definitely as possible to ensure ready 
recognition [for] [a]s a rule, the map reference on a large scale map is the best and 
most reliable means of ensuring future identification of a grave.' 1 5 All items taken 
from corpses, aside from government belongings which would be disposed of by the 
Deputy Assistant Director of Ordnance Services, were to be returned to a receiving 
officer at field headquarters for inspection and cataloguing, whereupon they would 
be despatched to the DAG, 2nd echelon, for eventual return to the next -of -kin. Under 
no circumstances were effects to be forwarded directly to relatives. ' 6 
The stipulations governing the construction and marking of graves, as well as the 
establishment of battlefield cemeteries, were also detailed in the 1923 Field Service 
Regulations. Single graves were to measure no more than six feet and six inches 
long, two feet across, and five feet deep, while distances of twelve inches and three 
feet respectively would separate adjacent graves and those in rows. Temporary 
crosses, the erection of which would usually precede that of a more permanent 
memorial or gravestone, were to stand two feet and six inches from the ground and 
measure one foot and four inches across. On each would be painted or written the 
14 Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Organization and Administration, 1923, Provisional, p. 254. 
15 Ibid., p. 260. 
16 Ibid., pp. 255 -6. 
17 Ibid., p. 259. 
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name, identification number and unit of the deceased.]$ In case of problems in the 
provision of crosses from base workshops to the frontline, the regulations made 
allowance for the marking of graves with pegs, the details of the deceased being 
recorded on an affixed label. Where no pegs were available, a bottle or tin driven 
partway into the ground would suffice as a temporary grave marker with the 
identification particulars written on a piece of paper and stored in the receptacle.19 
Cemeteries were to be situated 100 yards or more from the closest building and 
where nearby water supplies could not be contaminated, and in easily accessible 
locations to facilitate maintenance and, later, the visits of interested parties. Graves 
would be segregated by nationality and creed to allow for discrete British burial plots 
and cemeteries.20 
The 1929 Geneva Convention 
Just as the Great War prompted the War Office to revise Field Service Regulations, 
so too did it stimulate change at the ICRC. Indeed, the conflict provoked that 
organisation to improve the codification of the laws and practices of war.21 Thus, in 
July 1929, the ICRC published an adapted version of the 1906 Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field.22 Of 
greatest significance was the removal of the clause clausula si omnes' which meant, 
as Jean S. Pictet observed, that the Convention `is binding only if all the belligerents 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., pp. 259 -60. 
21 
David P. Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross, 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 6 -7, 27 -8. 
22 The 27 July 1929 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armies in the Field was ratified by the British government on 23 June 1931. 
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are bound by it.'23 As the War Office had done with servicemen in its 1923 Field 
Service Regulations, the ICRC was seeking to limit the possibilities that existed for 
governments to abrogate their responsibilities. Accordingly, more detail was added 
to the existing tenets of the articles relating to the treatment and disposal of the dead, 
with the rules on examining and identifying bodies, and the directives governing 
communications between belligerent nations, tightened. For example, it was stated 
that authorities of warring countries henceforth would be obliged to send reciprocal 
death certificates for each corpse recovered or discovered, as well as `one half of 
their identity discs, the other half to remain attached to the body.'24 One of the 
directives in Article 4, however, was new. It dictated that belligerents: 
shall further ensure that the dead are honourably interred, that their graves 
are respected and marked so that they may always be found. To this end, at 
the commencement of hostilities, they shall organize officially a graves 
registration service, to render eventual exhumations possible, and to ensure 
the identification of bodies whatever may be the subsequent site of the 
grave. After the cessation of hostilities they shall exchange the list of 
graves and of dead interred in their cemeteries and elsewhere.25 
Because the War Office had included information to this effect - in particular, that 
relating to the formation of the DGRE - in its 1923 Field Service Regulations, ICRC 
policy had less bearing on the 1930 edition. 
The 1930 Field Service Regulations 
The 1930 Field Service Regulations included much of the policy elucidated in 1923. 
In particular, the distinction between burial being the responsibility of frontline 
23 
Jean S. Pictet (ed.), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, (Geneva: ICRC, 1952), pp. 15 -16. 
24 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, 




soldiers, and oversight of graves being that of the DGRE, was maintained.26 
However, there were some amendments on points of detail. For example, it was 
stated that burial parties were to be led `by officers specially detailed in orders issued 
by commanders of formations', and that chaplains were expected to assume greater 
responsibility `for ministering to the wounded and dying, and for burials.'27 
Furthermore, the composition and role of the DGRE was clarified. Aside from its 
headquarters within the War Office, it would be comprised of graves registration 
units allocated one to each army and one to each Line of Communication (L of C), 
with the distribution of these units dependent on the progress of operations. In this 
regard, the assistance of all `A' Branch staff in enabling graves personnel to deploy 
and then to fulfil their duties was expected.28 The sections relevant to the treatment 
of the dead, which were spread throughout the regulations and not collected in one 
cohesive section, also stated that these graves servicemen, who would `be found on 
mobilization from personnel surplus to the requirements of and physically unfit for 
service in units of fighting troops', would be responsible for communicating to the 
War Office all information accrued in the course of their work, while correspondence 
received from next -of -kin and other civilians was to be similarly channelled.29 These 
directives were included to ensure the centralisation of communications relating to 
graves and cemeteries, and to prevent any unmediated contact between graves 
personnel in the field and the public. The War Office may have accepted that the 
army had a responsibility to care for its dead, but it did not want the public being 
privy to the manner in which this duty was discharged. Meanwhile, the regulations 
26 Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Organization and Administration, 1930, (London: HMSO, 
1930), pp. 114, 188. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., pp. 108 -112, 115. 
29 Ibid., pp. 114 -5, 118. 
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accorded responsibility for the construction and maintenance of cemeteries, and the 
provision, painting and inscription of crosses and other grave markers, to the Royal 
Engineers.3o 
The RAF War Manuals 
The RAF had no burial policy to revise after the Great War. As a new organisation, 
it had either to formulate its own decrees or adopt those of another armed service. It 
chose the latter course. The RAF War Manual, first published by the Air Ministry in 
1932 and reissued in March 1934 and again in December 1939, was intended as the 
air force equivalent of Field Service Regulations. With regard to burial policy, the 
RAF volumes were based on the 1930 edition of Field Service Regulations to the 
extent that most stipulations were exact or close repeats of the corresponding army 
directives and took no account of the differences between aerial and land warfare.3 
In line with its dependence on the army for burial doctrine, the Air Ministry used 
the RAF war manuals to cede certain duties to the DGRE. Thus it was stated that 
while the air force held responsibility for the location, identification and burial of its 
personnel, the DGRE was responsible for making and keeping the associated records, 
answering any public enquiries related to the interment of RAF servicemen, selecting 
the locations of cemeteries where air force dead would be interred, and marking and 
recording the location of their graves.32 
3° Ibid., pp. 140 -1. See also p. xx in this volume. 
31 For example, see TNA, PRO AIR 10/2313, RAF War Manual, Part II Organization and 
Administration, 1939, Appendix V, Paragraph 8. (The RAF War Manual consulted is a June 1940 
reprint of the December 1939 edition.) 
32 TNA, PRO AIR 10/2313, RAF War Manual, Part II, Organization and Administration, 1939, 
Chapter VIII, Paragraphs 61 -3; Chapter XIV, Paragraph 29. 
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 Army and RAF Burial Policy in the Second World War 
After revising its burial policy in 1930, the War Office made no changes to it before 
or during the Second World War.33 Throughout the 1939 -45 conflict, army burial 
policy was drawn exclusively from the 1930 Field Service Regulations, while the 
RAF War Manual, its content in this regard unchanged since 1932, provided the sole 
codification of official air force doctrine.34 During the war these policies were 
subject to occasional clarifications by the DGRE. For example, in September 1939 it 
published a directive ordering frontline officers to select burial sites that did not 
interfere unduly with the surrounding landscape, occupy fertile farmland (where a 
viable alternative existed), or obstruct existing thoroughfares.35 Instructions were 
also issued in response to events in the field, particularly where ignorance among 
frontline servicemen was thought to be undermining the efficient disposal of the 
dead. Army Council Instruction (ACI) 44 of 1944 stated: [i]t is reported from 
theatres of war that identification of the dead is made [diffi]cult by two factors:- (a) 
neglect of individuals to wear their identity discs, and (b) removal, in some cases, by 
burial parties of both discs from the body.'36 Relevant excerpts from Field Service 
Regulations were printed to remind soldiers of correct procedures. 
A further method for administering policy was forced upon the DGRE in the 
months before the launch of Operation Overlord in 1944. With the War Office 
determined to plan for each aspect of the invasion of Europe, the DGRE was required 
to prepare and release statements of burial policy to 21 Army Group in advance of its 
operations: it had never previously administered such advice to a force before its 
33 In September 1938 consideration was given to making some changes to burial policy, but none were 
made. See TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September 1938. 
34 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, Notes for Graves Units. 
3' TNA, PRO WO 165/35, Burials and Graves Registration Notes. 
36 TNA, PRO WO 293/31, ACI 44, Part 1, 1944. 
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deployment.37 Included in the statements were reiterations of Field Service 
Regulations and, more significantly, information on burials formulated specifically 
for 21 Army Group and its intended campaign on the Continent. 
Within the Preparatory Administrative Orders, published by the War Office 
during the spring of 1944, were sections on `Burials' and `Disposal of Effects of the 
Dead', in which were outlined the procedures for dealing with casualties incurred in 
the marshalling and embarkation areas before the sailing of 21 Army Group. Men 
killed in these restricted areas would, for example, be deemed to have died on the 
Continent to ensure that information on their deaths and burial would not, for reasons 
of security, be `communicated to relatives or friends of the deceased officer or other 
rank by the CO [commanding officer] or any other person of the unit until after the 
arrival of the unit overseas.'38 Complementary guidance was provided in the 
Administrative Instructions for Operation Overlord. In these, confirmation was 
given that the bodies of men who died during the initial crossing of the English 
Channel to France were to be buried on the Continent and not at sea, while advice 
was prescribed on how to dispose of the effects of personnel killed after the 
embarkation of the invasion force.39 
The Standing Orders for 21 Army Group, issued through the Adjutant 
General's department, provided a wider -ranging and more detailed exposition of the 
37 TNA, PRO WO 208/3226, Notes on Operation Overlord; Field Service Regulations, Volume I, 
Organization and Administration, 1930, p. 115. The issuing of ACIs and corrections continued 
throughout the war. 
38 TNA, PRO WO 199/1239, Preparatory Administrative Order, Part II. See also TNA, PRO WO 
199/1253, War Office Administrative Instructions, Operation Overlord, Appendix G, 25 April 1944; 
TNA, PRO ADM 1/16913, Operation Overlord Disposal of Dead Bodies, 1944 -45. 
39 TNA, PRO WO 199/1253, War Office Administrative Instructions, Operation Overlord, Phase II; 
TNA, PRO WO 219/2998, 21 Army Group Administrative Instruction Number 32. 
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burial policy to be implemented throughout the Continental campaign.40 `A' Branch 
field staff would facilitate the disposal of the frontline dead by inserting in all 
published operations orders a paragraph on their burial, as well as selecting - before 
battle and in consultation with graves personnel and members of the medical services 
- potential sites for permanent cemeteries. The same staffs were to appoint 
responsible frontline servicemen as Divisional Burial Officers to supervise the proper 
interment of the dead and the correct marking of graves.41 These officers would also 
determine where initial burial should be made. If corpses could not be interred at the 
sites of proposed permanent cemeteries, or in existing graveyards, bodies were to be 
collected together in `improvised cemeteries'.42 To this end the Standing Orders 
contained the first codifications of the terms `registration' and `concentration', both 
for the guidance of graves personnel whose tasks they were, and for the information 
of frontline servicemen to ensure a clear delineation of responsibilities. It was stated 
that `registration' meant to verify the position and identity of a grave and to erect 
over it a marked cross as proof of this.43 `Concentration' involved moving, where 
necessary, bodily remains from registered graves to permanent cemeteries for final 
interment. Servicemen completing this duty were to adhere to the order which 
decreed `that the permanent resting place [of bodies] shall be in a cemetery as near as 
possible to where the death occured [sic].'44 
4° TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, April, June 1944; TNA, PRO WO 208/3226, Notes on 
Operation Overlord. The copies of the Standing Orders held at the National Archives are of such poor 
quality that sections of the text are illegible. No other copy of the Standing Orders was obtained. 
41 TNA, PRO WO 219/1374, 21 Army Group Standing Orders, Section VIII, Graves. 
42 Ibid. 
43 TNA, PRO WO 219/1374, Standing Orders, Graves Registration 21 Army Group. 
44 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 219/1374, 21 Army Group Standing Orders, Section VIII, Graves. The 
Standing Orders on Graves Registration and Graves Concentration were revised and updated in 
December 1944. See TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War 
Diary, December 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Revised Standing Orders for 21 Army Group, 
January 1945. 
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The Standing Orders also sought to explain the role of 21 Army Group 
chaplains. They were to assist in the disposal of the frontline dead through the 
rendering of burial returns and by policing the interment practices of frontline 
servicemen.45 A supplementary DGRE publication, produced in conjunction with 
the Chaplain General's department, contained information designed to assist 
chaplains in the fulfilment of these duties, although some of it was ambiguous. One 
section read: [n]o chaplain should undertake the duties of O i/c [Officer in charge] at 
exhumations. If, for any reason, he is compelled to do so, he must ensure that the 
duties are properly performed, and must personally identify the bodies.'46 Included 
elsewhere in this publication were denominational alternatives to the generic 
Protestant burial service printed in the 1926 and 1932 editions of the Field Service 
Pocket Book; a Jewish interment service; and a directive on despatching condolence 
letters to relatives of the dead.47 
Section II: Frontline Burial Practice 
The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France, 1939 -1940 
The death of Lieutenant P. A. C. Everitt of the Royal Norfolk Regiment on 7 January 
1940, coming as it did in the relative calm of the Phoney War, shocked those who 
witnessed it. When his men returned to camp they announced: `Lieutenant Everitt's 
just been shot out of a tree, we've had to leave him and run!'48 In time his body was 
45 TNA, PRO WO 219/1374, 21 Army Group Standing Orders, Section VIII, Graves. 
46 TNA, PRO WO 171/4474, Instructions for Chaplains, circa March 1944. 
47 Ibid.; Field Service Pocket Book Part 1, Countries Other Than India, 1926, (London: HMSO, 
1926), Appendix VI, pp. 284 -5; Field Service Pocket Book, 1932, (London: HMSO, 1932), Appendix 
VIII, pp. 247 -8. 
48 Peter Hart, At the Sharp End, From Le Paradis to Kohima: 2nd Battalion The Royal Norfolk 
Regiment, (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1998), p. 38; The Half - Yearly Army List: January 1940, (London: 
HMSO, 1940), p. 1098. 
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recovered and Everitt, the first British officer killed in France during the Second 
World War, was accorded a full military funeral complete with its associated pomp 
and spectacle. In contrast, four months later Ted Mitchell Smith, signals officer with 
the Seaforth Highlanders, battled exhaustion and hunger to bury three comrades 
killed at Zillebeke as his unit fought to withdraw towards Dunkirk. He had just 
enough time to dig graves and to fashion a makeshift cross from a bottle and stick, 
but not to hold a service or attend to the other Seaforth dead.49 Necessity dictated 
that they were left unburied. 
This was the fate of many of the BEF dead. One officer recalled the twisted 
corpses that lay on the roads leading to Dunkirk, a second the discarded equipment 
and exposed bodies on the beaches at the end of the evacuation in June 1940.5° A 
third, Captain `Gun Buster', testified to the permeating `stench of blood and 
mutilated flesh' at Dunkirk, remembering that [t]here was no escape from it. Not a 
breath of air was blowing to dissipate the appalling odour that arose from the dead 
bodies that had been lying on the sand, in some cases for several days. We might 
have been walking through a slaughter -house on a hot day.'51 The campaign in 
France, and with it the bodies of the dead, were lost to the enemy.52 
The Keren Battlefield, 1941 
At Dunkirk there was no time to bury the dead, whereas on the Keren battlefield in 
Eritrea in 1941 members of the West Yorkshire Regiment had time but no space to 
49 Jim Stockman, Seaforth Highlanders: A Fighting Soldier Remembers, (1939 -45), (Somerton: Crecy, 
1987), pp. 49 -50. 
'0 Peter Hadley, Third Class to Dunkirk: A Worm's -Eye View of the B.E.F., 1940, (London: Hollis and 
Carter. 1944). p. 134: Patrick Wilson, Dunkirk: From Disaster to Deliverance, (Barnsley: Leo 
Cooper. 2000), p. 128. 
" Gun Buster. Return i'ia Dunkirk. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1941), p. 245. 
Major L. F. Ellis, The War in France and Flanders. 1939 -1940, (London: HMSO, 1953), p. 246. 
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bury theirs. They would wait for dark each night in order to negate the threat of 
snipers, and then throw the corpses from the hill on which they, and the cadavers, 
were trapped.53 While this brought the men temporary respite from the stench and 
the flies, the dead simply accrued between and behind the frontlines as the 
engagement wore on. Peter Cochrane, who served with the Cameron Highlanders at 
Keren, remembered that: [t]he corpses .. had been smelling to heaven since the 
second day of the battle; we tried to bury our dead, but explosions dug them up 
again, while the Italian and Indian and British bodies in the ravine in front of the 
Ridge just lay there, swelling.'54 These, he continued, `passed the stage of looking 
ludicrous or pathetic and reached that of the grotesque - when the normally loose 
uniform of shirt and shorts was filled to bursting point, every seam strained, by the 
tumid body inside, the skin shining as it was stretched tighter and tighter'.55 It was 
only when the fighting ended and victory had been won that the Cameron 
Highlanders were able to traverse the battlefield and bury their comrades. Corpses 
were interred where they were found. 
The North African Campaign, 1941 -43 
Elsewhere in Africa, the Eighth Army found it difficult to attend to its dead in the 
face of an advancing enemy. As his Royal Artillery unit retreated eastwards across 
the Western Desert to El Alamein in June 1942, Henry Ritchie saw `stricken crushed 
53 Ronald Lewin (ed.), The War on Land 1939-1945: An Anthology of Personal Experience, (London: 
Vintage, 2007), p. 75. 
54 Peter (James A.) Cochrane, Charlie Company: In Service with C Company, 2' Queen's Own 
Cameron Highlanders, 1940 -44, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1977), pp. 66 -7. Artillery fire also 
threatened the dead in another way. Exploding shells sometimes started bush and scrub fires that 
incinerated corpses before they could be retrieved. For example, see Christopher Bulteel, Something 
about a Soldier: The Wartime Memoirs of Christopher Bulteel, MC, (Shrewsbury: Airlife, 2000), p. 
206. 
55 Cochrane, Charlie Company, p. 66. 
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tanks and vehicles with the bodies of men raw and bloody from violent death', 
recalling that there was `a smell like a decaying sick room, of blood drying in the sun 
and corpses with half eaten faces, bloated bodies sprawling ungainly and 
awkward'.56 Norman Craig, of the Royal Sussex Regiment, remembered that from 
some of the destroyed tanks and vehicles that were strewn across the desert `oozed 
the sweet, sickly scent of scorched human flesh.'57 When Duncan McGregor and a 
colleague from the Royal Armoured Corps thought to bury the remains of a British 
officer, they came under attack from a nearby German position and were forced to 
withdraw before the job was begun.58 
Nonetheless, some burials were made in retreat. When this was done under 
fire there rarely was time for soldiers to choose the position of a grave or even to take 
note of the identity of a corpse. Bodies were rolled into hollows or scraped into 
groundsheets and covered with sand and dirt.59 During lulls in fighting, however, 
more time could be found to inter the dead. When two members of their company 
were killed in a bomb blast near Sollum, Robert John Crawford and his colleagues 
took the corpses to Halfaya Pass for burial. The dead, he recalled, were interred 
`with their faces pointing towards England. We painted little white wooden crosses 
and placed them on the graves. The crosses bore their names, numbers, arm of 
Service and the date ... At the foot of each grave we placed a tin helmet.'6° 
Once retreat was turned into advance in North Africa, it became easier, and safer, 
for the Eighth Army to attend to its dead. After the victory at El Alamein in late 
56 Henry R. Ritchie, The Fusing of the Ploughshare: From East Anglia to Alamein, The Story of a 
Yeoman at War, (Dunmow: Privately Published, 1987), p. 208. 
57 Norman Craig, The Broken Plume: A Platoon Commander's Story, 1940 -45, (London: IWM, 1982), 
p. 65. 
58 Duncan McGregor, A Desert Rat in Holburn Street, (Buchan: Ardo, 1994), p. 41. 
59 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Lieutenant S. Breen to Lieutenant Colonel R. H. Hoffman, 4 June 
1943. 
60 Robert John Crawford, `I was an Eighth Army Soldier', (London: Victor Gollancz, 1944), p. 26. 
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ferry the corpse back to the clearing where the unit was stationed. The company 
major read an impromptu burial service and another man made a cross for the 
isolated mountain grave from the pieces of an old box.64 
Other servicemen were more cautious about attending to the dead, preferring 
to work at night when there was some security of movement. Burials made under the 
cover of darkness were common throughout the Italian campaign. The Reverend 
John Wallis, who led many nocturnal excursions to locate and bury Royal Marines 
from 41 Commando, the unit to which he was attached, remembered one particular 
interment at Salerno as being especially difficult: 
[t]he man was lying with his arms outstretched. He was a very large 
fellow and even to cover his body with the rocky soil of the terraced 
vineyard was going to be a long job, but his limbs were so stiff that there 
was no question of folding them into his body. I had the Intelligence 
Officer with me and a Corporal who knew where the casualties were. We 
did our best, working as quietly as we could with the entrenching tools 
because we knew we must be very close to the German lines. We daren't 
stand up and so we had to work on our knees crouched as low as possible 
in the moonlight.65 
Because no corpse was deemed to be worth the life of another soldier, on certain 
Italian battlefields the collection and burial of the dead was not risked at all. 
One such place was at Cassino in 1944. Here the sight of the unburied dead 
became so common that bodies came to demarcate the battlefield. Cadavers were 
used both as directional reference points and indicators of minefield boundaries, 
some soldiers even able to navigate in darkness using the distinctive smells emitted 
by particular corpses.66 Philip Brutton served at Cassino with the Welsh Guards. He 
64 Alex Bowlby, The Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby, (London: Cassell, 2002), pp. 189 -190. 
6' John Wallis, With God's Blessing and a Green Beret: A Pilgrimage, (Poole: Firebird, 1994), p. 50. 
For another example of a night burial, see Bowlby, The Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby, pp. 101 -2. 
66 Philip Brutton, Ensign in Italy: A Story of the Felix Factor: The Nine Lives of a Young Welsh 
Guards Officer who Fought in Italy with his Regiment from the Ruins of Cassino to the Alps, (London: 
Leo Cooper, 1992), p. 32; Cole, Rough Road to Rome, p. 199. 
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remembers that `the stink of the town hit one forcibly - the sickly sweet smell of 
putrefying bodies which were left unburied half under or in the rubble of the rocks 
and ruined buildings, too dangerous to approach and dig out for decent burial; the 
stench of urine and human faeces'.67 Another serviceman recorded in his unit War 
Diary: [t]he smell of corpses ... was something the troops could not get used to and 
as it was impossible to organize burial parties, this area will always be remembered 
for its stench of death.'68 One brave soldier confronted the seeming impossibility of 
this situation by venturing forward of the frontline each night to scatter Lysol over 
the rotting mass of men and mules on which flies, rats and bullfrogs feasted.69 
Although this was no substitute for the interment of the dead, it did bolster morale by 
helping to prevent the spread of disease and lessen the sme11.70 
Infantryman Ken Bond was one of those detailed to attend to the dead at 
Cassino once the months of fighting had ended. His selection for this task resulted 
from the soldiers of the Essex Regiment drawing lots to determine who would return. 
In addition to interring corpses, the army wanted Bond and his colleagues to 
establish who among the regimental missing had been killed and who had been taken 
prisoner, in order that the appropriate administrative steps could be taken and the 
next -of -kin informed. Bond recalls: 
I personally found two chappies from our own lot. They were just lying 
there all those months after, among many more, including Germans 
obviously. There were wires everywhere. It was very grisly - maggots 
and flies going in and out of the bodies. I took dog tags off these two, 
67 Brutton, Ensign in Italy, p. 31. 
68 John Ellis, Cassino, The Hollow Victory: The Battle for Rome January-June 1944, (London: Andre 
Deutsch, 1984), p. 220. 
69 Walter Robson, Letters From a Soldier, (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), p. 102; Matthew Parker, 
Monte Cassino: The Story of the Hardest fought Battle of World War Two, (London: Headline, 2004), 
pp. 271 -2. 
70 Although rare, truces were occasionally arranged to allow both sides to retrieve their corpses from 
the battlefield. For examples, see Brutton, Ensign in Italy, p. 52; John A. Walker, Sergeant Jiggy: A 
True Story, (Place Unknown: Cosmos, 2002), p. 130. 
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and brought them back to the company. One was a Bristolian, the other 
from more up the country in Gloucestershire. I wrote to their mothers, 
and neither of them had heard a word about what had happened to their 
sons until I wrote. And they were most, most grateful.71 
When one of the mothers later asked for more details as to how her son had died, 
Bond did not tell her `that he'd had his head blown off.'72 
D -Day, 6 June 1944 
On D -Day, the ordered and efficient treatment of the British dead was in marked 
contrast to that seen throughout the Italian campaign. Cecil Newton, who landed 
with his tank troop on `Gold' beach on 6 June, saw non -combatant servicemen 
attending to the dead as waves of combat personnel, all of whom had been instructed 
to make their way inland as quickly as possible to consolidate the invasion, left the 
beaches. He recalls: [s]tretcher- bearers were methodically picking up the corpses 
and placing them in rows with feet towards the sea; one row for the British and a 
separate row for the Germans with their boots protruding. The bodies were covered 
with a large black tarpaulin, the end of which they turned back to receive another 
body.'' The day after the invasion, Harold Addie, a Royal Navy seaman, observed 
similar purpose and efficiency on `Juno' beach, remembering that there `the dead 
71 Parker, Monte Cassino, pp. 364 -5. 
72 Ibid., p. 365. 
7' Cecil Newton, A Trooper's Tale, (Unpublished), p. 26; John Hall, A Soldier of the Second World 
War: The Memoirs of a Junior Officer who Fought in the Front Line from 'D' Day in Normandy to 
V.E. Day with many Individual Infantry and Armoured Regiments of the British, Canadian and Polish 
Armies, (Privately Published, 1986), p. 40. 
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were being dragged along and placed in stacks for collection.'74 This was done 
mostly by personnel from the Royal Pioneer Corps, as well as some chaplains.75 
Bypassing the Dead: the North -west Europe Campaign, 1944 -45 
As 21 Army Group pressed inland from the Normandy beachhead, the uniformity of 
method and purpose that characterised the disposal of bodies during the initial 
landings was less evident.76 The manner in which the dead were interred, and 
whether this were done at all, varied between formations. Bruce McCay fought in an 
infantry unit that, for practical reasons, never buried its dead: 
the job of men in a rifle company in an infantry battalion was to fight, and 
at this period of the war when we were following up a retreating enemy, 
this meant moving forward to engage them. We spent no more time on 
eating, sleeping, the dead, and the wounded than was absolutely necessary. 
The dead were left where they fe11.77 
McCay assumed that the dead were collected and interred in mass graves by a non- 
combatant formation, possibly the Royal Pioneer Corps which many frontline 
soldiers believed was responsible for buria1.78 John Hall, who served in the Royal 
Artillery, recalled: [ b]odies had to be left where they fell. Sometimes if we were 
74 Robin Neillands and Roderick de Normann, D -Day 1944: Voices from Normandy, (London: 
Cassell, 2001), p. 301. 
75 Major E. H. Rhodes -Wood, A War History of The Royal Pioneer Corps 1939 -1945, (Aldershot: 
Gale and Polden, 1960), pp. 231 -2; Leslie Skinner, The Man Who Worked on Sundays, (Privately 
Published, Year Unknown), p. 16. 
76 The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of Europe: 6 June 
1944 - 8 May 1945, (Unpublished), p. 137. 
77 Letter from McCay to the Author, 16 May 2003. McCay did not wish to name the unit in which he 
served. 
78 For example, see Stanley Whitehouse and George B. Bennett, Fear is the Foe: A Footslogger from 
Normandy to the Rhine, (London: Robert Hale, 1995), p. 23. While the Pioneer Corps did bury the 
dead on occasion, as happened during the initial stages of Operation Overlord, this was not its usual 
work. See The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of 
Europe, p. 22. 
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able to do so, a little mound was dug and identified with an item of clothing, but in 
the heat of battle we had to take care of the living first.'79 
Even where circumstances did allow for frontline servicemen to attend to 
their dead, some officers preferred to spare soldiers the task to protect their morale. 
Major John Leytham of the Royal Engineers once forbade his sappers from looking 
inside an armoured vehicle for their incinerated colleagues. He believed that the 
remains should be removed by rear echelon personnel for they did not share the same 
emotional connection to the dead that his men did. Moreover, behind the frontline 
there was time to spray the walls with creosote and then to scrape away the charred 
flesh.80 Stan Brine, who served with the Royal Dragoon Guards throughout the 
north -west Europe campaign, asserts that his officers deliberately steered the 
regiment away from its dead in order to preserve individual and unit morale. He 
states that he `never heard the question of how our casualties were to be buried nor 
who was responsible for them mentioned during any general instructions or 
briefings.'81 This custom was all- encompassing for the men also never spoke of the 
dead. 
The Case of Leslie Skinner and the Sherwood Rangers 
Captain Leslie Skinner, padre to the Sherwood Rangers, thought similarly to the 
officers of the Royal Dragoon Guards. He believed that combat soldiers were 
subjected to such horrors in battle that they should be spared burial and its associated 
79 Hall, A Soldier of the Second World War, p. 47. See also Geoffrey Picot, Accidental Warrior: In 
the Front Line from Normandy till Victory, (Lewes: Book Guild, 1993), p. 279. 
80 Patrick Delaforce, Marching to the Sound of Gunfire: North West Europe 1944 -5, (Stroud: Sutton, 
2003), pp. 37 -8. 
81 Letter from Brine to the Author, 27 May 2003. See also Letter from Brine to the Author, 13 June 
2005; Brine, One Up, Two Up, Brew Up (Book 1), p. 126; Brine, One Up, Two Up, Brew Up (Book 3), 
p. 38. 
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tasks. The strength with which Skinner held this conviction led him to take the 
extraordinary step of assuming sole responsibility for attending to his regimental 
dead throughout the north -west Europe campaign: the interment of corpses, he 
determined, would be the central tenet of his war service. On 17 August 1944 he 
recorded in his diary: 
8 men killed, 5 still in tanks. Went back to start line then forward along 
C. Squadron axis. Buried the 3 dead and tried to reach remaining dead in 
tanks still too hot and burning. Place absolute shambles. [I]nfantry dead 
and some Germans lying around. Horrible mess. Fearful job picking up 
bits and pieces and re- assembling for identification and putting in 
blankets for burial. No infantry to help. Squadron Leader offered to lend 
me some men to help. Refused. Less men who live and fight in tanks 
have to do with this side of things the better. They know it happens but 
to force it on their attention is not good. My job. This was more than 
normally sick making. Really ill - vomiting. Buried all five in a 43 Div. 
cemetery being set up at Cross Roads in Berjou.82 
The mental and physical ailments Skinner suffered from handling the dead only 
fuelled his conviction that he was right to act as he did. Nor was danger a deterrent. 
Another diary entry reads: 
[r]ejoined Doc. Went up with CO in jeep to A. Sqdn. Heavy shelling. 
Hear Birkett and crew buried by Infantry. On foot located brewed up 
tanks - Watson and Heslewood died of wounds at Dorsets RAP 
[regimental aid post] - marked grave and buried 2 Infantry left behind by 
RAP. Only ash and burnt metal in Birkett's tank. Dorsets MO [medical 
officer] says other members of crew consumed by fire having been KIA 
[killed in action]. Searched ash and found remains pelvic bones. At 
other tank three bodies still inside - partly burned and firmly welded 
together. Managed with difficulty to identify Lt. Campbell. Unable to 
remove bodies after long struggle - nasty business - sick. C. Sqdn still 
wanting me for 2 burials, but after three unsuccessful attempts to reach 
them had to give up. Ground between us and their position too exposed. 
Heavy fire each time I tried.83 
No matter the circumstances surrounding the interment of the dead, Skinner always 
endeavoured to read a service, however brief, over the grave. Thereafter he 
82 Skinner, The Man Who Worked on Sundays, pp. 48 -9. 
8' Ibid., p. 44. 
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completed the burial return and any other official paperwork, disposed of all personal 
and army effects, checked the will to see if there were any last requests the soldier 
wished fulfilled in the event of death, and wrote to the next- of- kin.84 
While Skinner was wholly dedicated to providing pastoral care for his men, 
he refused to follow regulations that he regarded as flawed or not in their interests. 
He observed that: '[t]he "book" said that for burials "a chaplain could call on five 
men" - from where? In a forward area that meant asking for a whole tank crew, 
which was nonsense. [T]o send to the echelon two or three miles back was 
impracticable.'' These views brought conflict with the Senior Corps Chaplain, 
whom Skinner derided as being without 'a clue what it means to collect and bury 
casualties in action', but not with the men of the Sherwood Rangers, who admired 
and were grateful to their padre.86 Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Christopherson, the 
regimental commanding officer. did not detail soldiers to help Skinner, respecting his 
wish to work alone, nor did he issue instructions for the retrieval of the dead when 
Skinner was wounded and invalided away from the Sherwood Rangers for a month." 
It was during this period that all but one of the men posted as missing by the 
regiment during the first months of the north -west Europe campaign disappeared.88 
8- Ibid.. pp. 20 -1: Stuart Hills. By Tank into Normandy: A Memoir of the Campaign in North -West 
Europe from D-Day to YE Day, (London: Cassell, 2003), p. 90. Other regimental officers also penned 
letters to next -of -kin, but only Skinner wrote to the families of every man that was killed. 
85 Skinner. The Man Who Worked on Sundays, p. 100. It is unclear which publication Skinner meant 
by the 'book'. 
86 Skinner, The Man Who Worked on Sundays, p. 51. Stuart Hills. an officer in the Sherwood 
Rangers_ recalled that 'Padre Skinner was constantly at odds with the chaplain establishment.' See 
Hills. By Tank into Normandy. pp. 201 -2. 
87 Skinner, The Man Who Worked on Sundays, pp. 25, 71 -2, 101. While helping. an injured soldier on 
25 June 1944, a piece of shrapnel struck Skinner across the forehead. Despite his protestations, he 
was ordered to England to recover from his wound. See Skinner. The Man Who Worked on Sundays, 
pp. 29 -30: The Guardian, 21 November 2001. 
68 The Guardian, 21 November 2001. 
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Figure 1 
Leslie Skinner. His Sherwood Rangers comrade, Stuart Hills, described 
Skinner as `a remarkable and much -loved man.' See Hills, By Tank into 
Normandy, pp. 89 -90. (Photograph courtesy of the Sherwood Rangers 
Yeomanry Museum, and reproduced with its kind permission.) 
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 Burying the Dead: The North -west Europe Campaign, 1944 -45 
For many other combat soldiers in 21 Army Group, burying the dead was a part of 
frontline service. In the company of the King's Own Scottish Borderers in which 
Lieutenant Peter White served, the unit culture was such that personnel volunteered 
for burial duties or effected interment unprompted. After one particular engagement, 
he found the major in command of the company burying two men from headquarters, 
while in an adjacent field other members of the unit could be seen interring 
comrades.89 On a separate occasion, White was able to procure volunteers from his 
platoon to help him collect their dead despite the fact that several of the men were, he 
remembered, `part bomb happy with exhaustion and blast and shook with cold and 
fear'.9° 
For others attending to the dead was a matter of following orders. Rex 
Flower, a Yorkshire Light Infantryman, was a member of a party sent to collect and 
bury the bodies of twenty -six soldiers killed six days earlier in a failed attack on a 
farm. The dead men, including several from Flower's unit, had been lying in the sun 
since then. He recalls: 
[t]he stench was awful. Indescribable. It was a terrible thing to see them, 
that had been young men in the prime of their life. There was the inevitable 
dead cattle and horses, also a number of dead Germans grotesque in their 
tight fitting helmets. Their heads were swollen larger than their helmets, so 
that there was a large overlap. It was a charnel house. We started on the 
right. The first was a Sgt from the Hallams. The enemy had a nasty habit 
of putting grenades under corpses (even their own). When someone came 
to bury the body, instead of burying him, they joined him. They were lousy 
swine. The Padre and the Warrant Officer i/c [in charge] had brought a 
89 Peter White, With the Jocks: A Soldier's Struggle for Europe 1944 -45, (Stroud: Sutton, 2003), p. 
243. Infantryman R. M. Wingfield observed that slow and apathetic digging always indicated that a 
soldier was preparing a grave rather than a slit trench. See R. M. Wingfield, The Only Way Out: An 
Infantryman's Autobiography of the North -West Europe Campaign August 1944- February 1945, 
(London: Hutchinson, 1955), p. 46. 
eo White, With the Jocks, p. 139. 
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rope. The corpses were pulled out gently and buried in shallow graves as 
the earth was baked solid.91 
The interment of the British frontline dead was also the duty of the thousands of 
German prisoners -of -war (POW) ordered into burial parties as labourers. Many of 
the British dead from the north -west Europe campaign, if not the majority, were 
buried in graves dug by German POWs.92 
The challenges which confronted those who attended to the dead were 
physical as well as emotional. A witness to a tank clearance recalled: `[a]n armour 
piercing shot on one side [had] pierced the turret; the opposite side where it had 
emerged was splayed out like the petals of a tulip. Ropes were being used to pull the 
remains out of the turret hatch; the bodies bent, charred, angular and rigid were 
difficult to remove.'93 Similar problems were presented by corpses frozen stiff by 
snow or, in the first three days after death, rigor mortis. Decay presented the 
opposite problem, dissolving the corpse and rendering the handling of the viscous 
remains - likened by Tom King, a stretcher bearer in the infantry, to `sacks of 
crimson jelly' - almost impossible.94 The stench of bodies in this state was such that 
91 Delaforce, Marching To The Sound of Gunfire, pp. 88 -9. In Hoven Woods, Sydney Jary, a 
subaltern in the Somerset Light Infantry, was instructed by a senior officer not to attempt the burial of 
the dead for fear that some of the British corpses had been booby- trapped by retreating German 
forces. See Sydney Jary, 18 Platoon, (Bristol: Sydney Jary Limited, 1994), p. 83. 
92 Bob Price, What Did You Do in the War, Grandpa ?: Memories of a Young Gunner, Two Weeks' 
Territorial Camp Which Lasted Seven Years, 1939 -1946, (Woolhampton: Watermill, 1989), p. 117. 
In August 1944, 21 Army Group headquarters was given permission to keep up to 40,000 POWs in 
the north -west Europe theatre for use as labourers. This was permitted under Article 27 of the 1929 
Geneva Convention which stated: `[b]elligerents may employ as workmen prisoners of war who are 
physically fit, other than officers and persons of equivalent statue, according to their r[a]nk and their 
ability.' See The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of 
Europe, p. 56; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929, 
Section III, Chapter 1, Article 27. 
93 Newton, A Trooper's Tale, p. 50. 
94 Whitehouse and Bennett, Fear is the Foe, p. 168. 
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servicemen were known to urinate on their handkerchiefs and then tie them over their 
faces to combat the sme11.95 
At other times there was little of a man left to bury. An infantryman who saw a 
fellow private encircled by shells during fighting outside Cleve described what was 
left of him: `[h]is scalp was stuck on the wall two feet over the door. His head was 
hanging by the skin of the back of his neck. One leg and one arm were missing and 
the remaining leg was shattered. His wrist was hanging by a bit of skin. His 
intestines were in a heap covered by his body.'96 These remains were collected in a 
blanket, interment to be made when time permitted. 
The difficulties of transporting corpses, and the pressures of combat, made it 
difficult for servicemen to bury the dead in any place other than where they were 
found. John Watney described the scene as his unit approached the frontline in 
Normandy: 
the countryside presented an appearance of complete desolation; telegraph 
poles lay at all angles against the trees, while the lines wound in and out of 
each other like huge shattered spider -webs; burnt out tanks, smelling of 
putrifaction, lay by the roadside where they had skidded to their death; beside 
them a neat line of white crosses marked the place where their crews lay 
buried; houses, shaken by bursting shells, spilled their tiles over the earth; 
gardens, full of broken apple trees, sheltered the crude crosess [sic] hurriedly 
placed over newly dug graves. The sudden sight of these graves had a 
saddening affect on us; there was no telling where they would be found; some 
of them rested alone in the wheatfields and orchards with nothing but two bare 
sticks and a camouflaged helmet to show that a man was buried there; many 
were grouped together in tens, twenties, thirties, fifties; on some a name was 
printed, on others, nothing; a few carried the words: `A German'; some already 
had flowers on them.97 
Raymond Mitchell saw numerous shallow graves scattered near to Caen. He 
remembers: [s]ome were alone - perhaps an infantryman killed as he moved 
vs Bob Sheridan, What Did You Do in the War, Dad ?, (Lewes: Book Guild, 1993), p. 241. 
96 Delaforce, Marching to the Sound of Gunfire, pp. 191 -2. 
97 John Watney, The Enemy Within: A Personal Impression of the Invasion of Normandy 1944, 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1946), p. 186. 
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forward - while others lay in small groups, probably the crew of a field gun or 
tank. Each grave was marked with a rough cross or simply by a rifle thrust muzzle 
first into the ground and topped with a steel helmet to indicate "ours" or "theirs ".'98 
John Stirling was alarmed to find that the grave of his friend, which he and two 
colleagues found hidden in a copse, was no more than `a wretched little earth patch 
with a cross of sticks holding his label.'99 For fear that it would be lost in its 
ramshackle state, the men built around it a distinctive brick border and then, as 
Stirling recalled, `we got a piece of wood and scratched his name deep into it with 
a pencil, in the hope that it might preserve the sanctity of the spot until the Graves 
Commission [sic] arrived to do its job.'1°° 
If any of the men so interred had been accorded a funeral, it was probably brief, 
there being a correlation between the formality of funerals and the aesthetics of 
frontline graves. During the battle for Normandy, Lieutenant Geoffrey Bishop, 
23rd Hussars, attended a brief and informal ceremony for a colleague killed the 
previous day. He recalled: `[r]eveille was at 4.30 the next morning. At 0730 the 
Padre, haggard and unshaven, takes the burial service for Bob. All his friends are 
there. No other sound save the twittering of the birds greeting this sad morning. 
We make a simple wooden cross and Bob's beret is placed on it.' 101 Still, it was 
the rendering of such ceremonies where they were possible, rather than the form 
98 Raymond Mitchell, Commando Despatch Rider: From D -Day to Deutschland 1944 -45, (Barnsley: 
Leo Cooper, 2001), p. 84. See also Jim Driscoll, Stand to Your Horses: Recollections of a Tank 
Driver in the 4'177`h Royal Dragoon Guards, (Unpublished), p. 17. 
99 John Stirling, D -Day to VE -Day from my Tank Turret: A Personal Account, Written Between D -Day 
1944 and May 1945, (Unpublished), p. 45. 
loo Ibid. 
101 Delaforce, Marching To The Sound of Gunfire, p. 49. 
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Figure 2 
A grave in France. 
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they took, that most soldiers held to be important. Denomination, for instance, was 
rarely recognised by those who served at the frontline.102 
The Burial of the RAF Dead, 1939 -45 
The burial of British aircrew was mostly done by European civilians and German 
soldiers. This was because the bodies of the RAF dead, if they did not disappear into 
the sea, tended to fall behind enemy lines in Europe where the air war was 
concentrated and the risk of casualties highest. It was inevitable that the bodies of 
many RAF personnel would lie out of reach of other British servicemen, for 
Germany marked the frontline from the first day of the air war to the last.'°3 
It was a curious aspect of the war that this worked to the advantage of the Air 
Ministry. For those civilians living under German subjugation on the Continent, 
burying RAF aircrew was a way in which to demonstrate solidarity and compassion 
with the British cause, and passively to protest the occupation of their countries. A 
letter sent by a Frenchwoman to the mother of a British airman with news of his 
death and in appreciation of ̀ all that has been done in the defence of France by the 
glorious English R.A.F.', illustrates these sentiments: 
[y]our son was attacked by eight enemy planes - fighters and bombers. He 
held his own for a half -hour before his plane broke up ... and he fell on a 
path over which the Boches were expected (Dunkirk). We fetched a 
carriage and brought his body to hide in the house until they had gone by 
[w]e buried him wrapped in his parachute in a cemetery near by. He 
had been killed instantly by one bullet before he fell - he did not suffer. I 
assure you as a mother and a Frenchwoman no German hand touched him. 
I look after his grave, and with my husband and children visit it and put 
fresh flowers on it regularly. The plants are arranged so that there will 
102 George Blake, Mountain and Flood: The History of the 52 "d (Lowland) Division, 1939 -1946, 
(Glasgow: Jackson, Son and Company, 1950), p. 217; Skinner, The Man Who Worked on Sundays, p. 
48. 
103 TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Meeting Minutes, 9 September 1948. 
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always be a succession of blooms - all that I would do if he were my own 
son. ' 04 
The bodies and graves of other RAF personnel were tended with equivalent levels of 
care and devotion throughout occupied Europe. Edith Pritchard's son was killed in 
June 1941 when his aircraft crashed in Danish waters on its return from a mission to 
Kiel. After the war Mrs Pritchard received from a Danish villager a letter containing 
news of her son's burial: 
Dear unknown relations of the English airman Pritchard, [w]ith the deepest 
feelings of compassion I send you, who are unknown to me, a last message 
from the airman Pritchard. Pritchard's body was washed to our beautiful 
shore one fine summer's day in 1941. Gently he was - by Danish hands - 
put on the grass, and soon the ground all around him was decorated with 
flowers - red ones, white ones, blue ones - for we knew indeed that he was 
a friend of ours, although unknown to us. We should have liked to bury 
him ourselves in Danish earth. But the Germans came to take charge of the 
funeral. We were not allowed to decorate the tomb with wreaths and 
flowers, because in this way we showed our sympathy with the English. 
Nevertheless flowers and wreaths appeared there, more than the Germans 
could take away, and at last they gave up. Now the tomb is decorated by 
friendly hands - as if it were one of our own, especially at Church festivals 
and every Saturday evening throughout the summer - as is the custom in 
this country. Pritchard fell for his country in the fight against Nazi tyranny, 
but he also fell for our freedom. So we are thankful to him, and to you, that 
are unknown to us.'05 
While German authorities often resented the attention lavished on dead British 
aircrew, they rarely opposed civilians disposing of the bodies if it were done under 
their supervision. When a RAF bomber was shot down over Rheims in April 1943, 
German officials issued instructions for the interment of the crew members. The 
local mayor recalled: 
[t]he Germans told me to bury the bodies where they lay. But, after some 
difficulties, I was able to arrange for the airmen to be put in coffins and 
buried in our cemetery. The coffins, alas, were rather humble; they were 
made by myself and another inhabitant of my commune. A German 
military party rendered homage to the seven dead, and one of the party 
104 The Times, 29 May 1945. 
105 The Times, 17 September 1946. 
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made the following speech: [h]ere lie together a team of seven English 
soldiers. We salute them. They died in doing their duty to their country. 
We, too, will do ours.' Then gun -shots were fired. A large crowd of 
French people were at the cemetery. They all brought flowers.106 
Allowing civilians to bury the RAF dead meant that German soldiers were spared a 
task that was necessary for the preservation of community hygiene, and mandatory 
under the stipulations of international law and German army regulations.107 
It was only in the latter stages of the war that British servicemen, mostly 
soldiers, came to have any particular involvement in the burial of the RAF dead. 
Even then this was restricted, for it remained that aircraft were most likely to crash 
behind enemy lines. Fraser McLuskey served as a padre with the Special Air Service 
in France in 1944. When a Halifax aircraft crashed near where his unit was camped 
behind German lines, he and his men were able to retrieve the personal possessions 
of the crew before the German authorities learnt of the crash and arrived at the scene. 
The Germans placed the corpses in coffins and drove them to a cemetery in the 
nearby village of Marigny L' Église for burial. Some days after the bodies had been 
interred, and once he could be assured of relative safety, McLuskey decided to travel 
to the cemetery: `I went up with a section of our own men to conduct a service of 
commemoration. I think every man, woman and child in the parish must have turned 
up. The little cemetery was packed with the villagers, all dressed in their Sunday 
best.' 108 Despite the risks involved to their congregation, all the locals stayed after 
the service to place bouquets of flowers on the graves. Nor were such actions 
106 Sunday Express, 12 August 1945. Paul Fussell has argued that the ordered burial of enemy dead 
by the major belligerents was more probable early in the war when chivalric notions of the conflict 
were common. He suggests that once such sentiment dissipated, the dead were afforded less time and 
respect. See Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 11. 
107 TNA, PRO WO 287/122, German Field Regulations (Translation), Part II, circa 1934. 
108 J. Fraser McLuskey M.C., Parachute Padre: Behind German Lines with the SAS: France 1944, 
(Stevenage: SPA Books, 1985), p. 97. 
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isolated. As 21 Army Group advanced across north -west Europe, it found 
everywhere the beautifully -kept graves of British airmen covered in flowers.109 
109 French Tribute to Six Dead Airmen, Air Ministry News Service Bulletin 17214, 30, 23 January 
1945. See also Airmen's Graves in Norway, Air Ministry News Service Bulletin 19066, 23, 20 June 
1945; Manchester Guardian, 1 July 1944; Sunday Express, 13 August 1944; Daily Mirror, 2 
November 1944; The Times, 9 November 1945; Evening Standard, 30 September 1947; Viroslay 
Despatch by Alan Melville, WRU 4117, Number 240, 1 November 1944; Day of the Dead Despatch 




The Origins of the Army Graves Organisation and the First Stage of Army 
Graves Operations, September 1939 -June 1944 
Section I: The DGRE and the AGS in the First World War 
The Founding of a Graves Service 
Fabian Ware was forty -five when the Great War began.' Precluded by age from 
enlisting in the British army, he joined the Red Cross, travelling to Lille in north- 
eastern France in September 1914 to assume command of a group of fellow 
volunteers. These men, many of whom were middle -aged like Ware, together 
developed an interest in finding and identifying British graves, an endeavour for 
which no other civilian or military formation had assumed responsibility.2 Using the 
information and assistance provided by mayoral officials, churchmen and interested 
civilians to locate burial sites, Red Cross Mobile Unit A, as their group came to be 
known, saw to it that each British grave was marked with a sturdy wooden cross and 
the name of the dead man painted clearly on it.3 
Ware and his colleagues soon discovered that the work of finding and 
marking graves was beset by three significant difficulties. First, the Red Cross had 
no agreement with the British army to search for its dead. This meant that its 
A. J. A. Morris, `Sir Fabian Arthur Goulstone Ware' in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (eds.), 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: From the Earliest Times to the Year 2000, Volume 57, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 382 -3. 
2 CWGC, 2028, Red Cross Memorandum, circa autumn 1914; CWGC, 2029, Ware to Arthur Stanley, 
13 April 1915, CWGC, 2029, Red Cross Memorandum, circa spring 1915. 
s Reports by the Joint War Committee and the Joint War Finance Committee of the British Red Cross 
Society and The Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England: On Voluntary Aid Rendered to the Sick 
and Wounded at Home and Abroad and to British Prisoners of War, 1914 -1919, with Appendices, 
(London: HMSO, 1921), p. 321; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 3. 
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personnel could only reach the frontline if local military commanders, many of 
whom were reluctant to allow unarmed civilians into operational areas, agreed to 
grant them access. Ware, a powerful personality and fluent in French, had won some 
concessions from the military authorities in this regard, but this was no basis on 
which to plan operations in the longer term.4 Second, supply was proving a 
significant problem. The personnel of Mobile Unit A, isolated from the other Red 
Cross formations working in France, had resorted to buying and begging food and 
provisions from civilians.5 Third, the men lacked suitable and sufficient transport. 
While they did have the use of some Red Cross ambulances, their other vehicles 
were the same private cars in which several of the volunteers had driven themselves 
to the war.6 If the work of marking British graves were to be continued on a 
meaningful scale, an institution or organisation to invest administrative and logistical 
support was required. 
This backing came in October 1914 after Ware convinced Lieutenant General 
Sir Nevil Macready, Adjutant General to the BEF, of the merit of marking and 
maintaining graves and the need for a specialist, officially- sanctioned organisation to 
complete this work.? Later that month Macready granted Red Cross personnel access 
4 Reports by the Joint War Committee and the Joint War Finance Committee of the British Red Cross 
Society and The Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England, pp. 359 -60; Longworth, The Unending 
Vigil, pp. 2, 5; General the Rt. Hon. Sir Nevil Macready, Bart., G.C.M.G., K.C.B., Annals of an Active 
Life, (London: Hutchinson, 1924), Volume I, p. 220. 
s CWGC, 2029, Sir Arthur Lawley Note, 20 October 1914; CWGC, 2029, Red Cross Authorisation 
Note to Ware, 24 November 1914; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 2. 
6 CWGC, 2028, Red Cross Memorandum, circa autumn 1914; CWGC, 2029, GRC Staff List, circa 
autumn 1915. 
7 Imperial War Conference, 1917: Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers Laid Before the 
Conference, (London, 1917), p. 35; The Quarterly Army List: January 1915, (London: HMSO, 1915), 
pp. 28 -9; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 5; Fabian Ware, The Immortal Heritage: An Account of 
the Work and Policy of The Imperial War Graves Commission During Twenty Years, 1917 -1937, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937), p. 24. In his memoirs, Macready states that he had 
already decided on the need for such an organisation before Ware came to see him. This claim is 
supported by other evidence. Indeed, it is known that Macready had been greatly disappointed by the 
manner in which the British dead were attended to during the Boer War. See TNA, PRO WO 
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to the office of the DAG with responsibility for casualty records, and in November a 
further level of cooperation was reached when the Army Council agreed to share its 
information on missing British soldiers.8 Deciding how the proposed graves 
organisation should be governed and staffed proved more difficult. By the new year 
Macready had yet to determine whether Ware or one of his Red Cross colleagues, 
namely Lord Cecil or Colonel Ian Malcolm, should be given his imprimatur to 
establish the new body, although he was aware of the need for a decision.9 
In January 1915 the following passage was published, anonymously, in The 
Times: 
[t]en days ago a lady friend of ours left for a town not many miles north 
of Paris, which had been the scene of heavy fighting in September last. 
She desired to visit the grave of her brother, an officer in our Army. 
Comrades in his regiment had given her particulars of the exact locality 
and even described the temporary wooden cross and its inscription, 
erected over the grave. She found the place, where quite a number of 
victims had been interred, but every trace of the identifying crosses or 
other marks had disappeared. I will not dwell on the distress of our 
friend, and my sole object in approaching you is to point out that there 
must be thousands of similar painful cases. I do not know which 
department of the War Office could remedy this state of affairs by 
providing a more permanent identification mark for graves than the two 
battens, generally taken from packing- cases, which are now mostly 
used. I ° 
Macready had to act to assuage the concerns of this correspondent and others who 
felt similarly and, knowing that public interest in the treatment of those killed would 
not be transient, to do so in such a way as `to safeguard the Government when the 
32/9433, Meeting Minutes, 25 September 1916; Twenty -sixth Annual Report of the Imperial War 
Graves Commission, (London: HMSO, 1946), p. 12; Macready, Annals of an Active Life, Volume I, 
pp. 220 -1. 
8 Reports by the Joint War Committee and the Joint War Finance Committee of the British Red Cross 
Society and The Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England, p. 359. 
9 CWGC, 2029, Malcolm to Ware, 11 March 1915; CWGC, 2029, Ware Visit to Paris, 22 March 
1915; CWGC, 2028, Malcolm to Unnamed, 6 December 1916. 
10 The Times, 9 January 1915. 
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public should require an account of their stewardship towards the honoured dead'.11 
In February he selected Ware as the man to lead the new organisation and accorded 
Mobile Unit A, known as the Graves Registration Commission (GRC) after its 
inauguration, sole authority for tracing and marking the graves of British servicemen 
in France.12 Its staff members, who numbered approximately twelve at its formation, 
were to register the location and identity of graves, mark their positions with wooden 
crosses, maintain the order of these sites, and help to establish and configure war 
cemeteries.13 
The GRC was only in part incorporated into the army. The Adjutant 
General's department, to which it had been attached, supplied food, covered the costs 
of registering graves, and authorised GRC personnel to pass freely within army lines, 
but its transport and personnel requirements continued to be met by the Red Cross: 
for example, the onus for securing new recruits fell on Ware.14 Nor was employment 
" Macready, Annals of an Active Life, Volume I, p. 220. The following was recorded in the minutes 
of a War Office meeting in September 1916: `[ w]hen the matter was originally put to the War Office 
that they should bring this organization into the army the Adjutant -General [Macready] pointed out 
that from a purely military point of view the question as to whether bodies were properly buried, and 
flowers and crosses placed on the graves, did not directly help towards a successful conclusion of the 
war but that from a national and sentimental point of view the matter was an important one, and in the 
letter he wrote to the Government he stated that the Army was prepared to start this work. There were 
great difficulties in getting the consent of the Treasury but this was eventually obtained. He also 
stated that after the war, when all the present excitement was over, the popular attention which would 
be paid to the graves would be universal and that if the matter was not placed upon a satisfactory 
footing an outcry would certainly occur.' See TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, Meeting Minutes, 25 
September 1916. 
12 CWGC, 2029, Macready to Malcolm, 27 February 1915; CWGC, 2029, Ware to Arthur Stanley, 2 
March 1915; Ware, The Immortal Heritage, p. 24. 
CWGC, 2029, Ware Memorandum, 3 March 1915; CWGC, 2029, Ware to Arthur Stanley, 13 April 
1915; CWGC, 2029, Ware to Arthur Stanley, circa autumn 1915; Annual Report of the Imperial War 
Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, (London, 1920), p. 5; Macready, Annals of an Active Life, Volume I, 
p. 221. 
14 CWGC, 2029, Red Cross Memorandum, 12 February 1915; CWGC, 2029, Ware to Arthur Stanley, 
2 March 1915; CWGC, 2029, Ware Memorandum, 3 March 1915; CWGC, 2029, Red Cross Report 
by Colonel Stewart, circa spring 1915; CWGC, 2029, Ware to Arthur Stanley, 13 April 1915; CWGC, 
2029, Ware to Arthur Stanley, circa autumn 1915; Macready, Annals of an Active Life, Volume I, p. 
220. By March 1915, the Red Cross had spent approximately £12,000 on locating, identifying and 
maintaining graves in France. See Reports by the Joint War Committee and the Joint War Finance 
Committee of the British Red Cross Society and The Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England, p. 
361. 
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in the GRC governed by standard military regulations, Ware himself stating that he 
selected those men `who on account of age or for other reasons are prevented from 
serving their country as combatants.' 15 The organisation continued to be essentially 
civilian in character, its operations and personnel mostly not subject to military rules 
and conventions.16 Despite the army having made Ware an honorary major and 
accorded temporary commissions to certain of his staff, all GRC personnel remained 
Red Cross volunteers.17 
In an attempt to widen awareness of the GRC within the BEF, and 
simultaneously to encourage soldiers always to bury the dead, in April 1915 
Macready issued a statement advising that an organisation was `engaged in 
identifying the graves of British Officers and Soldiers, and renewing when necessary 
the inscriptions on tombstones and crosses so as to ensure as far as possible that there 
shall be no difficulty in identifying the graves of British soldiers.' 18 The publicity 
worked and thereafter the GRC began to make good progress. By May 4300 graves 
had been located and marked, and in the following four months this number 
increased to more than 31,000.19 The GRC was expanded to cope with its increased 
workload. At the end of the summer it employed forty -four staff at its Lillers 
headquarters in northern France and a further sixty -four personnel in the field.20 
15 CWGC, 2029, 
16 CWGC, 2029, 
17 CWGC, 2029, 
Memorandum, 3 
Personnel List, 1 
18 CWGC, 2033, 
19 CWGC, 2029, 
20 CWGC, 2029, 
Ware to Arthur Stanley, 13 April 1915. 
Ware Memorandum, 3 March 1915; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, pp. 7 -8. 
British Red Cross Society to Ware, 29 January 1915; CWGC, 2029, Ware 
March 1915; CWGC, 2029, Ware to Arthur Stanley, 13 April 1915; CWGC, 2033, 
918. Ware was made an honorary major on 22 February 1915. 
Macready Statement, 28 April 1915. 
Ware to Arthur Stanley, 10 May 1915; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 8. 
GRC Establishment, circa autumn 1915; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 8. 
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 The Establishment of the DGRE 
In October 1915 the War Office severed connections between the Red Cross and the 
GRC and fully incorporated the latter into the army, renaming it the DGRE in 
February 1916.21 Ware was installed as its inaugural director, and promoted to 
Lieutenant Colonel, and his officers accorded General List commissions and placed 
on the army payrol1.22 In addition, his authority over graves operations was made 
paramount, a General Routine Order (GRO) confirming that he was `responsible for 
the selection of sites for burial grounds for British officers and men and for the 
control and supervision of cemeteries, as well as for the work of the Directorate'.23 
Greater recognition for Ware and the DGRE soon followed. In March 
General Sir Douglas Haig, the commander of the BEF, praised the work being 
performed by the DGRE along the Western Front and recorded its `extraordinary 
moral value to the troops in the field as well as to the relatives and friends of the 
dead at home.'24 He acknowledged the foresight of such operations, noting `that on 
the termination of hostilities the nation will demand an account from the Government 
as to the steps which have been taken to mark and classify the burial places of the 
dead, steps which can only be effectively taken at, or soon after, burial.'25 
Recognition brought increased demand from the public for information and 
this, combined with a burgeoning workload, prompted the DGRE to relocate from 
21 CWGC, 2029, Ware to Arthur Stanley, circa autumn 1915; CWGC, 2033, Ware to Macready, 23 
October 1916; CWGC, 2028, Undated and Unsigned Memorandum, circa April 1917; CWGC, 2018, 
IWGC Meeting 277 Minutes, 17 January 1946; Ware, The Immortal Heritage, p. 24; Longworth, The 
Unending Vigil, p. 17. 
77 CWGC, 2033, Personnel List, 1918; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 17. 
23 TNA, PRO WO 123/200, GRO 1437, 3 March 1916. 
24 
TNA, PRO WO 32/5846, Haig to War Office, 15 March 1916; The Quarterly Army List: January 
1916, (London: HMSO, 1916), pp. 11 -12. 
25 
TNA, PRO WO 32/5846, Haig to War Office, 15 March 1916. 
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Lillers to the War Office in May 1916.26 The graves organisation was thus split into 
two branches: the DGRE in London headed by Ware; and a subordinate field arm, 
the AGS, commanded by Major Arthur Messer.27 The benefits of moving 
administrative operations were two -fold: in London Ware was better -placed to 
receive the support and advice of Macready, who had returned to the War Office the 
previous February as Adjutant General to the Forces, and there the DGRE could 
employ women as clerks, thus freeing male staff for service in the field.28 Moreover, 
Ware had plans to extend graves operations into the Middle East and the 
Mediterranean region and this could be more easily done from the War Office.29 
Three months after the relocation he was promoted to Brigadier General - his 
meteoric rise from civilian volunteer to general reflected the fact that large -scale, 
organised graves operations were a new and uncertain undertaking - and his 
administrative position upgraded from Director to that of Director General, a 
distinction which meant that he reported directly to the Adjutant General at the War 
Office.3° 
26 
CWGC, 2033, Ware to Lieutenant General Sir G. H. Fowke, circa May 1916; CWGC, 2033, Ware 
to Macready, 27 July 1916; CWGC, 2033, Ware to Macready, 27 August 1916; Michael Roper, The 
Records of The War Office and Related Departments, 1660 -1964, (Kew: PRO, 1998), p. 142; The 
Quarterly Army List: October 1917, (London: HMSO, 1917), p. 38. 
27 CWGC, 2029, Sir Arthur Lawley to Ware, 23 October 1914; CWGC, 2029, Red Cross Report by 
Colonel Stewart, circa spring 1915; CWGC, 2033, Macready to GHQ, BEF, 19 May 1916; CWGC, 
2033, Messer Memorandum, 1 August 1916; CWGC, 2033, Ware to Macready, 23 October 1916; 
Ware, The Immortal Heritage, Appendix C. 
28 CWGC, 2033, DGRE to Armies in the Field, 8 August 1916; `The Registration and Care of Military 
Graves During the Present War', Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, LXII (1917), 297- 
302; The Quarterly Army List: April 1916, (London: HMSO, 1916), pp. 25 -6; Macready, Annals of an 
Active Life, Volume 1, pp. 234 -5; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 17. 
29 CWGC, 2033, Ware to Macready, 27 July 1916; CWGC, 2033, DGRE to Armies in the Field, 8 
August 1916; Ware, The Immortal Heritage, p. 24. 
39 CWGC, 2033, Personnel List, 1918; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 18; Ware, The Immortal 
Heritage, p. 25. 
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 The Disbandment of the Graves Organisation 
Despite the further expansion of the graves organisation throughout 1916 -17 - at one 
point it employed over 700 personnel across Europe - operations remained 
incomplete at the time of the Armistice in November 1918.31 Accordingly, the task 
of registering graves and, where needed, exhuming and transferring bodies to sites 
where permanent cemeteries were planned, continued well into peacetime. As Ware 
observed in 1920, the graves organisation `has been very much delayed on account 
of the additional labour imposed upon them [sic] by the German advance in 1918 and 
the vastness of the work.'32 `Progress', he added, `has also been much hampered by 
successive schemes of demobilisation which have seriously interfered with 
continuity of personnel, so essential in the performance of work of this character.'33 
By the time the graves organisation was disbanded on 10 September 1921, its 
personnel had located, marked, and recorded the position and identity of 
approximately 500,000 graves in north -west Europe alone.34 With the closing of the 
DGRE, responsibility for the care of British and Dominion war graves passed to the 
IWGC.35 Formed in 1917 and founded and controlled by Ware, this organisation had 
been conceived in order to tend the graves of the British military dead in perpetuity.36 
31 Longworth, The Unending Vigil, pp. 18, 22 -3. 
32 Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 9. 
33 Ibid. See also Imperial War Conference, 1918: Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers 
Laid Before the Conference, (London, 1918), p. 228. 
34 Annual Report of the imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 9; Annual Report of the 
Imperial War Graves Commission, 1920 -1921, (London: HMSO, 1921), p. 7; Ware, The Immortal 
Heritage, p. 26; Daily Graphic, 14 October 1921. 
35 In France and Belgium this transfer of responsibility occurred on 17 March 1921. The IWGC later 
recorded the total number of British and Dominion graves from the Great War as 767,978. See 
Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 9; Annual Report of the 
Imperial War Graves Commission, 1920 -1921, p. 7; Ware, The Immortal Heritage, p. 26; Daily 
Graphic, 14 October 1921. 
36 CWGC, 1084, IWGC Meeting 36, 20 September 1921. 
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Figure 3 
King George V (second from right) at Tyne Cot Cemetery, Belgium, 1922. Haig 
stands immediately behind him. The man with hand to chin is Ware. 
Section II: The DGRE and the AGS, September 1938 -February 1943 
The Reconstitution of the DGRE 
Speaking at a conference in Germany in October 1936, Ware, a knight and titular 
Major General since 1920, told his audience that if conflict were to break out once 
more between the European nations it would result in `wounds so deep that they 
would defy healing, and in a multitude of graves which the labours of a century 
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could not make beautiful.'37 Although he found the prospect of another war 
abhorrent, he was sufficiently pragmatic to prepare for conflict once its possibility 
began to grow. In September 1938 he wrote to Sir Herbert Creedy, Permanent Under 
Secretary of State for War, proposing his own return to the army for a six month 
period to plan the reconstitution of the DGRE and the formation and deployment of a 
graves service.38 Cognisant that Ware's knowledge of burial policy and practice was 
unparalleled, Creedy quickly accepted the offer and later that month Ware, still the 
vice -chairman of the IWGC, returned to the War Office in an unpaid and honorary 
capacity.39 He was sixty -nine. 
Ware's first task was to resolve the question of staffing the DGRE. With 
experience but no War Establishment to guide him, he posited its personnel 
requirements as one regular army officer to serve as Assistant Adjutant General 
(AAG), a staff captain, and a small number of clerical and administrative workers, 
one of whom was to be seconded from the IWGC.40 Thereafter Ware began to 
identify candidates he thought capable of filling the senior positions in the DGRE. 
With no serving officers with experience of graves operations from which to choose, 
he selected the sixty -one year old Earl of Courtown to be his staff captain -a friend 
of forty years, Courtown had occupied this post during the First World War and had 
also worked at the IWGC throughout the 1920s - and Colonel A. R. Macallan, a 
reservist officer and formerly of the Cameronians, as AAG.41 In preparation for his 
37 Seventeenth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, (London: HMSO, 1937), p. 4; 
Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 13; CWGC, 2033, Personnel 
List, 1918; Morris, `Sir Fabian Arthur Goulstone Ware', p. 383. 
38 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September 1938. 
39 Ibid.; Twentieth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, (London: HMSO, 1940), 
P. 7. 
40 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September 1938. 
41 TCD, P 49/1/363, Viscount Stopford to the Earl of Courtown, 23 September 1915; TCD, P 
49/1/408, Viscount Stopford to the Earl of Courtown, 11 November 1916; TCD, P 49/1/441, Viscount 
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role, Macallan spent one week at the IWGC - there was no relevant military course 
in which he could be enrolled - learning his duties and responsibilities.42 On 4 
September 1939, the day after war was declared, the DGRE was officially re- formed 
and installed in accommodation at the London offices of the IWGC with Ware, who 
had extended indefinitely his attachment to the War Office, as Director Genera1.43 
The three DGRE officers immediately set about raising a service to be responsible 
for the graves of all British servicemen.44 
Raising the (Second) AGS 
In early September Numbers 1 and 2 Graves Registration Units (GRU), which Ware 
intended for service with the BEF, were formed at Aldershot.45 They were raised on 
the extant GRU War Establishments, last revised in 1931. These allowed for the 
employment of officers and men who were unfit for service at the front, and 
Courtown, 
Courtown Employment History, 12 February 1940; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, 
November 1938, January, June 1939; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Meeting Minutes, 9 September 1948; 
TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, War Office and IWGC Cooperation, circa 1949; The Quarterly Army List: 
July 1940, (London: HMSO, 1940), pp. 16, 3006. The name of the AAG appears in various 
documents as Macallan, MacAllan and MacAllen. In this thesis his name is spelt Macallan as it is 
thought to be the correct spelling. 
42 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, June 1939; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, War Office and 
IWGC Cooperation, circa 1949. 
43 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September 1939; The Times, 7 October 1939; The 
Quarterly Army List: July 1940, pp. 16, 1387h. Ware and Courtown were granted emergency 
commissions on 3 September, and authorisation for two clerical staff to join the DGRE was given on 
the 8th. Throughout the war the DGRE was known within the War Office as AG 13. 
44 The arrangement, accepted unofficially before the war, whereby the army was responsible for 
registering the graves of sailors and airmen, was formally confirmed by the Air Ministry in September 
1939 and by the Admiralty in March 1940. See TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, 
September 1938, September 1939, March 1940, Appendix V; Twentieth Annual Report of the 
Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 7; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 162. (The date cited by 
Longworth in this regard is wrong.) 
45 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September 1939; CWGC, 2033, Memorandum on 
Graves Services, 17 October 1939; CWGC, 2033, Director General Memorandum, circa December 
1939. The War Office used the name `Graves Registration and Enquiry Unit' to describe its graves 
registration formations until January 1944 when the title `Graves Registration Unit' was adopted. 
Because many of the documents which pre -date the change of name refer to Graves Registration 
Units, and the fact that the acronym adopted for both titles was GRU, this thesis uses `Graves 
Registration Unit' to describe those formations raised before and after January 1944 in order to avoid 
confusion. See TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, January 1944. 
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stipulated that each unit should have, in addition to three bicycles and one truck, 
thirty -eight personnel: one captain, two subalterns, one corporal, three Royal Army 
Service Corps (RASC) clerks, one RASC driver, two topographical draughtsmen and 
one photographer from the Royal Engineers, two batmen, one cook, and twenty -four 
men for general cemetery duties.46 
Captain W. H. Hine and Lieutenant A. O. Stott, reservist officers of the East 
Lancashire Regiment and Army Education Corps respectively, were given the 
commands of Numbers 1 and 2 GRU.47 Following their appointment, Ware 
successfully lobbied the War Office for authorisation to send with them to France a 
Deputy Assistant Director of Graves Registration and Enquiries (DADGRE). This 
officer, who would be Hine and Stott's superior, would coordinate and control AGS 
operations on the Continent. Major C. K. Phillips, who had served in the DGRE 
during the First World War and had also worked for the IWGC as a solicitor 
throughout the inter -war period, agreed to fill the position.48 
The DGRE provided the AGS officers with a dossier of information to guide 
them in the performance of their duties. Included in it were copies of Field Service 
Regulations and notes on their interpretation, documents detailing the procedures 
employed by the AGS during the Great War, general information about the DGRE 
46 TNA, PRO WO 24/933, War Establishment GRE Unit; TNA, PRO WO 24/933, War Establishment 
GRE L of C Unit; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, War Establishments; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, Notes for 
Graves Units; CWGC, 2033, Memorandum on Graves Services, 17 October 1939. 
47 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, November 1938, January, September 1939; TNA, PRO 
WO 165/35, War Establishments; TNA, PRO WO 167/1371, Number 1 GRU War Diary, September - 
October 1939; TNA, PRO WO 167/1372, Number 2 GRU War Diary, September 1939; CWGC, 
2033, Memorandum on Graves Services, 17 October 1939; CWGC, 2033, Director General 
Memorandum, circa December 1939. While Stott initially held only temporary command on account 
of his rank, it was soon made permanent. 
as CWGC, 2021, Phillips Employment Record, 24 March 1921; CWGC, 2021, Memorandum on 
Appointments, 10 March 1924; CWGC, 2021, IWGC to Phillips, 16 July 1930; CWGC, 2033, 
Memorandum on Graves Services, 17 October 1939; CWGC, 2033, Hart Memorandum, 4 January 
1940; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September 1939; The Quarterly Army List: July 
1940, pp. 87, 1387s. 
55 
and the IWGC, and the observation that graves duties `require initiative, imagination, 
and commonsense on the part of the personnel ... qualities which they should be 
prepared to exercise at all times.'49 Ware was in no doubt that he had recruited the 
right men in this regard. In a letter of 9 September to Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain he wrote: `[a] number of my old officers have rejoined me in this work 
and I can count on them to establish links of sympathy, confidence and affection with 
the relatives of the dead if the units in the Field are anything like as efficient and well 
equipped as the two first we are sending out.''° Ware expressed similar sentiments 
in a letter sent to Creedy on 19 September: `I should like you to know that my 
Directorate ... is really functioning and doing useful work.'S1 By the end of the 
month both graves units, Number 1 GRU having been attached to General 
Headquarters (GHQ) BEF and Number 2 GRU to the army L of C, were settled in 
France and ready to commence operations.52 
Retreat from France 
With the British army incurring relatively few casualties in the opening months of 
the war, the AGS had little to do after its deployment to northern France.53 
`Uneventful' was the most common entry in the War Diary of Number 1 GRU 
throughout this time, while over the same period Number 2 GRU personnel spent 
49 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September 1939; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, Burials and 
Graves Registration Notes; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, Notes for Graves Units. 
50 CWGC, 2026, Ware to Chamberlain, 9 September 1939. 
51 CWGC, 2033, Ware to Creedy, 19 September 1939. 
52 TNA, PRO WO 167/1371, Number 1 GRU War Diary, September 1939; TNA, PRO WO 167/1372, 
Number 2 GRU War Diary, September 1939; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, Notes for Graves Units; TNA, 
PRO WO 73/142, General Return of British Army Strength on 30 September 1939. The thirty -seven 
personnel of Number 2 GRU left Britain for France on 15 September, the thirty -four men of Number 
1 GRU following eleven days later. 
53 Number 1 GRU was based in Candas, Number 2 GRU in Dieppe. 
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many days cleaning and oiling their rifles.54 There was time even for a debate as to 
whether corpses should be interred in blankets or coffins - the return of bodies to 
Britain having been banned for the course of the war and a definitive ruling on 
repatriation deferred until its end - with the Adjutant General to the BEF, Lieutenant 
General Sir Douglas Brownrigg, reporting to the War Office on 20 December that 
`many British officers and other ranks find it repugnant when coffins are not to be 
used for the burial of their comrades, at any rate, in the back areas and so long as 
present conditions prevail.'55 The most significant event for the AGS during this 
period of extended calm was the raising of Numbers 3 and 4 GRU at Aldershot early 
in 1940, with the former establishing camp in northern France on 10 May.56 
The Phoney War ended the same day when German forces invaded the Low 
Countries. In a letter to Ware on 19 May, an exasperated Phillips described the 
widespread confusion since the German attack and complained that army 
headquarters was failing to provide the AGS with adequate instruction or direction.57 
In the event Ware had no time to respond as Numbers 1, 2 and 3 GRU were soon 
caught up in the scramble to retreat to Dunkirk and, by June, all graves personnel 
54 TNA, PRO WO 167/1371, Number 1 GRU War Diary, December 1939; TNA, PRO WO 167/1372, 
Number 2 GRU War Diary, January 1940. 
5' TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, November 1939; CWGC, 2033, Brownrigg to War 
Office, 20 December 1939; The Half - Yearly Army List: January 1940, p. 25. In November 1939, the 
relatives of a dead soldier applied to the DGRE for his remains to be removed from France and 
transported to Britain for burial. This request was refused on practical grounds, the DGRE informing 
them that French law prohibited the exhumation of bodies other than for sanitary reasons. Insufficient 
shipping space was cited as a further reason against repatriation. In December Macallan issued to the 
BEF a memorandum in which he stated that the exhumation of bodies was prohibited, and that `[n]o 
application for the removal of bodies to the United Kingdom, whether for burial or for re- burial, will 
be entertained.' Similarly, the Dominion governments prohibited the repatriation of bodies for the 
duration of the war. See CWGC, 2033, Macallan Memorandum, December 1939; Longworth, The 
Unending Vigil, p. 163. 
56 TNA, PRO WO 167/1373, Number 3 GRU War Diary, May 1940; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE 
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were back in Britain.58 They had registered a combined 552 graves before their 
evacuation from France: BEF losses for the campaign totalled 11,010 killed and 
missing.59 Later that summer the DGRE, having arranged for Hine and Stott and 
certain other AGS officers to be posted to Home Commands from where they could 
easily be recalled, disbanded the four existing graves units and turned its attention to 
the Middle East.6o 
The Establishment of the AGS in the Middle East Theatre 
The first step towards establishing an AGS presence in the Middle East had been 
taken soon after the reconstitution of the DGRE in October 1938. In that month 
Brigadier Sir Herbert Hart, a New Zealander in his mid -fifties working for the IWGC 
as Deputy Controller and Chief Administrative Officer of its Eastern Area, had 
agreed with the DGRE to assist its operations in the region in the event of 
hostilities.61 In April 1940 further consideration was given to the possibility of 
founding a Middle East graves service. At the behest of the DGRE and with the 
concurrence of GHQ Middle East Force (MEF), Colonel J. K. Edwards, a War Office 
Liaison Officer, was given the task of determining the merits and viability of 
58 TNA, PRO WO 167/1371, Number 1 GRU War Diary, May -June 1940; TNA, PRO WO 167/1372, 
Number 2 GRU War Diary, January, May -June 1940; TNA, PRO WO 167/1373, Number 3 GRU War 
Diary, May 1940; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, June 1940. 
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(London: Aurum Press, 1993), p. 255; CWGC, 2033, Registered Graves and Burials, 15 September 
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Services, 1942. 
bo CWGC, 2033, Macallan to Home Commands, July 1940; CWGC, 2033, Meeting of Officers and 
Inspectors, 3 July 1940; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, August 1940. 
61 CWGC, 2033, Director General Memorandum, circa December 1939; CWGC, 2014, Ware to Sir 
Godfrey Thomas, 9 July 1943; CWGC, 2014, CWGC to New Zealand Defence Force, 18 March 
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Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 6; Twenty- second Annual Report of the 
Imperial War Graves Commission, (London: HMSO, 1942), p. 3. The IWGC Eastern Area comprised 
Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Greece and Turkey. See CWGC, 2014, Ware to Hart, 22 May 1937. 
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establishing and maintaining an AGS force in the region.ó2 He decreed its formation 
necessary. 
In contrast to the practice employed at Aldershot the previous September, the 
DGRE determined that the Middle East graves service should be built from the top 
down rather than from the bottom up. Thus the selection in May of Hart as the 
unpaid commanding officer of Graves Registration and Enquiries Middle East Force 
(GREMEF) and the establishment of a headquarters in Cairo preceded the raising of 
any constituent graves units.63 Hart, who was given dispensation to remain living in 
Jerusalem where he was to continue in employment with the IWGC, was promised 
an emergency commission and the administrative rank of Assistant Director Graves 
Registration and Enquiries (ADGRE). This appointment would give him control 
over graves operations throughout the Middle East theatre and make him junior only 
to Ware within the graves organisation.64 For his headquarters, which was to be 
manned by a staff captain and a clerk, its expansion and the subsequent addition of 
AGS units to be pursued as necessary should hostilities commence, Hart selected a 
reservist officer with experience of graves work as his staff captain.65 Pending the 
arrival of this officer in Egypt from Britain, he asked Captain G. H. Peek, a long - 
serving IWGC employee with an intimate knowledge of the Middle East, to fill the 
62 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, April 1940; TNA, PRO WO 106/5066, Reports on Visit 
of Edwards, 1940; The Quarterly Army List: July 1940, pp. 75, 211b. 
63 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September 1939; TNA, PRO WO 106/5064, GHQ MEF 
to Edwards, 27 May 1940; TNA, PRO WO 106/5065, Macallan to Edwards, 13 June 1940. 
64 CWGC, 2014, CWGC to New Zealand Defence Force, 18 March 1994; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, 
Middle East and Mediterranean Zone Summary, June 1945; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War 
Diary, June, September 1940; The Quarterly Army List: October 1940, (London: HMSO, 1940), p. 
1386i; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 177. 
65 TNA, PRO WO 106/5064, GHQ MEF to Edwards, 27 May 1940; TNA, PRO WO 106/5065, 
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position in the interim and help him plan for a possible AGS deployment in the 
theatre.66 
The most significant problem confronting Hart and Peek was how to staff 
GREMEF. The DGRE had made it clear that none of the AGS personnel evacuated 
from the Continent would be committed to the Middle East, and the two men knew 
also that the provision of officers and men through GHQ MEF could not be 
guaranteed.67 Working on the assumption that GREMEF could expect no help with 
recruitment, Hart identified men he thought fit for command in the field and others, 
all regional IWGC employees, who might be employed as staff officers.68 Securing a 
sufficient number of men to fill the ranks of future graves units presented a bigger 
problem. As a GHQ MEF official conceded, local inhabitants would have to be 
drafted into GREMEF for Hart was unable to `find British white personnel for 
units' .69 
Once the staffing issue had been discussed, Hart and Peek sought DGRE 
clarification on certain particulars with regard to the future administration of 
GREMEF. One question asked: [d]oes the Army provide rations, accommodation, 
office equipment for personnel at formation H.Q.? It is presumed that G.R. & E. 
units are entirely an Army responsibility. Is this correct ?'70 Macallan replied in mid - 
June, confirming that the War Office held singular responsibility for all AGS units 
wherever they were raised and under whichever army command they operated.7 ' He 
66 TNA, PRO WO 106/5064, GHQ MEF to Edwards, 27 May 1940; TNA, PRO CO 323/1748/4, 
IWGC General Report, 4 October 1940; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, Hoffman to Ware, 26 November 
1942; CWGC, 2014, Ware to Hart, 4 February 1941; The Quarterly Army List: July 1940, pp. 3036a, 
3521f; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, pp. 115 -6, 177. 
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69 Ibid. 
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then proceeded to caution GREMEF against developing a reliance on recruiting 
personnel from outside the army, noting that those IWGC employees who had been 
given dual roles with the AGS in France had not always been able to devote time to 
their military duties.72 
The Deployment of the AGS in the Middle East Theatre 
The GREMEF command became active when Hart received official confirmation of 
his emergency commission as Brigadier on 3 July 1940.73 Later that day the Graves 
Registration East Africa Force (GREAF), the formation of which had first been 
considered by Hart in May, was raised in Nairobi on his authorisation.74 A. R. 
Wainewright, a retired colonel, was appointed as its head and Graves Registration 
Officer. He had no staff and was not permitted to claim payment or army benefits.75 
Further deployments of graves personnel followed in the autumn. Number 5 GRU, 
under the command of Captain E. Robson of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, was raised 
and staffed on the pre -war War Establishment and attached to the Western Desert 
Force for its campaign against Italian forces in the Cyrenaica region of Libya, and an 
AGS officer was despatched to Khartoum to supervise graves operations in the 
Sudan.76 
In an attempt to strengthen the AGS presence in East Africa, in October 1940 
Hart suggested to the War Office that Wainewright be given some men with whom 
72 Ibid. 
73 CWGC, 2014, CWGC to New Zealand Defence Force, 18 March 1994; Supplement to the London 
Gazette, 2 July 1940, p. 4010. 
TNA, PRO WO 169/886, GREAF War Diary, Volume I, July 1940. 
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to staff a graves force for the region. This proposal was rejected, whereupon the 
headquarters of East Africa Force (EAF) approached the command of the Union 
Defence Force (UDF) in Pretoria for assistance in delivering such an organisation.77 
Major R. H. Hoffman, a British national and ex- British army officer serving in the 
South African military, was charged by UDF headquarters with its formation.78 He 
subsequently devised a War Establishment which he thought better -suited than the 
War Office model to the requirements of modern warfare, not least because it would 
be easier to fill. It stipulated there be three officers - one captain and two subalterns 
- and ten other ranks: three batmen/drivers, three privates for general duties, one 
cook, and corporals in the positions of clerk, photographer and topographical 
draughtsman.79 Two units, Numbers 1 and 2 UDF GRU, were raised in Pretoria on 
this War Establishment, and Hoffman led his men north to a base in Nairobi in early 
1941.80 Although the units had no formal connection to the War Office, they were 
charged by EAF with registering British and Dominion graves in Abyssinia, Eritrea 
77 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, October 1940; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Middle East 
and Mediterranean Zone Summary, June 1945. 
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80 TNA, PRO WO 169/3222, Assistant Director, GREAF War Diary, February 1941; TNA, PRO WO 
170/7365, Middle East and Mediterranean Zone Summary, June 1945; CWGC, 2033, Macallan to 
Ware, 12 March 1941. Wainewright welcomed the deployment of the UDF units. For some time he 
had been of the opinion that his office was `entirely useless unless supplied with personnel for Field 
Work ... [t]he mere recording of graves as reported practically useless unless a Field Unit can get 
them marked down with real accuracy.' See TNA, PRO WO 169/3222, Assistant Director, GREAF 
War Diary, January 1941. 
62 
and Italian Somaliland. Hoffman and his men set about this task immediately and 
good progress followed.81 
The Reorganisation of GREMEF 
Elsewhere graves operations were beset with problems, a lack of personnel principal 
among them. When called upon in March to provide an AGS contingent in support 
of British forces stationed in the Mediterranean, Hart had been able only to send a 
lone officer to Greece. Responsibility for graves operations on Crete had been 
vested in the Royal Engineers until such time as GREMEF could despatch trained 
officers and men to the island.82 Numbers 6 and 7 GRU had been raised in April in 
an attempt to address these staffing deficiencies, but as volunteers had been few their 
formation had not provided the desired panacea.ß3 In light of these difficulties, GHQ 
MEF called a meeting at its Cairo headquarters in May to discuss the conduct of 
graves operations and the possible restructuring of GREMEF. Among the attendees 
were Hoffman, who travelled to Egypt from Nairobi, and representatives from 
Number 1 Australian GRU and the New Zealand GRU, both of these units having 
commenced operations in the Middle East theatre in support of their national 
forces.84 
Three significant resolutions were agreed at the meeting. First, the delegates 
determined that all graves units operating in the Middle East theatre should be pooled 
81 Wainewright resigned from his position in March so that Hoffman could be given complete 
command of graves operations in East Africa. See TNA, PRO WO 169/3222, Assistant Director, 
GREAF War Diary, February- March, 1941. 
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under the central command of GREMEF headquarters and attached to the British and 
Dominion armies as and when needed.85 For this purpose Hoffman and his men 
were to transfer to Cairo in the summer to join the three extant AGS units - two of 
which, Numbers 6 and 7, remained in cadre - as well as the Australian and New 
Zealand graves formations, in GREMEF.86 Second, it was decided that all units 
would adopt the GRU War Establishment employed by the UDF. Its efficacy had 
been proven in East Africa, while the fact that it stipulated thirteen personnel rather 
than thirty -eight was attractive, because recruitment was expected to remain 
difficult.87 Third, the delegates decreed that three officers should be appointed to the 
position of DADGRE in order to relieve Hart of some of his heavy work burden. 
Peek, who had continued as Hart's principal assistant since the formation of 
GREMEF, was one of those designated for this role.88 The second officer selected 
was a Canadian, Major A. F. Menzies.89 He had overseen the care and maintenance 
of British and Dominion war graves in Greece, where he had worked for the IWGC 
since the First World War, until the German invasion in April had forced his 
departure from the country.90 Hoffman was the third officer chosen, his appointment 
85 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, May 1941; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, GREMEF 
War Diary, November 1942. 
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to take effect from the time of his relocation to Cairo.91 There were no IWGC 
officials available in the theatre to fill the final DADGRE position, and Hart knew 
that the successes achieved by the UDF units in East Africa owed much to 
Hoffman's organisation and leadership skills.92 
Frustration and Slow Progress in Graves Operations 
Amid the restructuring of GREMEF in the summer of 1941, Hart endeavoured to 
bolster AGS representation in the Middle East theatre. In August 1941 Number 6 
GRU was staffed to a working level and sent to the Sudan to complete the task of 
registering graves there and in Eritrea, and the following month Number 9 GRU was 
raised in Cairo and then posted to Iraq to register graves in that country and in Iran.93 
The deployment of neither unit went as planned. After his first two weeks in 
Baghdad, the commanding officer of Number 9 GRU complained to army 
headquarters in Palestine that his unit consisted only of himself and one local man 
and that they had no transport or equipment.94 If these difficulties were attributable 
largely to the need to staff and equip frontline units as a matter of priority, poor 
administration and the relative anonymity of the AGS were also factors. For 
example, when Number 6 GRU called at Asmara to collect equipment and personnel 
for its operations on the Keren battlefield, military authorities proffered excuses 
rather than the promised trucks and interpreter. After four days spent wrangling with 
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these officials to no avail, the unit left the town without a translator and in vehicles 
obtained through private means.95 
Once in the field the men discovered that the process of registering graves 
could be similarly long and arduous. The personnel of Number 1 Section of Number 
6 GRU learnt this when attempting to locate the remains of several members of the 
Worcester Regiment killed on Mt Falestoh near Keren in early 1941. Acting on 
information collated from official and verbal reports that the dead lay there in 
unmarked graves, the investigating personnel scaled the mountain by its western face 
on 24 September. No trace of graves or remains was found. Having descended to 
their camp for the night, the men returned the next day and climbed Mt Falestoh by 
its northern aspect: again nothing was discovered. Over the following days less 
physically- taxing matters were attended to, with personnel visiting an Indian army 
regiment in order to obtain information about battlefield burials, and walking parts of 
the Keren road in search of the remains of two gunners. They returned to Mt 
Falestoh on the 29th, climbing the north- eastern side of the peak and then, when this 
approach also yielded no evidence of the dead, by its north -western aspect the next 
day. On this face of the mountain they discovered the remains of five soldiers strewn 
over a wide area, with the bodies and graves of a further nineteen members of the 
Worcesters found the next day. After the identities of the dead had been confirmed 
by verifying the details on their identity discs with those contained in burial returns 
and unit records, Number 1 Section personnel spent several days collecting the dead 
and transferring them to a nearby cemetery for interment, the officer in charge 
9s TNA, PRO WO 169/2594, Number 6 GRU (Advance Section) War Diary, August 1941. 
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having decreed Mt Falestoh an unsuitable location for their permanent burial because 
of its barrenness and relative inaccessibility.96 
While Number 6 GRU was at least able to function with relative freedom in 
East Africa, the operations of Number 5 GRU in the Western Desert were restricted 
by the near presence of the warring armies. Between the winter of 1941 and the 
summer of 1942, the unit spent much time moving eastwards across the desert to 
escape the advancing enemy, a state of affairs which made it difficult for its men to 
pursue investigations of any length or complexity.97 During this period they rarely 
had time to become acquainted with the geography of a region before being 
instructed to relocate elsewhere, something which affected their ability to search for 
graves in a vast area where, to the untrained eye, navigable landmarks were few.98 
On the rare occasions that the unit was able to settle in one place for a period of time, 
operations were hindered by the fact that many of the burial returns furnished 
through 2nd echelon, Eighth Army, were incomplete and thus of limited value.99 
Mindful that progress was slow, and of the growing expectation among 
Britons that news be provided of their missing and dead relatives, in the spring of 
1942 the DGRE released to the national press a report in which the difficulties of 
graves operations were explained.loo It was noted that: `[r]ecords of burials made 
under battle conditions, or by the enemy, lead not infrequently to lack of, or 
distortion in, names and service particulars. Such records often entail considerable 
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ioo Manchester Guardian, 7 March 1942. By this time Number 7 GRU, never raised other than in 
cadre, had been disbanded. 
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investigation after arrival; sometimes without immediate success.' 101 The account 
continued: [w]here identity is complete the next -of -kin are immediately notified of 
the position of the grave so far as it is known. Postal difficulties from the Middle 
East are of course a serious consideration, and play their part in delaying the 
transmission of information to the relatives.' 102 The report also carried a request for 
the British people to extend its understanding to the AGS: `[g]eography, as well as 
detection for identification purposes, play no small part in the work. The public 
would do well to bear in mind that information seemingly withheld is more often due 
to a difficulty of location, or identification, which must first be worked out and 
confirmed.' 103 In asking for the consideration of the public, Ware knew that its 
patience would soon expire if news of missing and dead servicemen did not come 
quickly, particularly if defeat became victory and hope was replaced by expectation. 
A Change of Leader 
Hart, who knew the demands on the AGS as well as anyone, relinquished his 
GREMEF command on 4 August 1942 in order to devote all his energies to the 
running of his IWGC office in Jerusalem.104 He had served the AGS well. With 
almost no assistance from the DGRE and scant resources, Hart had established a 
working graves service in the Middle East and overseen the hire or purchase of land 
101 CWGC, 2033, War Graves of the Services, 1942. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
1 °4 TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, GREMEF War Diary, August 1942; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE 
War Diary, September 1942; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Middle East and Mediterranean Zone 
Summary, June 1945; CWGC, 2014, Ware to Major General J. S. Steele, 30 September 1942; CWGC, 
2014, CWGC to New Zealand Defence Force, 18 March 1994; Twenty-third Annual Report of the 
Imperial War Graves Commission, (London: HMSO, 1942), p. 1; The Quarterly Army List: October 
1942, p. 2329c; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 177. Menzies followed Hart's example and 
resigned from the AGS in September 1942. See TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, GREMEF War Diary, 
September 1942; Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, (London: 
HMSO, 1944), p. 5. 
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for cemeteries throughout the theatre.105 He had also travelled at length throughout 
his enormous jurisdiction to observe graves operations and to encourage his men in 
their endeavours, his enthusiasm and belief in them and their purpose a key factor in 
GREMEF having survived a difficult beginning.'06 
Hoffman, whom Hart thought a `capable and efficient' officer, was promoted 
Lieutenant Colonel and to the command of GREMEF as ADGRE.107 His 
appointment, which was made through GHQ MEF rather than by the DGRE, was 
notable as no officer had previously worked his way into the upper echelons of the 
AGS from within its ranks, and he was unknown personally to the senior figures at 
the DGRE.108 The selection of Hoffman irked Ware for it was the first senior posting 
made to the graves organisation in either world war that he had not directly 
influenced, and he had wanted Peek to get the job on the basis of his formal 
connection to the IWGC.109 Ware wrote to the DAG to convey his unease at the 
appointment but, having allowed GREMEF to operate as an effectively autonomous 
command since its inception, he did not have a strong case for intervening in such 
matters and his concerns were dismissed.11° 
1 °5 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to Ware, 28 January 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, 
Acquisition of Land for Cemeteries, 16 July 1943; CWGC, 2033, Middle East Memorandum, 29 April 
1941; Twenty -third Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 1; Longworth, The 
Unending Vigil, p. 177. 
106 TNA, PRO WO 169/2593, Number 6 GRU War Diary, October 1941; TNA, PRO WO 169/2536, 
DADGRE War Diary, November 1941. 
107 CWGC, 2014, Hart to Ware, 18 November 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, GREMEF War Diary, 
August 1942. 
108 TNA, PRO CAB 106/454, Operations in Italy, 31 March 1946; CWGC, 2033, Hoffman to Ware, 
circa 27 October 1942. 
109 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September 1942; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Middle 
East and Mediterranean Zone Summary, June 1945; CWGC, 2014, Ware to Major General J. S. 
Steele, 30 September 1942; CWGC, 2014, Hart to Ware, 18 November 1942; CWGC, 2014, CWGC 
to New Zealand Defence Force, 18 March 1994; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 177. 
11° CWGC, 2014, Ware to Major General J. S. Steele, 30 September 1942; The Quarterly Army List: 
October 1942, p. 15. As DGRE director, Ware was required to authorise the appointment, although in 
this case his acquiescence was expected rather than sought. 
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It quickly became evident that Hoffman, who took up his new role as 
scheduled in August 1942, planned on running GREMEF his way. In a letter of 
introduction he informed Ware of his intention to institute the practice of writing and 
submitting to the War Office regular reports on the state of graves operations in the 
theatre." Hoffman and his officers also embarked on a tour of the graves units, 
returning fully cognisant of their difficulties and of the enormous challenge the AGS 
faced.112 For all the efforts of GREMEF over the previous two years, it remained 
that the exact whereabouts and identity of the bodies of thousands of British 
servicemen were not known.113 In the Western Desert, for instance, lay the remains 
of approximately 20,000 British and Dominion soldiers, the majority of whom were 
either in unregistered graves or in the open.114 Moreover, many of these bodies were 
behind enemy lines, including those - referred to by AGS personnel as `Wavell's 
Lot' - who had lain unattended in Cyrenaica for two years.115 If GREMEF were to 
recover within the near future, to the 
whereabouts and identity of the dead disappeared, the AGS would need to put more 
men into the field. Thus, in anticipation of an Eighth Army advance across the 
Western Desert and the freeing of all the North African battlefields for graves 
operations, Hoffman embarked on a recruitment drive.116 The subsequent and 
decisive victory won by the British and Dominion forces at El Alamein in the 
autumn proved it a wise decision. 
1 1 1 CWGC, 2033, Hoffman to Ware, circa 27 October 1942. 
112 Ibid. 
11' TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, Hoffman to Peek, 4 December 1942. 
114 Ellis, The World War II Databook, p. 255. There are no statistics on how many graves had been 
registered by the autumn of 1942, but it is unlikely to have been more than a few thousand and, 
probably, closer to 1000 -2000. 
115 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 177. General Sir 
Archibald Wavell commanded British forces in the 1940 -41 Cyrenaica campaign. 
16 TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Middle East and Mediterranean Zone Summary, June 1945; Longworth, 
The Unending Vigil, p. 177. 
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 Recruitment to GREMEF 
While Hoffman was desperate to increase the strength of GREMEF, he refused to do 
so at any cost. In common with most AGS officers, he believed that an undermanned 
organisation staffed by men wholly committed to its service was preferable to one 
which included those without any appreciation of or interest in, its task. This meant 
identifying soldiers who would find the successful location and identification of 
bodies a worthwhile and important endeavour.117 Accordingly, GREMEF officers - 
including one known widely as `Bones of the Eighth' - made it clear to servicemen 
interested in being seconded to the AGS that the work was difficult, often gruesome, 
and not for those looking for an easy war behind the frontline.118 Eighth Army 
soldiers who remained undeterred after these warnings were then interviewed by 
Hoffman and senior members of his staff to determine whether they were suitable for 
the AGS.119 In questioning the applicants, GREMEF officers sought to identify 
those who were meticulous and dedicated by nature, reasoning that men with these 
characteristics would be most likely to attend to the smallest details of a case and to 
persevere with its investigation regardless of any complications and complexities 
encountered. Hoffman and his assistants also tried to find personnel with skills that 
would be of practical benefit to the AGS: those who had experience as clerks or 
draughtsmen, for instance.12o 
11' Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 178; CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
18 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; CWGC, 2033, Hoffman to Fraser, 20 December 1943. Just 
as men were not forced into the service of the AGS, all those in its employ were allowed to leave at 
any point. For example, see TNA, PRO WO 169/2593, Number 6 GRU War Diary, October 1941. 
119 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, January 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13802, GREMEF War Diary, July, December 1943; CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
120 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Staff List, circa September 1943. 
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Eventually sufficient numbers of officers and other rank servicemen were 
recruited to allow for the staffing of several new AGS units, although not quite the 
four that GREMEF had formed in the interim. Hoffman soon found himself moving 
men between the British units in order to make up the strength of the newly- raised 
Numbers 11, 12, 17 and 18 GRU, with Number 9 GRU disbanded in the autumn of 
1942 and its personnel posted to Number 12 GRU in order that it could be fully 
staffed.121 Transferring experienced personnel into new units served another purpose 
in that it meant no one formation was composed entirely of untrained recruits. 
Hoffman even acknowledged to a senior aide that he had `milked' an established unit 
`dry' in this regard.122 Although men new to GREMEF were expected to learn fast 
and on the job, all were posted where they could gain knowledge from others, and 
officers were given basic instruction in AGS operations as well as copies of Field 
Service Regulations.123 By the winter of 1942 -43, the new recruits had been 
deployed in the field. 
At this time the majority of GREMEF units were operating in the Western 
Desert.124 Hoffman expected them to remain there until their work was finished, and 
to then gradually work their way westwards towards the First Army which had 
121 TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Middle East and Mediterranean Zone Summary, June 1945; TNA, PRO 
WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, April 1942; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, January 
1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, GREMEF War Diary, July 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/6821, 11 
GRU War Diary, August- December 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to Major V. H. 
Dixon, 29 January 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to Major V. H. Dixon, 8 February 
1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to War Office, 13 February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13802, GREMEF War Diary, January- February 1943. Permission to raise Numbers 13, 14, 15 
and 16 GRU was given to West Africa Command in July 1942, but the units were never formed. 
There were two Indian graves units operating in Iraq, although these were not attached to GREMEF. 
See TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, July 1941, July 1942. 
122 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to Major V. H. Dixon, 29 January 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13802, GREMEF War Diary, January 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to Major V. H. 
Dixon, 8 February 1943. 
123 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13802, Hoffman to Major V. H. Dixon, 8 February 1943; CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
124 Hoffman had lost the services of Number 1 Australian GRU. It had been withdrawn from Palestine 
in the autumn in order to return to Australia with its national force. 
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landed on the French North African coast in November.125 However, when informed 
by the War Office that graves concentration work in Egypt was not to delay the 
commencement of registration operations along the Eighth Army line of advance - 
the Adjutant General's department was anxious to divest responsibility for the 
control of military cemeteries to the IWGC as soon as possible - Hoffman was 
forced to alter his plans.126 Estimating that `registrations in the Eighth Army battle 
zone' would `take six months at a minimum' to complete should GREMEF remain at 
its current strength, he cancelled all leave, issued an exhortation to senior officers `to 
make every effort to instil enthusiasm and "drive" into the minds of all personnel 
during the coming 3 or 4 months', and ordered Number 10 Graves Concentration 
Unit (GCU), a unit of eighteen months standing but which had only recently come 
under his direct authority, to transfer from Addis Ababa to El Alamein in order that 
he might free several GRUs for operations further west.127 
125 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to Major V. H. Dixon, 8 February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13802, Hoffman to War Office, 13 February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, 
August- September 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, Hoffman to Ware, 26 November 1942; Ellis, The 
World War II Databook, p. 34. 
126 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to Major V. H. Dixon, 8 February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
169/6811, Hoffman to Eighth Army Rear Headquarters, 24 November 1942; TNA, PRO WO 
169/6811, Hoffman to Ware, 26 November 1942; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, 
February 1943. 
127 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to Major V. H. Dixon, 8 February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13802, Hoffman to War Office, 13 February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, GREMEF War 
Diary, January 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, Hoffman to Eighth Army Rear Headquarters, 24 
November 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, Hoffman to Ware, 26 November 1942; TNA, PRO WO 
169/6811, Hoffman to Peek, 4 December 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War 
Diary, January 1943. Number 10 GCU, formed on a specially- devised War Establishment in August 
1941 from South African personnel who had been left behind in East Africa following the transfer of 
the two UDF graves units to Cairo, had operated under the command of EAF. See TNA, PRO WO 
165/35, DGRE War Diary, September 1941; TNA, PRO WO 169/6820, Number 10 GCU War Diary, 
April- October 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/6819, Number 10 GCU War Diary, November -December 
1942; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Middle East and Mediterranean Zone Summary, June 1945. 
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Section III: A Study of Number 10 GCU 
The Redeployment of Number 10 GCU 
In mid -January 1943, Major R. H. Fry, the South African commanding officer of 
Number 10 GCU, led his unit, the first British or Dominion unit in the Second World 
War to be dedicated solely to graves concentration, to Cairo.128 There he recruited 
several personnel to strengthen his depleted sections, and drew from MEF the 
equipment needed for their operations in the Western Desert.129 These included a 
compass, binoculars, camera, typewriter, metal and woven measuring tapes and a 
first aid kit.130 The unit was also supplied with rations and petrol and equipped with 
three trucks.131 The three officers and nine other rank personnel who comprised 
Number 10 GCU proceeded to El Alamein in mid -February, where they established 
camp in a series of disused dugouts adjacent to the cemetery, informed the regional 
mayor of their arrival, and advised nearby military officials of their future supply 
needs.132 
One week later Fry had established what needed to be done and how his men 
should go about it. A preliminary reconnaissance of the region had determined that 
at least 2000 graves, lying isolated or in Allied and enemy battlefield burial grounds, 
as well as many unburied bodies, required concentration into the El Alamein 
128 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, January -February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13802, Staff List, circa September 1943; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Middle East and 
Mediterranean Zone Summary, June 1945. 
129 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, January -February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13802, Hoffman to Ware, 28 January 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to Major V. H. 
Dixon, 8 February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to War Office, 13 February 1943; 
TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Memorandum 7592AG1, 9 June 1943. 
130 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Major V. H. Dixon to Lieutenant Buchanan, 29 May 1943; CWGC, 
2033, Instruction Manual, March 1944. 
131 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, February 1943. 
132 Ibid. The strength of Number 10 GCU remained steady throughout its time at El Alamein. For 
example, see TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Field Strength Returns, May 1943. 
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cemetery.133 Because some of these graves and remains also needed to be registered, 
Fry decreed that his men, rather than waiting for the assistance of GRU personnel, 
should perform registration `so that any bodies for identification could be exhumed 
... and removed to the [El Alamein] Cemetery thus obviating the necessity for re- 
burial at the same spot.' 134 There was a need to expedite the process as the initial 
search region alone covered tens of thousands of square miles, while the fact that all 
remains found by the unit were to be brought for burial to the northern extreme of the 
operational area would further lengthen the time required for concentration.135 As 
Fry realised, his unit was faced with a labour of at least several months, perhaps even 
a year or more.136 
Operations in the Western Desert 
There were two main tasks which Fry set his men once Number 10 GCU commenced 
operations in late February. The first involved working at El Alamein cemetery, 
which had been established near to the town railway station by Eighth Army 
servicemen during the fighting in 1942. Designated as permanent by GREMEF 
authorities in the winter of 1942 -43 on account of its flatness; an accessible position 
adjacent to the coast, a settlement and a road; the nearby supplies of water and 
construction materials; and its iconic location, it already contained the remains of 
133 TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, Hoffman to Ware, 26 November 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, 
Hoffman to Peek, 4 December 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to War Office, 13 
February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, March -April 1943; CWGC, 
2033, Thomas Recollections. 
'34 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, February 1943. 
135 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, Hoffman to Ware, 26 November 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, 
Hoffman Memorandum, 2 December 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Concentration Cemeteries, 
February 1943; CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
136 TNA, PRO WO 169/13813, Number 10 GCU (Number 2 Section) War Diary, August 1943; TNA, 
PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, December 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/18054, 
Number 10 GCU War Diary, January -February 1944. 
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approximately 1300 men and was expected to contain several thousand bodies by the 
time of its completion, possibly as many as 6000.137 In the meantime the existing 
graves needed attention and so they were tidied, unused sections of the cemetery 
prepared to receive further bodies, and solid walls built in order to keep out the sand 
which crept over the graves.138 
The second task, and the one to which the majority of personnel were 
committed, involved searching the Egyptian regions of the Western Desert for the 
dead and returning them to El Alamein for permanent burial. Sometimes these 
operations were pursued close to unit headquarters, particularly during adverse 
weather or when the trucks were not running well, with the men returning to camp 
each night.139 There was, for instance, much work to be done collecting the dead 
from the many destroyed armoured vehicles abandoned during the battles for El 
Alamein.14o More commonly, however, the field sections ventured deep into the 
desert, usually for four days at a time, in search of bodies and graves.141 This was a 
sufficient period to allow for the conduct of intensive operations far from El 
137 TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, Hoffman to Ware, 26 November 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, 
Hoffman Memorandum, 2 December 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to War Office, 13 
February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Concentration Cemeteries, February 1943; TNA, PRO 
WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, May 1943; CWGC, 2033, Godfrey Talbot Talk, 6 
December 1942; IWM, 99/16/1, Major A. F. Flatow; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 179. Some 
of these 1300 burials had been made by soldiers during the battle for El Alamein, while others had 
been performed by AGS personnel who had worked in the area before the arrival of Number 10 GCU. 
The five cemeteries earmarked as permanent in the Egyptian regions of the Western Desert - at El 
Alamein, Sidi Marrani, El Daba, Mersa Matruh and Sollum - were all located on the coastal road 
running between Alexandria and Tripoli. Of these, it was expected that the cemetery at El Alamein 
would be the biggest. 
138 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, February- March, October 1943; CWGC, 
2033, Godfrey Talbot Talk, 6 December 1942. 
139 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
14° TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, March -April 1943; IWM, 99/16/1, Major 
A. F. Flatow. 
141 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, 
June -July 1943; The Sphere, 22 May 1943. 
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Alamein, but also short enough to ensure that any exhumed remains would not be 
exposed to further deterioration.142 
These longer expeditions required careful planning and organisation. The 
preparatory process began with officers identifying a particular target zone within the 
wider search region and then collating from burial returns and casualty lists all the 
information pertaining to deaths, interments and missing personnel therein.143 
Thereafter compass bearings and mileages to and from El Alamein were calculated, 
the appropriate quantities of petrol and rations drawn, and a work schedule 
formulated.144 Finally, Fry took a note of the proposed movements of each unit 
section in order that he would know where to send assistance should person or 
vehicle suffer an accident during the course of the week.145 
Once in the field, it was common for the men to find no trace of reported 
battlefield graves. In the period since interment, fierce desert winds had blown away 
crosses and rifles that had once identified burial sites, while other markers had been 
overgrown and obscured from view by camel scrub bush, crushed by the military 
traffic which had criss- crossed the Western Desert continually since 1940, or 
removed by Bedouin for firewood.146 Many graves and small cemeteries had simply 
been swallowed by the shifting desert sand.147 Personnel thus became vigilant in 
142 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, August 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13802, American Cemetery Memorandum, 27 February 1943. 
143 TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, Hoffman to Peek, 4 December 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, 
Number 10 GCU War Diary, March 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser Report, 30 March 1944; 
CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; CWGC, 2033, Instruction Manual, March 1944. Usually 
something was known about when and where the missing had disappeared. 
144 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, 
October 1943. 
145 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
146 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, Hoffman Memorandum, 2 December 1942; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, March 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to War 
Office, 11 June 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser Report, 30 March 1944. 
147 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; TNA, PRO WO 169/6811, Hoffman Memorandum, 2 
December 1942; TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, March 1943. Crosses 
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looking for other signs -a lone helmet, a collection of stones, inverted bottles and 
tins - that might indicate a grave was nearby. 
Locating the remains of Eighth Army dead proved a painstaking and often 
frustrating process. One Number 10 GCU section spent six days searching part of 
the Qattara Depression and found only one grave.148 On a separate occasion a 
member of the unit followed a set of vehicle tracks for miles only to discover that the 
indents in the sand had been caused by a large petrol drum being blown about the 
desert.149 Another member, having come across a mound of earth surrounded by a 
neat fence, decided to excavate on the assumption that he had discovered an 
unidentified burial ground: he unearthed a one -time meat dump.150 A further, 
inexperienced, member abandoned a disinterment when he discovered long hair and 
combs in the grave and reasoned that he had found the remains of a woman civilian. 
The skeleton was that of a Sikh soldier.151 But the men were never easily deterred. 
One officer noted of his sergeant that he `was as keen and as enthusiastic a man as I 
ever met', recalling that once their section arrived at its designated site `he never 
gave up whilst there was any reason to believe that there could be graves in the 
area.' 1 52 
A successful search for graves always involved such persistence and 
dedication, as well as considerable skill and ingenuity. On one occasion two officers 
set out to find the grave of a pilot reported to have been buried approximately 100 
found in very loose sand often marked entombments rather than burials. Entombing casualties meant 
interring them several feet down and surrounded with heavy objects in order to secure the remains. At 
one mass entombment, Number 10 GCU personnel had to dig their way past packing cases, railway 
sleepers and truck engine bonnets to unearth the eighty bodies therein. 
148 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, June 1943. 





miles south of Sollum. Driving cross country they found their way to the general 
area by sun compass, this an achievement in itself. The officers then proceeded to 
search methodically an area of 400 square miles for the grave, finding it on their 
fourth day of looking. The body, along with two others disinterred from unrecorded 
graves discovered on the outward journey, was exhumed and driven to Sollum for 
reburial. ' 53 
A separate case involved one of the unit's officers enlisting civilian assistance 
to find the remains of a pilot who had been buried next to his downed aircraft, 
repeated efforts to locate the crash site having failed on account of the vast amount of 
military wreckage littering the search area. The officer, who had acquired a 
knowledge of colloquial Arabic during the course of his service in Number 10 GCU, 
asked a group of passing Bedouin if they were aware of the aircraft and grave in 
question whereupon a tribesman promptly led the section twelve miles to the exact 
location.''¢ Once it had been exhumed, the body, as was the custom with all remains 
handled by the unit, was wrapped carefully in a blanket, bound with telephone wire - 
discarded lengths of which were found scattered everywhere throughout the Western 
Desert - and then guarded from animals and humans until it was reinterred in a 
permanent cemetery.'" 
Difficult and painstaking as these concentrations were, the work was harder 
still when unnamed graves and remains had first to be identified and registered. In 
such cases identification was pursued through several methods. Sometimes rubbing 
a pencil across faded markings was enough to reveal the original inscriptions and 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
iss Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, April 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13802, Hoffman to War Office, 11 June 1943; CWGC, 2033, Instruction Manual, March 1944. 
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produce a name, whether on paper, a weathered cross, or damaged identity discs: 
these discs, made of a relatively weak fibrous material, were commonly rendered 
illegible or completely destroyed through prolonged exposure to heat, water, and the 
acids and gases released by soil and decomposing bodies.156 Otherwise, the area in 
which the remains had been found was combed for evidence of identity. Personnel 
looked in particular for items that could be tied to an individual such as military - 
issue denture plates, which carried a unique service number, and personal objects 
such as diaries, letters and photographs.157 If none of these were found, attempts 
were made at identifying the dead by a process of elimination. The finding of an 
epaulette or a particular piece of headgear could prove to which unit the dead man 
belonged, while a badge of rank on a sleeve or the presence of a certain type of 
weapon further limited the number of names that could be matched with the body. 
Records might then reveal that only one person of that unit, rank and function had 
been killed in the area.158 Similarly, when dealing with remains, careful note was 
made of individual characteristics and the nature of any wounds in the hope that this 
information, taken in conjunction with other evidence, might eventually allow for 
their successful identification.' 59 The dead could also be named through association. 
156 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, 
March 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Major V. H. Dixon to War Office, 19 June 1943; TNA, PRO 
WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, June, November 1943; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Brigadier C. S. 
Vale Minute, 23 August 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/14817, Marking War Graves Memorandum, 
Undated; IWM, 93/32/1, Wing Commander B.O. Dias; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 19. 
157 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; CWGC, 2033, Instruction Manual, March 1944. 
158 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; TNA, PRO WO 169/13809, Number 5 GRU War Diary, 
January 1943. Graves personnel were always mindful that it was common for soldiers to exchange kit 
and equipment with others. 
159 CWGC, 2033, Instruction Manual, March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 169/13809, Number 5 GRU War 
Diary, January 1943. If so instructed by the AGS, the DGRE would write to next -of -kin or their 
associates requesting more information about the deceased. One such letter read: '[i]n order to assist 
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For instance, the remains scraped from the weaponry seat of a tank were most likely 
those of the gunner.16° 
Personnel did not form their own judgments as to the veracity of the evidence 
they gathered but simply submitted it, and a report cataloguing their findings, to Fry 
for review.161 This could take weeks, months even, in instances where the records 
against which the evidence needed checking were held at the War Office. If and 
when Fry was able to confirm the identities of the dead, sturdy markers to replace the 
temporary wooden crosses were manufactured for erection above their graves: these 
were produced in the shape of a Christian crucifix, the Star of David or other 
appropriate religious symbol, and were indented or inscribed with name, rank, 
military number, unit and date of death.162 Conversely, where Fry had doubts, 
however small, as to the identity of remains, they were buried as unknown and the 
grave crested with a marker on which was embossed only that which had been 
definitely established about the dead man; perhaps his nationality, armed service or 
unit.163 Of those men interred as `An Unknown Serviceman' there was nothing 
known. 
It was the successful conclusion of difficult investigations that best pleased 
the men. `It was most gratifying', a unit officer remembered, to `receive a batch of 
completed pre- fabricated metal crosses from Cairo and know that one's efforts had 
confirmed - and sometimes otherwise - that some -one, somewhere, would at last 
160 CWGC, 2033, Instruction Manual, March 1944. 
161 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
162 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, March 1943; CWGC, 2033, Notes 
for Graves Units, 5 June 1943. 
163 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, March 1943; CWGC, 2033, Thomas 
Recollections; CWGC, 2033, Instruction Manual, March 1944; Research Trip by Author to El 
Alamein War Cemetery, September 2004. If the religion was known, the marker would take the 
appropriate form. 
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know what really had happened to that chap who had been reported "Missing" 
months and months ago, and what had happened to his remains'.164 
A Difficult Existence 
Such successes were important, for the men could easily become dispirited or 
depressed by the macabre nature of the work and its many difficulties. Operations 
were regularly conducted in temperatures higher than fifty degrees Celsius, while 
personnel had to contend with the threat of malaria brought by the wet season, as 
well as the violent rains and sandstorms that swept through the Western Desert 
halting work for days at a time.165 Further difficulties arose from the manner in 
which the Eighth Army had buried and reported its dead. Many of the bodies and 
possessions exhumed from near the Mediterranean Sea were found to be sodden, 
rendering their identification impossible, with other complications caused by crosses 
having been placed over the wrong graves, the spreading of remains between 
different plots, incorrectly transcribed records, and erroneous map references cited in 
burial returns.166 Mines proved an insuperable problem, with several Number 10 
GCU personnel killed or maimed by their explosion during the course of 
operations. 167 
164 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
16' Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, April, November 1943; TNA, PRO 
WO 169/6816, Number 5 GRU (Unit and Detachment) War Diary, January 1942; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13832, 2 Platoon, 46 Quartermaster Graves Registration Company, May 1943. 
166 Peter Roach, The 8.15 to War - Memoirs of a Desert Rat: El Alamein, Wadi Halfa, Tunis, Salerno, 
Garigliano, Normandy and Holland, (London: Leo Cooper, 1982), p. 98; CWGC, 2033, Thomas 
Recollections; CWGC, 2033, Instruction Manual, March 1944. 
167 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, April -May, October -November 1943; 
CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
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Because of the potential for his men to become downcast, Fry took care to 
rest them from field operations.168 Members of his unit were periodically assigned to 
the El Alamein cemetery where the work was safer, less grisly than the task of 
concentrating bodies, and not as physically demanding. There the men were helped 
by indentured Italian POWs as well as labourers hired from among the local 
population. 1 69 This rotation policy also served a practical purpose, for Fry was wary 
of losing personnel and then having to replace them with soldiers who were graves 
concentration novices and unfamiliar with the desert and its conditions. Allowing 
the men a day off every week was an equally important aspect of their pastoral care, 
with personnel able to use each Sunday to relax or to involve themselves in the 
activities Fry organised. These included sparring with the boxing gloves provided to 
the unit under a GREMEF welfare provision, and playing cricket against the soldiers 
of the New Zealand GRU who were stationed nearby. ' 7° 
Section IV: The Development of the Graves Organisation and the Conduct of its 
Operations Before D -Day 
The Raising and Deployment of Number 8 GRU 
At the same time as Hoffman was strengthening GREMEF in the autumn of 1942 
with a view to its pushing westwards across North Africa with the Eighth Army, the 
DGRE raised Number 8 GRU for attachment to the Anglo- American First Army in 
168 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, April 1943; CWGC, 2033, Thomas 
Recollections. 
169 TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, February- March, October 1943; TNA, 
PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman Memorandum, circa October 1943. 
170 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Despatch Note, 28 June 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 
GCU War Diary, June 1943. Fry was later promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and put in charge of all 
GREMEF concentration operations. See TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Staff List, circa September 
1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13811, Number 10 GCU War Diary, November 1943. 
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the event of its deployment to French North Africa.17' There were two reasons for 
the unit's formation. First, the DGRE was keen to avoid a repeat of recent events 
when no AGS personnel had accompanied British forces to Madagascar because the 
DGRE had not been informed of their departure; and second it was cognisant that the 
GREMEF remit did not extend as far as Tunisia and Algeria.172 
Command of Number 8 GRU, which had been raised at Aldershot on the 
1931 GRU War Establishment and was the first unit formed by the DGRE in three 
years, was given to Captain S. C. G. Donovan, Intelligence Corps.173 Formerly the 
Senior Postmaster in the Colonial Office and in his mid -fifties, he had lived in a 
number of countries and spoke five languages fluently, including French.174 After 
two months of preparations, the thoroughness of which earned Ware's 
commendation, Donovan, his two fellow officers, and thirty -five other rank 
personnel disembarked at Algiers on 13 November 1942, five days after the First 
Army landings along the French North African coast.175 
Their deployment did not proceed as planned. The DGRE had intended for 
the unit to follow the First Army in its eastwards advance towards Tunis. Yet in the 
weeks after their arrival Donovan and his men found themselves confined to Algiers 
on account of their being without transport or equipment.176 By January the unit had 
secured its vehicles and supplies, but little operational progress had been made. As 
171 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, August- September 1942. 
172 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, May 1942. See also TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE 
War Diary, November 1942. 
13 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, August- September 1942; TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, 
Number 8 GRU War Diary, November 1942. 
174 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Donovan to AFHQ, 7 February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, 
Donovan to AFHQ, 16 February 1943. 
175 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Number 8 GRU War Diary, November 1942; TNA, PRO WO 
175/1330, Donovan to AFHQ, 7 February 1943; Ellis, The World War II Databook, p. 34. 
176 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Number 8 GRU War Diary, November 1942; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, 
Fraser Report, 30 March 1944. 
84 
Donovan lamented, the accommodation provided to the unit was cramped and 
isolated, while the need for him to travel up to 100 kilometres a day in order to 
inspect cemeteries left him little opportunity to complete his administrative tasks.177 
He was frustrated also by the absence of a DADGRE at Allied Force Headquarters 
(AFHQ), the War Office having refused the DGRE sanction to appoint an officer to 
this position.178 Donovan noted that `[m]uch of the work now done is not proper to a 
Registration Unit, but is what should be done by the D. A. [Deputy Assistant] 
Director's Department'.179 The man to whom he had been made responsible, the 
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General at AFHQ, had no expertise in graves matters and 
provided no advice.180 Donovan's problems were compounded when most of his 
personnel were seconded to other duties, leaving Number 8 GRU with only one 
clerk, one draughtsman, and one general labourer by the end of January.181 
Feeling that a lack of support from AFHQ had made his position untenable, 
Donovan requested to be relieved of the command of Number 8 GRU.182 He did so 
unaware that the `A' Staff had produced a report in which he was accused, among 
other things, of being indecisive and too old to take charge of a graves unit.183 
Donovan, who thought these criticisms unfair, wrote numerous letters, including 
177 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Number 8 GRU War Diary, January- February 1943. 
178 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September 1942. 
179 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Number 8 GRU War Diary, January 1943. 
180 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September 1942. 
181 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Number 8 GRU War Diary, January- February 1943. At the same time 
an embossing machine and a vehicle were taken from the unit for use elsewhere. 
182 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Number 8 GRU War Diary, January -February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
175/1330, Donovan to AFHQ, 4 February 1943. 
183 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Number 8 GRU War Diary, February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, 
Donovan to AFHQ, 7 February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Donovan to AFHQ, 16 February 
1943; TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, AFHQ to Donovan, 18 February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, 
AFHQ to Donovan, 4 March 1943. 
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some to Ware, in an attempt to clear his name.184 His efforts were to no avail. On 18 
February he was ordered to relinquish his command and return to Britain.185 
Following Donovan's departure, AFHQ reorganised its graves force in an 
attempt to conclude a wholly unsatisfactory episode. In March Number 8 GRU was 
reformed on the MEF War Establishment and a new unit, Number 19 GRU, 
created.186 The latter was raised for service in the forward areas in Tunisia, while the 
restructured Number 8 GRU was attached to the First Army L of C and remained in 
Algeria.187 Problems remained, however, with Number 8 GRU having only three 
persons of the stipulated thirteen on its strength well after its reformation had been 
effected.188 AFHQ soon conceded that Numbers 8 and 19 GRU were `under 
considerable pressure of work with a great deal of leeway to make good in the First 
Army area.' 189 
Hoffman is Called to the War Office 
In light of these difficulties, in March Hoffman was summoned to the War Office to 
discuss the state of graves operations in the Middle East and North Africa.190 His 
stay in Britain produced two important developments. First, a decision was taken to 
bring Numbers 8 and 19 GRU under his command and to accord GREMEF 
184 For example, see TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Donovan to Ware, 26 February 1943. 
185 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, AFHQ to Donovan, 18 February 1943; TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, 
AFHQ to Donovan, 4 March 1943. 
186 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Number 8 GRU War Diary, March 1943; TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, 
AFHQ to Donovan, 4 March 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, GREMEF War Diary, March 1943. 
Number 19 GRU was raised on the MEF War Establishment. 
187 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Number 8 GRU War Diary, March 1943; TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, 
AFHQ to Donovan, 4 March 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, March 1943; TNA, 
PRO WO 169/13802, Location of Graves Units, 20 July 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman 
to War Office, 21 July 1943. 
188 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Number 8 GRU War Diary, March 1943. 
189 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, AFHQ Memorandum, 13 May 1943. 
'9° TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, GREMEF War Diary, March 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE 
War Diary, March 1943. 
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responsibility for all graves operations in Algeria and Tunisia.191 As Ware now 
recognised, logistically it did not make sense to have two graves forces in northern 
Africa working independently of each other, while the amalgamation of the separate 
organisations would be beneficial in that it would allow Hoffman to transfer a 
number of experienced GREMEF personnel into the beleaguered British North 
Africa Force (BNAF) units.192 To ensure that GREMEF could cope with these 
enlarged responsibilities, the organisation would again be expanded and a DADGRE 
to assist Hoffman appointed to AFHQ to oversee operations in French North 
Africa.193 
The second development came when the IWGC agreed to assume control of 
completed military cemeteries in the Middle East and North Africa theatres from the 
DGRE. This transfer of responsibility would be done on a case -by -case basis and 
according to the provisos that the cemetery was in a presentable condition, no longer 
in a battle zone, and that each burial within it had been fully documented.194 At the 
same time as this agreement was struck, senior IWGC officials petitioned Hoffman 
to accept a position within their organisation as Deputy Controller of North Africa 
District.195 They reasoned he was the man best -placed to coordinate the handover of 
cemeteries in the region from the army to the IWGC, and to this end wanted him to 
191 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, March, June 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, 
Hoffman to War Office, 21 July 1943; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Middle East and Mediterranean 
Zone Summary, June 1945; CWGC, 2033, Ware to War Office, 27 March 1943; CWGC, 2033, Ware 
to War Office, 2 December 1943. 
192 CWGC, 2033, Ware to War Office, 27 March 1943. 
193 TNA, PRO WO 175/1330, Number 8 GRU War Diary, April 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, 
DGRE War Diary, April 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, GREMEF War Diary, March, May 1943; 
TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to Ware, 10 June 1943; CWGC, 2033, Ware to War Office, 27 
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194 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, February- March, June 1943; TNA, PRO WO 
169/13802, Cipher Message, 28 May 1943; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 178. 
195 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, March 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Cipher 
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be given an IWGC post.196 Hoffman accepted the unpaid role, which was to be 
performed in conjunction with his army duties but as the secondary of his two 
concerns.197 
A Period of Change 
Upon his return to Cairo at the end of May, Hoffman embarked on the reformation 
and expansion of GREMEF.198 He gained authorisation from GHQ MEF to raise 
five new graves units, four of which were for registration purposes and the other for 
concentration.199 However, his capacity to plan for the future was curtailed when he 
learnt that Peek was to return to full -time work with the IWGC and would need to be 
replaced, and that the DADGRE at AFHQ, having only recently been appointed, was 
being recalled by the War Office to undertake a special assignment in another 
theatre.200 Compounding these unforeseen difficulties was news of the poor state of 
graves operations in East Africa. Graves units operating there had yet to hand over 
burial grounds to the IWGC despite there having been no hostilities in the region for 
two years: `cemeteries in Abyssinia and the Somalilands', Hoffman wrote, `are "No 
one's Baby" and are not properly maintained or periodically inspected'.2 
°1 
196 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to War Office, 11 June 1943. 
197 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, March 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Cipher 
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At this time Hoffman sent Macallan a detailed review of the deployment of 
Number 8 GRU. He wrote that the sending of only this unit to French North Africa 
had not been `sufficient for the territory and task in hand', and that on deployment 
the unit `was wrongly constituted and had not from the practicable point of view 
received any initial training or adequate instructions as to their duties and 
responsibilities.'202 Nor, he continued, had Numbers 8 and 19 GRU been properly 
provisioned and equipped, observing that [t]he "A" Staff at B.N.A.F. were also (as 
usual in large formations) unaware of G.R. requirements and functions'.203 The 
review recommended that the Field Service Regulations relevant to the graves 
organisation be redrafted, and cautioned that the deployment of AGS personnel to the 
Continent would require extensive resources and the backing of an ordered and 
committed organisation if the difficulties experienced by Number 8 GRU were not to 
be revisited.204 
On a different matter, Hoffman asked the War Office to define exactly what it 
accepted as constituting a body. He explained that GCU personnel had opened many 
graves in which little or no trace of bodily remains had been found, and while 
acknowledging that in these cases `[c]oncentration is "truthfully" out of the 
question', he wondered whether it would be permissible to bury a `body' `by 
removing some earth from the site or sites and placing it in a sandbag and re- 
interring it in a permanent cemetery.'2°5 
Summary, June 1945. Due to a convoluted administrative arrangement, graves policy in East Africa 
was formulated and controlled by the regional command in Nairobi rather than GREMEF. This made 
it difficult for Hoffman to influence graves operations there in any substantive way. 
2Q.. CWGC, 2033, Hoffman Report, 12 June 1943. 
203 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, General Order (Middle East) 147, 12 March 1943; TNA, PRO 
WO 169/13802, Hoffman to War Office, 11 June 1943. In March, Hoffman had issued a General 
Order reminding commanders of the responsibility they had to assist AGS operations. 
204 CWGC, 2033, Hoffman Report, 12 June 1943. 
205 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to War Office, 11 June 1943. The underlining is Hoffman's. 
89 
The task of addressing these issues fell to Colonel S. G. G. Fraser, who 
replaced Macallan as AAG in July.206 It was a good portent for the future of the 
graves organisation that Fraser thought similarly to Hoffman. The new AAG was 
adamant that the AGS required immediate and major reform if its important task 
were to be done properly.207 He agreed that Field Service Regulations needed to be 
revised to make them clearer and more definite, and acknowledged the importance of 
better training for personnel and the necessity of the DGRE appointing liaison 
officers to facilitate a closer relationship between the graves service and the wider 
army.208 In this regard he urged Ware to appoint a DADGRE with responsibility for 
Italy, and to authorise an AGS deployment to Sicily where the Eighth Army had 
landed in early July.209 Although this would mean that operations in North Africa 
and the Middle East would take longer to complete, the numbers of lost and 
unidentifiable bodies and graves in Italy would be reduced if the AGS followed close 
behind the army. 
On the subject of the body, Fraser formulated two general rules for the 
guidance of officers. The first read: [ w]here there is satisfactory evidence that an 
actual interment of some of the mortal remains of the deceased took place but 
nothing can be found on exhumation, it may be assumed that the remains have been 
absorbed into the soil, and "concentration" can take the form of moving a bag of soil 
to the new grave.'210 To this directive Fraser added that `[n]o mention of the fact of 
no actual remains having been found, which might cause distress to the relatives, 
'06 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, August 1943; The Quarterly Army List: October 1943, 
Part I, (London: HMSO, 1943), p. 42. 
207 CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware, 2 August 1943. 
208 Ibid.; CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware (Appendix B), 2 August 1943. 
209 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, August 1943; Ellis, The World War II Databook, 
p. 37. 
'10 CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Hoffman, 22 October 1943. 
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should be made on any documentary reports concerning this concentration.'211 The 
second rule he explained to Hoffman thus: `[w]here no burial ever took place it is 
best to treat the case as that of an unlocated [sic] grave and the name would be 
eventually commemorated among the missing at the appropriate cemetery.'212 
Number 11 GRU and a detachment from Number 18 GRU, along with a 
DADGRE to supervise operations, were deployed to Sicily in August.213 While the 
late entry of the units into the Italian campaign meant that graves work on the island 
began six weeks in arrears, their deployment marked a seminal moment nonetheless: 
it was the first AGS operation launched outside of Africa in more than three years.214 
Shortly after the graves contingent landed on Sicily, the GREMEF jurisdiction was 
extended to include Italy and the command renamed the Graves Registration and 
Enquiries (GRE) Mediterranean Poo1.215 
Change was also afoot within the DGRE in London. In the knowledge that 
his office was falling behind in its work of processing registration reports and 
answering public queries about grave locations, Ware petitioned the War Office for 
more staff.216 The addition of thirty -two personnel - raising the total number of 
people employed at the department to fifty -four - was approved, as was a move from 
the existing DGRE offices within IWGC headquarters at Wooburn House in 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid. 
213 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, August- September 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13814, 
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214 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, August 1943. 
215 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, September 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, 
GREMEF War Diary, September 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Cipher Message, 12 October 
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Buckinghamshire to more spacious War Office accommodation in London.217 
However, by the time the extra staff members arrived, it was realised that the 
increased work caused by the invasion of Sicily would prevent them from clearing 
the administrative backlog. The attachment of a further fifty clerical staff for a 
period of four months was sought and authorised.218 
For his part Hoffman continued to enlarge the AGS, a process he had first 
begun several months earlier. Eleven new units - eight GRUs and three GCUs - 
were raised over the summer and early autumn of 1943. When the GRE 
Mediterranean Pool War Establishment was finalised in December, the number of 
units in the organisation was twenty.219 With few British soldiers having been 
recruited, Hoffman was forced to staff the new formations mostly with Italian 
POWs.22° He knew that many in Britain would be displeased should they learn of 
enemy servicemen handling the remains of their dead - the AGS adopted the 
euphemism `Dilution Personnel' to refer to Italians employed in this regard - but the 
prisoners were a ready source of labour and there was neither option for acting 
217 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, July- August 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE 
Staff, July 1943; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 161. 
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220 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Proposed War Establishment, circa autumn 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, 
Proposed War Establishment (Appendix A), 10 December 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, 
Hoffman Directive, 4 August 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman Directive, 13 August 1943; 
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otherwise nor time to delay.221 Ware now conceded that graves operations would 
extend well into the post -war era, while Hoffman estimated that even with the 
assistance of POWs and hired non -European workers, the concentration of remains 
in the Middle East and North Africa theatres alone would take a minimum of three 
more years to complete.222 
The size of the task and the need for urgency was reflected in the concurrent 
expansion of the administrative arm of the GRE Mediterranean Pool. By December, 
Hoffman, who had been upgraded to Deputy Director Graves Registration and 
Enquiries (DDGRE), was supported by twelve principal officers, three of whom had 
been appointed ADGRE and the remaining nine DADGRE, and a clerical staff of 
approximately 130 based at GRE Mediterranean Pool headquarters in Cairo.223 Of 
those appointed to the role of DADGRE, each was given a specific role relating to 
records, statistics, or field operations.224 A GRE Mediterranean Pool Records Office 
was established in Cairo in December, with a second administrative centre then set 
up in Algiers: divided into `Registrations' and `Concentrations' sections, these 
offices were staffed by clerks who were tested on their skills and knowledge of the 
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2033, Hoffman to Fraser, 20 December 1943. When Hoffman first recruited the Italians to the AGS, 
they were POWs as Italy had yet to change allegiance to the Allied powers. 
2222 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman Note, 27 June 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman 
Note (2), 27 June 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, October -November 1943; TNA, 
PRO WO 165/36, Proposed War Establishment (Appendix A), 10 December 1943. 
223 
TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, GREMEF War Diary, November 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13804, 
GRE Records Office War Diary, December 1943; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Middle East and 
Mediterranean Zone Summary, June 1945; CWGC, 2033, Ware to Office of the Adjutant General, 2 
December 1943. 
224 TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Middle East and Mediterranean Zone Summary, June 1945; TNA, PRO 
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graves organisation before their employment was confirmed.225 The divisions of 
responsibility within the AGS had never been so clearly and professionally ordered. 
Criticisms of Graves Operations 
Amid these developments there was bad news for the DGRE. In December 1943 a 
high -ranking officer from AFHQ informed the Adjutant General of his opinion that 
graves operations in North Africa were not being performed satisfactorily.226 In the 
same month further criticism of the AGS was received from Air Chief Marshal Sir 
Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff (CAS).227 He had recently returned from an 
overseas tour and was so disappointed by the state of the cemetery at Tunis, sections 
of which he labelled `disgraceful', that he had a letter sent to the DGRE to relate 
what he had seen: 
`[m]any graves had wooden crosses without any form of identification, 
some crosses had apparently had names painted on them but this [sic] had 
become illegible on account of the weather and on many of the nameless 
graves were rusty cigarette tins said to contain the particulars of the 
person buried. The C.A.S. states that he opened three of these tins and in 
one he found a paper, the writing on which was illegible, the paper in the 
second tin contained writing which was in the last stage of legibility and 
the third tin was full of ants.'228 
Ware recognised in these criticisms the damning implication that he and his London - 
based staff were ignorant of circumstances in the field.229 He thus sent Fraser to tour 
the Middle East and Mediterranean theatres to assess at first hand the progress of 
225 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman Note, 27 June 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13804, GRE 
Records Office War Diary, December 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/13804, Clerical Trade Test, 
December 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/18050, Minimum Establishment for Records Office, circa 
December 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/18050, Clerical Trade Test, January 1944; TNA, PRO WO 
170/3960, Report by Major C. Huntingdon, 5 January 1944; TNA, PRO WO 170/3960, GRE Records 
Office (Algiers) War Diary, January 1944. 
76 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, December 1943. 
227 TNA, PRO WO 169/18049, Fraser to AFHQ, 20 December 1943; John D. Cantwell, The Second 
World War: A Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office, (Kew: PRO, 1998), p. 37. 
228 TNA, PRO WO 169/18049, Fraser to AFHQ, 20 December 1943. 
79 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, July- December 1943, January 1944. 
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graves operations, and to make the acquaintance of AGS personnel in order to 
establish whether their standard of work and the conditions under which they 
laboured were acceptable.23° 
Between January and March 1944, Fraser travelled over 9000 miles through 
Italy and the countries of North Africa and the Levant.231 He was impressed by the 
dedication and bravery of AGS personnel, and pleased that they welcomed his 
presence as a demonstration `that the higher authorities had an interest in them and 
their work': as one officer noted, there had been puzzlement as to why the War 
Office had not previously `thought fit to send a representative to visit the Graves 
Registration Service in the Mediterranean theatres where active operations had been 
in progress for nearly three years.'232 Fraser afforded special praise to Hoffman, 
whose efforts at forcing supplies and support from `A' Staff officers he recognised as 
having been pivotal to the development of the AGS.233 The AAG soon came to the 
conclusion that the frontline units were responsible for many of the shortcomings in 
the treatment of the dead: 
[f]rom even a brief trip through Algeria and Tunisia it appears that a great 
deal of the work now being done by Graves Service Units has been 
caused not so much by the absence of Graves Service staff and units as 
by the neglect of formations and units to carry out normal battle 
procedure. In many cases no formation burial grounds were selected or 
made known to units, battlefields were not cleared, nor did many units 
bury their dead, as unburied are still being found in open positions. Even 
where burial was carried out little attempt was made to collect bodies at 
23° TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, December 1943, January 1944; TNA, PRO WO 
165/36, Ware Memorandum, January 1944; CWGC, 2033, War Office Meeting Minutes, 5 January 
1944; CWGC, 2033, Lieutenant Colonel H. F. Chettle to Ware, 4 April 1944. 
231 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, January, March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Details 
of Fraser Tour, January-March 1944. 
232 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Details of Fraser Tour, January -March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, 
Fraser Report, 30 March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Hoffman Report, 18 June 1945; CWGC, 
2033, Fraser to War Office, 10 February 1944. 
233 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser Report, 30 March 1944; CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware, 19 February 
1944; CWGC, 2033, Fraser to War Office, 10 February 1944. 
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all before interment, and in many cases no burial returns were made out 
or submitted.234 
Fraser concluded his tour convinced that everything possible was being done to 
complete graves operations in the Middle East and Mediterranean theatres as quickly 
as circumstances allowed, and he returned to Britain determined to apply what he 
had learnt to the benefit of the AGS in its forthcoming deployment to the 
Continent.235 
Preparing for North -west Europe 
DGRE preparations for the invasion of north -west Europe were well- advanced by 
this time. Numbers 32, 33 and 34 GRU had been formed - on the same GRU War 
Establishment as was used in the GRE Mediterranean Pool - and placed on stand -by 
for attachment to 21 Army Group, and approval for a DADGRE to accompany the 
units to the Continent had been secured.236 Major Stott, the erstwhile commander of 
Number 2 GRU, was selected for this position, and during February and March 1944 
he and the men in his charge were schooled thoroughly in their duties.237 When 
Numbers 35 and 36 GRU were raised later in the spring, their members were given 
234 CWGC, 2033, Major C. Huntingdon to War Office, 7 February 1944. 
235 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser Report, 30 March 1944; CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware, 19 
February 1944; CWGC, 2033, J. C. Latter to Ware, 31 March 1944. 
236 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, August- December 1943; TNA, PRO WO 166/14164, 
Number 32 GRU War Diary, December 1943; TNA, PRO WO 171/3786, Number 32 GRU War 
Diary, January 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3787, Number 33 GRU War Diary, March 1944; TNA, 
PRO WO 171/3788, Number 34 GRU War Diary, March 1944. 
237 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, December 1943, February 1944; TNA, PRO WO 
171/3786, Number 32 GRU War Diary, February 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3787, Number 33 GRU 
War Diary, March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3788, Number 34 GRU War Diary, March -April 1944. 
Stott's appointment as DADGRE was upgraded to ADGRE on 1 April 1944. See TNA, PRO WO 
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the same training at an army camp in Essex to ready them for service on the 
Continent.238 
In addition to receiving this instruction, Stott and the officers of the new units 
were provided with a manual in which the aspects of graves operations were 
explained in detail.239 Written by a senior member of Hoffman's staff for the benefit 
of other AGS officers, it was the first resource of its kind. The subjects covered 
ranged from explanations of the religious rites to be observed when interring the 
dead of different faiths, to how to bury a rigid corpse: `[t]he arms should be forced 
down to the side with the aid of a shovel.'240 In the section on disinterment it was 
noted that `[exhumation] does not take long and during this period the man can 
smoke to disguise the odour which is inevitable' - '[a]ny unpleasantness that may be 
in exhumation is more than repaid by the satisfaction one gets at having identified a 
man and the feeling that one has done a dead comrade a good turn.'241 The manual 
warned personnel to avoid `indiscreet talk', to ensure the AGS avoided acquiring a 
reputation within the army `as a "Corps of Ghouls "', although to this injunction was 
added the recommendation that officers make an example of servicemen who, in 
their ignorance of its task, derided the graves organisation.242 The DGRE and the 
AGS were better prepared for the invasion of north -west Europe than for any 
previous operation. 
238 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3787, Number 33 
GRU War Diary, April 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3789, Number 35 GRU War Diary, April 1944; 
TNA, PRO WO 171/3790, Number 36 GRU War Diary, April 1944. 
239 CWGC, 2033, Preface to Instruction Manual, 11 March 1944. 
24° Ibid.; CWGC, 2033, Instruction Manual, March 1944. 




The Second Stage of Army Graves Operations, June 1944 -July 1949 
The AGS Returns to North -west Europe 
The personnel of Numbers 33 and 36 GRU landed at Normandy on 10 June 1944, 
four days after the Allied invasion of north -west Europe.' They were followed by 
their colleagues in Number 32 GRU who disembarked at Arromanches on 13 June, 
and then by the men in Numbers 34 and 35 GRU several days later.2 Ware noted 
that their deployment so soon after the main fighting force represented `a great 
improvement in priority on any previous expedition.'3 However, the ability of the 21 
Army Group Graves Service to operate was restricted by the crowded conditions 
within the Normandy bridgehead and the constant need to move billets in order to 
accommodate frontline soldiers.4 It was more than two months before Stott, the 
ADGRE with responsibility for the theatre, was able to gauge accurately the size of 
the task facing his force.5 He immediately petitioned the War Office for more staff. 
Stott thought the additional men necessary on two counts. First, he was 
unsure that his personnel, the majority of whom had no field experience, would be 
able to attend to the graves of the thousands of servicemen killed since D -Day and 
TNA, PRO WO 171/3787, Number 33 GRU War Diary, June 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3790, 
Number 36 GRU War Diary, June 1944. 
2 TNA, PRO WO 171/3786, Number 32 GRU War Diary, June 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3788, 
Number 34 GRU War Diary, June 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3789, Number 35 GRU War Diary, 
June 1944. 
3 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, June 1944. 
4 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, June -August 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army 
Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, September 1944. 
5 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, September 1944. 
Stott was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on 23 June 1944. See The Quarterly Army List: October 
1944, Part II, (London: HMSO, 1944), p. 3015. 
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still keep pace with 21 Army Group if and when it moved from the bridgehead.6 
Second, he was concerned about what was to be done with the remains of military 
personnel buried on the Continent before D -Day. Among this number were the 
bodies of POWs, and of soldiers killed in the 1939 -40 campaign, who had been 
interred by the enemy or civilians, often in isolated graves, after the retreat of the 
British army to Dunkirk. Aside from the additional commitment of resources and 
labour which the registration of these remains would necessitate, Stott knew that 
identifying the unknown among the pre -D -Day dead would be especially difficult 
because of the time that had passed since burial.$ 
In early September Stott was informed that he was to be provided with three 
new formations, Numbers 37 and 38 GRU as well as a GCU, Number 39, but that 
their men were to attend only to the graves of the post -D -Day dead.9 While Stott was 
awaiting the deployment of the units, he travelled through northern France and into 
Belgium meeting local officials and concluding agreements with them to facilitate 
AGS operations.10 From Belgian authorities he obtained a waiver allowing his men 
to exhume bodies without the customary judicial permission, as well as the promise 
6 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, September 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army 
Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, September 1944; CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware, 23 
October 1944. 
7 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser to British Military Commands, 21 July 1944; TNA, PRO WO 
171/186, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, July, September- October 1944; 
TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Stott to DGRE, 3 October 1944; Stockman, Seaforth Highlanders, pp. 50, 
58 -9. 
8 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, October - 
November 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, 
March 1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott to DGRE, 16 March 1945; CWGC, 2033, Fraser to 
Ware, 23 October 1944. 
9 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, September 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army 
Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, September- October 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3786, 
Number 32 GRU War Diary, August 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3791, Number 37 GRU War Diary, 
September 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3792, Number 38 GRU War Diary, September 1944; TNA, 
PRO WO 171/3794, Number 39 GCU War Diary, October 1944. 
10 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, September 
1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Stott Tour Map, September 1944. 
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that officials across the country would report to him the location of any isolated 
graves." Stott also used this time away to designate as permanent a number of 
battlefield cemeteries, arranging in each case for the landowners who owned the 
relevant territory to divest control of it to the 21 Army Group Graves Service as the 
representative of the British government.12 His selections favoured cemeteries which 
were associated with a particular unit and held special significance for its men, 
although he always ensured first that the location of these burial grounds met with 
the criteria set out in Field Service Regulations.13 In this regard the asymmetry and 
small size of some cemeteries was not a constraining factor. Stott selected a number 
of sites with space for only forty to 150 graves in the knowledge that Ware thought 
these translated better than larger graveyards ideas of `reverence' and `peace'.14 The 
biggest of the cemeteries earmarked as permanent was at Bayeux where 5000 
servicemen were to be interred.15 
By the time Stott had completed his tour, the new units had been raised and 
their personnel trained. ' 6 At the end of September he stationed Number 37 GRU in 
the Falaise region, Number 38 GRU in the Bény -Bocage area, and Number 39 GCU 
in Bayeux in order that its personnel could begin moving British bodies from the 
11 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, October 1944. 
12 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, September - 
November 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Stott to Major General H. W. A. F. Graham, 15 September 
1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Paris Meeting Minutes, 25 October 1944. Most landowners were 
happy to gift their land to the AGS or accept compensation for it. If they did not want to part with 
their land or could not be contacted, steps could be taken to acquire it compulsorily. Stott attempted 
to avoid such requisitioning wherever possible, and it was rarely needed. 
13 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Stott to Major General H. W. A. F. Graham, 15 September 1944; TNA, 
PRO WO 171/186, Cemetery Graphics, November 1944. 
14 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Stott to Major E. Lugard and Major T. A. K. Longstaffe, 8 
December 1944. In France, forty burials was the minimum number allowed in a military cemetery by 
law. 
15 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Stott to Major General H. W. A. F. Graham, 15 September 1944; CWGC, 
2033, Cemetery List, October 1944. 
16 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, September 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army 
Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, September 1944. 
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invasion beaches to the cemetery in the town." Of the other graves formations, 
Number 32 GRU was encamped in Bayeux where its men were constructing the 
burial ground and photographing all the British graves in permanent cemeteries 
throughout the Normandy region, it being War Office policy to provide the next -of- 
kin of each dead man with two pictures of his final burial place free of charge, 
Number 34 GRU was working in northern France, and Numbers 33, 35 and 36 GRU 
had commenced operations in Belgium.18 Stott was also based in that country, 
having moved his headquarters from Bayeux to the more central location of Brussels. 
In Belgium he was able to access the extensive records which the Ministry of the 
Interior had compiled on each military burial performed in the country during the 
war.19 
Fraser Tours North -west Europe 
In October Fraser flew to the Continent to assess the progress being made by the 21 
Army Group Graves Service.20 The impetus for his journey came from a resolve 
developed after his trip to the Middle East and Mediterranean theatres earlier in the 
'7 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, September 
1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Stott to Major General H. W. A. F. Graham, 15 September 1944; 
TNA, PRO WO 171/3791, Number 37 GRU War Diary, September- October 1944; TNA, PRO WO 
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39 GCU War Diary, October 1944; CWGC, 2033, List of Units Visited by Fraser, October 1944; 
CWGC, 2033, Cemetery List, October 1944; The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army 
Group on the Continent of Europe, p. 92. 
18 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, September 
1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3786, Number 32 GRU War Diary, July- September 1944; TNA, PRO WO 
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year that DGRE officers should regularly visit AGS personnel in the field.21 
Following a series of meetings in Brussels, Fraser and Stott spent one week 
travelling through the operational area of the 21 Army Group Graves Service.22 
Fraser was pleased that the majority of the units had managed to find secure and 
warm accommodation, and by what had already been achieved.23 12,500 of the 
15,000 British graves reported to the AGS since June had been registered, more than 
400 bodies had been concentrated from isolated burial places into permanent 
cemeteries, and operations had commenced in Holland.24 Fraser was similarly 
satisfied with the choice of permanent cemeteries. In a report to Ware he described 
Ryes cemetery, for instance, as `[a] fine site with views to the sea and about 2 miles 
from the [invasion] beaches[,] [h]as about 150 direct burials and some local 
concentrations and will receive more.'25 
However, Fraser did identify certain concerns. Most importantly, the 
question of attending to the pre -D -Day graves remained unresolved. `A' Staff 
officers at 21 Army Group headquarters were adamant that this task was beyond the 
capabilities of its AGS contingent as it was then constituted, while their counterparts 
at the War Office were equally reluctant to assume responsibility for these graves.26 
Fraser did not proffer a solution to the conundrum, but noted that the 21 Army Group 
Graves Service was struggling to cope with its workload, particularly with the Royal 
21 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser Report, 30 March 1944. 
22 TNA, PRO WO 171/3790, Number 36 GRU War Diary, October 1944; CWGC, 2033, Fraser Tour 
Itinerary, October 1944; CWGC, 2033, List of Units Visited by Fraser, October 1944. 
23 CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware, 23 October 1944; CWGC, 2033, List of Units Visited by Fraser, 
October 1944. 
24 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Statistics Report, 15 October 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Unit 
Location Statement, October 1944. Since D -Day, the AGS in north -west Europe had also managed to 
register 7,500 Allied and enemy graves. 
25 CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware, 23 October 1944; CWGC, 2033, Cemetery List, October 1944. 
26 CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware, 23 October 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group Graves 
Service Headquarters War Diary, October 1944. 
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Engineers engaged at the front and unavailable for cemetery construction duties. The 
usefulness of the civilian labourers hired in their stead was limited for they did not 
possess the same tools and skills as the Engineers.27 Fraser was concerned also about 
the prospect of a bitter winter. The weather was deteriorating, and should the cold 
become severe and the ground turn to ice, graves operations would be severely 
hampered.28 
Developments in the Autumn 
Fraser returned to London in mid -October and to the news that Ware, having decided 
that his IWGC commitments had become `too pressing to allow him to devote 
sufficient time to his military duties', was to resign from the DGRE.29 Ware, who 
was now seventy -five, had always preferred his wide -ranging duties at the IWGC to 
the administrative tasks which occupied his time at the War Office, and his 
resignation did not come as a surprise.30 Among certain of his army colleagues it 
prompted little regret. Since the beginning of the war, Ware had devoted more time 
to the IWGC than to his military role - he had not inspected graves units in the field 
since visiting France in 1939 - and as a result the AGS had suffered from inadequate 
supervision.31 This lack of leadership, coupled with the fact that Ware did not 
27 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Paris Meeting Minutes, 25 October 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3786, 
Number 32 GRU War Diary, October, December 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3794, Number 39 GCU 
War Diary, November 1944; CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware, 23 October 1944; CWGC, 2033, List of 
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1944; CWGC, 2033, Cemetery List, October 1944. 
29 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, October 1944; Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the 
Imperial War Graves Commission, (London: HMSO, 1945), p. 7; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 
181. 
39 Longworth, The Unending Vigil, pp. 158, 181. 
31 Ibid., pp. 162, 181; Twenty-first Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, (London: 
HMSO, 1941), p. 13. 
103 
always acknowledge the good deeds of the AGS - his refusal to correct media 
reports in which the IWGC was credited for work done by military graves personnel 
annoyed Fraser - were points of frustration for certain DGRE staff members.32 
The Army Council appointed Brigadier J. K. McNair, formerly of the Royal 
Artillery, to succeed Ware on his retirement, which was scheduled for December, 
and in the interim approved the amendment of the DGRE War Establishment to 
allow for the new director to be employed and paid as a full -time army officer.33 The 
revised establishment also made provision for McNair to hire a further 110 clerical 
staff once he assumed the directorship, an increase in their number having been 
necessitated by a burgeoning administrative workload at the DGRE.34 
The announcement of these changes was followed by another major 
development. After several months spent arguing the issue with `A' Staff on the 
Continent, the War Office declared its intention to raise Number 40 GRU, as well as 
an additional contingent comprised of one officer and four other ranks on a specially - 
conceived War Establishment, specifically to register the graves of the pre -D -Day 
dead in north -west Europe.35 Having realised that the need to attend to these graves 
was urgent - the DGRE knew of 3000 such interments, and the number of public 
enquiries relating to the whereabouts and possible identity of those buried in these 
32 See TNA, PRO WO 169/18049, Mediterranean Pool Headquarters War Diary, October 1944; and 
correspondence in CWGC, 2033. 
33 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, October, December 1944; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, 
DGRE War Establishment, circa autumn 1944; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Establishment 
(Officers), circa autumn 1944; Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 
p. 7; The Quarterly Army List: October 1944, Part I, p. 210; The Quarterly Army List: January 1945, 
Part I, (London: HMSO, 1945), p. 15B. 
34 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, December 1944; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War 
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circa autumn 1944; Twenty-ffth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 7; The 
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Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, November 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3793, Number 
40 GRU War Diary, November 1944- January 1945. 
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sites had increased significantly - the War Office determined to deploy these 
formations by January 1945.36 
The Experiences of Captain A. R. Thomas 
In November 1944, two months after returning to Britain from North Africa where 
he had served with Numbers 10 and 25 GCU, Captain A. R. Thomas was ordered to 
report to Aldershot where Number 40 GRU was being mobilised. He was to be the 
inaugural commander of this new unit.37 At the barracks Thomas met his two 
lieutenants. One of them was an experienced AGS officer whom he had befriended 
on a previous deployment, and the other was a long -serving member of the 
Territorial Army who had no experience of graves work but who was cheerful and 
enthusiastic.38 Thomas was pleased with their attachment to Number 40 GRU, and 
to learn that both lieutenants spoke French, for he did not.39 The three officers were 
joined at Aldershot by the ten other rank personnel who were to make up the 
remainder of the unit and, after a period spent training the recruits and arranging for 
the provision of stores and equipment, they sailed for the Continent in the first week 
of January 1945.4° 
36 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, December 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army 
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The following weeks proved frustrating for Thomas and his men. Because of 
inclement weather, the crossing to Ostend in Belgium involved several attempts and 
took four days. On the Continent, the personnel of Number 40 GRU spent one week 
in a transit camp awaiting permission to leave.41 When clearance eventually was 
obtained, Thomas was instructed to take his unit to Amiens. The 200 mile trip took 
two days as the roads were clogged with military traffic and were covered in snow 
and ice, the fears of a particularly harsh European winter having been realised. After 
reaching Amiens and finding that nobody was expecting the unit, Thomas drove a 
further 200 miles to and from Lille in search of someone who could provide him with 
definite instructions. He eventually encountered a fellow AGS officer who 
confirmed that Number 40 GRU was to register the pre -D -Day British graves in the 
Amiens region. This task was commenced at the end of January, the adverse weather 
making progress slow.42 Thomas did not see this work completed, for at the end of 
February he was ordered to join Number 48 GCU, a newly- raised formation which 
was stationed at Leon - Sur -Mer in Normandy.43 
After two months spent working along the Norman coast, Thomas was 
instructed to lead several soldiers from his unit to Gheel in Belgium where they were 
to concentrate into permanent cemeteries the bodies of servicemen killed in fighting 
41 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; TNA, PRO WO 171/3793, Number 40 GRU War Diary, 
November 1944- January 1945. 
42 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Unit Location Statement, December 1944; TNA, PRO WO 
171/8349, Number 39 GCU War Diary, January 1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/8350, Number 40 GRU 
War Diary, February 1945. 
43 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; TNA, PRO WO 171/3794, 21 Army Group Memorandum, 20 
September 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3794, 21 Army Group Memorandum, 1 October 1944; TNA, 
PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, November 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group 
Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, November 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3794, 21 Army Group 
Memorandum, 11 December 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Changes in Officer Postings, February 
1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/8350, Number 40 GRU War Diary, February-March 1945. 
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for the Meuse -Escaut Canal in September 1944.44 In Gheel Thomas prepared for 
operations. He housed his other ranks with a group of Royal Engineers and found 
for himself a room above a shop, choosing these lodgings on the basis that the 
adjacent hotel had a bath, something which he regarded as a necessity given the 
nature of graves work.45 He secured the services of an interpreter, visited the town 
clerk who promised to find him 100 local men willing to be employed as paid 
labourers, and called on the Burgermeister who took him to the two cemetery sites 
selected by Stott.46 The first piece of land, in a cornfield at Kasterlee, was to be used 
exclusively for the burial of British and Allied servicemen.47 The second site was on 
flat and open ground on the outskirts of Gheel and was to contain only German 
remains. 
Work began at Kasterlee, for there the cornfield had to be cleared. British 
personnel and labourers removed all the corn, which Thomas distributed among the 
locals as a gesture of goodwill, and then any other remaining plants and roots. This 
weeding involved the men crawling across the field in an unbroken line, and was 
repeated until the ground was completely bare.48 Thomas then sent his sergeant to 
the nearest British army depot to indent from it tape measures and minefield markers, 
to be used during the planning and construction of the two cemeteries, blankets and 
telephone wire to wrap and bind the dead, and the disinfectant creosol and carbolic 
soap for hygiene. The sergeant also obtained scrubbing and paint brushes, paint, 
stencils and several hundred pre- fabricated steel crosses which had been shipped to 
44 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; CWGC, Kasterlee War Cemetery; TNA, PRO WO 171/8351, 
Number 48 GCU War Diary, May 1945. 
as CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. In his recollections, Thomas spells Kasterlee as Casterlee. The former spelling is more 
common. 
48 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
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the Continent for the use of the 21 Army Group Graves Service.49 Thomas accorded 
the task of painting these and then inscribing on them the details of the deceased to 
one of his labourers who he had discovered was an experienced sign- writer.5o 
Once Thomas had decided on layouts for the cemeteries, and graves had been 
dug in the appropriate positions, the concentration of the dead commenced. The 
order in which this was done often was determined by the local people, many of 
whom had particular reasons for wanting the exhumation of certain bodies before 
others. One woman asked Thomas to expedite the removal of fifty British soldiers 
from a field in order that she could return her cow to pasture and do so with a clear 
conscience, while among the residents of Gheel there was consensus that the remains 
of 200 German servicemen buried next to the town church should be disinterred and 
taken from their midst as soon as possible.51 Given his reliance on the local people 
for labour and information as to the whereabouts of graves, Thomas obliged these 
requests where he could. Moreover, civilians were entitled to voice their opinion 
given the active roles they played in many exhumations. Farmers with horses and 
carts regularly helped to transport the remains of British servicemen to Kasterlee.52 
The local population showed great respect for the British war dead. When 
Thomas was ready to concentrate the fifty corpses from the grazing field, he 
arranged for the operation to begin at a particular time. News of the planned 
exhumations spread and when he reached the field it was surrounded by townsfolk. 
Working in full view of the crowd - he saw no reason to erect his AGS -issue canvas 
49 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, February 1944; Delaforce, Marching to the Sound 
of Gunfire, p. 21. 
5o CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, 
September 1944. 
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screens and hide the dead from the very people who had buried them - the fifty 
bodies were loaded into trucks.53 Once Thomas had confirmed that the evidence of 
identity found in the graves matched the names in his records, the vehicles were 
driven away in the direction of the British cemetery. `As we left', he remembered, 
`heads were bared, and all the men and women present knelt down along the lane. 
When we turned into the main street, we found the pavements lined with with [sic] a 
number of people who all went down on their knees and remained with bowed heads 
until we had passed. It was ... most moving.'54 
Nor were displays of reverence for British dead isolated. Thomas recalled 
entering a village with his men to concentrate the remains of two soldiers whose 
graves lay along the footpath on the main street: [a]s soon as we commenced all the 
shops closed, & blinds were drawn. The inhabitants line[d] the pavement on their 
knees, and, as we lifted the bodies, the church bell kept up a mournful tolling ... until 
we slowly drew away.'55 Respect for British dead was manifested also in the 
attention paid to their graves, the isolated burial sites encountered by Thomas always 
being well -kept and adorned with flowers and plants.56 
Some locals invested such effort and feeling into caring for British graves 
that they actually resented the dead being exhumed. On one occasion when he was 
disinterring remains from a residential garden, Thomas was confronted by the 
homeowner who, he recalled, `was screaming and flailing her arms about, shouting 
that no -one was going to touch him [the dead man] - he had to stay there were [sic] 
53 2033, Thomas Recollections; TNA, PRO WO 171/8653, Stott Memorandum, 16 April 
1946. 




Ibid.; The Times, 10 November 1944. 
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she could care for him.'57 The woman had to be restrained from attacking Thomas. 
After she became calmer, he explained what he was doing and why, and told her that 
she would be able to visit the serviceman's grave in the British cemetery at any time. 
In this way the woman was appeased.58 
On one rare occasion, a British frontline soldier was witness to the care that 
was bestowed upon the dead. He had been given permission to take leave from his 
unit to travel to Gheel to search for his brother's grave, and by chance he happened 
upon it in the grounds of a vicarage just as the body was being exhumed. The 
remains of his sibling were driven to the cemetery at Kasterlee, where the soldier was 
asked by Thomas if he wished to take part in their reburial. Grateful for the 
opportunity, he helped to carry the stretcher on which his brother lay, took control of 
one of the rubber cables used to lower the body into the earth, and assisted with the 
filling of the grave. He then requested permission to take a photograph, at which 
point, Thomas recalled, his personnel `immediately decorated the mound with moss, 
stones and one or two flowering plants borrowed from adjacent graves.'59 The 
soldier declared that his parents would be profoundly comforted to learn of the 
attention paid to their dead son. 
Over the course of two months, Thomas and his men moved more than 400 
bodies into the German cemetery at Gheel, and the remains of 100 British 
servicemen into the burial ground at Kasterlee.60 During this time they built at the 
latter cemetery an entrance, erected a fence, cleared paths between the graves, put up 
boards signifying where the dead from a particular unit had been grouped together, 
57 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
b0 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 171/8351, Number 48 GCU War Diary, July 1945; CWGC, Kasterlee War 
Cemetery. 
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produced a detailed scale plan of the burials, and obtained a certificate from local 
officials which confirmed that a gift had been made of the land.61 In fulfilling these 
tasks, all of which had to be completed for the IWGC to accept control of the site, 
everything possible was done to create a cemetery in which visitors would feel a 
sense of peace and seclusion. Thus the entrance was built away from the nearest 
road and in a position where the trees which bordered the field could be left standing, 
and the design of the burial plots was conceived in order best to fit with this plan.62 
When operations at Kasterlee were complete, Thomas returned with his men to 
Leon -Sur -Mer before accepting, several weeks later, his release from military 
service.63 While graves work still interested him, the prospect of civilian life was too 
alluring to resist after six years in the army. 
Towards the End of the War 
In common with their colleagues in Gheel, AGS personnel stationed elsewhere in 
north -west Europe had made tangible progress by early 1945. In January, 35,000 
graves had been registered and 1753 bodies concentrated into permanent 
cemeteries.64 By May, more than 48,000 post -D -Day graves, of which 27,000 were 
British, had been registered, and 5588 concentrations performed.65 6433 pre -D -Day 
graves had been located, sixty -seven British cemeteries established, and photographs 
of 3000 graves despatched to next- of- kin.ó6 Stott and his administrative staff had 
61 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Cemetery Graphics, November 
1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, Stott Memorandum, 15 December 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 
Stott Memorandum, 2 August 1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Template for Cemetery Handover. 
62 CWGC, 2033, Thomas Recollections. 
63 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 171/8351, Number 48 GCU War Diary, July- August 1945; TNA, PRO WO 
171/8351, Field Return of Officers, August 1945. 
64 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Statistics Report, 15 January 1945. 
65 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott to DAG, 21 Army Group, 5 May 1945. 
66 Ibid. 
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also been busy. By May they had responded to 17,600 enquiries forwarded from the 
War Office about the whereabouts of graves, and established liaisons with the 
Missing Research Section (MRS) field branch, a small division of the RAF which 
had been sent to the Continent by the Air Ministry to locate the bodies and graves of 
missing airmen.67 Its personnel were to register air force graves, and then to notify 
AGS officers who would concentrate the remains into permanent cemeteries.68 
Although pleased with this progress, Stott was concerned that the 21 Army 
Group Graves Service was still understaffed. Because most members of his 
headquarters staff were engaged in answering the hundreds of grave location queries 
received each week, 30,000 burial registration forms had yet to be processed.69 He 
was also short of officers and other ranks to man the graves units, his force having 
been weakened by the demobilisation of large numbers of soldiers. The problem was 
a pervasive one, for some of the men suggested as replacements were themselves due 
for demobilisation in a matter of weeks, meaning that it was pointless expending 
time and money on their training.70 In order that other ranks in the field were not 
rendered idle - AGS sections were permitted to operate only when supervised by an 
officer - 21 Army Group headquarters arranged for some of them to receive direct 
commissions, but this did not solve the problem of staff shortages in the longer 
term.71 These difficulties were compounded by the fact that Stott had now been 
67 /bid.; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, 
February -March 1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott to DAG, 21 Army Group, 4 March 1945. 
68 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott to AGS Officers, 16 November 1945. See also TNA, PRO WO 
171/3926, RAF Cooperation Memorandum, 16 November 1945. 
69TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, February, May 
1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott to `A' Staff, 21 Army Group, 23 February 1945. 
70 TNA, PRO WO 171/8345, Number 35 GRU War Diary, December 1945. 
71 TNA, PRO WO 219/1374, Standing Orders, Graves Registration 21 Army Group; TNA, PRO WO 
165/36, Fraser Report, 30 March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service 
Headquarters War Diary, March, May, July 1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott to `A' Staff, 31 
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accorded responsibility for graves operations in southern France, despite 21 Army 
Group not having fought in the region. Upon learning of this additional burden, he 
protested that `I am not in a position to organise Registration and Concentration 
there, neither have I the means of handling such in this Branch.' 72 The War Office 
was unmoved. 
There was also the problem of what to do with the British dead in Germany. 
Stott did not know whether British servicemen would be buried there or removed to 
Holland, Belgium or France for interment, the matter being under discussion in 
London.73 General Sir Ronald Adam, the Adjutant General, believed that they 
should be buried where they fe11.74 In voicing his opinion that `war cemeteries in the 
heart of Germany would serve as a salutary reminder to Germany of the events of 
this war', he made it clear that for the War Office the issue was not whether British 
dead should remain on enemy territory, but where precisely within it they should be 
buried.75 The Admiralty was also opposed to repatriation, although the Air Ministry 
was open to the idea of moving the dead to an adjacent Allied country or even to 
Britain for buria1.76 There was, however, consensus between the navy and the air 
force that if there were to be cemeteries in Germany, in deference to tradition they 
should be located to the west of the Rhine River. Most of the 6500 British and 
May 1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/8351, Captain R. F. Wilkes to BAOR Headquarters, 6 November 
1945. 
72 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott to `A' Staff, 21 Army Group, 23 February 1945. Responsibility for 
operations in southern France had previously rested with GRE Mediterranean Pool. See TNA, PRO 
WO 169/18049, Hoffman to Fraser, 1 November 1944. 
73 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, March -April 
1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott to DGRE, 2 April 1945; TNA, PRO WO 32/11593, 21 Army 
Group Headquarters to War Office, 5 May 1945. 
74 TNA, PRO WO 32/14353, Royal Warrant for the IWGC Appointment of Ronald Adam, 26 June 
1941; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, April 
1945; TNA, PRO WO 32/11593, IWGC Committee Meeting Minutes, 30 April 1945; TNA, PRO WO 
32/11593, IWGC Committee Meeting Minutes, 14 May 1945; Twenty- seventh Annual Report of the 
Imperial War Graves Commission, (London: HMSO, 1947), p. 2. 
75 TNA, PRO WO 32/11593, IWGC Committee Meeting Minutes, 30 April 1945. 
76 TNA, PRO WO 32/11593, IWGC Committee Meeting Minutes, 14 May 1945. 
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Dominion First World War dead interred in the country lay in this area, and graves 
maintenance would be easier from the western side of Europe.77 The three armed 
services did agree that any such cemeteries should contain no enemy remains - the 
interment of German dead in AGS burial grounds was permitted elsewhere - and that 
in Germany no British bodies should be left in civil graveyards, as was common 
practice in other countries.78 
For Stott, the options under consideration had drawbacks. Moving bodies 
across international borders - be it to Britain or elsewhere - would be legally and 
logistically difficult, yet to leave the dead in Germany would complicate graves 
operations in other ways. In its one decree on the subject, the War Office had ruled 
that if land were required for cemeteries in Germany, it would be requisitioned 
without canvassing German public opinion and regardless of any opposition 
expressed.79 The possibility of trouble in this regard, coupled with the fact that 
civilians in Germany would probably be less willing to assist AGS personnel than 
were those elsewhere, presented potential difficulties to graves operations in the 
country. However, it was not for Stott or his military superiors to decide whether the 
British dead should be buried in Germany. The public importance of the issue meant 
77 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 32/11593, IWGC Committee Meeting Minutes, 30 April 1945; TNA, PRO 
WO 219/1373, List of British First World War Graves in Germany, May 1945; Twelfth Annual Report 
of the Imperial War Graves Commission, (London: HMSO, 1932), p. 44; Ware, The Immortal 
Heritage, p. 63; CWGC, Germany Graves Statistics. 
78 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott to DGRE, 2 April 1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Burials in 
Germany Memorandum, April 1945. In Allied countries, the AGS generally left the British dead in 
civil cemeteries unless the next -of -kin specifically requested their removal. See TNA, PRO WO 
171/186, Stott to Major General H. W. A. F. Graham, 15 September 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 
21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, October 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 
Cemetery Graphics, November 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service 
Headquarters War Diary, April 1945; TNA, PRO WO 32/11593, 21 Army Group Headquarters to 
War Office, 5 May 1945. See also Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 453 HC, DEB 5S, (London: 
HMSO, 1948), pp. 995 -6. 
79 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, November 
1944. To this decree it was added that `ordinary steps will be taken not to give the local inhabitants 
justifiable cause for resentment'. 
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that the decision was to be made by the Cabinet, but with the government unwilling 
to commit to a policy on repatriation before the general election in July, a ruling was 
not expected until after that.80 
The Progress of Graves Operations in the Middle East and Mediterranean 
Theatres 
In the Middle East and Mediterranean theatres, graves operations were further 
advanced than they were in north -west Europe, with Hoffman expecting that his men 
would finish their task by the autumn of 1945.81 For example, in North Africa fewer 
than 5000 graves, most dating from the first campaigns fought in the region, 
remained to be registered, while in Italy AGS personnel already were present in the 
north of the country.82 Such had been the efficiency of their operations in Italy that 
only 3.4 per cent of the British bodies in military cemeteries had been interred as 
unknown: the corresponding figure for Tunisia, where there were fewer dead, but 
where graves units had not followed close behind the frontline formations, was 10.2 
per cent.83 Elsewhere in the Mediterranean theatre, AGS servicemen were working 
on Gibraltar, on the islands in the Adriatic Sea, and in Greece where a start had been 
8° TNA, PRO WO 32/11593, 21 Army Group Headquarters to War Office, 5 May 1945; TNA, PRO 
WO 32/11593, McNair to 21 Army Group Headquarters, 17 May 1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 
Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, July 1945. 
81 TNA, PRO WO 169/18049, Hoffman to Fraser, 1 November 1944; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, 
Conference Minutes, 3 February 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, January and February Report, 9 
March 1945. 
82 TNA, PRO WO 169/18049, Hoffman to Fraser, 1 November 1944; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, 
Record Office Report, 17 February 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, General Progress Report, 28 
February 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Unit Location Statement, February 1945; TNA, PRO WO 
170/7365, January and February Report, 9 March 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Record Office 
Report, 13 April 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Hoffman Report, 18 June 1945. 
83 TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, January and February Report, 9 March 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, 
Hoffman Report, 18 June 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Colonel A. B. Lawson to War Office, 25 
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Annual Report, 2000 -2001, p. 43. 
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made on attending to the British and Dominion dead killed during the campaigns of 
1940 -41.84 
There were several reasons for this progress across the region. First, the 
expansion of the graves organisation in the autumn of 1943 had been successful. 
Hoffman, whose headquarters had been moved to Naples, had thirty -one graves units 
at his disposal, twenty of which were British.85 Second, the Mediterranean Pool was 
led by an experienced cadre of senior officers, many of whom had worked together 
for several years.86 Third, Hoffman had no equivalent of the Germany question with 
which to contend. There existed general agreement among fighting servicemen that 
the dead should not be interred in civil graveyards in Italy, but there had been no 
opposition to locating dedicated British cemeteries in the country.87 The first two of 
these, at Catania and Syracuse on Sicily, had been established in October 1943 
without adverse comment.88 
However, Hoffman did have his concerns. Mines had long been a scourge of 
graves operations in his jurisdiction, and they continued to maim and kill his men in 
North Africa and Italy. The Commander -in- Chief, Middle East, had had to issue an 
84 TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Unit Location Statement, February 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, 
General Progress Report, 28 February 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, January and February Report, 
9 March 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Gibraltar Memorandum, 23 March 1945; mA, PRO WO 
170/7365, Adriatic Operations, 24 March 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Greece and Crete Report, 
3 April 1945. 
85 TNA, PRO WO 169/18049, Mediterranean Pool Headquarters War Diary, September- October 
1944; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Unit Location Statement, February 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, 
Middle East and Mediterranean Zone Summary, June 1945; Twenty-sixth Annual Report of the 
Imperial War Graves Commission, pp. 27 -8. Mediterranean Pool headquarters moved from Cairo to 
Naples in September 1944. At the same time, Mediterranean Pool Advance Headquarters, which had 
been located in Naples since March of that year, relocated to Florence. 
86 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Staff List, circa September 1943; TNA, PRO WO 169/18049, 
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87 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Burials in Germany Memorandum, April 1945. 
88 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Administrative Instruction Number 3, 10 October 1943; TNA, PRO 
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order to AGS personnel forbidding them from knowingly entering mined areas in 
their attempts to recover the dead.89 That the bodies of hundreds of servicemen lay 
out of reach in enormous minefields in the Western Desert and at Anzio also raised 
the question of whether these remains should be classed as lost or a request made of 
the Royal Engineers to remove the explosives.90 
Hoffman also was concerned about the potential effects of demobilisation on 
the Mediterranean Pool, particularly with regard to its leadership, as many higher - 
ranked officers were intent on leaving the AGS.91 Some had tired of the army and its 
bureaucracy; others wished to take up positions with the IWGC; a few had spent too 
long working with the dead and their mental and physical health was suffering as a 
result; and most simply wanted to be reunited with their families.92 This longing for 
home was particularly evident among the numerous Mediterranean Pool officers 
from South Africa and New Zealand who had not seen their native lands for several 
years.93 Hoffman, who had not been to South Africa since 1940, did not seek to 
dissuade his officers from leaving the AGS. Instead he focused on encouraging 
those of his men who were to remain and planning as carefully as he could for post- 
war operations.94 
89 TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Conference Minutes, 3 February 1945. 
90 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 169/18049, Hoffman to Fraser, 1 November 1944; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, 
McNair Memorandum, 8 January 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Record Office Report, 23 
February 1945. 
91 TNA, PRO WO 169/18049, Hoffman to Fraser, 1 November 1944; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, 
Record Office Report, 23 February 1945. 
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93 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Staff List, circa September 1943. 
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 Establishing the Post -War AGS 
The war in Europe ended on 8 May 1945. Within a week of the German surrender, a 
conference of senior DGRE and AGS figures was convened at the War Office to 
discuss the manner in which graves operations should be pursued in the post -war 
era.95 Hoffman and Stott were among the attendees. The delegates charged Hoffman 
and the members of the Mediterranean Pool with finding the British dead in Austria, 
Albania, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria, and renamed his command Central 
Mediterranean Graves Registration and Enquiries (CMGRE) better to reflect the 
extent of their additional responsibilities.96 
Otherwise the discussion was of operations in north -west Europe. Stott 
moved that in the post -war era the work of the 21 Army Group Graves Service 
should be organised by territory, particularly given that all the European battlefields 
on which British soldiers had fought would henceforth be accessible, and that the 
prevailing system whereby AGS units were attached to formations should be 
ended.97 In this regard he proposed the delineation of seven operational areas - 
Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Northern France, Southern France, Eastern Germany 
and Western Germany - and giving responsibility for each to an officer of DADGRE 
95 TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Mediterranean Pool Headquarters War Diary, May 1945; TNA, PRO 
WO 170/7365, CMGRE Headquarters War Diary, June 1945. 
96 TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Mediterranean Pool Memorandum, circa April 1945; TNA, PRO WO 
170/7365, Notes on Post -war Requirements, 18 April 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Middle East 
and Mediterranean Zone Summary, June 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Unit Location Statement, 
June 1945. Hoffman had expected for some time that his command would be made responsible for 
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working in these places. However, not until May were they formally charged with this duty. 
97 With AGS units attached to formations, Stott was able to exercise only limited control over the 
deployment of his men. See TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters 
War Diary, June 1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott Report, 15 June 1945; TNA, PRO WO 
171/3926, McCandlish Memorandum, 21 June 1945; The Administrative History of the Operations of 
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administrative rank. These men would report to him in Brussels.98 Stott also 
suggested that his office staff be increased, and that five more graves units be raised 
for the 21 Army Group Graves Service to bring the total number of formations in the 
command to fifteen. If these changes were made, he believed that his men could 
attend to the graves of the British dead in north -west Europe within three years.99 
Having returned to Brussels confident that his proposals would be adopted, 
Stott was surprised to learn that the War Office wished to despatch three of his units 
to Asia for service in the war against Japan. 
this would have on his organisation: 
'°° He was quick to point out the effect 
at the end of the last War the number of Graves Registration and 
Concentration Units were increased ... This shows that, far from anything 
being nominated for SEAC [South East Asia Command], extra units 
should be provided, otherwise the work of this Service will not be 
completed for an unconscionable time. If units have to be found for 
SEAC, then even more ought now to be found for this theatre.' 
°1 
Stott warned the War Office that if the ranks of the 21 Army Group Graves Service 
were depleted, graves operations in north -west Europe might not be completed 
before 1950 -51.102 As evidence for this claim, he noted that his force was 
functioning at only half of its theoretical capacity because positions for eleven 
subalterns had never been filled.103 Soon afterwards Hoffman, who had decided to 
leave the AGS for a full -time position with the IWGC as its Deputy Controller, 
Southern European District, submitted a damning report to the War Office in which 
98 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, May 1945; 
TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott Memorandum, 17 October 1945. 
99 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, May -June 
1945; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott to `A' Staff, 31 May 1945. 
loo TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, January, May 
1945. 
101 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, May 1945; 
TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott Note, 27 May 1945. 
102 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Graphic by Stott, 26 May 1945. 
103 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott to `A' Staff, 31 May 1945. 
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he accused the British army of showing a general lack of interest in, or concern for, 
its dead.104 
In June the Army Council approved a series of reforms which, in the words of 
Brigadier J. E. C. McCandlish, a War Office official, would enable the 21 Army 
Group Graves Service to complete its `task in a fitting manner'.105 He announced 
that the changes, which were much as Stott had proposed, were the result of a 
`compromise between the stringent demands of manpower economy and the natural 
desire of the public at home to have the graves of its soldiers and airmen found and 
suitably commemorated at the earliest possible date'.106 War Office authorities 
undertook to increase the strength of the 21 Army Group Graves Service from 198 
men to 360 by raising six new graves units and staffing fully those extant formations 
which were undermanned, and pledged not to take from Stott any of his personnel for 
the war in Asia.107 His administrative staff would be increased from thirty -six to 
eighty -one, and Stott promoted to colonel, and to the administrative position of 
DDGRE, to ensure that his rank and salary were commensurate with his 
responsibilities. The extent of these, McCandlish admitted, had not been realised 
previously.108 For his part, Stott was expected to have graves operations in north- 
west Europe completed by June 1948.109 
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 A Difficult Period 
Stott welcomed these changes, particularly as his problems were multiplying as the 
summer went on. Some of his concerns, such as the surreptitious trade in 
photographs of graves, were difficulties new to the AGS. Members of the British 
public, unwilling to wait for the army to provide them with pictures, were offering 
non -AGS army personnel large sums of money to photograph burial places.1 to This 
practice, which contravened military regulations, was causing distress to the relatives 
of the dead and embarrassment to the army, for not only were some graves revealed 
to be in a poor state, but often the unofficial photographs did not correspond with the 
pictures later provided by the War Office, remains having been moved into graves in 
permanent cemeteries in the interim.1" A further difficulty for Stott stemmed from 
the attempts to identify unknown casualties. It was taking longer than expected to do 
this, particularly in cases where bodies had been buried face downwards thereby 
increasing the exposure of identity discs and papers to acids released by the soil and 
decomposing flesh.112 Because of these problems, Stott was unable to assist the 
numerous French mayors who wanted something done about the British dead buried 
in shallow graves whose remains had begun to smell badly in the hot weather.113 
The difficulties confronting the 21 Army Group Graves Service were 
exacerbated in July when, inexplicably, Adam ordered that graves operations in 
north -west Europe be finished by the summer of 1947, a full year earlier than the 
110 TNA, PRO WO 171/186, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, December 
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date previously specified.114 Stott made it clear that he thought this was unfeasible. 
The units he had been promised had not yet arrived from Britain, large parts of 
Holland would probably flood during the forthcoming autumn, making graves 
operations there impossible from October to the following March, and he could not 
plan for the future without knowing the number of British dead in Germany or where 
they were to be buried.115 The `A' Staff at 21 Army Group headquarters supported 
Stott in this regard, and pointed out to the War Office `that the passing of the summer 
without any work being done on graves in Germany, owing to the lack of a 
fundamental policy, means that the ultimate completion of the task of the Graves 
Service in this theatre will be disproportionately delayed.' 116 McNair replied that 
amid the changes at Westminster following the electoral victory of the Labour Party, 
there had not been time for the new government to determine whether the British 
dead should be buried in Germany.117 
J. J. Lawson, the Secretary of State for War and ex-officio chairman of the 
IWGC, put this issue to the Cabinet on 7 September.i18 Ostensibly, ministers had 
been charged with determining whether the repatriation of bodies to Britain from any 
country would be permitted, but in effect they were ruling only on whether the 
remains of the British dead in Germany should be left there or moved to an adjacent 
country for burial. They used the meeting formally to forbid repatriation, and 
decreed that the bodies of British servicemen in Germany should be concentrated, as 
McNair explained to Stott, `to suitable military cemeteries in the general zones in 
"`' TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott to `A' Staff, 5 July 1945. 
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which the men fell, irrespective of whether these were or were not in the British zone 
of occupation, or were East or West of the Rhine.' 119 This decision made financial 
sense, while it also met with the wishes of the IWGC commissioners who advocated 
uniformity in the treatment of the British dead and were opposed to any form of 
repatriation.120 Stott was instructed to implement the agreed policy.121 There was no 
time to spare, for the completion date for graves operations in north -west Europe had 
again been revised, this time to June 1946.122 
Planning Operations in Germany 
The pressure on Stott to expedite graves operations was relieved somewhat in early 
October when four of the six units promised to him in the summer arrived in the 
north -west Europe theatre from Britain.123 Numbers 53 GRU and 56 GCU were 
immediately stationed in Berlin, while Numbers 55 and 57 GCU were despatched to 
Valkenswaard in Holland and Paris respectively.124 The deployment of these 
formations was the cue for Stott to restructure his force - renamed the British Army 
of the Rhine (BAOR) Graves Service in August - along territorial lines, and five 
administrative areas were decreed: Belgium and Holland, Northern France, Southern 
19 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 32/11593, McNair to Stott and Major General M. S. Chilton, 11 September 
1945. The Dominion governments also voted against repatriating their national dead. See TNA, PRO 
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Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 9; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, pp. 
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France, Western Germany and Denmark, and Eastern Germany.125 The French areas 
would be divided by the Loire River, while the Rhine River would demarcate the 
border between the German areas, which meant that the Eastern Germany area 
incorporated the three non -British zones in Allied -controlled Germany, and 
Czechoslovakia and Poland in addition.126 
Meanwhile, stories began to appear in the British press that the 3000 
Canadian personnel killed in Germany were to be buried in Holland. The Times 
reported on 22 October that a beautiful site surrounded by trees and adjacent to a lake 
had been chosen for this purpose, and then eight days later that the Canadian 
government had taken its decision not to have cemeteries in Germany in deference to 
the wishes of bereaved mothers.127 While the Canadian policy was not unusual in the 
sense that the American, French and Belgian governments were also expected to take 
their national dead from Germany, it was significant in that Canada was an IWGC 
member state.128 
Enquiries of officials at the casualty offices of the British armed services 
soon escalated. On 1 November the Director of the Casualty Branch at the Air 
Ministry wrote to Colonel C. M. Clode, who had replaced Fraser as AAG in July, to 
inform him that the same questions were constantly being asked of his staff: `will 
graves be left in Germany or concentrated west of the Rhine ?'; `will isolated graves 
125 TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, July- August 
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in Germany be concentrated into local churchyards or war cemeteries ?'; and `will 
graves in enemy countries be concentrated into an allied or neutral country ?' 129 
While the War Office endeavoured to clear up public misconceptions about 
the graves policies to be followed in Germany, Stott worked at establishing a 
framework for the conduct of operations in the country.l3° He drafted an order which 
would compel all German citizens to report the existence of any military graves, and 
sought permission for the AGS to enter the areas of the country not under British 
contro1.131 It was anticipated that the awarding of access rights for the American and 
French Zones would be a formality, but not for the Soviet Zone where Russian 
authorities were suspicious of foreign personne1.132 
The probability of Russian obstructionism raised the issue of whether it 
would be prudent to site permanent cemeteries in the Soviet Zone. Even if AGS 
personnel were allowed entry into this territory, it was unlikely that Russian 
authorities would consent to their living there while these were constructed.133 
Furthermore, British intelligence sources knew that the Soviet Zone was being 
stripped of its primary resources, which meant that any building scheme therein 
would have to be supplied from elsewhere.134 Because of these concerns, it was 
confirmed at the end of November that British dead found in the Soviet Zone would 
129 TNA, PRO WO 32/11593, Group Captain R. Burges to Clode, 1 November 1945; TNA, PRO WO 
171/3926, 21 Army Group Graves Service Headquarters War Diary, July 1945; The Quarterly Army 
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be transported to the nearest Allied Zone for interment. The bodies of British 
servicemen killed in Germany were to be buried in four principal cemeteries located 
in Berlin, Hamburg, Hanover and Xanten.135 
Taking Stock 
Elsewhere in north -west Europe, graves operations were progressing only slowly. 
By December 1945 nearly 68,000 graves had been registered, 20,000 bodies 
transferred into permanent burial grounds, and seven British cemeteries completed 
and handed over to the IWGC.136 However, there were still 63,000 unregistered 
graves, an equivalent number containing remains which required concentration, and 
a further 34,000 graves in which lay unknown bodies awaiting exhumation and 
identification.137 In view of these statistics, Adam decided to act. For the BAOR 
Graves Service he promised to raise, by the new year, ten GRUs, seven GCUs, and 
two Cemetery Construction and Maintenance Units (CCMU), whose personnel 
would fulfil the building duties officially ascribed to the Royal Engineers, and he 
gave his consent for graves operations to continue until 30 September 1946.138 
It fell to McNair to inform next -of -kin that it would be at least one year 
before they would be able to travel to the Continent to visit the graves of the war 
dead. In a newspaper interview at Christmas, he stated that this was `due to the 
difficulties of transport' and because he did `not want relatives to visit cemeteries 
135 TNA, PRO WO 32/11593, McNair to BAOR Headquarters, 30 November 1945; TNA, PRO WO 
32/11593, DGRE to Air Ministry Casualty Branch, 8 December 1945. 
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until they are completed and the last doubts of identification cleared up.' 139 McNair 
added that next -of -kin hoping to visit cemeteries in the Middle East and 
Mediterranean theatres would also have to wait a while longer!" 
A False End 
Operations outside north -west Europe had not proceeded as planned during the latter 
months of 1945. The registration and concentration of graves was effectively 
complete in the Middle East and North Africa, and was well -advanced in Italy, and 
responsibility for the majority of cemeteries had been handed to the IWGC.141 But 
there remained a number of other frustrating and time -consuming tasks to which 
AGS personnel were attending. Most of these involved remedial work, such as at 
Benghazi where parts of the cemetery were being rebuilt after the discovery of 
mines.142 In other cases it was just that progress was slower than expected. The two 
photographers attached to AGS regional headquarters in Cairo, for instance, had still 
to take and process pictures of several thousand graves located as far apart as 
Palestine and Eritrea.143 That operations had not yet been concluded was, however, 
attributable to a common reason: demobilisation was crippling the AGS. The search 
for the remaining British dead in Libya, for example, had been suspended for more 
139 Sunday Dispatch, 23 December 1945. 
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than a month while replacements were sought for the two officers whose duty it had 
been.144 
Colonel A. B. Lawson, CMGRE director and a forthright South African 
officer in the manner of his predecessor, did not believe that work in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East theatres would be complete by the summer of 1946 
when the AGS was due to be disbanded.145 He thought he had insufficient trained 
men at his disposal to fulfil this aim, and that as long as War Office authorities 
continued to send him officers who had not elected to serve in the AGS, graves 
operations would be further slowed. Lawson wrote to army officials in London: 
[i]t has always been the principle to have Graves officers as volunteers, 
because it was found in practice that certain people are simply incapable 
of doing a thorough search of a body which has been buried for some 
time. This is not surprising. We are not so concerned with the officers 
[sic] feelings as we are with the fact that if the search is not efficiently 
done an identity may be lost. These new postings to us are not 
volunteers, and the first of them to arrive has said that he simply cannot 
face exhumations. He is, therefore, useless to us.146 
Lawson, who worked to the maxim `that the last one thousand graves are more 
difficult to find than the first ten thousand', knew that for all the CMGRE had 
achieved - by the end of November approximately ninety -five per cent of the 42,000 
British and Dominion graves in Italy had been registered - much remained to be 
done.147 For instance, the transfer of the dead to Rhodes from the neighbouring 
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islands could not be done until a sturdy boat was found, and in Austria operations 
had only recently commenced.148 Furthermore, Lawson was having difficulties 
dealing with the governments of the Communist states for which CMGRE was 
responsible. No definite indication had been received from authorities in 
Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria that the AGS would be allowed into their 
territories, while permission for personnel to enter Albania had been secured only 
after a series of convoluted negotiations with its government.149 
Graves Operations in Albania 
The possibility of AGS personnel entering Albania had first been raised with the 
national government in Tirana in the autumn of 1944. Nothing came of this 
approach.15o A further request for entry, submitted through the British Military 
Mission (BMM) in Tirana, was made the following May but was refused.151 A third 
petition, in which the Albanian authorities were encouraged to demonstrate some 
compassion for the next -of -kin of the British dead, was advanced in June and two 
months later it was decreed that an AGS officer and one other rank could enter 
Florence from August 1945. CMGRE Advance Headquarters moved to Klagenfurt in Austria the 
following month. See TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to War Office, 31 August 1943; TNA, 
PRO WO 170/7365, Colonel A. B. Lawson to War Office, 4 August 1945. 
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Albania, subject to their being deemed of good character.152 The first two officers 
proposed by Lawson were refused visas by Albanian officials, Lieutenant Otto 
Cammerloher because he had been born in Germany, Lieutenant V. F. I. Merrett 
because he had served in Albania during the war as part of a commando force 
associated with the anti -Communist King Zog.153 
Permission to enter Albania was eventually accorded to Major F. McIntosh, 
an experienced and highly- regarded AGS officer, and his driver.t54 Following a two 
week journey from Florence, they arrived in Tirana in early October. At this time 
McIntosh believed there to be at least thirty -five British graves in Albania.155 He 
knew for certain that the bodies of several commandos had been abandoned after one 
wartime raid, and was reasonably sure of a number of RAF aircraft having crashed in 
the country.156 This knowledge he hoped to supplement with information provided 
by the Albanian military, but a visit to its headquarters in Tirana revealed only 
apathy with regard to the existence and whereabouts of British graves.157 Albanian 
General Staff officers did, however, consent to make enquiries of regional officials in 
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this regard, and after six weeks, during which time McIntosh was forbidden to leave 
Tirana, enough information had been gathered for a trip beyond the capital city.'58 
In mid -November McIntosh headed for the Albanian mountains.159 He was 
accompanied by a Partisan lieutenant, whose task, although ostensibly one of 
protection, was to establish whether McIntosh was a spy, and a civilian driver, his 
own having been forced to leave Albania.160 When they reached the foot of the 
mountains, the men left behind the jeep and their heavier supplies and then, with 
mules to carry their food and bedding, continued on foot.161 The path they followed 
climbed to heights of 7000 feet, where deep snow slowed their progress. After a 
hard trek lasting several days, during which time shelter was taken in the villages of 
mountain peasants, McIntosh and his party found the remains of eleven RAF 
personnel :62 Nine of the bodies were badly burned and conjoined, meaning that 
these men could be identified collectively but not individually.163 
The dead were transported back to Tirana, where McIntosh was able to 
convince the Albanian government to provide him with a block of land for use as a 
cemetery.164 The site obtained was on the crest of a hill on the outskirts of the city. 
There were good views from the plot and, more importantly, there was no possibility 
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of buildings being erected nearby.165 He secured the verbal agreement of Albanian 
authorities to lease the site gratis to the British government for a period of ninety - 
nine years and, with the aim of formalising the arrangement, set to work drafting a 
legal document which would enshrine this commitment when signed.'66 
In early December McIntosh, the Partisan lieutenant and driver embarked on 
their second foray into the field, this time to the west coast of Albania where the 
commandos had left their dead.167 Two armed government soldiers travelled with 
the men to protect them from the coastal peoples, mainly Greeks, who were anti - 
Albanian and anti- British.168 This operation engendered difficulties different from 
the first. McIntosh was offered no information or help in locating graves, and the 
villagers put a high price on their labour. He recorded that `[i]n one town of about 
1,000 inhabitants everyone available positively refused to help to dig up a body 
unless a payment of 30/- was made. The body had eventually to be dug up by my 
Partisan Officer and myself.' 169 While such attitudes were disappointing, McIntosh 
was more disheartened that he was able to identify only two of the thirty bodies he 
unearthed during the two week operation. All were fully decomposed, a sign that 
burial had taken place a considerable time after death, and few forensic clues to their 
identity were found. ' 70 The crosses that had once marked some of the graves had 
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167 TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, McIntosh Report, 25 December 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/9124, 
McIntosh Report, 25 February 1946. For each separate journey McIntosh undertook, he was made by 
the Albanian authorities to apply for a travel permit. These usually took at least a week to process, 
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McIntosh Report, 5 December 1945. 
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been removed by locals, and if they knew the names of the dead commandos 
McIntosh was not told.171 
By the time he returned to Tirana with these bodies on 21 December, 
McIntosh was striving to complete graves operations in Albania as quickly as 
possible.172 Along with the fact that the severe winter was making travel difficult, 
there were several reasons for him to make haste.173 The BMM in Tirana was 
scheduled to close in January and McIntosh did not relish the prospect of operations 
without the support of its staff members.174 Their assistance was crucial in hiring 
workers and finding materials for the construction of the British cemetery, and in 
helping to obtain the gold with which the AGS conducted its business in Albania.175 
McIntosh knew also that his presence in the country was increasingly resented, 
something that was evident in the treatment of the Partisan lieutenant who was 
suspended by the Albanian military for providing him with too much assistance.176 
McIntosh was, moreover, looking forward to his own demobilisation which was to 
take place when he returned to Florence.177 It came sooner than expected. 
In February government authorities in Tirana ruled that McIntosh was a spy 
attempting to foment political unrest and, despite British diplomatic representations 
171 Ibid. Across Albania, civilians generally paid little attention to British graves. The wartime 
interment of the British dead had mostly been done by German or other combat personnel. 
172 TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, McIntosh Report, 25 December 1945. 
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to the contrary, he was forced to leave Albania.178 By the time of his departure, he 
had discovered fifty -two bodies, twenty -two of which he had positively identified, 
but nine of this total remained to be buried.179 In addition the cemetery was without 
a fence, some graves had no marked crosses, and the Albanian authorities - `Balkan 
barbarians' according to Lawson - had not yet formally agreed to lease the land. 189 
Thus McIntosh, who had travelled 8000 miles and spent five months in pursuit of the 
British dead in Albania, left the country disappointed not to have completed his 
task.181 `He was', Lawson informed the War Office, `filled with disgust with the 
treatment accorded him in his effort to collect British dead who had given their lives 
to liberate Albania.' I "2 
178 TNA, PRO WO 170/9124, McIntosh Report, 25 February 1946; TNA, PRO WO 170/9124, 
Progress Report, February 1946; TNA, PRO WO 170/9124, CMGRE Headquarters War Diary, 
February -March 1946. 
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 The Conclusion of Graves Operations in the Middle East and Mediterranean 
Theatres 
In common with McIntosh, CMGRE servicemen at work elsewhere in the region 
were forced to make the best they could of difficult situations as the end of AGS 
operations - scheduled for 31 May and 30 June in the Middle East and 
Mediterranean theatres respectively - approached.183 With many units having only 
one or two British soldiers on their strength, officers were forced to devolve 
responsibility for an increasing number of specialist tasks, previously vested only in 
British or Dominion servicemen, to foreign persons in order to expedite graves 
operations.184 Thus non -British civilians and ex- Italian and German POWs worked 
as batmen and drivers. At the time of its disbandment, more than eighty per cent of 
personnel in Number 25 GCU, for example, were former German prisoners.185 In an 
AGS first, a sub -contract was awarded to a commercial firm, with Kodak Limited 
engaged to assist beleaguered army photographers in the Middle East theatre.186 
Logistic difficulties also beset operations in specific areas. By the end of 
May the AGS still had not managed to secure a boat for its operations in the Greek 
archipelago, making it likely that the work would continue beyond the summer. As 
one senior officer observed, `[a] rough estimate for completing work in the islands is 
two months from the date the boat is available; but this estimate cannot be firm as the 
1S3 TNA, PRO WO 170/9124, Colonel A. B. Lawson to CMGRE Headquarters, 15 January 1946; 
TNA, PRO WO 169/24269, Progress Report, 9 May 1946; TNA, PRO WO 170/9124, Florence 
Conference Minutes, 15 June 1946. 
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135 
weather has a large effect and the difficulties which may be encountered cannot be 
known until the islands are visited.' 187 Elsewhere, a lone CMGRE serviceman was 
allowed into Yugoslavia in March and permission for AGS personnel to enter 
Romania and Bulgaria was received in June, but once work commenced in these 
countries, in which there were a combined 648 British graves, operations were 
afflicted by bureaucratic interference similar to that experienced by McIntosh in 
Albania.188 
Officially the AGS ceased to function in the Middle East and Mediterranean 
theatres on 30 June 1946. However, in the Communist states of southern Europe, as 
well as in Italy and Greece, personnel were given permission to continue working for 
another four months.189 Although War Office authorities had considered classifying 
all bodies and graves not found by the June deadline as lost, they decided that they 
could not ignore the corpses which had previously remained out of reach, or the new 
information which former POWs continued to supply to the DGRE concerning 
hitherto- unknown burials - in Italy it was thought that there were still more than 
1100 unregistered interments - and thus a small force was kept in southern Europe to 
deal with any remaining tasks.190 The majority of the graves personnel left behind 
187 TNA, PRO WO 170/9124, Progress Report, February 1946; TNA, PRO WO 169/24269, Progress 
Report, 9 May 1946; TNA, PRO WO 169/24269, Progress Report, 29 May 1946; TNA, PRO WO 
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were New Zealanders, the DGRE reasoning that the governments of Communist 
countries were less likely to object to them than they were to British servicemen.191 
The Pressure Mounts on the AGS in North -west Europe 
In north -west Europe, the AGS was not to be disbanded until 30 September. 
However, it seemed increasingly unlikely that its task in the theatre would be 
complete by then. The BAOR Graves Service had still to register at least 51,000 
graves, concentrate 55,000 sets of remains, and exhume and attempt to identify 
31,000 bodies in 1600 separate locations.192 Only 7000 British graves in north -west 
Europe had been photographed, while at headquarters staff members were receiving 
approximately 300 enquiries a day, all of which had to be investigated and 
answered.193 
That so much remained to be done was not the fault of Stott. In order to meet 
Adam's autumn deadline, he had been promised an additional nineteen graves units 
by early 1946.194 These units had been raised late and on deployment were not 
adequately staffed or equipped.195 Number 69 GRU proved a typical example. Its 
men spent their first weeks together in Ghent in Belgium awaiting stores. An order 
was then received for their deployment to the south of France, but this could not be 
CMGRE Headquarters War Diary, June 1946; TNA, PRO WO 170/9124, Lieutenant 
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Middle East and Mediterranean theatres, remains in the most heavily -mined 
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acted upon initially as they were without a clerk, cook, draughtsman, or rations.196 
Eventually the unit made the journey and set up quarters in Hyeres in March, but 
without these three positions having been filled. It was only in May, once a French 
civilian had been hired as a cook and necessary equipment had been procured, that 
any progress was made in the field.197 
The autumn deadline was also contingent upon the AGS being granted 
unrestricted access to the Soviet Zone and this had not happened.198 Russian 
authorities had informed British diplomats that entry rights would only be awarded to 
graves personnel in exchange for the Baltic and Ukrainian peoples living within the 
British Zone, but as Britain did not recognise the Soviet nationality of these 
displaced persons a stalemate had been reached.199 The lack of progress in this 
regard was particularly frustrating given that Stott had kept five units stationed in 
Berlin for several months in the expectation that authority to enter the Soviet Zone 
would be received.200 Moreover, there was no indication yet that the AGS would be 
allowed into Czechoslovakia and Poland, nor did Stott have any firm idea of how 
many British dead lay in these two countries.2 
°1 
The new director of the DGRE, Brigadier A. W. Holbrook, formerly of the 
Royal Engineers, sympathised with the men of the BAOR Graves Service and the 
difficulties they were facing.202 In a welcome expression of solidarity, he wrote to 
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Stott in June asking him to propose a realistic date for the conclusion of graves 
operations.203 Stott replied that he hoped to have all the graves of the post -D -Day 
dead registered and concentrated by 31 March 1947, but that it would `take a further 
year to eighteen months to complete all "Pre "D" Day" Graves - including 
exhumations and Photography ... [depending] upon the extend [sic] to which Units 
of the Graves Service (including this Directorate) in the field are maintained.'204 
Stott explained that with the officer strength of his organisation having been no 
higher than fifty -five per cent of the stipulated War Establishment level for several 
months, and sixty per cent of AGS vehicles in north -west Europe under repair or not 
working, it was inevitable that progress was slow.205 After hearing from Stott, 
Holbrook visited the Continent to witness at first hand the conditions under which 
the AGS was labouring. 206 What he saw convinced him that its personnel were 
performing their difficult task exceptionally well. 
On his return to the War Office, Holbrook suggested to the new Adjutant 
General, General Sir Richard O'Connor, that the BAOR Graves Service should be 
given better support and more time to complete its operations: `I am of the opinion 
that the allocation of man power to the Graves Units in B.A.O.R. has been and still is 
insufficient for the task. It is false economy to cut down the numbers of personnel in 
the Graves Service as there is a certain irreducible number of man-hours work to be 
done'.207 Holbrook noted that press columnists had begun to make unfavourable 
comparisons between the manner in which the British and American armies treated 
tos TNA, PRO 
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their dead, the United States military having nearly finished attending to 150,000 of 
its graves in north -west Europe.208 The better results achieved by the Americans, he 
pointed out to O'Connor, were not necessarily due to superior practice but because 
their authorities had committed 7000 soldiers to the work. The BAOR Graves 
Service, for which the War Establishment stipulated a strength of 1000 men, had 
never been staffed by more than several hundred trained personne1.209 Holbrook 
informed the Adjutant General that if Stott was not provided with an additional forty - 
nine officers and 256 other rank servicemen, graves operations would continue until 
the spring of 1949.210 
In September, O'Connor wrote to Colonel Lord Nathan, the Parliamentary 
Under Secretary of State for War, stating that he could find no more men for the 
AGS and that there was no choice but to adopt the spring of 1949 as the end date for 
graves operations.211 Sir Eric Speed, the Permanent Under Secretary of State for 
War, who was privy to this correspondence, did not agree and informed Nathan of 
his `uneasiness' in this regard: 
I think that the impatience of the Press and public may well increase and 
that they are hardly likely to be content with another 21/2 years delay or 
more and I think it may be a little difficult to put across the explanation 
that it is due to our inability to find another 49 officers and 256 other 
ranks to speed up the work and complete it in half the time. I understand 
that labour for digging is not the bottleneck; the actual digging is already 
done very largely by local labour in France, Belgium and Holland, as 
well as in Germany, although it is not considered policy to publicise this. 
208 TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, Holbrook Report, July 1946. 
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The difficulty is the shortage of British Officers and other ranks who are 
required for supervision and for doing the documentary work.212 
Speed recommended that the Adjutant General be asked to find the additional 305 
men and to accord the AGS a higher staffing priority generally. O'Connor duly 
agreed to investigate what could be done.213 
The AGS Enters the Soviet Zone 
At this time Stott received the good news that Russian military authorities had given 
their consent to three `Search Teams' and three `Disinterring Teams' entering the 
Soviet Zone from 15 October.214 Strict conditions were attached to their entry. Each 
of the `Search Teams' would consist of one officer and two other ranks, while the 
individual `Disinterring Teams' would comprise two officers and six other ranks.215 
A minimum of two days before entering the Soviet Zone, the AGS would have to 
provide the Soviet Military Administration in Potsdam with maps of where its men 
planned to travel, and give good cause why they wished to visit these places. Further 
to this condition, team members were not to proceed anywhere other than those 
places stated in their applications, although the possibilities of this happening were 
negligible for they were always to be accompanied by Russian officers.216 British 
servicemen entering the Soviet Zone were expected to return to their base in Berlin 
212 TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, Speed to Nathan, 30 September 1946; The Quarterly Army List: August 
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each night if possible, and none were to stay more than four consecutive days in 
Russian territory: apart from the security reasons for this ruling, the Russian 
authorities were reluctant to provide AGS personnel with rations and 
accommodation.217 Other conditions of entry were that servicemen wore military 
uniform while travelling in the Soviet Zone and denim overalls when handling the 
dead, and transported bodies only in closed vehicles.218 The AGS was quick to 
accept these rules knowing that there was nothing to be gained and everything to be 
lost by disputing them, and arrangements were made for men from Number 53 GRU 
and Number 56 GCU to enter the Soviet Zone.219 It was expected that the removal of 
the British dead from the region would take at least a year.22° 
The Increasing Hostility of the Public 
As information was gathered from the Soviet Zone and hitherto -unknown burials 
were discovered in other areas, Stott was able to deliver to the War Office more 
accurate forecasts of what remained to be done by the AGS in north -west Europe. At 
the end of 1946 he reported that there were 58,000 graves to be registered - an 
increase of 8,000 on the figure for the previous June - 55,000 concentrations still to 
be performed, and 30,000 unknown bodies awaiting exhumation for identification.22t 
These problems were compounded by the fact that O'Connor had not found the 
Western Europe Graves Service any more servicemen, and nor was he willing to 
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218 Ibid. 
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employ and train civilians to fill its skilled staff deficiencies for the predicted yearly 
cost of doing so was £90,000.222 
Although the public knew nothing of the Adjutant General's position, many 
Britons believed that a parsimonious government was solely to blame for the slow 
progress in graves operations, and for the decision, not yet widely accepted, to bury 
the dead in Germany. Gertrude Green from Sussex wrote to The Times in 
December: 
[a] letter from a friend in great distress tells me that her son's grave is 
probably to be in Germany. She and her relatives have appealed for a 
reversal of this decision, but the only answer they have leads them to 
assume that parsimony on the part of the Government is responsible. It is 
unbearable that those who mourn the loss of their heroic dead should 
have their hearts wrung by the thought that England allows them to lie in 
enemy territory.223 
Margery Swanwick of Chesterfield thought similarly. In a letter to the Daily 
Telegraph she wrote: `I myself lost a son and a nephew, both killed in Germany, and 
it is with the utmost distaste that I contemplate the idea of visiting their graves in a 
country, and among inhabitants, with whom we have so recently been at war.'224 
She added that `[t]he trouble and expense of moving the graves from Germany to 
countries of our Allies would indeed be a small matter compared with the 
satisfaction to those whose feelings are surely entitled to some consideration.'225 
222 TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, Holbrook Memorandum, 22 November 1946; TNA, PRO WO 
32/12036, Internal Memorandum, 12 December 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, Internal 
Memorandum, 16 January 1947. In the autumn of 1946, the BAOR Graves Service changed name, 
first to the North -West Europe Graves Service and then to the Western Europe Graves Service. 
223 
The Times, 5 December 1946. Similar sentiments had been expressed after the First World War. 
For example, see CWGC, 1050, The Countess of Selborne to Sir Laming Worthington- Evans, 30 
December 1924. 
224 Daily Telegraph, 10 December 1946. 
225 Mid. One letter writer, borrowing the words of Rupert Brooke, declared that it did not matter 
where cemeteries were located. for all foreign fields would be `for ever England'. See The Times, 9 
December 1946. See also The Times, 13 December 1946; Daily Telegraph, 14 December 1946; Daily 
Telegraph, 17 December 1946; The Times, 28 December 1946. 
143 
In February 1947, O'Connor informed Frederick Bellenger, the Secretary of 
State for War, that AGS operations would not be completed before the spring of 
1949.226 The Adjutant General explained that the army was short of junior officers 
and non -commissioned officers and he did not feel that any could be spared for the 
AGS. At the same time he assured Bellenger that `I am doing all I can to speed up 
the work in other ways.'Z27 Like Speed, who had continued to argue that somehow 
more men had to be found for the AGS, Bellenger was `disturbed' by the position 
adopted by O'Connor.228 He replied: `I would be glad to have an early report on the 
means you are pursuing for speeding up the work ... [i]n discussing the topics about 
which the Public write to the War Office I noticed that enquiries about Graves now 
head the list.'229 
In the House of Commons Bellenger was being questioned regularly about the 
progress of graves operations.230 One MP asked him to ensure `proper co- ordination 
between his Department and the War Graves Commission to avoid what happened 
recently, when an organised party arrived ... and found the cemetery was in a 
transitional stage, with no list of graves and no flowers, with the result that the visit 
caused a good deal of distress'.231 Bellenger replied: `[n]ot all the cemeteries are 
226 In December 1946, Major General V. Blomfield had succeeded Holbrook as DGRE director. See 
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properly organised. It is an immense problem to recover so many bodies, scattered 
as they are over the battlefields, and concentrate them; but I am glad to say that the 
work is progressing very well indeed.'232 Privately, however, he was concerned. As 
he informed his ministerial colleague, Ernest Bevin, in August: `the public will not 
tolerate any laxity in dealing with the proper registration and care of war graves.'233 
The Increasing Isolation of the AGS 
By this time Stott had realised that he was not going to be provided with any form of 
additional resources. On this matter O'Connor remained resolute.234 Thus Stott 
turned his attention to reorganising his personnel as efficiently and effectively as 
possible, converting ten GRUs into five large GCUs on the basis that most of the 
work which remained to be done involved moving bodies into permanent 
cemeteries.235 In Germany, meanwhile, the concentration programme was to be 
more diverse than first anticipated, with Stott envisaging the construction of fifteen 
British cemeteries in the country rather than the original four.236 
The restructuring of the Western Europe Graves Service was part of a wider 
plan formulated by Stott which was intended to facilitate the completion of graves 
232 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 438 HC, DEB 5S, pp. 1779 -80. The debate was reported in the 
national press the following day. For example, see Manchester Guardian, 18 June 1947. 
233 TNA, PRO FO 371/64626, Bellenger to Bevin, 12 August 1947. 
234 TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, O'Connor to Bellenger, 29 March 1947; TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, 
O'Connor to Bellenger, 3 May 1947. 
235 TNA, 267/605, Conference Minutes, 10 March 1947; TNA, 267/605, Conversion of Units, 27 
March 1947; TNA, PRO WO 267/605, Quarterly Historical Report, 31 March 1947; TNA, PRO WO 
267/606, Unit Disbandment Memoranda, 29 April 1947; TNA, PRO WO 267/606, Reorganisation 
of 
AGS, 19 May 1947; TNA, PRO WO 267/606, Quarterly Historical Report, 31 June [sic] 1947. 
236 TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, O'Connor to Bellenger, 3 May 1947; TNA, PRO WO 32/11593, British 
Cemeteries in Germany, 4 July 1947. 
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operations by 31 December 1948.237 Its central tenet involved what he termed the 
`final sweep', an operation which was to be conducted in two stages in 41,296 
separate mayoralties across the theatre.238 During the first stage, personnel would 
systematically comb the land and complete the registration and concentration of any 
graves that remained unattended, exhume unknown bodies for identification, and 
obtain from the mayor a certificate stating that all graves within his jurisdiction had 
been made known to the AGS.239 The second stage would entail, where necessary, 
the erection of crosses, the photographing of graves, and the finalising of reports 
ready for the handover of cemeteries to the IWGC.240 During these operations, 
personnel would pay particular attention to the 6000 civil cemeteries in north -west 
Europe which were thought to contain remains of British servicemen to ensure that 
no graves were bypassed.241 Similarly, all enemy graves would have to be attended 
to for an area to be considered 'cleared'.242 
Certain War Office authorities baulked at the scale of their ongoing 
commitment to the dead. In the autumn of 1947 the Director of Finance stated that 
either the size of the AGS had to be reduced, or the date of its disbandment brought 
forward, for the War Office could not afford to fund graves operations on this level 
237 TNA, 267/605, Conference Minutes, 10 March 1947; TNA, 267/606, Conference Minutes, 6 May 
1947; TNA, PRO WO 267/606, Quarterly Historical Report, 31 June [sic] 1947; TNA, PRO WO 
267/606, Target Dates for Completion of Operations, June 1947. 
238 TNA, 267/605, Conference Minutes, 10 March 1947; TNA, PRO WO 267/606, Reorganisation of 
AGS, 19 May 1947; TNA, PRO WO 267/606, Stott to Clode, 5 July 1947; TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, 
Statistics Tables, 10 November 1947; TNA, PRO WO 267/610, Statistics Report, 25 June 1948. 
239 TNA, PRO WO 267/606, Stott to Clode, 5 July 1947. 
240 Ibid. 
241 TNA, 267/605, Conference Minutes, 10 March 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/54, Conference Minutes, 
14 March 1947; TNA, PRO WO 267/606, Reorganisation of AGS, 19 May 1947; TNA, PRO WO 
267/607, Quarterly Historical Report, 30 September 1947; TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, Statistics 
Tables, 10 November 1947; TNA, PRO WO 267/610, Statistics Report, 25 June 1948. 
242 TNA, PRO WO 267/606, Areas of Responsibility Memorandum, circa June 1947; TNA, PRO WO 
267/606, Target Dates for Completion of Operations, June 1947. 
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until the end of 1948 243 In addition to lessening the dependence of the Western 
Europe Graves Service on external labour - it employed 500 European civilians to 
whom the army had to pay wages - it was suggested that costs might be cut by 
reducing the scope of its work, particularly in relation to German casualties and the 
American and French dead in southern France.244 In this regard the Director of 
Finance was giving voice to a school of thought which existed within the War Office 
that the AGS was doing too thorough a job. As one senior official put it, [h]ow far 
must the areas where war dead may be found be combed in order to satisfy public 
opinion ?'245 The DGRE replied that Britain was bound by the Geneva Convention 
to deal with the German dead, that the target date of 31 December 1948 had been 
calculated on the assumption that the strength of the AGS would not be further 
weakened, and that everything possible would be done to conclude graves operations 
before this point and at minimum cost.246 
243 TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, Internal Memorandum, 12 September 1947; TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, 
Internal Memorandum, 3 November 1947; The Quarterly Army List: August 1947, Part I, (London: 
HMSO, 1947), p. 59. On 15 September 1947, Brigadier C. S. Vale, the Director of Prisoners of War 
at the War Office, replaced Blomfield as DGRE director. Vale was formerly of the RASC. See TNA, 
PRO WO 32/12036, Internal Memorandum, 15 September 1947; The Quarterly Army List: December 
1947, (London: HMSO, 1947), pp. 35 -7; The Quarterly Army List: August 1948, (London: HMSO, 
1948), p. 213d. 
244 TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, Internal Memorandum, 12 September 1947; TNA, PRO 
WO 32/12036, 
Internal Memorandum, 3 November 1947. At one point, the AGS in north -west Europe employed 
over 1000 civilians, mostly as unskilled labourers. See TNA, PRO WO 171/10997, Number 56 GCU 
War Diary, June 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, Table on Civilian Labour, 22 February 
1947; TNA, 
PRO WO 32/12036, Statistics Tables, 10 November 1947. 
245 TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, Internal Memorandum, 18 November 1947. 
246 TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, Internal Memorandum, 15 September 1947; TNA, 
PRO WO 32/12036, 
Internal Memorandum, 21 November 1947. 
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 The Disbandment of the AGS 
The strength of the Western Europe Graves Service diminished over the first half of 
1948. In all areas outside Germany, units were disbanded or amalgamated.247 
Administrative headquarters were moved to Calais in preparation for the departure of 
the AGS from the Continent, and in May the supply and administration of the 
Western Europe Graves Service was devolved to Eastern Command in England in a 
move designed to appease the Treasury. 248 By this time, approximately 85,000 
graves had been registered in France, Belgium and Holland.249 
In Germany, where a further 25,000 British and Dominion dead lay, AGS 
operations were less advanced.250 For instance, the concentration of 5000 British 
bodies from the Soviet Zone had stalled for a lack of interpreters.251 The one officer 
in the AGS who spoke Russian had been demobilised, and other Britons in Germany 
who were fluent in the language were already employed within the military and civil 
administration.252 The seriousness of the situation that AGS operations in 
the Soviet Zone were expected to take another year.253 
Despite these problems, by the autumn of 1948 AGS operations in Europe 
were effectively complete except in Poland, entry into this country having only been 
247 TNA, PRO WO 267/608, Quarterly Historical Report, 31 December 1947; TNA, PRO WO 
267/609, Quarterly Historical Report, 31 March 1948; TNA, PRO WO 267/610, Quarterly Historical 
Report, 30 June 1948; TNA, PRO WO 267/609, Unit Location Statement, April 1948. 
248 TNA, PRO WO 267/610, Quarterly Historical Report, 30 June 1948. 
249 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 267/609, Statistics Report, 25 March 1948; TNA, PRO WO 267/610, 
Statistics Report, 25 June 1948. 
250 Ware, The Immortal Heritage, p. 63; Commonwealth War Graves Commission Annual Report, 
2000 -2001, p. 41; CWGC, Germany Graves Statistics. 20,000 of the 25,000 dead were British. 
251 TNA, PRO WO 32/11755, Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Armitage to Vale, 29 April 1948; TNA, PRO 
WO 32/11755, Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Armitage to Vale, 13 May 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/11755, 
Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Armitage to Vale, 25 May 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/11755, Soviet Zone 
Concentrations, circa May 1948. 
252 TNA, PRO WO 32/11755, Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Armitage to Vale, 29 April 1948. 
253 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 32/11755, Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Armitage to Vale, 13 May 1948; TNA, 
PRO WO 32/11755, Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Armitage to Vale, 25 May 1948. 
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secured that year, and in the Soviet Zone.254 In some `cleared' regions there 
remained a few bodies and graves unaccounted for, but these territories had been so 
thoroughly searched that it had become pointless to continue looking for the dead.255 
The work of the AGS could not continue indefinitely, and thus steps were taken to 
end investigations. The DGRE informed the mother of Lance Corporal G. R. 
Bentley that: 
the location of his grave has not been reported to this Directorate ... 
although many searches and enquiries have been made for the graves of 
those that still remain unlocated [sic]. I fear that after this lapse of time 
there is now very little hope that his grave will ever be located, and in 
your great loss and sad distress I extend to you the most sincere sympathy 
of this Directorate.256 
On 30 September the War Office closed the DGRE and ended AGS operations in 
France, Belgium and Holland.257 
The forty -eight men who remained in the service after this date continued 
working in Poland until January 1949 and in the Soviet Zone until 31 July, on which 
day the last AGS unit was disbanded.258 No fanfare marked the occasion. Rather, 
there was just the disappointing matter of work unfinished, Russian authorities 
254 TNA, PRO WO 32/11755, Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Armitage to Vale, 29 April 1948; TNA, PRO 
WO 32/12968, Vale Minute, 23 August 1948. 
255 CWGC, 3031, Summary of War Graves and Cemeteries, August 1949. 
256 CWGC, 3001, DGRE to B. Bentley, 19 August 1948. 
257 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale Minute, 23 August 1948; TNA, PRO WO 267/610, Kite 
Order 3186, circa September 1948; CWGC, 3031, Vale Memorandum, 8 September 1948; CWGC, 
3031, Notice of DGRE Closure, 1 October 1948; The Quarterly Army List: August 1948, p. 15B; The 
Quarterly Army List: December 1948, (London: HMSO, 1948), pp. 15 -15A. 
z58 TNA, PRO WO 32/12036, Statistics Tables, 10 November 1947; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale 
Minuté, 23 August 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale to Frank Higginson, 20 September 1948; 
TNA, PRO WO 32/11755, Lieutenant Colonel F. C. Hallowes to J. Mackenzie, Foreign Office, 26 
April 1949; TNA, PRO WO 32/11755, Lieutenant Colonel F. C. Hallowes Memorandum, 26 April 
1949; TNA, PRO WO 32/11755, Major J. C. Vincent Report, 29 July 1949; CWGC, 3031, Vale 
Memorandum, 8 September 1948; CWGC, 3031, Notice of DGRE Closure, 1 October 1948; CWGC, 
3031, Summary of War Graves and Cemeteries, August 1949; Thirtieth Annual Report of the Imperial 
War Graves Commission, (London, HMSO, 1950), pp. 22 -3; The Quarterly Army List: December 
1948, p. 15. On 1 October 1948, the Department of POWs and Graves was formed within the 
Directorate of Personal Services (DPS) at the War Office. Its function with regard to graves was to 
supervise the AGS personnel still at work in Poland and the Soviet Zone. 
149 
having forbidden the men of Number 50 GCU from entering Thuringia and East 
Prussia to recover the bodies of several hundred British servicemen.259 The public 
conclusion of operations was equally subdued. The War Office did not announce 
that the AGS officially had completed its task in Europe, meaning that the event 
which denoted this achievement, the handover of Heerstrasse War Cemetery in 
Berlin to the IWGC, went unnoticed in Britain.260 For a largely anonymous 
organisation such as the AGS, this was sadly appropriate. 
259 TNA, PRO WO 32/11755, Lieutenant Colonel F. C. Hallowes Memorandum, 26 April 1949; TNA, 
PRO WO 32/11755, Major J. C. Vincent Report, 29 July 1949; CWGC, 3031, Summary of War 
Graves and Cemeteries, August 1949. The graves of British soldiers in Czechoslovakia were attended 
to at some point in the 1940s, although exactly when this was done and by whom is not known. 
269 TNA, PRO WO 32/11755, Lieutenant Colonel F. C. Hallowes Memorandum, 26 April 
1949; 
CWGC, 3031, Summary of War Graves and Cemeteries, August 1949. 
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Figures 4 -12: AGS Operations in France 
Members of Number 48 GCU chart the position of isolated graves in Normandy, 
1946. 
Searching the countryside for bodies and graves. 
151 
An identity disc. 
Painting and preparing crosses for erection in cemeteries. 
152 
An exhumation (1). 




) /GREN. CRAFT, K. 0 GEFR. WERLE. G. 
German burial plot, Tilly- sur -Seulles War Cemetery, Calvados. 
A Number 48 GCU officer (left) prepares to hand over Banneville -la- Campagne War 
Cemetery, Calvados, to an IWGC official, 1947. 
155 
Figures 13 -29: The Development of Bayeux War Cemetery by the AGS, 1944 -48 
A muddy field. 
A temporary burial plot (1). 
156 
A temporary burial plot (2). 
Marking permanent burial plots. 
157 
Civilians digging graves (1). 
Civilians digging graves (2). 
158 
Tilling and levelling the earth. 
Checking graves. 
159 
Crosses awaiting erection. 
Crosses being erected. 
160 
Scots Guards burial plot. 
Flattening mounds. 
161 
A delivery of amended crosses. 
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Keeping Track of Missing RAF Personnel: September 1939- December 
1945 
A New Concern 
On 4 September 1939, Blenheim and Wellington aircraft from Number Two Group, 
Bomber Command, attacked naval installations at Wilhelmshaven on the German 
North Sea coast. A number of the aircraft did not return to base.' It was possible - 
probable even - that the crews of these aircraft were dead, yet in the absence of 
conclusive evidence or eyewitness reports, death could only be supposed. If they 
were dead, it could not be assumed that evidence of their deaths would be found. It 
was likely that the men had been shot down behind enemy lines, near to their targets 
and where German air defences were strongest, but that this did happen could not be 
assumed either. The aircraft may have crashed into the North Sea or the English 
Channel and sunk to the sea floor. Had they crashed on land, the impact may have 
been such that the aircraft and the bodies of the crew would have been damaged 
beyond recognition. Conversely, it was feasible for the families and the Air Ministry 
to retain the hope that the men were still alive. They could have been captured and 
incarcerated as POWs or, having avoided capture, be making their way back to 
Britain. The Air Ministry was aware of all these possible fates, but only knew for 
certain the names of the airmen. They were listed as missing and the families of the 
men notified of this status by telegram. Simultaneously, the Casualty Branch, part of 
TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part I; John Nichol and Tony Rennell, The Last Escape: The Untold Story 
of Allied Prisoners of War in Germany 1944 -45, (London: Penguin, 2003), p. 36. 
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the secretarial division of the Air Ministry, was given responsibility for the missing 
aircrew, although exactly what this entailed had yet to be clarified.2 
The Casualty Branch had no experience of determining the fate of RAF 
personnel lost overseas. Its role had been to deal with the relatively small number of 
peacetime casualties resulting from flying accidents in Britain and its duties, 
although melancholy, had never been taxing.3 Locating missing aircrew in Europe 
was a new challenge and, until such time as the Casualty Branch was able to mount a 
search for the missing men in Germany, investigations into their fate would have to 
be pursued from London. This posed conceptual as well as practical difficulties, 
there being no obvious way by which to commence the task. No person at the Air 
Ministry had any relevant experience on which to draw, and nor were there 
procedural instructions or regulations to which staff could refer for direction.4 The 
stipulations in the RAF War Manual detailed how airmen were to be buried and not 
how the missing might be found. 
In the first three weeks of the war, the Casualty Branch was entirely reliant on 
the British and foreign media for information regarding the whereabouts of missing 
airmen, with transmissions from BBC correspondents on the Continent, and German 
radio, useful sources of information on the fate of RAF personnel.5 Many Britons 
recognised the voices of missing relatives and friends on German broadcasts and 
then notified the Air Ministry, allowing it to change the status of these servicemen 
from `missing' to `POW'. The Casualty Branch was nonetheless wary of relying too 
heavily on the media. Not only was it sceptical as to the veracity of public news, it 
2 At this time the Casualty Branch was known as S7 Casualty within the Air Ministry. 
3 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part I; The Air Force List: September 1939, (London: HMSO, 
1939), p. 
877. 
' See CWGC, 2033, Major H. F. Chettle to Ware, circa December 1939. 
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recognised the awkwardness and potential for embarrassment of having no 
information to pass on to concerned relatives of the missing other than that taken 
from, and available in, the public domain. 
It was, therefore, a relief when POW capture cards began to be received in 
Britain at the end of September 1939. The purpose of these cards, which were 
completed by newly- interned POWs and sent by German authorities to the POWs' 
next -of -kin, was compassionate in that it allowed prisoners to notify relatives of their 
capture and prove that they were alive.6 For the Casualty Branch, capture cards 
served the more prosaic function of establishing the POW status of missing RAF 
personnel. The arrival of the cards in Britain also provided an indication of the 
preparedness of German authorities to abide by the decrees within the Geneva 
Conventions governing the transfer of casualty information between belligerents. 
For the Casualty Branch, hamstrung by its inability to deploy in the field, this was 
promising for it could not hope to locate large numbers of missing airmen without 
the cooperation of enemy authorities. 
To this end the British armed services had agreed on 2 September to 
cooperate with the Joint War Organisation (JWO) - comprised of the British Red 
Cross Society and the Order of St John of Jerusalem - to facilitate the exchange of 
casualty information with the German military. Formal ties for this purpose were 
forged at the end of the month after contact had been made with the ICRC in Geneva, 
and this foundation was built upon when the JWO established a POW Department in 
6 Ibid.; Nichol and Rennell, The Last Escape, pp. 89 -90. See also Hilary St George Saunders, The Red 
Cross and the White: A Short History of the Joint War Organization of the British Red Cross Society 
and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem During the War 1939 -1945, (London: Hollis and Carter, 
167 
London in October.' The ICRC undertook to send any information obtained from 
German officials regarding missing British airmen to this department, which would 
then pass the knowledge to the Casualty Branch, an arrangement which ensured that 
the Air Ministry would be privy to all relevant Red Cross information.8 In turn, the 
Casualty Branch agreed to channel all its enquiries about missing RAF personnel 
through the JWO and, ultimately, the ICRC. To facilitate these transfers of 
information, an ICRC Liaison Officer was attached to the Air Ministry and, by the 
middle of October, Britain and Germany were exchanging casualty data readily and 
reliably.9 
Such communications were a melancholy business for they involved the 
Casualty Branch confirming the deaths of British airmen. The telegrams forwarded 
from Germany through the ICRC included basic synopses on the fate of aircrew, and 
this information was expanded upon in the Totenlisten that followed. I° These were 
photostatic copies of original German documents that recorded the manner of death 
of enemy servicemen and the site of burial." The first Totenliste was received at the 
Casualty Branch on 14 October 1939 whereupon it was translated into English. 
Stamped for despatch by German military authorities in Berlin on 27 September, it 
detailed the deaths of four RAF personnel. Of one of these men, Sergeant Prince, it 
1949), p. 85. As capture cards were sent directly to next -of -kin, the Casualty Branch was dependent 
on families notifying it that they had received news of their missing relatives. 
7 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part I; S. C. Rexford -Welch (ed.), The Royal Air Force Medical Services, 
Volume 1, Administration, (London: HMSO, 1954), pp. 345 -6. The 1930 Field Service Regulations 
stated that `[i]n accordance with international conventions a Prisoners of War Information Bureau will 
be established for the record and transmission of information regarding prisoners of war and for the 
disposal of the personal effects of the dead.' See Field Service Regulations, Volume I, Organization 
and Administration, 1930, p. 210. 
8 See correspondence in TNA, PRO WO 32/14357. 
TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part I; Rexford -Welch (ed.), The Royal Air Force Medical Services, pp. 
350 -1. See also TNA, PRO WO 32/14357, Relations Between the Casualty Branch and the British 
Red Cross, Undated; TNA, PRO WO 32/14357, Relations Between the Casualty Branch and the 
ICRC, Undated. 
1° TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part I. Totenlisten translates as lists of the dead. 
" TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part I. 
168 
was stated: [b]rought down by enemy on 3/9/39 - Broken neck and both thighs - 
Died in Marine Hospital Wesermunde on 4/9/39 - Buried Geestemunde Cemetery, 
soldiers' section.' 12 Because there was no reason to doubt the truth or accuracy of 
the information provided in the Totenliste, the Casualty Branch confirmed Prince and 
the three other airmen dead upon receipt of this document. 
The subsequent receipt of further Totenlisten throughout October and 
November generated more work than the existing staff of the Casualty Branch could 
cope with, and in late 1939 the department was expanded by the Air Ministry. At the 
same time it placed the Casualty Branch under the jurisdiction of the Directorate of 
Personal Services (DPS), which was a division of the department of the Air Member 
for Personnel (AMP).13 
The Escalation of the Air War 
Several months later, in May 1940, the Wounded, Missing and Relatives Department 
of the JWO was established. Not only did this department provide the Casualty 
Branch with an additional avenue for keeping track of missing airmen through the 
ICRC, but it was agreed that it would deal also with enquiries from the relatives of 
missing personnel.14 The timing of this happening was propitious for the strategic air 
12 Ibid. Presumably Prince had been killed in the early morning of 4 September and not on the Pas 
stated in the Totenliste. 
13 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part I; The Air Force List: December 1939, (London: HMSO, 1939), p. 
13. The internal title of the Casualty Branch changed from S7 Casualty to P4 Casualty to reflect its 
transfer from the secretarial division to the personnel division of the Air Ministry. 
14 Rexford -Welch (ed.), The Royal Air Force Medical Services, p. 353; P. G. Cambray and G. G. B. 
Briggs, Red Cross & St. John: The Official Record of the Humanitarian Services of the War 
Organisation of the British Red Cross Society and Order of St. John ofJerusalem 1939 -1947, 
(London: Publisher Unknown, 1949), pp. 339, 341. Also in May 1940, the Directorate 
of Prisoners of 
War (DPW) was established at the War Office. See Nichol and Rennell, The Last 
Escape, p. 37; 
David Rolf, "`Blind Bureaucracy ": The British Government and POWs in German 
Captivity, 1939- 
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offensive against Germany began on 15 May 1940 when Bomber Command aircraft 
attacked railways and oil depots in the Ruhr.15 For the Casualty Branch, the 
implications of this development were profound. Since the German invasion and 
occupation of the Low Countries on 10 May, the 1200 mile flight from southern 
England to northern Germany had become more dangerous as it entailed a longer 
time spent flying over or near enemy territory.16 The strategic air offensive also 
meant more personnel going missing because of the large numbers of aircraft 
involved. On 15 May ninety -nine bombers attacked the Ruhr, more than had been 
despatched on operations the previous October and November, and in the four 
months from May to August, Bomber Command listed 269 aircraft missing, 196 
more than for the previous eight months.'? There was a further escalation in the air 
war in 1941 when, in the three months from June to August, 11,396 bombers were 
despatched on raids and 411 of these went missing.' 8 
With the increase in the numbers of missions being flown and airmen being 
killed, more staff at the Casualty Branch became involved with despatching 
notifications in cases where death had been confirmed. As this work was of primary 
importance, the investigations into the fates of airmen listed as missing, and about 
whom nothing had yet been established, temporarily had to be abandoned.19 All the 
while more airmen went missing. It soon became apparent that the Casualty Branch 
45' in Bob Moore and Kent Fedorowich (eds.), Prisoners of War and their Captors in World War II, 
(Oxford: Berg, 1996), p. 49. 
15 Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939- 
1945, Volume I, (London: HMSO, 1961), p. 144. 
16 Bomber Command Continues: The Air Ministry Account of the Rising Offensive Against Germany 
July 1941 -June 1942, (London: HMSO, 1942), p. 30; Richard Overy, Bomber Command 1939 -1945, 
(London: Harper Collins, 1997), p. 202. 
17 Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939 -1945, Volume IV, pp. 
431, 434. 
18 Ibid. 
19 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II. 
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needed to be reconfigured. Its two different tasks - processing notifications where 
death was certain, and investigating the whereabouts and status of airmen whose fate 
remained unknown - needed to be dealt with separately. The creation of the MRS in 
December 1941 to fulfil the second of these tasks was designed to formalise this 
demarcation.20 It was now that the term `missing research' entered the RAF lexicon. 
The MRS: December 1941 -December 1944 
After being separated from the rest of the Casualty Branch to ensure that they were 
not fettered by other duties, the Flight Lieutenant and two civilian clerks who staffed 
the MRS soon brought a previously -unknown method and order to their work. They 
assiduously collected and collated information on missing airmen; initiated enquiries 
through the JWO; and, mindful that the identification of bodies would be a difficult 
and exact science, planned for the future by establishing contacts with jewellers, 
tailors, watchmakers At the same time, case files were opened for 
each missing RAF aircraft. In these were stated details relating to the last mission 
undertaken by each aircraft, such as the date, time and place of its departure, the 
expected time and place of its return, the purpose of the operation, the intended flight 
path of the aircraft, its type and identification number, and the names and ranks of 
each crew member on board.22 
These details, obtainable from flight records, then were supplemented by 
other information the MRS was able to gather on the likely whereabouts of the 
aircraft and its crew, with each piece of recorded information given a weighting 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Sinkinson Report, 23 April 1946; Rexford -Welch (ed.), The Royal Air 
Force Medical Services, p. 353. 
22 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II; CWGC, 2033, Douglas Hague Recollections. 
171 
according to its source and likely veracity.23 The evidence of returning aircrew - 
provided to Air Ministry Intelligence in debriefing sessions at the end of each 
operation - was seen to be particularly valuable in this regard, as the testimonies 
given were those of eyewitnesses.24 For example, during a raid on Cologne, Flight 
Lieutenant C. S. Chatten recalled seeing `a Lancaster spiral away on fire and from its 
markings he recognised it as one that had taken off just ahead of him from Bourn in 
Cambridgeshire ... he realized it was piloted by his friend, Len Hyde.'25 Men 
returned from operations also often were able to indicate the likelihood of there 
having being survivors from downed aircraft, it being a habit of aircrew to watch 
aircraft fall in the hope of seeing parachutes unfurl nearby.26 However, the 
destruction of many aircraft went without witnesses, at least among RAF personnel. 
Sergeant F. V. Shaw remembered watching `a Lanc flying straight and level about a 
mile away. She was being repeatedly attacked from dead astern but took no evasive 
action and there was no answering fire from her guns. I concluded that all on board 
were either dead or wounded and watched until she disappeared, still flying a level 
course.'27 If all its aircrew were dead, and if it were not shot down first, this 
Lancaster may have flown on the same course for hours and crashed only when it ran 
out of fuel, anywhere within a radius of several hundred miles. All the information 
provided by witnesses such as Shaw was incorporated into case reports and used to 
predict the likely fates of missing RAF personnel, with one of three labels appearing 
23 
TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part I. 
24 
John Nichol and Tony Rennell, Tail -end Charlies: The Last Battles of the Bomber War 1944 -45, 
(London: Penguin, 2005), pp. 11 -12, 48; CWGC, 2033, Douglas Hague Recollections; Miles Tripp, 
The Eighth Passenger, (London: William Heinemann, 1969), p. 47. Tail gunners especially witnessed 
many crashes. Because of the wide range of vision allowed from their gun turrets, it was their duty to 
keep the captain informed when other aircraft above or behind them in the formation were hit. 
25 Nichol and Rennell, Tail -end Charlies, p. 48. 
26 Ibid. 
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next to the names in MRS records: `Missing Believed Killed', `Missing Believed 
Prisoner of War', or simply `Missing' for those men about whom the MRS knew 
nothing.28 
As no clue to the whereabouts of an airman, however trivial it seemed, was 
overlooked, the compiling of case reports was a long and laborious process. This 
process was exacerbated by the steadily increasing workload of the MRS. During 
1941 Bomber Command despatched 30,608 aircraft on operations, of which 914 
went missing. The comparative figures for 1942 were 35,050 and 1400; 64,528 and 
2314 in 1943; and 148,448 and 2573 in 1944.29 Throughout this period the MRS 
focused solely on accruing information and compiling case reports as the basis for 
future investigative operations in the field. As long as the Continent remained under 
German occupation, it could do little else. Even the invasion of Normandy in June 
1944 had no immediate effect on the work of the MRS, for in order to mount a 
methodical search for missing airmen, the Allied armies needed first to secure a 
bridgehead of several hundred miles to ensure that investigations could be conducted 
unhindered by the enemy. In the meantime the compilation of case reports 
continued, and in so doing the weight and quality of the evidence accumulated was 
sometimes sufficient to prove the fate of a missing airman. 
28 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part I. The conferral of these labels was never taken as definitive or 
absolute. For those men listed as `Missing Believed Prisoner of War', there was a good chance that 
their POW status would be confirmed through !CRC channels, in which case the MRS would no 
longer be responsible for them. 
29 Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939 -1945, Volume IV, p. 
437. 
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 The Case of Flying Officer John Joseph Berg 
On 17 June 1944 the Casualty Branch cabled Mrs J. Berg of Grimsby, Lincolnshire, 
to inform her that her husband, John Joseph Berg, was `MISSING AS A RESULT 
OF AIR OPERATIONS OVER ENEMY TERRITORY ON THE NIGHT OF 16/17 
JUNE 44'.30 The telegram also stated: `ANY FURTHER INFORMATION WILL 
BE IMMEDIATELY COMMUNICATED TO YOU PENDING RECEIPT OF 
OFFICIAL NOTIFICATION FROM THE AIR MINISTRY NO INFORMATION 
SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE PRESS'.31 It was not until October that the MRS 
learnt anything of the fate of Berg and his crew when a Totenliste was received from 
the ICRC. The Totenliste recorded that six British airmen had been killed on 17 June 
when their aircraft had been shot down, but only three of the dead were named, the 
remaining corpses having been too badly disfigured to be identified. The date and 
place of burial were given as 19 June and Varsseveld Cemetery in Holland, with 
German authorities also providing the numbers of the six adjacent graves in which 
the men had been interred.32 From the names written on the Totenliste, the MRS 
identified the aircraft that had crashed. However, as a consultation of flight records 
revealed that the aircraft had departed on operations with a crew of seven, the MRS 
could confirm only the fate of the three men named in the Totenliste, for while the 
whereabouts and identity of the seventh and missing crew member remained 
unknown, it could not be certain of the names of the three unidentified dead.33 On 
behalf of the JWO and the Casualty Branch, the British Red Cross wrote to Mrs Berg 
3° IWM, 9293/30/554, Air Ministry to Berg, 17 June 1944. 
31 Ibid. 
32 IWM, 9293/30/554, Air Ministry to Berg, 17 December 1944. 
33 IWM, 9293/30/554, British Red Cross to Berg, 9 October 1944. 
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on 9 October to inform her of these developments and to reassure her `that every 
effort is being made in order to clarify this distressing situation.'34 
On 21 October Mrs Berg received from Leicestershire a letter from Flying 
Officer R. Kay, the seventh and missing crew member. He wrote: 
I've been in England some days now, after a hectic time on the Continent, 
& I'd hoped that the authorities had informed you of the fate[ ?] of Jack 
[Berg] & the rest of the crew. Apparently they haven't & this unpleasant 
task is left to me. Well Mrs. Berg I won't `beat about the bush', but I'm 
afraid I can offer no hope concerning Jack.35 
Kay explained that they had been late leaving their target and had become isolated 
behind the main aircraft formation. Their bomber was shot down twenty minutes 
later by a German fighter.36 Kay had parachuted from the burning aircraft and, 
assisted by Dutch civilians, had managed to evade capture and make his way through 
Holland to Britain. Although he offered Mrs Berg no hope that her husband was 
alive, he did not confirm his death. Kay recalled that: [w]hilst I was in the vicinity 
of the crash the Dutch locals told me that only five bodies were found, but that one 
airman was caught in a local town & made prisoner. I supposed that the 
aforementioned airman was F/O [Flying Officer] Heath the rear gunner, but after 
reading your Red Cross letter I don't know what to think.'37 For Mrs Berg there 
remained a faint hope that her husband was still alive. For the MRS, the identity of 
the three unnamed corpses in Varsseveld Cemetery remained unproven. 
34 Ibid. 
35 IWM, 9293/30/554, Kay to Berg, 21 October 1944. To Mrs Berg Kay wrote: `I hope you won't 
think this letter is too frigid & matter -of -fact but I know you'll understand that I'm completely out of 
my depth.' 
36 IWM, 9293/30/554, Kay to Berg, 21 October 1944. 
37 Ibid. The original Totenliste received from the ICRC had listed the three identified dead 
as Flying 
Officer J. Heath, Acting Squadron Leader G. S. Smith, and Flying Officer L. Pulfrey. The 
names of 
these men had also been given to Mrs Berg by the British Red Cross in its letter of 9 October. 
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Two months later the MRS had its answer and Mrs Berg had her loss 
confirmed. On 13 December the Casualty Branch cabled to inform her that her 
husband was dead. Supplementary information obtained from the ICRC - the nature 
of which was not stated - had proved beyond doubt that the men interred in graves 
twelve to fourteen in Varsseveld Cemetery were the three remaining members of the 
seven man crew: Berg, Flight Lieutenant Tizard and Flight Sergeant Townsend.38 
On 15 December the British Red Cross wrote to Mrs Berg to express its regret at 
hearing news that the Air Ministry was to list her husband as `Missing Believed 
Killed', then two days later she received a letter from the Casualty Branch.39 It 
noted: `[t]here is unhappily no reason to doubt the accuracy of the German list, and 
the necessary steps for the formal presumption, for official purposes, of your 
husband's death will be taken shortly.'40 With this letter the question of whether or 
not Flying Officer Berg was dead was closed. 
Creating the MRS Field Branch 
The six months of work it took to solve the Berg case was a reminder to the MRS 
that pursuing enquiries from London was no substitute for working in the field 
among the dead. In this regard, Casualty Branch officials had monitored the progress 
of operations in north -west Europe and, by the autumn of 1944, they felt confident 
enough in the position of the Allied armies on the Continent to consider sending a 
MRS detachment to France. In September they met with Fraser, representing the 
army, to discuss what the despatch of such a formation would involve and, as the 
38 IWM, 9293/30/554, Air Ministry to Berg, 13 December 1944. 
39 IWM, 9293/30/554, British Red Cross to Berg, 15 December 1944. 
4° IWM, 9293/30/554, Air Ministry to Berg, 17 December 1944. 
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War Office was responsible for the bodies and graves of all British servicemen, to 
seek its authorisation for Air Ministry involvement in the handling of the dead.41 
With AGS personnel overworked, the DGRE willingly devolved responsibility for 
finding and identifying missing airmen to the MRS.42 
The arrangement was confirmed in November when the Air Ministry was 
accorded permission to raise a force, the MRS field branch, to search for missing 
airmen.43 There was, however, some confusion as to where MRS responsibilities 
ended and those of the DGRE and the AGS began. The AGS would be responsible 
for registering the graves of those airmen whose deaths had been confirmed and 
whose whereabouts were already known, but the question remained as to whether the 
AGS or the MRS field branch should be responsible for marking the burial places of 
RAF personnel located and identified by the latter organisation. Initially it was 
deemed sufficient for the Air Ministry to be given broad responsibility for missing 
airmen. This in itself represented an enormous investment in the new MRS 
branch, for it was now estimated that 30,000 aircrew were missing as a result of 
operations in north -west Europe. Of these, sixty -nine per cent were thought to be 
British personnel, seventeen per cent Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) personnel, 
seven per cent Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel, and three per cent 
Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) personne1.44 Exactly how many of these 
men had disappeared over land and how many over sea was not known. 
41 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, September 1944. 
42 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, October 1944. 
43 Some documents refer to the MRS field branch as the MRES. This creates a nomenclature problem 
as these were different organisations. In this thesis, the detachments of MRS personnel which worked 
in the field between December 1944 and July 1945 are referred to collectively as the MRS field 
branch, a division of the MRS based at the Casualty Branch of the Air Ministry in London, while 
MRES refers to the missing research organisation which operated post -July 1945. 
44 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II. RAF personnel from other Allied countries were estimated to 
comprise four per cent of the missing. 
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A War Establishment was quickly devised for the inaugural missing research 
field detachment. Number 1 Section MRS was to consist of seven officers and seven 
other ranks. It would be commanded by a Squadron Leader, with six Flight 
Lieutenants serving as Search Officers. Of the other ranks, one would work as a 
clerk and assist the Squadron Leader, while the remaining six would serve as 
drivers.45 Six cars would be placed at the disposal of the section to ensure that the 
Search Officers would be able to work independently and, as the arbiters of missing 
research operations, attend every crash site. The need for mobility was recognised as 
paramount for aircraft, unlike soldiers on the battlefield, rarely fell together. 
E. F. Hawkins, from the Administrative and Special Duties Branch of the Air 
Ministry, was chosen to command Number 1 Section MRS and, in the event of later 
expansion, the MRS field branch as a whole.46 Hawkins, who was fifty- seven, had 
started his career as a regular soldier before becoming the representative in Europe of 
the aircraft manufacturer Hawker Siddeley. He spoke French, German and Italian 
fluently, and had, as one Air Ministry official later observed, `a peculiarly happy flair 
for establishing useful friendships - an invaluable quality in his particular post.'47 
Hawkins shared much in common with the six men he recruited as Search Officers. 
Volunteers, as per MRS field branch policy, each of the Search Officers had lived 
and worked in France before the war: a tailor, a lawyer, a farmer, a travel agent, a 
wool merchant, and a bar manager.48 Their nationalities - three Britons, a Canadian, 
an Australian and a New Zealander - reflected the multinational composition of RAF 
aircrew and RAF dead. 
45 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II. 
46 Ibid. See also The Air Force List: July 1945, (London: HMSO, 1945), pp. 4, 682. 
47 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, MRES North -west Europe Report, February 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 
20/9050, Slessor to Longmore, 22 September 1947. 
48 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II. 
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 The Deployment of Number 1 Section MRS 
In December 1944 Hawkins moved to Paris to establish a field headquarters and 
make preparations for the deployment of his section. He procured accommodation 
and offices for himself and his men in a building occupied by British army personnel 
and, once this was done, scheduled field operations to begin in January.49 However, 
the deployment had to be deferred. As warm billets were at a premium in the 
particularly harsh winter, Hawkins was unable to secure suitable accommodation for 
Number 1 Section MRS outside Paris. Further difficulties arose in February, and by 
the time his men eventually joined him early that month, the vehicles previously 
allocated to the formation had been diverted to a different theatre. With replacement 
transport not due to arrive until the end of April, the section found itself confined to 
Paris.5o 
Despite these setbacks, Hawkins determined that he and his men would make 
profitable use of their time. They travelled to cemeteries close to Paris to search for 
RAF casualties, and examined the records of the French Red Cross and the French 
graves services for new or corroboratory information that would strengthen the case 
reports held by the MRS. The time in Paris afforded Hawkins and his Search 
Officers the opportunity to study the records compiled by Madame L'Herbier.51 A 
French citizen, she worked for a small division of the French Red Cross known as 
the Amicale des Infirmières Pilotes et des Secouristes de l'Air whose members had 
49 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Internal Memorandum, 24 July 1946. 
so TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II. 
51 Ibid. 
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gathered information on the fate of missing French airmen throughout the war.52 
L'Herbier had also collected details of the fate and burial places of Allied airmen, as 
well as items of evidence from aircraft crash sites.53 As Hawkins later noted, she had 
`anticipated by some years the activities of the R.A.F. Missing Research Service, and 
the results of her efforts were of inestimable value to the Casualty Branch and to 
No.1 Section in their early approaches to the immense problem confronting them.'54 
By April the winter had passed and transport for Number 1 Section MRS had 
arrived, allowing Hawkins and his men to begin the search for missing RAF 
airmen.55 Through enquiries made of French civilians, they quickly found that not 
only was the information in many MRS case reports outdated and inaccurate, but that 
there was a significantly greater number of dead RAF airmen than there were case 
reports.56 The preparation of these files from afar had always been an inexact 
science, but no person within the MRS had anticipated that there would be many 
missing airmen of whom the organisation had no prior knowledge. Nor could the 
Casualty Branch explain how such an anomaly had arisen. Since 1941 the entire 
concept of missing research had been predicated on the notion that case reports 
would provide the documentary foundation of searches for missing airmen. One 
week of field operations had exposed this as false. 
Realising that it had grossly underestimated the size and difficulty of the 
missing research problem, the Casualty Branch hastily set about strengthening the 
52 Amicale des Infirmières Pilotes et des Secouristes de l'Air translates as the Union of Pilot Nurses 
and Air Rescuers. 
5' TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II. 
s Ibid. L'Herbier was awarded the Order of the British Empire in recognition of her wartime actions. 
55 It is thought that Number 1 Section MRS commenced its operations in northern France. 
56 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II. See also TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 4 MREU (`G' 
Section) Operations Record Book, June 1947. 
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MRS presence in the field.57 In May 1945, Number 2 Section MRS was raised on a 
War Establishment `similar' to that of Number 1 Section MRS.58 The headquarters 
of Number 2 Section MRS would be in Brussels and its region of operations would 
be Belgium. Further formations were soon deemed necessary, and in June Numbers 
3 and 4 Section MRS were raised for service alongside Number 1 Section in France, 
where in the north there was a particularly heavy concentration of RAF casualties. 
By the summer of 1945, these four sections of the MRS field branch, working under 
the overall command of Hawkins, had investigated and determined the whereabouts 
of a few hundred of the estimated 30,000 missing airmen.59 This was slow progress, 
particularly given that the war in Europe had ended.6° 
A Critical Juncture 
Group Captain R. Burges, the Director of the Casualty Branch, was concerned about 
the difficulties Hawkins and his men were encountering on the Continent.61 He was 
also mindful of the worsening public mood, the period of grace afforded to the Air 
Ministry by the families of missing RAF personnel having passed. The criticisms 
expressed by G. R. J. Vick of Cheshire in a letter to Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill were typical: 
57 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II. 
58 Ibid. 
59 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Beckess Report, June 1945. 
60 After the war ended, the Air Ministry transferred responsibility for the Casualty Branch from its 
personnel division back to its secretarial division, where it was known as S14 Casualty. The exact 
date of this administrative reorganisation is not known. 
61 A Royal Navy commander before his retirement, before the outbreak of war Burges had been a 
Flight Lieutenant in the Auxiliary Air Force. He was made an honorary Wing Commander on 11 
September 1939 and, as an officer of the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, was assigned to the DPS 
in March 1940 as a Retired Officer. On 1 December 1943 he was promoted to honorary Group 
Captain, Administrative and Special Duties Branch. See The Air Force List: March 1940, (London: 
HMSO, 1940), pp. xxx, 13; The Air Force List: November 1941, (London: HMSO, 1941), 
p. I9a; The 
Air Force List: October 1944, (London: HMSO, 1944), p. 978. 
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[m]y only son, No. 2209015, Sgt. J. A. Vick, Royal Air Force, No. 138 
Squadron, was reported `missing' from air operations against the enemy 
on the night of June 2 /3rd, 1944, and for nearly a year my wife and I have 
suffered untold agony in our anxiety for news of his safety, or ultimate 
fate, however, to date we have not been able to obtain any information 
other than the bald statement that he is `missing' ... the next -of -kin of 
those who have failed to return are entitled to expect more energetic 
action to be taken in tracing them. The majority of us know that the 
`missing' will not return now, but this is not sufficient. We want to know 
what was their fate ... so that many of us may get to know the last resting 
place of those we loved.62 
Realising the potential for trouble if more was not done to find missing 
airmen, Burges instigated a review of the MRS field branch. In June he sent A. 
Beckess, his assistant and Senior Staff Officer in the DPS, to France and Belgium to 
study missing research operations.63 Reporting his observations and 
recommendations on his return to London, Beckess was unequivocal in his call for 
an expansion of the missing research organisation, noting that it was `inadequately 
equipped' in every department and that more Search Officers, drivers and batmen, 
clerks, vehicles and supplies were required if the search for the missing 
completed within one year and so prevent `the scent for clues of all kinds [becoming] 
stale.'64 That there was a clear danger of evidence disappearing was reflected in the 
low number of individual cases, 890, that the MRS field branch had successfully 
concluded by this time. Beckess stated in his report that [a]t the present rate of 
progress and with the present scale of organisation, it [missing research] will be a 
labour of several years'.6' 
62 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Vick to Churchill, 21 May 1945. The underlining is Vick's. 
es The Air Force List: July 1945, pp. 50 -1. 
64 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Beckess Report, June 1945. 
65 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Burges to Venn, 12 July 1945. 
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The Casualty Branch now estimated that the total number of aircrew missing 
in Europe was approximately 31,000.66 7000 of these men had been labelled as 
`Missing' aircrew, while the remainder were described as `Missing Believed Killed': 
in the words of Burges, `those who have been presumed dead on lapse of time 
without evidence and who, though technically dead, are in fact, missing'.67 The 
Casualty Branch estimated also that the bodies of 4000 RAF personnel were in the 
Mediterranean region and that at least 10,000 of the 31,000 missing airmen were in 
the sea.68 Faced with these statistics, and in the knowledge that the MRS field 
branch as it was then constituted could only hope to conclude a maximum of 4000 
cases annually, Burges determined that reform was necessary. He envisaged an 
organisation - tentatively labelled the Missing Research Group (MRG) - which 
would replace the MRS field branch and aim to complete missing research 
operations by the autumn of 1946.69 
Proposals for the MRG 
The proposals for the MRG, which Burges sent to Air Commodore G. O. Venn, 
Director of the DPS, were ambitious in that the Casualty Branch had never 
previously asked the Air Ministry for so much in terms of men and materia1.70 
66 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Burges to Venn, 12 July 1945. 
b7 Ibid. The Casualty Branch did not countenance the idea that a significant number of missing 
aircrew might be alive. Most of the estimated 2800 airmen who had escaped from POW camps or 
avoided capture in occupied Europe had returned to Britain. See Overy, Bomber Command 1939- 
1945, pp. 202, 204. 
68 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Burges to Venn, 12 July 1945. Bomber Command, which of all the RAF 
commands kept the fullest and most accurate casualty statistics, was able to provide the Casualty 
Branch with estimates predicting how many of its dead would be found in particular countries. It 
remains that RAF casualty statistics, including those from Bomber Command, are incomplete. See 
Ellis, The World War II Databook, pp. 258 -9; Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive 
Against Germany 1939 -1945, Volume IV, p. 429; Overy, Bomber Command 1939 -1945, p. 194. 
69 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Burges to Venn, 12 July 1945. 
70 Ibid. 
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However, as Burges observed, the dimensions of the MRG were `hardly outsize 
when compared .. with those of the Disarmament Wings or the Bombing Research 
Mission and, compared to the amount of manpower and material which was used to 
create the problem facing us, the requirements of the proposed scheme are 
negligible.'7i He suggested incorporating the extant MRS field branch sections into 
wings that would be organised by geographical location, with each wing operating 
under the command of a central field headquarters. Integral to the proposals was the 
injection of men and supplies into the missing research organisation - Burges wanted 
between thirty and forty Search Officers in each wing. The twenty -five officers and 
thirty -six airmen operating in France, Belgium and Holland with the MRS field 
branch would form the nucleus of the MRG, with new recruits making up the 
strength of each of the new wings. He also envisaged an organisation that would 
include specialised medical, operational, accounting, catering and accommodation 
staff, all necessary equipment including adequate transport, and any other auxiliary 
services necessary to allow for a five -fold increase in missing research operations.72 
In addition to his suggestions concerning personnel, Burges advanced 
proposals for the governance of the MRG. He wanted to enshrine its subordination 
to the Casualty Branch, and suggested that the MRG be made to report directly to the 
AMP. Burges did not trust RAF field commands to provide for the MRG without 
coercion from London, noting that they `have already shown lack of interest and a 
tendency to play off.'73 By placing the AMP at the apex of the reporting structure, 
the cooperation of RAF field commands could be forced, and MRG officers would 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. See also TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Slessor to Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, 10 
August 1945; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Slessor to Air Vice Marshal R. A. George, 10 August 
1945. 
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be able to ignore British commanders who took umbrage at missing research work 
being performed in their jurisdictions. Such stipulations were pertinent given that 
any type of MRG would be a new and unfamiliar entity. 
Burges wanted to distance the MRG from the AGS. Describing the War 
Office as tardy and its methods as `dilatory', he informed Venn of the need to 
minimise army interference in missing research operations.74 Observing that `the 
War Office entirely fail to realise our problems', Burges noted `that old methods will 
not meet the need created by long -range air operations; their own problem is 
relatively small, being on the one hand to find comparatively few "missing" in the 
area of military operations, and on the other to discover unaccounted for prisoners - 
of -war.' 75 
At the same time as these proposals were advanced, the existing missing 
research organisation was expanded. During July Number 5 Section MRS, with 
headquarters at The Hague, was raised for operations in Holland, and Number 6 
Section MRS formed to investigate missing research cases in Norway from a 
headquarters in Oslo.76 The creation of two more formations was scheduled for 
August: Number 7 Section MRS would search for missing airmen in Denmark from 
headquarters in Esbjerg, and Number 8 Section MRS, with headquarters at Bunde, 
was to scour the Allied zones in Germany.77 These developments, which seemed to 
contradict the recognition by some officials that the MRS field branch required 
reform, underscored the need for the Air Ministry to take unified and decisive action. 
74 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Burges to Venn, 12 July 1945. 
75 Ibid. 
7e TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II. 
77 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 3 MREU Operations Record Book, July 1946. 
185 
Burges saw only two options: `[e]ither to jog along at the "five year" speed, 
while local interest flags, clues become obliterated and next -of -kin embittered; or to 
handle a new problem in a new and revolutionary way with a good chance of solving 
it in a year.'78 Observing that `the public expects the debt of "the many" to "the few" 
to be paid in full', he noted that `unless it can be shown that the problem [missing 
research] is being handled on an adequate scale, far in excess of our present effort, 
and with the possibility of being concluded in a reasonable time, it contains the seeds 
of a public scandal of some magnitude.' 79 
A Seminal Meeting 
A meeting in the Air Ministry on 26 July to discuss Burges's proposals was chaired 
by the AMP, Air Marshal Sir John Slessor. As Director of the Directorate of Plans in 
September 1939, Slessor had overseen the debate within the Air Ministry regarding 
the merits and otherwise of a strategic air offensive.80 He also had a practical 
knowledge of bombing operations, having commanded Number 5 Bomber Group 
from May 1941 to March 1942.81 That he understood well the human costs of aerial 
bombardment was a good portent for the future of a MRG. Other attendees included 
Hawkins and, representing the Casualty Branch, Burges, Beckess and Squadron 
Leader A. P. Le M. Sinkinson. The DGRE was not represented.82 All the officials 
present came fully briefed, Beckess having sent them information on the proposals 
78 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Burges to Venn, 12 July 1945. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939 -1945, Volume I, p. 135. 
Overy describes Slessor as `one of the most influential thinkers in the pre -war RAF'. See Overy, 
Bomber Command 1939 -1945, p. 28. 
81 Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections, (London: Cassell, 1956), p. 366; 
Steven D. Chambers, Political Leaders and Military Figures of the Second World War: A 
Bibliography, (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996), p. 235. 
82 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Meeting Minutes, 26 July 1945. 
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for the MRG, excerpts from his June report on the MRS field branch, and copies of 
letters that the Air Ministry had received from relatives of missing airmen concerned 
about what was being done to find them.83 
The meeting agenda was framed around four central questions. The first two 
questions read: [d]oes public policy require Missing Research ?' and `[h]as [the] Air 
Ministry an obligation to elucidate the fate of `missing' Air Force personnel ?'84 The 
attendees at the meeting agreed that for both questions the answer was, indubitably, 
yes.85 The third question read: `[i]f the answer to 1 and 2 is `yes', how long ought to 
be allowed for completion of the work ?'86 To this question it was proposed, and 
accepted, that the MRS should aim to complete its work within one year.87 The 
fourth question asked: [i]s the present establishment of the Missing Research and 
Enquiry Service [MRS field branch] adequate to achieve the object in [question] 
3?' 88 The meeting attendees `agreed that the present establishment was manifestly 
inadequate'.89 Having settled that the Air Ministry had a duty to conduct a thorough 
and prompt search for its missing airmen, they set about expanding the MRS field 
branch along the lines proposed by Burges. The MRES was born. 
The Function and Structure of the MRES 
The new MRES units were to find and then identify the missing RAF aircrew, before 
arranging for the registration of their graves.90 It made sense that the reformed 
$' TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Beckess Memorandum, 23 July 1945. 
84 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Meeting Agenda, 26 July 1945. 






It is unclear exactly when the decision was taken to make the MRES responsible for registering 
the 
graves of RAF personnel. It is possible that some MRS sections were already involved in graves 
187 
organisation should assume the responsibility of graves registration as it was the 
logical endpoint of a process that began with finding and identifying the dead. 
However, this devolution of duty was only partial as once the interred had been 
named, MRES personnel would contact an AGS officer to arrange for the erection of 
a grave marker and have the registration confirmed through DGRE channels.91 
Graves concentration would remain the exclusive duty of the AGS, and it would 
continue to register the burial places of those RAF personnel who had already been 
identified and interred, the involvement of the MRES being limited to registering the 
graves of missing airmen which it found.92 The AGS would also be responsible for 
performing all exhumations, whether for identification or concentration purposes.93 
Although this meant that the MRES would have to maintain constant contact with the 
AGS, the Air Ministry and the War Office hoped to keep these interactions to a 
minimum. For example, the Casualty Branch would be made wholly responsible for 
communication departments, foreign governments, and the 
British public regarding missing research operations, and the Air Ministry would 
ensure that RAF commands, such as 87 Group in France and British Air Forces of 
Occupation (BAFO) in Germany, were aware of MRES requirements in order that 
these were fulfilled from air force resources.94 
registration before the 26 July meeting, although it is probable that is was only then that the 
arrangement was formally recognised. 
91 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Sinkinson to A. F. Thorp, 2 October 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part 
V. 
92 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part VII; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Cooperation Memorandum, 16 
November 1945. 
93 TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Cooperation Memorandum, 16 November 1945. MRES policy decreed that 
`[i]f a man is registered by number but not by name, or the information is incomplete but judged to be 
enough to enable Air Ministry to trace him, exhumation is unnecessary.' The exhumation of bodies 
was permitted only when there was no other evidence for establishing identification, or where there 
was reason to doubt the stated identity of the interred. While the MRES thus sought to avoid wanton 
exhumations, its policy did dictate that `[e]very unknown must be exhumed.' This echoed the AGS 
position. See TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V. 
4 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Meeting Minutes, 26 July 1945. 
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A new War Establishment was created for the MRES. As the Director of the 
Casualty Branch, Burges would assume a second title of Inspector of Missing 
Research, and would take responsibility for administering the general policy of the 
MRES. His principal assistants would be Sinkinson, who would act as Head of 
Missing Research, and Beckess who, as Senior Staff Officer, would serve as Deputy 
to Head of Branch.95 Hawkins, whose command of the MRS field branch had been 
transferred to the new MRES, would be assigned more staff, with a Squadron 
Leader, a Flight Lieutenant, one clerk and a driver to assist him at field 
headquarters.96 In addition to his role overseeing the field operations of the new 
organisation, Hawkins would be responsible for maintaining liaisons with bodies 
such as the Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons Division of the Allied Control 
Commission (ACC) for Germany, and with AGS representatives where they were 
needed. 
The MRS field branch sections would be incorporated into three wings or 
`parent units'. Number 1 Missing Research and Enquiry Unit (MREU) would be 
responsible for all missing research work in France and Luxembourg; Number 2 
MREU for operations in Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia and the French Zone in 
Germany; and Number 3 MREU for searching Norway, Denmark and the American 
Zone in Germany.97 The Casualty Branch deferred the raising of a fourth `parent 
unit', which would search for missing airmen in the British and Soviet Zones in 
Germany as well as Poland, because permission to enter Russian -controlled territory 
had not been obtained. 
95 TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Casualty Branch Memorandum, circa October 1945; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, 
Air Ministry Office Instruction, 1 December 1945; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Directive on MRES Policy, 
14 March 1946. 
96 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III. 
97 Ibid. 
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Each MREU would consist of 118 personnel, with officers of the rank of 
Wing Commander and Squadron Leader respectively serving as first and second in 
command. A Flying Officer would serve as Adjutant. There would be forty Search 
Officers in each MREU. These personnel would be split into eight independent five - 
man sections each comprising one Squadron Leader and four Flight Lieutenants.98 
Forty drivers and thirty -five aircraftmen would make up the remainder of each 
MREU.99 The presence of a large number of airmen was intended to ensure that 
Search Officers could concentrate on their duties in the field and not be 
overburdened by matters of organisation, administration or supply. In this regard, 
the MRES War Establishment made generous provision for transport, stipulating that 
each MREU was to be accorded forty `utility' passenger cars - one for every Search 
Officer - as well as a `heavy' passenger car for the use of the commanding officer, a 
motorcycle for the despatch rider, two vans and one three -tonne truck. ' 00 Although 
the experiences of the MRS field branch had disproved many preconceptions about 
missing research operations, reliable transport for Search Officers was accepted as 
essential. 
Recruiting MRES Personnel 
From July the Casualty Branch commenced the recruitment of volunteers willing to 
forgo demobilisation and the fruits of peacetime to serve in the MRES, including the 
98 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Meeting Minutes, 26 July 1945. As it transpired, sometimes 
there 
were insufficient numbers of officers in each unit to have eight of these sections. For example, see 
TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Missing Research Policy, 5 April 1946. 
99 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III. 
goo Ibid. 
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125 airmen who were needed as Search Officers.101 Given that many applicants 
would be deterred from joining the MRES on discovering its function - Hawkins 
believed that interested men `should have all sides of the work, and its arduous and 
exacting nature, explained to them before a decision is reached as to their suitability 
for search duties' - he and Burges attempted to facilitate the recruitment process by 
targeting redundant aircrew and regular officers who were due for retirement.102 It 
was hoped that some of the thousands of men in these categories would take the 
chance to remain in the RAF or, in the case of officers from the Dominions, to 
continue their period of secondment.103 
Being encouraged to apply to the MRES did not, however, guarantee 
acceptance, there being neither time nor money to waste on training men who were 
not suited to the organisation and its work.104 This meant identifying at an early 
juncture those recruits who were enthusiastic and diligent, capable of interacting with 
others, collected and diplomatic in the face of challenges and criticism, and 
resourceful enough to survive in foreign and sometimes hostile environments. It was 
thought that men who were gregarious and of cheerful disposition would be less 
inclined to succumb to the melancholy nature of missing research operations, and be 
more likely to integrate better into foreign communities. In this regard, the MRES 
preferred recruits who had experience of living and working on the Continent, while 
fluency in at least one European language - ideally French or German given that the 
101 In the early post -war period, the total staff at the Casualty Branch numbered approximately 250. 
More than two- thirds of these personnel were employed by its MRS division, a significant change 
from December 1941 when the MRS had had only three staff members. See TNA, PRO AIR 
20/9305, Part II; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Burges to Venn, 12 July 1945. 
102 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part IV; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Meeting Minutes, 26 July 1945. 
1°3 Officers from the Dominions were wanted in the MRES not just for their skills - and in the case of 
many RCAF officers for their fluency in French - but also because the Air Ministry viewed the search 
for missing RAF airmen as a Commonwealth concern. See TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, 
Slessor to Air 
Marshal Johnson (RCAF), 9 August 1945. 
104 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part IV. 
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majority of missing airmen were expected to be in France and Germany - was also 
highly prized.t05 
Training MRES Search Officers 
Successful applicants had to be trained. The experience of leading Number 1 Section 
MRS into the field had convinced Hawkins of the need to instruct Search Officers 
thoroughly in their duties before deployment. The nature of missing research work 
was too intricate, and the burden of responsibility on Search Officers too great, to 
expect that they might learn their trade as they worked. Thus officers with 
experience of missing research operations were enlisted to lecture MRES recruits on 
such subjects as how to procure help and information from civilian populations, 
search methods, the collection of evidence, and the identification of remains. 
Training MRES Search Officers: Making Contacts and Establishing 
Relationships 
Since the MRS field branch had exposed the catalogue of case reports as incomplete, 
the assistance afforded by European civilians to MRES personnel would be crucial to 
the success of missing research operations. Search Officers would depend on the 
inhabitants of Continental communities, who in some cases had served as the 
custodians of the RAF dead since early in the war, to provide them with information 
about aircraft that had crashed in the area.106 Hawkins accepted the impossibility of 
codifying a set of guidelines to govern the interaction between Search Officers and 
European civilians - apart from its lack of practicality, the very idea would have 
1°5 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Meeting Minutes, 26 July 1945; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, 
Sinkinson 
Report, 23 April 1946. 
106 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Missing Research Policy, 
5 April 1946. 
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falsified these relationships - but he did believe that useful advice could be provided 
on the development of cordial relations.107 
Search Officers new to a region would refer to a list that suggested the order 
in which to approach local persons. It ranked civilians according to their predicted 
usefulness.108 Search Officers initially were to seek out the office of the Mairie or 
Burgermeister. Aside from the courtesy of calling first on the community's leader, 
being on good terms with the Mairie or Burgermeister increased the likelihood of 
MRES personnel finding suitable accommodation. Moreover, often the mayoral 
chambers would be the repository for records relating to deaths and burials in the 
area. It was recommended that Search Officers call next on the police, followed by 
the cemetery keeper, and then to make contact with `local inhabitants'.109 In their 
conversations with these people, Search Officers were to seek information that would 
lead them to members of the wartime resistance who were expected to have detailed 
knowledge of crashed aircraft and of the fate of the occupants. Where such help was 
not available, Search Officers were to focus their investigations on likely burial 
places such as fields, clearings or churchyards near to wrecked aircraft.1 to 
Search Officers were also warned to be discerning and alert to falsities when 
pursuing their enquiries.l 11 It was expected that most people who knew something of 
crashed aircraft and RAF graves would willingly share this information, but in areas 
that had suffered greatly from Allied bombing the Casualty Branch believed that 
Search Officers might find it difficult to elicit accurate information from local 
107 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V. 
los Ibid. 
1 °9 Ibid. 
11° Ibid.; CWGC, 2033, Douglas Hague Recollections. 
111 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V. 
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inhabitants. Some would inevitably associate an RAF uniform with the misery of 
being bombed and, as Hawkins noted, `[a] tactless approach to one who may have 
suffered considerable hardship through R.A.F. operations is more likely to cause 
such a person to withhold information than to become a reliable informant.' 112 It was 
expected that Search Officers would meet resentment in Germany, and possibly in 
Italy and some areas of northern France.113 In Normandy, as in Hamburg, the tact 
displayed by a Search Officer might prove crucial to the eventual success of a 
missing research operation. 
Training MRES Search Officers: Finding Airmen 
It was not feasible for the RAF to search every corner of Europe for its dead. As the 
Casualty Branch acknowledged, even to attempt such an exercise would require an 
organisation of a size equal to that of the entire air force.114 Therefore, the adoption 
of a clearly defined and ordered system of searching was vital if the MRES were to 
maximise its chances of success. In the first instance, the search for missing airmen 
would be ordered along national lines, with each MREU allocated particular 
countries. Thereafter each country would be searched by region with officers using 
obvious boundaries - provincial borders or physical barriers such as mountain ranges 
112 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part IV. 
113 In 1944 the Foreign Office issued to 21 Army Group servicemen a pamphlet on France and its 
inhabitants. In this publication it was noted that `bombing in thickly populated areas has caused 
increasingly heavy civilian casualties. It is only natural that these should have caused some 
resentment.' Geoffrey Picot, who served in France, witnessed such resentment. He wrote in his 
memoir: `[i]n Normandy we saw nothing but destruction: wrecked farmsteads, damaged villages, 
obliterated towns. I was familiar with the dismal face of the French peasant, the look of gloom, the 
look of despair, the look that might have meant anything. Lord knows those Normans suffered! It 
was a strange kind of liberation we bought them. For many, caught inescapably in a battle, it was the 
liberation of death.' See Instructions for British Servicemen in France 1944, (Oxford: Bodleian 
Library, 2005), p. 31; Picot, Accidental Warrior, pp. 157 -8. 
114 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Missing Research Policy, 5 April 1946. 
MRES policy stated that `[o]nly when there are grounds for believing that an unreported crash or 
grave is in a defined and accessible position will it be permissible to search an area yard by yard. 
To 
justify such a search, the grounds must be very strong indeed.' 
194 
- to define these. In France, for example, operations might be ordered by 
Départèments; in Germany by Kreise.115 Individual unit sections would then work at 
a local level by searching particular tracts of land within these regions.116 The 
attraction of this simple search method was that while it did not allow for confusion, 
it did allow for flexibility. If a large number of RAF casualties were concentrated in 
a certain place, or if a stretch of terrain made searching difficult, the MREU 
commanding officer could transfer sections between areas as and when needed)" 
In addition to being strictly ordered, the search for missing airmen was also to 
proceed according to a definite pattern. A section first would investigate cases 
concerning those airmen of whom the MRS had established something about their 
disappearance. This work was expected to represent a small fraction of MRES 
operations.118 The second and bigger aspect of its burden would involve hunting for 
the bodies of airmen of whose disappearance nothing was known. This would be 
done in two steps, with Search Officers investigating first any reports compiled by 
local officials concerning burials made in the region after 3 September 1939, and 
then performing an `area sweep'.119 The second of these stages would entail MRES 
personnel travelling across regions interviewing inhabitants in order to discover 
whether there were missing airmen nearby for whom they had yet to make 
account.120 
115 Départèments and Kreise are administrative regions. 
16 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Missing Research Policy, 5 
April 1946. 
117 TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Missing Research Policy, 5 April 1946. 
18 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V. 
119 Ibid. 
120 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Missing Research 
Policy, 5 April 1946. 
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 Training MRES Search Officers: Identifying Dead Airmen 
The most important element in the training of new Search Officers involved the 
identification of dead airmen. This was the crux of all missing research work, for 
only when every possible effort had been made to bury all RAF casualties in named 
graves would the Air Ministry be absolved of its responsibility to their families. 
European civilians would sometimes be able to provide the MRES with the names of 
airmen they had found or interred, while other RAF personnel would be identified 
easily enough by their identity discs or a name label found stitched to the battledress 
tunic. Nonetheless, Burges and Hawkins ensured that Search Officers were taught 
sophisticated techniques of identifying human remains and aircraft. The successful 
identification of bodies would often depend first on establishing a link between an 
airman and his machine. 
Establishing the identity of an aircraft was simple when its markings and 
alphanumeric identification number remained visible. However, when the wreckage 
of an aircraft was scattered over a wide area, or when its livery had been destroyed or 
obscured - usually by fire, prolonged submergence in water, or an overgrowth of 
foliage - there was need for more subtle methods of identification. Accordingly, 
Search Officers were given instruction about where to locate the manufacture and 
serial numbers specific to particular aircraft. These were stamped on the radio call 
plates and data plates located in the cockpit, the weapons, each propeller, engine 
casings, and on eight components of a Rolls Royce engine.121 Provided with any of 
these numbers, MRS staff could identify from Air Ministry records the exact aircraft 
121 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Parts II, V; Bomber Command Continues, p. 6. See also TNA, PRO AIR 
55/66, Engine Memorandum, 10 July 1946. 
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in question and then name those who had been on board, meaning that Search 
Officers would have a finite set of names to which to match human remains.'22 
As the strongest evidence for identifying the dead often would have been 
destroyed when the aircraft crashed or in the time that had elapsed since - the human 
body, identity discs, pay books, personal documents, photographs and letters were 
not fireproof, waterproof, or resistant to decay - Search Officers were instructed to 
pay careful attention to remnants of clothing and equipment. They were to report 
such details as the nationality indicated on shoulder flashes; whether a distinctive 
patch had been stitched to the battledress tunic; the manner in which decorations 
were sported; the form of emblems engraved on brass buttons; the size of footwear 
and whether the dead man had worn flying or escape boots; the design and make of 
handkerchiefs and braces; the brand and size of shirts, trousers and underwear; and 
whether clothing was standard or officer issue. Where possible Search Officers were 
to record the name of the place where a garment had been made as it was possible 
that it was also the home town of the deceased. In addition, clothes were to be 
examined for laundry marks, numbers and sewn tabs, and a note made of the type of 
life jackets and parachutes found with remains. :23 
Because the MRES could not rely on finding such evidence as this, medical 
specialists were enlisted to lecture Search Officers on human anatomy, dentistry, the 
resistance of the body to fire and certain liquids, and how the moisture content of 
certain types of soil dictated, as Hawkins noted, `the rate of decomposition and .. the 
"' TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Sinkinson Report, 23 April 1946. 
TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V. Brass buttons were usually marked with RAF, RCAF, RAAF or 
RNZAF and were, therefore, indicators of an airman's nationality. RAAF personnel wore braces 
marked `Police'. The level of detail Search Officers were expected to include in their reports was 
great. For example, Burges wrote: `if you find Sergeant's stripes on a man but see also that there is a 
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type and rate of discoloration [sic] of effects and clothing.' 124 It was hoped that an 
understanding of these subjects would help in matching pieces of different bodies 
together, and in the identification process itself once the remains had been 
assembled.125 Thus the anatomy tuition given to the recruits focused on the thicker 
and stronger bones - the jaw bone, the pelvis bone and the major arm and leg bones 
- which were the most resistant to fire and decomposition and, therefore, the most 
likely to provide evidence for confirming identities.126 Measurements taken from the 
larger leg bones, for instance, could be used to estimate the height of a casualty, 
using Pearson's Formula.127 Dentistry lectures concentrated on the nature and effects 
of dental surgery in order that airmen might be identified through comparisons made 
between their teeth and dental records. Search Officers were told to note when 
examining a casualty whether any teeth were missing and if they had been 
deliberately excised or forced out as the result of injuries sustained at the time of 
death; the type of metal used in fillings, caps and crowns; and the size and location of 
tooth cavities as well as the extent of gum decay.128 
Search Officers also were to describe any discernible or remaining features of 
the body such as eye colour; the shape of the nose, lips and eyebrows; the size of the 
nipples; and whether or not the larynx were prominent. Where possible they were to 
measure the circumference of the skull, and look for appendectomy scars and signs 
of other operations and healed fractures. The penis was to be studied to see if the 
hole in the sleeve whence a crown might have been removed, state it just that way. Don't take it for 
granted he is a Sergeant.' 
124 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V. 
125 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part IV. 
126 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V. 
127 For an example of where Pearson's Formula was applied to solve a missing research investigation, 
see TNA, PRO AIR 55/63, Flight Lieutenant J. C. Hall to Wing Commander M. J. A. Shaw, 18 
October 1948. See also Appendix One. 
128 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V. See also Appendix Two. 
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casualty had been circumcised - this could be a particularly valuable pointer to the 
identity of an unknown corpse, particularly in cases where one or more of the bodies 
were known to be Jewish - and the pubic region and other parts of the body 
inspected for the quantity, type and colour of hair: a variety would indicate that the 
remains under observation were probably those of multiple airmen.129 Even the feet 
were to be examined for corns and callouses.13o 
Other evidence for the identification of airmen was expected to come from 
objects found with the remains such as keepsakes, jewellery and the metal brevets 
which RAF personnel wore to indicate rank and function. Items such as metallic 
cigarette cases and rings, which were generally resistant to decay and fire, potentially 
were important clues for establishing identity as they often were engraved with the 
name or initials of the dead man or the date of a significant happening such as a 
twenty -first birthday or wedding anniversary.131 The bodies of RAF personnel also 
could be identified by establishing an association with the amulets that many airmen 
took with them on operations. Miles Tripp carried a stocking, a brooch, a pink scarf 
and a small bone elephant when he flew. Two of his crewmates insisted on flying 
with their distinctive scarves, the wireless operator with the brassiere of his 
girlfriend.132 Only two members of the crew flew with no such idiosyncratic objects 
which, given the superstitions of the others, potentially was as instructive. 
129 The colour of hair could also pose problems for Search Officers. As Beckess noted: `[w]henever 
there is moisture present in the remains, special precautions should be taken to clean the hair before 
recording a description. Excess moisture and such things as the dye in the Mae West can completely 
change the shade of human hair. In all doubtful cases hair should be thoroughly cleaned in petrol and 
left for a few minutes to dry.' See TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V. 
1313 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V. 
131 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part VI. 
132 Tripp, The Eighth Passenger, p. 30. 
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 Preparing to Deploy the MRES 
By the end of 1945 the MRES was ready to be deployed. In December Hawkins 
travelled to RAF Sundern in the British Zone in Germany to oversee this process. 
This station was an ideal choice for MRES headquarters for it already housed the 
BAFO command and was located centrally in Europe.133 Here he would have 
unfettered access to the Commander -in- Chief, BAFO, something which the Air 
Ministry had decided was worthwhile to ensure that the MRES was given the 
supplies and support it requested, and his administrative staff would be close to the 
thousands of German documents that had been captured, primarily from Dulag Luft, 
in 1945.134 Throughout the war the German military had kept records of RAF 
casualties who had been killed or incarcerated in Germany and although these files 
were not always accurate, they did provide important material for supplementing and 
corroborating existing case reports.135 The advantage conferred by the capture of 
these documents had been complemented by former POWs who had furnished the 
MRS with information on the whereabouts of crashed aircraft and dead airmen in 
Germany. The MRES personnel about to enter the field were certainly better 
informed than their MRS field branch predecessors, just as they were also better 
trained and equipped. Whether they could find the missing airmen of the RAF 
within the promised timeframe remained to be seen. 
133 Upon moving from Paris to BAFO headquarters, Hawkins was accorded the additional 
administrative title of Assistant Inspector of Missing Research. His position as MRES commanding 
officer came with the rank of Group Captain. See TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Meeting Minutes, 26 July 
1945; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, MRES Commanding Officer Duties, 20 December 1945. 
134 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Meeting Minutes, 2 August 1945; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Missing 
Research Policy, 5 April 1946. Dulag Luft, in Wetzlar, had served as a transit post and screening 
camp for captured Allied airmen. Its archives were, therefore, of interest to the MRES. See TNA, 
PRO AIR 20/9305, Part I; Overy, Bomber Command 1939 -1945, p. 126. 
135 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part I; CWGC, 2033, Douglas Hague Recollections. The information 
gleaned from captured German documents proved vital in solving a number of missing research cases. 
For examples, see TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part VI. 
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Chapter Five 
The Location and Identification of Missing RAF Personnel: December 
1945- September 1949 
The Deployment of the MRES 
Number 1 MREU was the first MRES formation to be deployed, arriving at its 
headquarters in Le Mans in early December 1945. For operational purposes, the unit 
defined the English Channel coast, its first search area, as comprising all the land 
within the eight seaside Départèments between Dunkirk and Brest. This tallied 
neatly with the way in which the unit was structured for each of its constituent 
sections was allocated a single Départèment in which to start work.' 
The personnel of Number 2 MREU were deployed across Belgium and 
Holland following the establishment of a unit headquarters in Brussels at the end of 
December, while Number 3 MREU arrived in Esbjerg at the beginning of January 
1946.2 This town was an obvious choice for the unit base as its people had 
accommodated Number 7 Section MRS since its deployment there the previous 
summer, and it was near Jutland, the region of Denmark where there were most RAF 
casualties. The Burgermeister of Esbjerg provided Number 3 MREU with a home 
and headquarters by gifting it the use of a small hotel.3 Once his men had settled in, 
the unit commanding officer deployed four of his sections in Jutland, where Number 
7 Section MRS had been operating, two in Zealand and another in Funen. At the 
same time, Number 6 Section MRS, which had been working in Norway from a base 
TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III. 
2 Ibid. Upon its arrival in Brussels, Number 2 MREU absorbed into its strength Numbers 2 and 5 
Section MRS. 
3 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Parts II -III; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 3 MREU Operations 
Record Book, July 1946. 
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in Oslo since the previous July, was incorporated into Number 3 MREU, and then 
instructed to complete the search for missing airmen in that country.4 By the middle 
of January all three MRES units had commenced operations. 
The Case of Spitfire MH 756 
The value of the comprehensive training that Search Officers had been given was 
soon evident. When conducting an area sweep of the Alençon area of Normandy, a 
Number 1 MREU section heard rumours of a wrecked aircraft in the region.5 By 
questioning local people, the investigating Search Officer established that sometime 
in June or July 1944 an aircraft had crashed in a field several miles away at La 
Ferrière Bochard. Subsequent enquiries at the mayoral office in Condé- sur -Sarthe 
determined that an air battle had been waged over Alençon on 5 July that year. 
When the Search Officer and his men visited the crash site there was little to be 
seen as the aircraft, having crashed nose first and at great speed, had been completely 
buried below ground. If this were initially a disadvantage, it was to their benefit that 
the earth had insulated the aircraft and its contents against fire. An excavation of the 
area resulted in their finding a glove, a finger and pieces of a Spitfire, then four -fifths 
of its alphanumeric identification number -H 756 - was sighted. Casualty Branch 
officials subsequently advised that Spitfire MH 756, piloted by Flying Officer W. R. 
Chowen, personal number J 26678, had failed to return from operations on 5 July 
1944. Although it now seemed likely that the section had found Chowen, further 
4 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Parts II -III. 
5 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part VI; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Sinkinson Report, 23 April 1946. The 
exact date of this investigation is not known, although it is thought to have occurred in April 1946. 
202 
evidence was required to establish this definitely.6 After the excavation had been 
deepened by six feet to allow for the extraction of the remains of the pilot, an identity 
disc, J 26678, was discovered.? The Casualty Branch informed Chowen's family of 
his death. 
Raising New MRES Formations 
With the work of all three units proceeding well, Burges and his staff turned their 
attention to Germany where Number 8 Section MRS, which had been searching for 
missing airmen in the Ruhr from its headquarters at Bunde since August 1945, had 
achieved little success.8 The industrial area of the Ruhr had been the primary target 
of Bomber Command throughout the war - the RAF lost at least 1577 aircraft and 
6070 personnel in this region - and had suffered widespread damage.9 Mounds of 
concrete rubble made it difficult to locate and gain access to crashed aircraft and 
bodies, meaning that missing research personnel were even more dependent than 
they were elsewhere on local people advising them of the whereabouts of wreckage 
and human remains. However, as some inhabitants of the Ruhr harboured specific 
reservations about helping men with whom they associated their bombing, and others 
saw no good reason to render assistance while the bodies of relatives and friends who 
had served in the Luftwaffe remained in Britain, often appeals for information met 
either no response or feigned ignorance.1° These difficulties convinced the Air 
6 In a single person aircraft, such as the Spitfire, the identification of either the aircraft or the pilot 
meant the automatic identification of the other. 
7 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part VI; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Sinkinson Report, 23 April 1946. 
8 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II. 
9 TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, 20 Section Progress Report, 20 January 1949. 
10 As Hawkins later observed: `[s]earch work in the devastated industrial areas was exceedingly 
difficult and there was no sympathetic population waiting and willing to produce information and 
relics of crashes; indeed having suffered considerable hardship from R.A.F. bombing, their attitude 
was generally unco- operative.' See TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III. See also Appendix Three. 
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Ministry to bring forward the formation of the fourth MRES unit - it had hoped to 
defer its raising until the Russian Military Government (RMG) decided whether to 
allow the MRES into the Soviet Zone in Germany - to subsume and replace the 
beleaguered Number 8 Section MRS." 
After establishing its headquarters in Hamburg in April 1946, the newly- raised 
Number 4 MREU divided the British Zone into four search areas: northern, central, 
south -eastern and south- western.12 The Ruhr was within the south -western region, 
and it was decided to search there last on account of the experiences of Number 8 
Section MRS and because it contained the heaviest concentration of RAF casualties 
in the British Zone. By searching the three other areas of this territory first, Number 
4 MREU hoped that its Search Officers would become accustomed to German 
conditions and attitudes before operations in the Ruhr recommenced.13 
The decision to raise Number 4 MREU coincided with the formation of MRES 
Mediterranean/Middle East.14 The genesis and War Establishment of this force 
differed from the four MREUs, reflecting that its creation had not been a part of the 
original MRES model. MRES Mediterranean/Middle East was raised by RAF 
Mediterranean and Middle East Command, and it was to this formation and not 
Hawkins that its officers were responsible, the force connected to the MRES only by 
name and function.15 MRES Mediterranean/Middle East commenced operations in 
11 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Internal Memorandum, 24 July 1946. 
12 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 TNA, PRO AIR 55/66, Sinkinson Memorandum, 30 April 1947. It is thought that the selection of 
personnel for MRES Mediterranean /Middle East was less discerning than it was for the four MRES 
units. One senior MRES officer was later to complain that numerous MRES Mediterranean/Middle 
East Search Officers were not suited to missing research work. See TNA, PRO AIR 55/66, Meeting 
Minutes, 25 April 1947. 
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Italy in the spring of 1946 from headquarters in Naples, before moving to the north 
of the country and a new base in Treviso.16 
Considering the Future of the MRES 
Although missing research operations had begun on a large and organised scale only 
recently, by the summer of 1946 the scheduled date for the disbandment of the 
MRES was near.17 With this in mind, Slessor had made enquiries about how many 
missing airmen had been discovered and how many remained to be found.18 The 
statistics made obvious that the bodies of thousands of RAF personnel would have to 
be left untraced should the MRES be disbanded as scheduled. Of the 31,000 RAF 
personnel missing in north -west Europe, only 7000 had been located. Even if half of 
the 31,000 were in the sea, this left 8500 aircrew still to be found.19 As Slessor 
mused: [t]he relatives of all the 24,000 expect the maximum to be done; and in a 
number of cases we have assured relatives that, while we have not yet had time to 
deal with the area in which their relation may be found, we shall cover it in due 
course.'20 
However, maintaining the MRES was not straightforward. Although it was a 
relatively small branch of the air force, the costs of keeping the organisation in the 
field were substantial, particularly given the post -war penury afflicting the armed 
16 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III. Missing research operations in the Middle East theatre were 
begun later in 1946. There were far fewer RAF casualties in this region than there were on the 
Continent. See TNA, PRO AIR 55/66, Missing RAF Personnel, 31 January 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 
55/67, Meeting Notes, 25 March 1947. 
17 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Meeting Minutes, 26 July 1945. On 26 July 1945 it was agreed 
that the 
MRES should aim to complete missing research work within a year. This meant 
within a year of its 
formation, therefore July 1946, and not within a year of its deployment. 
18 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Slessor to Air Commodore E. S. Burns, 1 May 
1946. 
19 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Slessor to de Freitas and Brown, 1 August 1946. 
20 Ibid. The underlining is Slessor's. 
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services and the manpower shortages in the RAF caused by demobilisation.21 
Supplying MRES personnel was especially difficult for BAFO which was based in 
the country most severely affected by the war, and the strain on this command would 
be exacerbated once Numbers 2 and 3 MREU transferred respectively into the 
French and American Zones in Germany and BAFO became responsible for 
supporting three missing research units.22 
Despite these concerns, Slessor concluded that the MRES needed to remain 
in existence and continue its work.23 On 1 August he sent his recommendations on 
its future to Sir William Brown, Permanent Under Secretary of State for Air, and 
Geoffrey de Freitas, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, both fellow 
members of the Air Council. Slessor began by citing the thoughts of Air Marshal Sir 
Philip Wigglesworth, the Air Officer Commanding -in -Chief (AOC- in -C), BAFO. 
Wigglesworth was not among the most senior members of the Air Ministry, but his 
views on this topic were valued for as BAFO commander he had reason to wish for 
the partial or full disbandment of the MRES. While acknowledging that BAFO 
found it difficult to supply missing research operations, Wigglesworth had expressed 
support for the MRES remaining in existence on the basis that its work was 
important for the sake of RAF and public morale. In relaying this opinion to de 
Freitas and Brown, Slessor also informed them that Hawkins had told him `that if we 
21 Ironically, demobilisation was a process for which Slessor, as AMP, held responsibility. 
Z' TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Casualty Branch Statistics, 24 July 1945. 
23 Slessor knew that evidence relating to the identities of the First World War dead was still being 
uncovered in France, and that enquiries about casualties from this conflict continued to be received. 
He predicted that the Air Ministry would continue to receive information on dead RAF airmen from 
the Second World War for at least another ten years, and a large number of related casualty enquiries 
for a further three to four years. This influenced his thinking on MRES disbandment. See TNA, PRO 
AIR 20/9050, Slessor to de Freitas and Brown, 1 August 1946. 
206 
postponed reduction till the middle of next year he thinks he could break the back of 
the job.'24 
Slessor thus proposed that the Air Council approve an extension to allow 
missing research operations to continue beyond early 1947. He thought this a logical 
course of action given that the MRES was extant and functioning, and `on grounds of 
the great public interest in the question, the desirability of maintaining the prestige of 
the Service [the RAF] and the political pressure that the utmost possible be done'.25 
Slessor realised that the financial and personnel benefits which would be generated 
for the Air Ministry by the disbandment of the MRES might be outweighed by the 
severity of the public and political backlash such action would incur.26 He knew that 
during the preceding seven months, MPs at Westminster had put forward ten 
parliamentary questions and more than 300 separate enquiries on the subject of 
missing research operations, many of these on behalf of aggrieved constituents, while 
such was the desperation of other civilians for news of their relatives that they were 
engaging the services of psychic mediums and spiritualists.27 As Slessor observed, 
the disbandment of the MRES was less the prerogative of the Air Ministry and more 
a `political question' determined by `public reactions'.28 
24 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Slessor to de Freitas and Brown, 1 August 1946. 
2s Ibid. 
26 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Slessor to Unknown, 22 June 1946. 
27 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Slessor to Wigglesworth, 1 August 1946; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, 
Slessor to de Freitas and Brown, 1 August 1946. For examples of parliamentary questions on missing 
research operations, see Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 419 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 
1946), pp. 252 -3; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 420 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1946), p. 
388; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 426 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1946), p. 1. In addition 
to their concerns that psychics were preying on vulnerable people and making money through 
deception, Air Ministry officials were worried about civilians being given false hope that 
their 
relatives remained alive. See related correspondence in TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050. 
78 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Slessor to Wigglesworth, 1 August 1946; TNA, 
PRO AIR 20/9050, 
Slessor to de Freitas and Brown, 1 August 1946. 
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Hawkins had expressed the hope that the MRES would be given until the 
summer of 1947 to complete its task, but realising that this might be asking too much 
of the Air Council, Slessor recommended instead that missing research operations 
continue until April.29 To this was added the caveat that should the winter weather 
impinge on the work of the MRES, a further three month extension to its existence 
could be awarded when the future of the organisation was reviewed in March.3° 
These proposals were approved, although Brown was not entirely convinced of their 
merits. He observed in a letter to de Freitas: 
I may personally be inclined to underestimate the sentimental importance 
of pursuing this form of research. My impression is that we cut it off 
much sooner in World War I. Every officer or man we retain on this task 
means one officer or man the less to man the R.A.F. But, having 
recorded that personal opinion, I am ready to agree that our expected 
economics should be deferred if those better qualified to judge than I - 
and A.O.C.- in -C., B.A.F.O., and A.M.P. are already on record - attach 
more importance than I do to the `morale' effect, on the Service and on 
civilians interested.31 
For his part, Hawkins was instructed to expedite missing research operations.32 
Realising that this would be difficult without according priority to certain MRES 
procedures, he issued a directive to Search Officers instructing them `to discontinue 
sweeping operations ... and ... to concentrate on Air Ministry Casualty Enquiries'.33 
As one MRES officer noted subsequently, this instruction represented `an important 
change of policy and there is a feeling of regret amongst officers that the work is not 
to be done as thoroughly as heretofore.'34 
29 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Slessor to de Freitas and Brown, 1 August 1946. 
39 Ibid. 
31 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Brown to de Freitas, 7 August 1946. In writing of post -First World War 
`research' operations, Brown was referring to work performed by the AGS. 
32 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Slessor to Wigglesworth, 1 August 1946. 
33 TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Hawkins to MREU Commanding Officers, 24 July 1946. 
34 TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 3 MREU Operations Record Book, August 
1946. 
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 Making Progress 
Unaware of the internal machinations at the Air Ministry over the summer of 1946, 
missing research personnel had been making progress in finding and identifying 
airmen. The quick advance of Number 1 MREU southwards through France 
prompted the unit to relocate its headquarters from Le Mans to Chantilly in August 
in order that it might commence searching the central and southern Départèments of 
the country, and Luxembourg.35 In Holland and Belgium missing research 
operations had been slowed somewhat by flooding, but by September Number 2 
MREU had nearly completed its work in these countries.36 With the exception of 
one section which was left in Holland to conclude investigations into several 
outstanding cases, the unit transferred to Diez in the French Zone in Germany later 
that month.37 
For Number 3 MREU, progress had come more easily in one country than 
another. Few difficulties had been experienced in searching Denmark for it was flat 
and easy to traverse, the winter had not been long enough or sufficiently severe to 
interfere unduly with missing research operations, and the Danes had assisted MRES 
personnel by providing them with shelter, provisions and detailed records relating to 
the location of crashed aircraft and graves.38 In Norway operations had proved more 
complicated. The men of the erstwhile Number 6 Section MRS had begun work in 
the south of the country before gradually moving northwards, and in the rugged and 
35 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III. Mines found on stretches of the English Channel coast had been 
the one significant problem Number 1 MREU had encountered in France. In these areas it had been 
forced to suspend its search for missing airmen in early 1946. Once the mines had been removed, unit 
personnel returned to complete their work. 
36 The floods prompted the unit to enlist the help of special salvage crews and the Dutch navy to raise 
aircraft from the water. See TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Notes, 
25 March 1947. 
37 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III. A section of Number 2 MREU remained in Holland until May 
1947. See TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 2 MREU Operations Record Book, June 1947. 
38 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Parts II -III. 
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inhospitable territory past Narvik, where there were a number of wrecked RAF 
aircraft, they experienced significant difficulties. Although this region had been 
searched in the high summer - outside this ten -week period the extreme cold and 
lack of daylight rendered operations impossible - the weather conditions encountered 
still had been demanding, and bandit gangs had also proved a hindrance.39 
Moreover, it was difficult for personnel to obtain transport in remote northern 
Norway. On one occasion, when a pre -arranged flight was cancelled, two Search 
Officers travelled to their destination by fishing smack, a journey which meant them 
rounding Cape Nordkyn, the northern -most point of the Continental mainland and 
inside the Arctic Circle.40 By August these officers and their men, aided by the 
Norwegian armed services and police, had located the wreckage of fifty aircraft, 
along with approximately 100 graves, some of them belonging to British soldiers.41 
The following month the Number 3 MREU personnel in Norway completed their 
operations in the country, whereupon they travelled to Denmark to join 
colleagues and the unit commenced the process of relocating to Karlsruhe in the 
American Zone in Germany.42 
Less had been achieved by Number 4 MREU, which was encountering in the 
Ruhr the same difficulties as had Number 8 Section MRS before it. Eventually the 
lack of substantive progress was such that stronger action was required. The nature 
of Allied military and political authority in Germany allowed the MRES to demand 
39 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part II. 
4° TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 3 MREU Operations Record Book, July 1946. 
41 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Parts 11 -III; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 3 MREU Operations 
Record Book, July- September 1946; Birmingham Mail, 12 September 1946. 
42 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 3 MREU Operations Record 
Book, July- November 1946. Number 3 MREU, minus one section which remained in Esbjerg, 
transferred to Uetersen in Germany on 13 September and into the American Zone in November, with 
personnel preparing for the next stage of their operations in the intervening two months. For example, 
two experienced officers spent one week lecturing new Search Officers on missing research 
techniques. 
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of Burgermeisters that they compile accounts of what they knew about aircraft 
crashes and burials of airmen in their areas of jurisdiction and then to attest to the 
accuracy of these.43 The information gathered in this way helped facilitate 
operations.44 
A further welcome development followed in October 1946 when the RMG 
advised that the MRES would be permitted to enter the Soviet Zone in Germany.45 
By this time, 38,000 RAF personnel had been listed as `missing', and of these 9200 
had been found. If at least 15,000 were presumed to be in the sea, 13,800 remained 
to be located and it was thought that a significant proportion of these men would be 
found in the British and Soviet Zones in Germany.46 The Daily Telegraph 
anticipated that `many British families will receive definite information within 12 
months about the fate of their relatives reported missing or presumed killed.'47 
The Soviet Military Administration in Potsdam imposed the same restrictions 
on the MRES entering the Soviet Zone as it did on the AGS, as well as the additional 
stipulation that the six Number 4 MREU Search Officers permitted access to the 
region should never converse with civilians other than through interpreters chosen by 
the Soviet authorities.48 The effect of the enforcement of these conditions was to 
make it difficult for MRES personnel to work in the manner to which they were 
43 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Parts III, V. A similar procedure was later used to obtain information 
from police authorities in the Ruhr. See TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 4 MREU (20/22 Sections) 
Operations Record Book, January- February 1948. See also Appendix Four. 
44 TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Notes, 25 March 1947. 
45 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 55/76, Stott Memorandum, 5 October 1946. 
46 TNA, PRO WO 219/1370, DPS to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), 19 
June 1945; Daily Telegraph, 29 October 1946. See also TNA, PRO AIR 55/66, Missing RAF 
Personnel, 31 January 1947. 
47 Daily Telegraph, 29 October 1946. 
48 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Notes, 25 March 1947. That the 
RMG was willing to enforce these conditions was evidenced when a Search Officer was expelled 
from the Soviet Zone for talking directly to a civilian. The officer was never readmitted. See TNA, 
PRO AIR 29/1598, Berlin Detachment Operations Record Book, October 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 
29/1598, Number 4 MREU (Headquarters) Operations Record Book, April 1949. 
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accustomed.49 In particular, their ability to interview local inhabitants was curtailed. 
Instead, the Search Officers relied for information on Soviet authorities asking local 
Burgermeisters what they knew of RAF graves and aircraft, and when this assistance 
was refused, there was nothing that the MRES could do to redeem the situation.50 It 
was similarly powerless to intervene when the RMG closed the Soviet Zone, which it 
did often and usually for no apparent reason. During these closures, which tended to 
last between one and two weeks, the Search Officers could only wait in their Berlin 
headquarters for the zone to be reopened.51 
Reconsidering the Future of the MRES 
While the MRES was thus making progress, it was being achieved only slowly, and 
when the time came for the Air Ministry to consider the future of its missing research 
organisation in March, approximately 26,000 RAF personnel had not been accounted 
for.52 At the review meeting, Burges took issue with those who sought to measure 
the success of missing research operations solely in quantitative terms, declaring that 
sentiment should always be the prime motivation for the existence of the MRES: the 
relatives of missing airmen were entitled to know where their dead lay.53 Although 
49 A MRES official observed: `[o]ur right to search this zone is flimsy; it rests on no contract, but has 
been weaned from the Russians by local diplomacy. It might be withdrawn for no good reason, at any 
moment.' See TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, MRES North -West 
Europe Report, February 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/62, Soviet Zone Activities, 22 August 1949. 
50 TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 4 MREU (21 Section) Operations Record Book, March 1947; 
TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Berlin Detachment Operations Record Book, May 1947. 
51 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Parts III. For examples, see files in TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598. 
52 TNA, PRO AIR 55/66, Missing RAF Personnel, 31 January 1947. About 4000 of the 26,000 
missing were in the Middle East, while the remainder were somewhere on the Continent. Almost 
nothing is known about missing research operations in the Middle East theatre. It is thought that the 
AGS may have taken much of the responsibility for finding and locating missing airmen in this 
region. 
53 TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Notes, 25 March 1947. Burges attended the meeting in his new 
capacity as observer of the MRES and advisor to the Air Ministry. Beckess had succeeded him as 
Director of the Casualty Branch sometime in February or March 1947. See TNA, PRO AIR 55/53, 
MREU Operational Areas, 11 February 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 1 MREU Operations 
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he accepted that this concern was insufficient justification for prolonging missing 
research operations indefinitely, he believed that the MRES should continue 
functioning beyond the spring.54 Moreover, he knew that the organisation had not 
been afforded the best possible chance to complete its task. It had far fewer vehicles 
than the number stipulated by the War Establishment, and some Search Officers were 
having difficulty in securing the services of AGS units to effect exhumations and 
concentrations on their behalf.55 For example, the officers of Number 3 MREU had 
made numerous representations to their Number 85 GCU counterparts in the hope of 
expediting exhumations in the Karlsruhe area, but to no avail as the army unit was 
understaffed and overburdened.56 At the same time, it was clear that severe weather 
over the previous winter had further hampered operations. In many areas roads had 
become so icy as to be impassable; the cold had seized engines and rendered 
immobile many of the vehicles the MRES did possess; heavy snow had hidden 
graves and aircraft from view; and where an interment or wrecked aircraft was 
found, the frozen ground had made digging and the collection of evidence difficult.57 
With these factors in mind, the Air Ministry agreed to postpone temporarily the 
dissolution of the MRES. The organisation would remain operating at its extant 
strength until 30 June 1947, and thereafter its four constituent units would be 
Record Book, April 1947. At the meeting it was announced that all RCAF personnel were to be 
withdrawn from the MRES before July to return to Canada. In making this announcement, Air Vice 
Marshal R. E. McBurney of the RCAF noted `that the Canadian authorities appreciated that there 
would be public criticism in Canada at the curtailment of missing research by the R.C.A.F., but they 
felt that it could be demonstated [sic] that a big effort had in fact been made; they realised that the job 
was not finished but were prepared to take the consequences and to face any criticism.' 
54 TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Notes, 25 March 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Beckess to Air 
Commodore A. S. Ellerton, 2 May 1947. 
55 TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 3 MREU Operations Record Book, February-March 1947. 
56 TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 3 MREU Operations Record Book, February-May 1947. 
57 For example, see TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 2 MREU Operations Record Book, January 
1947. 
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disbanded in stages over a five month period.58 MRES Mediterranean/Middle East 
would be given until February 1948 to complete its missing research operations.59 
Despite the apparently definite nature of these rulings, uncertainty continued 
to surround the existence of the MRES.60 Those at the review meeting had moved 
that their proposals `be regarded as fairly elastic as to precise dates', and they had 
reserved the right to keep sections of units operating in certain countries for 
`mopping up' purposes after the organisation was disbanded. Others in the Air 
Ministry wanted the MRES dissolved immediately, the advocates of this position 
reasoning that the inevitable public backlash this decision would provoke was of 
lesser concern than the finances and personnel requirements of the RAF.61 That 
Philip Noel- Baker, the Secretary of State for Air, chose to involve himself in this 
debate was further evidence of the uncertain position of the MRES, and of the fact 
that missing research had become increasingly politicised, for no previous occupants 
of his position had intervened in the affairs of the organisation. On 9 June he advised 
that he would consider the existence of the MRES during his forthcoming trip to 
Europe and that a decision on its dissolution would be made later that month.62 
Having returned from his Continental tour, during which he discussed with 
Hawkins and other MRES officers the progress and problems of missing research 
58 TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Notes, 25 March 1947. Steps would be taken to replace the RCAF 
personnel who were to be withdrawn from the MRES. 
59 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Beckess to Air Commodore A. S. Ellerton, 2 May 1947. The MRES 
Mediterranean/Middle East War Establishment stipulated for fifty -three officers and 238 other rank 
airmen. In March 1947 it was staffed by twenty -seven officers and 161 other rank airmen. Sinkinson 
wrote of the formation in April: `it did not begin effective work until much later, as for some time 
after its inception, strength was far below establishment. That is why the proposed date of its final 
disbandment (1st. February 1948) is later than that of M.R.E.S. (N.W. Europe).' See TNA, PRO AIR 
55/67, Meeting Notes, 25 March 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/66, Sinkinson Memorandum, 30 April 
1947. 
6o TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Air Commodore A. S. Ellerton to Slessor, 8 May 1947. 
ó1 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Notes, 25 March 1947. 
62 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Air Commodore A. S. Ellerton to Slessor, 8 May 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 
20/9050, J. S. Orme Memorandum, 9 June 1947. 
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operations, the Secretary of State wrote to Slessor and Sir James Barnes, who had 
succeeded Brown as Permanent Under Secretary, to express his concern at the 
imminent disbandment of the MRES: 
I feel that the work which the Missing Research Units are doing is of 
such importance that if we abandoned the task before it is given a 
reasonable chance of completion, there might be serious repercussions, 
particularly in view of the large effort which the Americans are putting 
into their Research Operation. In this connection I understand that in 
`John Bull', published on 6`h June, there was an article containing adverse 
comment on our policy of winding up the Units before the work is 
completed.63 
Noel- Baker's thinking also was likely to have been influenced by the intended 
incorporation of MRES Mediterranean/Middle East into the MRES as Number 5 
MREU. This plan had been announced in June and the date for the inauguration of 
the fifth unit set for 1 July, the day on which the disbandment of the MRES was 
scheduled to commence.64 Number 5 MREU was to be made responsible for 
completing missing research operations in southern Europe, an area defined as 
including Italy, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Yugoslavia, Greece, 
Turkey and the islands of the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas.65 Recognising that 
this unit would need time to fulfil its task, Noel -Baker gave permission for Number 5 
MREU to operate until May 1948, and simultaneously took the opportunity to extend 
the operating period of the other MRES units: Numbers 1 and 2 MREU would 
remain in the field until the end of 1947, Number 3 MREU until the following 
February, and Number 4 MREU until the following April. As he acknowledged, `I 
fully realise that in this way we might go on postponing the winding up of this work 
63 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, 
ea TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, 
Ellerton, 2 May 1947. 
65 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, 
Noel -Baker to Slessor and Barnes, 28 June 1947. 
Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Beckess to Air Commodore A. S. 
Part III; Daily Telegraph, 29 October 1946. 
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indefinitely, but I am convinced that it is most important that we should do all we 
can to complete the work'.66 
Development and Disbandment 
Number 5 MREU was based in Italy for less than a month. Primarily this was 
because the War Office intended to withdraw British military personnel from the 
country during the summer and the Foreign Office did not want a significant MRES 
presence to remain in the country thereafter.67 However, it suited Number 5 MREU 
to leave Italy as the majority of missing research cases there had been concluded by 
MRES Mediterranean/Middle East, and a headquarters located more centrally in 
southern Europe would facilitate operations in the eastern reaches of the search area. 
Leaving two sections to complete any outstanding investigations, at the end of July 
Number 5 MREU transferred its headquarters to Klagenfurt in Austria.68 From this 
new base the unit planned to search Yugoslavia - where some MRES personnel were 
already at work, having been allowed to enter the country the previous month after a 
long series of negotiations between the British and Yugoslavian governments - and 
Austria and Hungary, before moving down the Balkan Peninsula.69 Rights of entry 
into the newly -Communist states of Albania, Bulgaria and Romania had not been 
obtained, and while graves operations in these countries mostly had been completed 
by the army, the MRES wanted access so that it could ensure that the work had been 
66 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Noel -Baker to Slessor and Barnes, 28 June 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/66, 
Sinkinson Memorandum, 30 April 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, MRES North -West Europe 
Report, February 1948. 
67 TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Notes, 25 March 1947. 
68 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Parts III, VII; TNA, PRO AIR 55/71, Wing Commander M. J. A. Shaw to 
Squadron Leader A. H. S. Browne, 3 November 1947. 
69 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 55/73, Unknown to Foreign Office, 25 January 
1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/73, Major R. G. Dakin to Captain Petnicki, 31 May 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 
20/9050, Noel -Baker to Slessor and Barnes, 28 June 1947. 
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conducted to its satisfaction.70 It suspected that AGS personnel, who lacked the 
specialist training given to Search Officers, had buried as unknown some RAF 
personnel who could have been identified.71 
At the time Number 5 MREU moved to Austria, plans were enacted to 
disband Numbers 1 and 2 MREU.72 Although Noel -Baker had secured the existence 
of these units until the end of the year, the Casualty Branch had agreed to dissolve 
formations earlier than scheduled where possible.73 In disbanding Number 1 MREU, 
however, it opted for caution by creating from the remnants of the unit a small 
missing research formation based in Paris. Known as France Detachment, this force 
was intended to insure against the possibility of fresh evidence of missing airmen and 
unregistered graves being uncovered in France.74 The reticence to declare missing 
research operations therein wholly complete was informed by statistics. On 30 
September, by which time both Numbers 1 and 2 MREU had been disbanded, there 
was still no account of 21,800 missing RAF personne1.75 As it was now thought that 
approximately 13,400 airmen were lost in the sea, it was presumed that there were 
70 TNA, PRO AIR 55/73, Unknown to Foreign Office, 25 January 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/73, 
Memorandum on Entry into European Countries, 28 January 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/73, 
Yugoslavia Memorandum, circa January 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Minutes, 14 February 
1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/73, Major R. G. Dakin to Captain Petnicki, 31 May 1947. Permission to 
enter Soviet -controlled Hungary was obtained in October 1946, although it seems that MRES 
personnel did not travel into the country until the autumn of the following year. It is thought that 
authority for the MRES to enter the Soviet Zone in Austria was also secured in October 1946. The 
conditions imposed by Russian authorities on RAF servicemen entering the Soviet Zone in Austria 
were similar to those which governed the operations of British graves personnel in the Soviet Zone in 
Germany. See TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; Daily Telegraph, 29 October 1946; and related 
correspondence in TNA, PRO AIR 55/69. 
71 TNA, PRO AIR 55/73, Yugoslavia Memorandum, circa January 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, 
Meeting Minutes, 14 February 1947. 
72 A section of Number 2 MREU operated for a short time in Czechoslovakia during the summer of 
1947. See TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 2 MREU Operations 
Record Book, May -June 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 3 MREU Operations Record Book, 
August 1947. 
73 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Notes, 25 March 1947. 
74 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 55/53, Address Memorandum, 1 September 
1947. 
75 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Sinkinson to A. F. Thorp, 2 October 1947. 
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8400 bodies on the Continent of which the MRES had yet to find any trace, and 
while these were probably in Germany and eastern and southern Europe, this was not 
known for certain.76 
If this were cause for concern, the news from Germany was encouraging. In 
the Ruhr a change in searching technique, whereby difficult cases were temporarily 
eschewed in favour of more straightforward ones, had meant Number 4 MREU 
achieving better results.77 Similarly, the MRES section at work in the Soviet Zone, 
which had been named Berlin Detachment, was making strong progress.78 In 
November 1947, for example, its men travelled a distance of 5568 miles in 
investigating fifty -one missing research cases involving 212 personnel, positively 
identifying eighty per cent of these bodies.79 On account of its good work, Berlin 
Detachment was given authorisation to operate beyond the April 1948 deadline until 
September of that year.80 And while the disbandment of Number 3 MREU 
proceeded as planned at the end of February, the decision to extend missing research 
76 In August 1946, Slessor had suggested that the percentage of missing RAF personnel lost in the sea 
and `out of reach of search' might be as high as fifty per cent. By 1947, the Casualty Branch 
generally worked on the prediction that forty per cent of missing airmen were lost in the sea. See 
TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Slessor to de Freitas and Brown, 1 August 1946; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, 
Sinkinson to A. F. Thorp, 2 October 1947. The figure of 8400 included those airmen who had been 
buried as unknown. 
77 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, MRES North -West Europe Report, 
February 1948. 
78 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Berlin Detachment Operations Record Book, September- October 
1947. Berlin Detachment had been placed under the direct command of Hawkins, who had deemed its 
separation from Number 4 MREU `advisable on account of the somewhat intricate negotiations which 
had from time to time to be carried out at a high level' in order to broker entry into the Soviet Zone. 
79 TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Berlin Detachment Operations Record Book, November 1947; TNA, 
PRO AIR 20/9050, MRES North -West Europe Report, February 1948. 
80 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Saunders to Henderson, 16 January 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, 
MRES North -West Europe Report, February 1948. Saunders had been keen to secure this extension 
for Berlin Detachment in the knowledge that any `break in operations in the Russian Zone might delay 
the job indefinitely.' 
218 
operations in the Soviet Zone indicated a growing acceptance within the Air Ministry 
that the MRES should remain in the field until its task was complete.$' 
The Case of Mosquito NS 654 
With the majority of its more straightforward investigations finished, from the 
beginning of 1948 the MRES concentrated on missing research cases that, through 
want of evidence or other complications, had long gone unsolved. Forming what 
Hawkins termed `the hard -core of missing research operations', these cases were not 
always pursued successfully.82 For example, France Detachment had an unknown 
airman disinterred from the cemetery at St Avold in an attempt to identify him. The 
remnants of a British battle jacket, RAF -issue underpants, parts of a parachute 
harness and a flying suit were found in the grave, but little of the airman remained 
distinguishable and his name was not determined.S3 Other cases, however, were 
concluded successfully. 
The investigation into the disappearance of RAF aircraft NS 654 was initiated 
by the MRS in late 1944 after the Air Ministry received an ICRC report which stated: 
`27/10 Mosquito 1315 hours Two unknown dead. Buried Warnemünde Cemetery.'84 
Having predicted that the Mosquito was probably NS 654, the MRS set out to 
establish its identity as incontrovertible. Flight records showed that this aircraft had 
taken off with a RAAF pilot and a RAF navigator from RAF Benson on the morning 
of 27 October 1944 to photograph potential bombing targets in the Berlin area. The 
predicted flight time was six hours. The MRS had established that had the pilot 
81 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III. 
82 TNA, PRO AIR 55/63, Investigation Report, 24 September 1948. 
83 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V. 
84 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part VI. 
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followed his mapped route -there was no evidence to suggest that he had not - the 
aircraft would have been over the Baltic coast and in the vicinity of Warnemünde at 
the reported time of the crash.85 As RAF records showed that no other Mosquito 
could be placed in this region at this time, the MRS accepted that the crashed aircraft 
was NS 654, and the crew members' next -of -kin had been notified of their relatives' 
deaths and burial places by the Casualty Branch. 
Captured German documents obtained by the MRS in 1945 revealed that a 
RAF Mosquito, identification number NS 65, had crashed at 1350 hours on 27 
October at Gut Steinfeld, eleven kilometres east of Rostock. The papers recorded 
that the two men pulled from the aircraft wreckage were so badly burned as to be 
unrecognisable, and that their bodies had been buried in separate graves in New 
Cemetery, Warnemünde. While the information contained in these documents 
suggested that the aircraft in question could be NS 654, the time of the crash 
conflicted with that cited in the original ICRC report. Yet even if the crash had 
occurred at 1350, rather than at 1315, NS 654 would still have been near 
Warnemünde. The MRS was prepared to countenance that the different times cited 
in the two reports probably represented no more than an incidental discrepancy, and 
that the abbreviated identification number stated in the captured German documents 
was due to a transcription error, or the result of the digit `4' having been obscured by 
the fire that had consumed the aircraft.86 What was known for certain was that field 
investigations would be required to determine conclusively the identity of the aircraft 
and its occupants. 
85 Ibid. It was reasonable for the MRS to assume that the aircraft had crashed near to the burial site. 
86 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part VI. 
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In October 1946, Number 4 MREU was provided with a report detailing all 
that was known about Mosquito NS 654, but as a result of Soviet obstruction no 
enquiries were possible until March 1948.87 When finally access to the crash site 
was brokered, the Soviet officer with whom Berlin Detachment was dealing would 
allow it to travel only as far as Rostock. Eventually a Search Officer was given 
permission to telephone the Burgermeister of Gut Steinfeld who was able to confirm 
that local people had removed two corpses from the wreckage of an aircraft fitting 
the description of a Mosquito in October 1944, and that the bodies had been buried in 
Warnemünde New Cemetery. When MRES personnel were later permitted to visit 
this cemetery, they learnt from the caretaker that two unknown men had been 
interred there on 30 October 1944, and that their bodies had been exhumed by the 
American Graves Registration Service (AGRS) in August 1947. Believing the 
graves to be those of United States Air Force personnel, the Americans had 
transported the remains found therein to Strasbourg for examination at the American 
Central Identification Centre. Identification could not be made and the bodies were 
buried in the American military cemetery at Neuville -en- Condroz in Belgium, their 
gravestones marked `Unknown'.88 
Through enquiries conducted by the RAF Liaison Officer attached to AGRS 
headquarters in Paris, MRES personnel were able to determine the path of the 
remains since their exhumation. After arranging for the bodies to be disinterred from 
Neuville -en- Condroz cemetery, and then performing a more thorough examination of 
them than had been conducted by the Americans, it was established that the remains 




feasible to identify the men by name. When contacted by the Casualty Branch, the 
mother of the navigator confirmed that her son had not worn dentures, while a 
simultaneous enquiry to RAAF authorities in Melbourne elicited the fact that the 
pilot had worn an upper denture. After four years of investigations, there was thus 
enough evidence to be certain of the identities of the two airmen, and they were 
buried by AGS personnel in individual graves in a British cemetery near Louvain in 
Belgium.89 
New Frontiers and Old Questions 
With the MRES expecting that its final months would be taken up with similarly 
difficult investigations, it came as something of a surprise when permission was 
received in April 1948 for it to operate in Poland, negotiations to this end having 
been ongoing for a number of years.90 For the three servicemen whom Hawkins 
selected to search the country, the potential loss of evidence as a result of the passage 
of time was partly offset by their being able to take advantage of a dossier of 
information that the Casualty Branch had been compiling since the end of the war on 
RAF casualties in Poland.91 The MRES entered the country knowing that seventy - 
five aircraft and approximately 400 bodies were to be found there, and that within the 
89 Ibid. 
90 In June 1947, Noel -Baker had argued that one good reason for not disbanding the MRES was that a 
search team might yet be granted entry to Poland. See TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Noel -Baker to 
Slessor and Barnes, 28 June 1947; Sunday Express, 13 October 1946. 
91 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, British Embassy (Warsaw) to Foreign 
Office, 3 March 1948[ ?];TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Sir D. Gainer to Foreign Office, 16 March 1948; 
TNA, PRO AIR 55/63, Poland Progress Report, 14 August 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/63, Poland 
Progress Report, 21 October 1948; Manchester Guardian, 7 January 1949. 
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Figure 30 
A Search Officer inspects the remains of an airman. The casualty's height was 
calculated using measurements taken from the femur (foreground). This 
information, coupled with evidence garnered from studying fragments of clothing, 
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CROSS SHOWS .See exh,,., repórt ö..._...1............___ _._.__..__......_..........._._ 
CEMETERY RECORD See exh, report No. 1 
DATE OF DEATH .. ............_24.:.3. -?+ ...._.._............_. ........_ ....................._ REMARKS.....B.caxszs...111ark3 ag....grsues._xtere..... 
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Part of a MRES exhumation report. With regard to the `Teeth' section, the 
Dominion air forces kept accurate dental records for their personnel. The RAF came 
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crypt of a chapel in Sagan were the ashes of fifty airmen who had been murdered by 
the German military in 1944.92 
As operations commenced in Poland, Arthur Henderson, who had replaced 
Noel -Baker as Secretary of State, toured Germany where he visited MRES 
personnel. This visit seemingly persuaded him that the dissolution of the 
organisation should be postponed once more on account of the good work that he had 
seen and because missing research operations remained incomplete.93 Air Marshal 
Sir Hugh Saunders, who had replaced Slessor as AMP in October 1947, concurred, 
and it was agreed to review the progress of the MRES in August to determine 
whether September remained a viable date for its complete disbandment.94 
By the time of this review, which took place in September, Berlin Detachment 
and Number 4 MREU, the existence of which also had been continued after April 
1948, were the only two MRES formations still working in the field, Number 5 
and France Detachment having been In 
addition to the manifold difficulties of working in the Ruhr and the Soviet Zone, 
missing research operations in Germany remained incomplete because of the 
demobilisation of large numbers of personnel. Both of the surviving formations were 
92 The Times, 17 April 1948; Manchester Guardian, 7 January 1949. See also TNA, PRO AIR 55/63, 
Poland Progress Report, 14 August 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/63, Poland Progress Report, 21 October 
1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/57, Sinkinson to Squadron Leader E. C. Rideal, 25 October 1948. Having 
escaped from Stalag Luft III, these fifty airmen had been recaptured and then executed. 
93 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Henderson to Saunders, 9 April 1948. 
94 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Saunders to Henderson, 21 April 1948; The Air Force List: April 1949, 
(London: HMSO, 1949), pp. 13 -15. 
95 In southern Europe, search operations did not cease entirely after the disbandment of Number 5 
MREU, which gradually had worked its way from central Europe to Turkey to mainland Greece, via 
the Dodecanese and Aegean archipelagos. Two of its officers stayed on in Austria in order to 
complete any outstanding work related to missing research operations in that country, and four Search 
Officers remained in Athens. Number 5 MREU never gained entry to Albania, Romania and 
Bulgaria, despite the persistent efforts of the Air Ministry. For more information on these subjects 
and on MRES operations in Greece and Turkey, see TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO 
AIR 20/9050, Air Commodore A. S. Ellerton Memorandum, 12 July 1948; Manchester Guardian, 12 
December 1947; and files in TNA, PRO AIR 55/58, 63, 66, 68 -72. 
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chronically understaffed, and in particular need of Search Officers.96 One senior 
MRES figure suggested that certain German civilians already serving with the 
organisation - scores were employed as interpreters, clerks, typists, cooks, cleaners, 
night -watchmen, foremen, labourers, sign- writers, batmen and boilermen - could be 
trained to fulfil the investigative duties undertaken by Search Officers, but Hawkins 
rejected this proposal, essentially on the grounds that the bodies of RAF personnel 
should not be handled by former enemies.97 Faced with this constraint, an officer 
commanding a Number 4 MREU section observed: 
[i]t is most obvious ... that this Section at its present strength cannot 
possibly complete the task in hand by the close -down date of the Unit, i.e. 
September 1948. As we are now towards the end of Missing Research 
activities those cases which remain to be solved are naturally the ones of 
a more difficult nature. Apart from the normal investigations it will be 
observed that an immense task still remains in the execution of final 
registration action. This final registration action ... is one of the most 
important links in our entire procedure. Any amount of most thorough 
investigation work can be rendered useless if the final registrations, 
movement of bodies and marking of crosses is not efficiently and 
accurately carried out.98 
Saunders and Henderson were sympathetic to this argument, and in September it was 
agreed to permit Number 4 MREU and Berlin Detachment to continue operations 
until March 1949 with a further review on the disbandment of the MRES to be 
scheduled for February.99 
This decision afforded Hawkins and his men only brief respite. To coincide 
with the closing of the DGRE and the cessation of most AGS operations in north- 
96 TNA, PRO AIR 55/63, Officer Commanding Number 4 MREU to Hawkins, 13 June 1948; TNA, 
PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 4 MREU (20/22 Sections) Operations Record Book, August 1948. 
97 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, MRES North -West Europe Report, February 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 
55/69, Civilian Employment Memorandum, 23 June 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/69, Hawkins to Officer 
Commanding Number 4 MREU, 29 June 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Civilian Labour Minute, 6 
October 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Civilian Labour Establishment, circa January 1949. 
9S TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 4 MREU (20/22 Sections) Operations Record Book, August 
1948. 
99 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Saunders to Henderson, 22 September 1948. 
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west Europe on 30 September 1948, the War Office devolved to the Air Ministry 
complete responsibility for `all exhumations, body transfers to Military Cemeteries, 
[and] erection and painting of crosses for all R.A.F. war casualties recovered.' loo 
While a similar situation had arisen previously in Yugoslavia after the departure of 
the AGS from that country in 1947, for the MRES this was a much greater burden to 
assume and its response was to form three Missing Research Graves Registration 
(MRGR) sections to fulfil those duties which had hitherto been performed for it by 
GCU personne1.101 A total of seventy -three German civilians staffed these new 
formations, with the only RAF member in each MRGR section the Flight Lieutenant 
who was placed in command.102 Necessity had meant Hawkins overcoming his 
objections to Germans handling the air force dead. 
The End of Missing Research Operations 
Operations in Poland were completed in December 1948. Over eight months and 
after journeys totalling 25,000 miles, the three servicemen Hawkins had sent there 
had located seventy -two of the seventy -five aircraft and 417 of the 426 RAF 
personnel missing in the country, and arranged for the remains they had found to be 
loo TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Civilian Labour Minute, 6 October 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Civilian 
Labour Memorandum, 11 November 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Wing Commander C. B. Millett 
Memorandum, 23 December 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Civilian Labour Minute, 3 January 1949; 
TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Policy Memorandum, 12 April 1949. 
101 TNA, PRO AIR 55/73, Yugoslavia Memorandum, circa January 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, 
Meeting Minutes, 14 February 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/66, Meeting Minutes, 25 April 1947; TNA, 
PRO AIR 55/71, Wing Commander M. J. A. Shaw to Squadron Leader A. H. S. Browne, 3 November 
1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Civilian Labour Minute, 6 October 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, 
Civilian Labour Memorandum, 11 November 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Wing Commander C. B. 
Millett Memorandum, 23 December 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Civilian Labour Minute, 3 January 
1949. 
102 TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Civilian Labour Minute, 6 October 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Civilian 
Labour Memorandum, 11 November 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Wing Commander C. B. Millett 
Memorandum, 23 December 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Civilian Labour Minute, 3 January 1949; 
TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Policy Memorandum, 12 April 1949. 
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interred in British cemeteries at Krakow, Poznan and Malborg.1°3 By the time they 
returned to MRES headquarters in Germany, it had been established that 41,881 
airmen had gone missing in Europe. Of these, 21,000 had been traced, between 
12,000 and 17,000 were thought to be in the sea, and between 2000 and 7000 were 
unaccounted for.1 °4 
Although the MRES had come to accept that most of the men in this latter 
category would not be found, all hope was not abandoned and, in February 1949, the 
Air Ministry ratified another six -month extension to missing research operations.'°5 
However, simultaneous with this work, preparations were made for the departure of 
the MRES from Germany. For example, its personnel contacted officers of the 
French Search and Exhumation Sections to arrange for them to take future 
responsibility for any dead British airmen who might be discovered in the Soviet 
Zone, and charged the caretaker of Heerstrasse cemetery with the duty of burying 
any such bodies brought the French.1o6 
103 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part III; TNA, PRO AIR 55/63, Poland Progress Report, 21 October 
1948; The Times, 17 April 1948; Manchester Guardian, 7 January 1949. (Malborg is also known as 
Malbork.) Not all of the 417 RAF personnel named by the MRES could be identified individually. 
104 Manchester Guardian, 7 January 1949. 
105 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, MRES North -West Europe Report, February 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 
20/9050, Agenda for Meeting on MRES Future, circa September 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, 
Number 4 MREU (20/22 Sections) Operations Record Book, February 1949; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, 
Wing Commander C. B. Millett Minute, 23 February 1949; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Squadron Leader 
E. C. Rideal Memorandum, 26 February 1949; TNA, PRO AIR 55/58, Unit Location Statement, 1 
April 1949; TNA, PRO AIR 55/58, Unit Location Statement, 14 July 1949; TNA, PRO AIR 55/60, 
Disbandment of Berlin Detachment, 28 July 1949; TNA, PRO AIR 55/62, Soviet Zone Activities, 22 
August 1949. 
106 TNA, PRO AIR 55/62, Soviet Zone Activities, 22 August 1949. See also TNA, PRO AIR 
29/1598, Berlin Detachment Operations Record Book, February 1949. 
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The MRES ceased operations in September 1949.107 Immediately thereafter 
its personnel began arriving in Sundern to obtain their clearances from the RAF. 
While this represented the final military duty for most of these men before their 
return to civilian life, from the officers eight were selected for the RAF Graves 
Service which, working from Rheinberg and Rotenburg, was to complete any tasks 
left unfinished by the MRES in Germany. These officers, who were to be assisted by 
six other ranks as well as fifty German civilians recruited mostly from the MRGR 
sections, were to remain in post until April 1950.108 
Hawkins retired from active service knowing there was little more the MRES 
could have done to locate the 20,000 RAF personnel whose bodies were still missing. 
He was proud that his men had found 22,000 British and Dominion aircrew, and of 
the manner in which they had approached their task as a worthy and important 
endeavour.109 As the commander of Number 3 MREU used to remind his officers: 
`[r]emember ... have a responsible and humane duty to perform. 
In your wholehearted pursuit of information you may alleviate the suffering of next- 
of-kin of our fallen brother Air Crew. By your efficiency and endeavours prove your 
gratitude.' 110 
107 TNA, PRO AIR 55/60, Disbandment of Number 4 MREU, 29 August 1949; TNA, PRO AIR 
55/59, Civilian Labour Memorandum, 12 September 1949; TNA, PRO AIR 55/60, Photography 
Memorandum, 27 September 1949; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 4 MREU (Headquarters) 
Operations Record Book, September 1949. On 6 September, Saunders wrote to Henderson suggesting 
that the MRES continue operations until 31 March 1950. This proposal was rejected, the disbandment 
of the organisation officially confirmed on 21 September. See TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Saunders to 
Henderson, 6 September 1949. 
108 TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Civilian Labour Memorandum, 11 November 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 
29/1598, Number 4 MREU (Headquarters) Operations Record Book, September 1949; TNA, PRO 
AIR 55/59, Civilian Labour Memorandum, 12 September 1949; TNA, PRO AIR 55/60, Memorandum 
on Operations from 1 October 1949, 20 September 1949; TNA, PRO AIR 55/60, Number 4 MREU 
Disbandment, 24 September 1949. 
109 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Foreword; Daily Telegraph, 7 October 1949. 




The Establishment of the IWGC and its Second World War Task 
Section I: The Origins and Establishment of the IWGC 
Following the formation of the GRC in 1915, Ware made it a principle of its 
operations that the bodies of British servicemen should remain where they died. He 
then secured a ban on their exhumation for the duration of the war, thus raising the 
question of who would maintain these graves in the longer term.1 The Prince of 
Wales's National Committee for the Care of the Graves of British Soldiers was 
formed in January 1916 to advise the government on matters pertaining to war 
graves and, once the conflict had ended, to arrange for their preservation and 
upkeep.2 
By 1917 Ware thought that this committee, of which he was a member, had 
too limited a charter to allow it to provide adequately for the remembrance of 
hundreds of thousands of war dead.3 He suggested that it be replaced by an imperial 
organisation - Ware wanted the Dominions represented to reflect the allied nature of 
CWGC, 2033, Macready Statement, 28 April 1915; TNA, PRO WO 32/5847, Macready to Sir 
Reginald Brade, 1 September 1915; Imperial War Conference, 1917, p. 34; Fabian Ware, `War 
Graves and the British Commonwealth', The Nineteenth Century and After, CII (1927), 631 -41; 
Rudyard Kipling and Douglas Macpherson, The Graves of the Fallen, (London: HMSO, circa 1918), 
p. 15; Sidney C. Hurst, The Silent Cities: An Illustrated Guide to the War Cemeteries and Memorials 
to the `Missing' in France and Flanders, (London: Methuen, 1929), p. vii; Longworth, The Unending 
Vigil, pp. 13 -4. In writing sections of this chapter, I have taken guidance from Longworth, The 
Unending Vigil. Where this is the case, acknowledgement is given in the appropriate footnote. 
2 TNA, PRO WO 32/5847, Macready to Sir Reginald Brade, 1 September 1915; TNA, PRO WO 
32/5847, Sir Reginald Brade to Lieutenant Colonel Lord Stamfordham, 5 October 1915; TNA, PRO 
WO 32/5847, Sir Reginald Brade to Field Marshal Lord Grenfell, 14 January 1916; TNA, PRO WO 
32/5847, Press Statement, 29 March 1916; TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, Meeting Minutes, 25 September 
1916; TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, Ware Memorandum, 7 March 1917; `The Registration and Care of 
Military Graves During the Present War', 297 -302; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 16. 
3 TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, Ware Memorandum, 7 March 1917. 
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the war effort - with executive powers to arrange for the care of the war graves in 
perpetuity.4 The Prince of Wales wrote to David Lloyd George to explain Ware's 
proposals for the new organisation: it would operate under Royal Charter, be 
governed by representatives from its constituent countries, and be linked to, although 
independent from, the DGRE.5 The prime minister saw the merits of such an 
institution and promised that the subject of its formation would be raised with 
delegates at the imperial conference in the spring.6 
At the conference the Earl of Derby, Secretary of State for War, argued the 
case for the proposed organisation by informing his fellow delegates that the time 
had come for more effort to be invested in the care of graves. Acknowledging that 
British efforts in this regard rarely had been adequate in the past, he expressed his 
determination to see `that the graves of those who have fallen in this War are looked 
after by those who are living at the same time, and handed on to those who come 
after them.' 7 These sentiments met with unanimous support, and in May the king 
signed the IWGC into being.8 As Longworth writes, never before had a single 
organisation been charged `with the care of all the dead of a nation in any war.'9 
That the IWGC had been accorded a task of great importance was evident in 
the composition of its governing body. The Prince of Wales was made its president 
4 Ibid. 
5 TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, Prince of Wales to Lloyd George, 15 March 1917. 
6 CWGC, 1001, Lloyd George to Prince of Wales, 15 March 1917. 
7 Imperial War Conference, 1917, pp. 23, 128. 
8 Ibid., p. 5; TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, IWGC Charter, 10 May 1917; Annual Report of the Imperial 
War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 5; `The Registration and Care of Military Graves During the 
Present War', 297 -302; Ware, `War Graves and the British Commonwealth', 631 -41; Ware, The 
Immortal Heritage, p. 23. For a full account of the proceedings which led to the formation of the 
IWGC, see Imperial War Conference, 1917, pp. 23 -38, 86 -93, 137 -50; TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, 
IWGC Draft Charter, circa spring 1917. 
9 Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 28. 
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and Derby, by virtue of his ministerial position, its chairman.10 The other ex- officio 
members were the Secretaries of State for the Colonies and for India, the First 
Commissioner of Works, and the Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, South African 
and Newfoundland ambassadors to the United Kingdom." 1 Seven unofficial 
members, each selected because of his professional expertise, comprised the 
remainder of the governing body.12 They included General Sir Herbert Plumer, 
Admiral Sir Edmund Poe, Rudyard Kipling and the prominent trade unionist Harry 
Gosling.13 Ware also became an unofficial member. He was made vice -chairman 
and thus effective director of the IWGC - the roles of president and chairman were 
mostly symbolic - in order that its work and that of the DGRE could be coordinated 
by one person.14 He was, moreover, the inspiration behind both organisations. 
The commissioners were charged with the responsibility of determining how 
to commemorate the British and Dominion dead in a manner that was both 
reverential and practical. Their first step in this regard, announced after the 
inaugural meeting of the IWGC on 20 November 1917, was to enshrine equality as 
the key tenet of remembrance policy: 
[t]he Imperial War Graves Commission ... has laid down for a guiding 
principle that as the sacrifice has been common, so the memorials to the 
lo TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, Prince of Wales to Lloyd George, 15 March 1917; TNA, PRO WO 
32/9434, List of Commissioners, circa November 1917; Imperial War Conference, 1918, p. 226; 
Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 5. 
TNA, PRO WO 32/9434, List of Commissioners, circa November 1917; Imperial War Conference, 
1918, p. 226; Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 5. 
12 TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, Ware to Creedy, 15 October 1917; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 29. 
13 TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, List of Unofficial Commissioners, circa October 1917; TNA, PRO WO 
32/9434, List of Commissioners, circa November 1917; Imperial War Conference, 1918, p. 226; 
Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 5; Ware, The Immortal 
Heritage, p. 61; Harry Gosling, Up and Down Stream, (London: Methuen, 1927), pp. 221 -3; W. S. 
Sanders and Marc Brodie, `Harry Gosling' in Matthew and Harrison (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Volume 22, pp. 1029 -30; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 29. 
14 TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, Prince of Wales to Lloyd George, 15 March 1917; TNA, PRO WO 
32/9434, Derby Memorandum, 30 October 1917; TNA, PRO WO 32/9434, Ware to Derby, 16 
November 1917; TNA, PRO WO 32/9434, Meeting Minutes, 20 November 1917; Imperial War 
Conference, 1917, p. 92. 
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dead should be identical, and that, therefore in the treatment of the graves 
no distinction should be made between officers and men. The 
Commission feels strongly that it would be inadvisable to leave the 
provision of memorials to private initiative. If memorials were allowed 
to be erected in the War Cemeteries according to the preference, taste, 
and means of relatives or friends, the result would be that costly 
monuments put up by the well -to -do over their dead would contrast 
unkindly with those humbler ones which would be all that poorer folk 
could afford. Thus, the inspiring memory of the common sacrifice made 
by all ranks would be obscured, the cemeteries would lose that regularity 
and orderliness most becoming the resting -places of soldiers, who fought 
and fell side by side, and would, in the end, grow to be ill- assorted 
collections of individual monuments. The governing consideration which 
has influenced the Commission's decision is that all who died for the 
Empire's sake are members of one family, and children of one mother 
who owes to all an equal tribute of gratitude and affection, and that, in 
death, all from General to Private should receive equal honour under a 
common memorial, the symbol of their comradeship and of the cause to 
which they gave their all.15 
The commissioners were, however, unsure as to the form the cemeteries should take. 
Advice had been sought from the director of the National Gallery of British Art, 
Charles Aitken, and from the celebrated architects Edwin Lutyens and Herbert 
Baker, but their contradictory responses had confused matters.16 It seemed to Ware 
that everyone had a view and most were different. In the face of this confusion the 
commissioners requested the guidance of Major Sir Frederic Kenyon, the director of 
the British Museum.'? He was respected as an arbiter of artistic taste, and because of 
his connection to the army it was hoped that his opinions would hold credence with 
15 CWGC, 1137, Draft Statement, December 1917. This quotation is taken from a draft of the final 
statement. 
16 TNA, PRO WO 32/9434, Ware to Derby, 22 October 1917; CWGC, 1137, Aitken, Baker and 
Lutyens Report, 18 July 1917; CWGC, 1137, Aitken to Ware, 20 August 1917; CWGC, 1137, Ware 
to Baker, 9 November 1917; CWGC, 1137, Ware to Aitken, 11 November 1917; Imperial War 
Conference, 1918, pp. 226 -7; Lieutenant Colonel Sir Frederic Kenyon, War Graves: How the 
Cemeteries Abroad Will be Designed, (London: HMSO, 1918), p. 4; Herbert Baker, Architecture and 
Personalities, (London: Country Life, 1944), p. 88; Christopher Hussey, The Life of Sir Edwin 
Lutyens, (Woodbridge: Antique Collectors' Club, 1989), p. 372; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 
32. See also Appendix Six. 
17 TNA, PRO WO 32/9434, Ware to Derby, 22 October 1917; TNA, PRO WO 32/9434, Derby 
Memorandum, 30 October 1917; TNA, PRO WO 32/9434, Meeting Agenda, 20 November 1917; 
TNA, PRO WO 32/9434, Meeting Minutes, 20 November 1917; Imperial War Conference, 1918, p. 
227; Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 6; The Times, 24 
November 1917. 
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current and former servicemen.18 Kenyon was engaged to consult with such 
interested parties as soldiers and next -of -kin and then to formulate a series of 
proposals for the design of the war cemeteries.19 These were contained in his 
February 1918 report.20 
Building on the tenet of equality the IWGC had made inviolable, Kenyon 
recommended that each grave be marked with `its own headstone, of uniform 
dimensions, on which the name of the dead will be carved, with his rank, regiment, 
and date of death', and that these be arranged in ordered rows.21 Three key 
principles informed this suggestion. First, he thought that the cemeteries had to be 
recognisable as burial grounds. While he did not advocate a morbid form of 
remembrance, he thought it `right that the fact that they are cemeteries, containing 
the bodies of hundreds of thousands of men who have given their lives for their 
country, should be evident at first sight, and should be constantly present to the 
minds of those who pass by or who visit them.'22 Second, he believed that the sight 
of massed and ordered headstones was appropriately military in nature and would 
18 TNA, PRO WO 32/9434, Ware to Derby, 22 October 1917; H. I. Bell, `Sir Frederic George 
Kenyon' in Matthew and Harrison (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Volume 31, pp. 
341 -2; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 32. 
19 TNA, PRO WO 32/9434, Meeting Minutes, 20 November 1917; Kenyon, War Graves, pp. 2 -3, 22; 
Kipling and Macpherson, The Graves of the Fallen, p. 2; Sir Reginald Blomfield, Memoirs of an 
Architect, (London: Macmillan, 1932), p. 175. Many Britons wanted to repatriate the bodies of the 
dead and advocated making permissible individual acts of remembrance, and a strong anti -IWGC 
movement developed in the immediate post -war period. For more information on opposition to the 
IWGC, see Longworth, The Unending Vigil, pp. 44 -55; Bourke, Dismembering the Male, pp. 225 -27; 
and files in CWGC, 1050; and CWGC, 1084. 
20 Kenyon, War Graves, p. 22. 
21 Ibid., pp. 5 -6, 7 -8. Kenyon proposed that each headstone `be 2 ft. 6 in. in height and 1 ft. 3 in. in 
width; not so large as to be cumbrous and oppressive, but large enough to convey the effect desired.' 
They were eventually made so that they would stand two feet, eight inches from the ground, and as 
wide as Kenyon had suggested, with each being three inches thick. See Ware, The Immortal Heritage, 
p. 28; Their Name Liveth: Some Pictures of Commonwealth War Cemeteries 1914 -1918, 1939 -1945, 
Volume I, (London: Methuen, 1954), p. 2. 
22 Kenyon, War Graves, pp. 7 -8. 
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suggest `the spirit of discipline and order which is the soul of an army.'23 Third, he 
reasoned that individual headstones, which would be erected in place of the wooden 
crosses used by the AGS, would provide a focus for the emotions of next- of- kin.24 
To this end Kenyon proposed that the bereaved be allowed to compose an epitaph of 
up to three lines for inscription on the headstone of their relative.25 He explained 
that further `variety in uniformity' could be incorporated if national and regimental 
emblems were carved into the headstones, a measure that would allow for the subtle 
differentiation of the graves of those from different countries, and for the 
perpetuation of the strong regimental associations which existed within the British 
army.26 
Kenyon suggested also that each cemetery contain two standard monuments. 
The idea for the first of these had been proposed by Lutyens, who thought that `one 
great fair stone of fine proportions, twelve feet in length, lying raised upon three 
steps, of which the first and third shall be twice the width of the second; and that 
each stone shall bear in indelible lettering, some fine thought or words of sacred 
dedication', would make a striking and powerful addition to the cemeteries.27 The 
second standard monument was to be a large cross. It would be used to signify that 
the cemeteries belonged to a Christian empire, something which Kenyon believed 
was important given that the headstones would not be of cruciform shape and 
Lutyens's monument was to be essentially atheistic in form.28 
23 Ibid., pp. 7 -8, 14; CWGC, 1137, Draft Statement, December 1917; Captain A. W. Hill, Our 
Soldiers' Graves, (London: HMSO, 1920), p. 4. 
24 Kenyon, War Graves, p. 8. 
25 Ibid., pp. 9 -10. 
26 Ibid., pp. 8 -9, 23. 
27 Ibid., pp. 10 -11; CWGC, 1137, Lutyens Memorandum, 28 August 1917; CWGC, 1137, Ware and 
Archbishop of Canterbury Meeting, 17 October 1917. 
28 Kenyon, War Graves, pp. 10 -11, 23; Blomfield, Memoirs of an Architect, p. 178; Mosse, Fallen 
Soldiers, pp. 83 -4; Thomas W. Laqueur, `Memory and Naming in the Great War' in John R. Gillis 
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Acting on the assumption that the ban on the repatriation of bodies would be 
extended to include peacetime, the commissioners accepted the main points of the 
Kenyon report and set about implementing them.29 First they appointed men to 
design the cemeteries. The title of principal architect was conferred upon Lutyens, 
Baker and Reginald Blomfield, with each given responsibility for planning the 
development of burial grounds in a particular area, and a team of subordinates to 
execute their ideas.30 In addition, Lutyens was instructed to proceed with plans for 
his monument - it was named the `Stone of Remembrance' because this title was not 
specific to one faith - and Blomfield was asked to fashion a `Cross of Sacrifice' for 
erection in each cemetery.31 Kipling chose the biblical words THEIR NAME 
LIVETH FOR EVERMORE as the text for the Stone of Remembrance, and devised 
the phrase `Known unto God' for inscription on the headstones of unidentified 
servicemen.32 
The commissioners had also to consider the issue of how the IWGC was to 
be funded.33 The Treasury had accepted that it would pay for any operations 
concerned with remembering the national war dead, and it restated this commitment 
(ed.), Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994), p. 162. For Christian servicemen an image of a crucifix would be inscribed upon the 
headstone. The headstones of Jews, Hindus, Muslims and other non -Christians who had died in the 
service of the British Empire would be marked by an appropriate symbol. 
29 
Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 6; Blomfield, Memoirs of an 
Architect, p. 175. The ban on repatriation was extended. 
30 CWGC, 2004, Baker to IWGC, 6 March 1918; CWGC, 2004, Blomfield to IWGC, 6 March 1918; 
CWGC, 2004, Lutyens to IWGC, 6 March 1918; CWGC, 2017, Memorandum on Architects, circa 
early 1918; Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 7; Kenyon, War 
Graves, pp. 19 -20; Baker, Architecture and Personalities, p. 89; Blomfield, Memoirs of an Architect, 
pp. 173, 176 -7. 
3' Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 7; Kenyon, War Graves, pp. 
11 -12, 23 -4; Kipling and Macpherson, The Graves of the Fallen, p. 11; Their Name Liveth, Volume I, 
p. 3; Blomfield, Memoirs of an Architect, p. 179; Mary Lutyens, Edwin Lutyens: By His Daughter, 
(London: John Murray, 1980), p. 154; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 36. See also Appendix 
Seven. 
32 The Times, 10 November, 1928; Ware, The Immortal Heritage, pp. 31 -2; Longworth, The Unending 
Vigil, p. 43. 
33 Kenyon, War Graves, p. 21. 
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at the Imperial War Conference held in June 1918.34 At this time the Dominion 
governments also affirmed their intentions to provide financial assistance, and it was 
decided that each of the member states should fund the IWGC in proportion to that 
country's percentage of the imperial war dead.35 While pleased to have secured 
funding, Ware and his colleagues were concerned about the possibility of the 
Treasury interfering in the formation of remembrance policy, for under this 
arrangement the British Exchequer would be responsible for providing the IWGC 
with more than eighty per cent of its budget. They feared that the IWGC would be 
unable to operate as an imperial entity if the Chancellor imposed conditions on the 
spending of these monies.36 For their part, Treasury officials were reluctant to allow 
the organisation to spend as it chose, particularly as the commissioners had not 
provided them with a firm estimate of the cost of developing the battlefield 
cemeteries. However, in June 1919 the Chancellor relented.37 While the IWGC thus 
won an important victory, the treasuries of the member states subsequently were able 
to impose financial restrictions by agreeing that the organisation's budget would be 
limited to ten pounds per grave.38 
34 TNA, PRO WO 32/5849, Treasury Memorandum, 3 June 1916; TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, Meeting 
Minutes, 25 September 1916; Imperial War Conference, 1917, p. 35; Imperial War Conference, 1918: 
p. 228; Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, p. 3; Longworth, The 
Unending Vigil, pp. 16, 38. 
35 TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, Ware Memorandum, 7 March 1917; CWGC, 2043, Treasury Meeting, 20 
June 1919; Imperial War Conference, 1917, pp. 5, 35 -7; Imperial War Conference, 1918, pp. 4, 32 -3, 
226; Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, pp. 3, 15. 
36 CWGC, 2043, Treasury Meeting, 20 June 1919; TNA, PRO T 1/12519, Internal Memorandum, 12 
January 1920; Ware, `War Graves and the British Commonwealth', 631 -41. 
37 TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, Ware Memorandum, 7 March 1917; TNA, PRO T 1/12519, Treasury 
Meeting, 20 June 1919; TNA, PRO T 1/12519, Internal Memorandum, 12 January 1920; CWGC, 
2043, Treasury Meeting, 20 June 1919; CWGC, 2043, G. L. Barstow to Ware, 4 March 1920; 
Imperial War Conference, 1918, pp. 30, 226; Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 
1919 -1920, pp. 7, 15; Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1920 -1921, p. 3; 
Longworth, The Unending Vigil, pp. 38 -40. 
38 TNA, PRO T 1/12519, Internal Memorandum, 12 January 1920; CWGC, 2069, Winchester House 
Meeting, 28 July 1919; CWGC, 2069, Memorandum on Costs, circa July 1919; CWGC, 2069, 
Director of Works to Financial Adviser, 7 August 1919; Imperial War Conference, 1918, pp. 29, 31, 
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 Remembering the Great War Dead 
Because of these tight financial constraints and the edict requiring the architects to 
adhere to the principles established by Kenyon, the style of the cemeteries developed 
by the IWGC in the post -war period was understated, although their modesty also 
owed something to the desire of the principal architects, whose number was 
eventually expanded to seven, not to remember the dead in a gaudy and 
ostentatiously sentimental manner.39 The architects thus created cemeteries that 
were free of idiosyncrasy and not of a particular era or fashion, the only definite 
influence evident in the burial grounds being horticultural.40 In Europe, attractive 
miniature rose species, which were hardy and small enough not to overwhelm 
graves, were grown alongside headstones, with each cemetery made to resemble a 
peaceful English garden by the additional planting of crocuses, snowdrops, daffodils, 
poplars, willows, yews and lawns.41 Baker, in particular, was fond of emphasising 
227; Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, pp. 7 -8, 12; Longworth, The 
Unending Vigil, p. 38. 
39 CWGC, 1137, Lutyens Memorandum, 28 August 1917; CWGC, 2001, Blomfield Report, February 
1918; CWGC, 2017, Memorandum on Architects, circa early 1918; Kenyon, War Graves, pp. 19, 20- 
2, 24; Baker, Architecture and Personalities, p. 89; Blomfield, Memoirs of an Architect, p. 178; Ware, 
The Immortal Heritage, pp. 30 -1; Curl, A Celebration of Death, pp. 317 -9; Longworth, The Unending 
Vigil, p. 128. The cemeteries in France and Belgium were designed by Lutyens, Baker, Blomfield and 
Major Charles Holden; those in Italy, Macedonia, Egypt, Greece and Germany by Sir Robert Lorimer; 
those in Syria, Palestine and Turkey by Sir John Burnet; and those in Iraq by Major Edward Warren. 
See Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 1920 -1921, p. 5; Eighth Annual Report 
of the Imperial War Graves Commission, (London: HMSO, 1928), p. 5; Hurst, The Silent Cities, pp. 
viii -ix. 
4° CWGC, 2001, Blomfield Report, February 1918. 
41 TNA, PRO WO 32/9433, Meeting Minutes, 25 September 1916; Annual Report of the Imperial War 
Graves Commission, 1919 -1920, pp. 5, 7; Twenty- second Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves 
Commission, p. 5; Twenty -ninth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, (London: 
HMSO, 1949), p. 15; Kenyon, War Graves, pp. 12 -13; Hill, Our Soldiers' Graves, pp. 2 -3, 5 -10, 12; 
W. F. W. Harding, `The Horticultural Work of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission', Journal 
of the Royal Horticultural Society, LXXXVIII (1963), 252 -3; Jane Ridley, Edwin Lutyens: His Life, 
His Wife, His Work, (London: Pimlico, 2003), p. 280; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, pp. 73 -4, 114. 
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such a connection, noting `that the homely sense of the English churchyard should 
strike the key -note of the designs of the cemeteries'.42 
As well as providing for the remembrance of the dead, the IWGC took steps 
to ensure the permanence of its work. Ware persuaded the member states to 
establish a £5 million endowment fund to secure the maintenance of the cemeteries, 
and arranged for the relevant foreign governments to accord the IWGC authority 
over all British and Dominion graves in their territories.43 These provisions became 
relevant once the organisation completed its construction operations in 1932, by 
which time it had erected 587,117 identified headstones and inscribed on memorials 
the names of 517,773 servicemen who had no known graves.44 
The scale of this achievement, coupled with the beauty of the cemeteries, 
made the IWGC a venerable institution. One admirer, Stanley Baldwin, declared in 
1928 that its work `has been a revelation and a comfort.'45 He also expressed his 
hope that the organisation never would have to undertake such a task again. Initially 
42 CWGC, 1137, Baker to Ware, 9 November 1917; Baker, Architecture and Personalities, pp. 88 -9. 
The cost of producing and erecting each Stone of Remembrance and Cross of Sacrifice was such that 
the Stones were eventually placed only in the larger graveyards, while the Crosses routinely were 
placed in all cemeteries containing forty or more burials. See CWGC, 2069, Winchester House 
Meeting, 31 July 1919; CWGC, 2069, F. C. Sillar Memorandum, 22 October 1946; Gibson and Ward, 
Courage Remembered, p. 53. 
43 Imperial War Conference, 1918, p. 228; Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 
1919 -1920, p. 11; Eighth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, pp. 3, 6; Twenty- 
first Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 5; The Times, 10 November 1928; 
`The Registration and Care of Military Graves During the Present War', 297 -302. On the IWGC 
endowment fund, see Report from the Select Committee on the Imperial War Graves Endowment 
Fund Bill: Together with the Proceedings of the Committee and Minutes of Evidence; Public Bill for 
Imperial War Graves Endowment Fund; and correspondence in TNA, PRO WO 32/3145; TNA, PRO 
WO 32/3146 and CWGC, 2081. Most of the agreements with regard to war graves in foreign 
territories formalised arrangements that had been made during or immediately after the war. For 
example, see Agreement Between the United Kingdom and France Respecting British War Graves in 
France, 26 November 1918. 
44 Eighth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 6; Thirteenth Annual Report of 
the Imperial War Graves Commission, (London: HMSO, 1933), pp. 3, 45; Ware, The Immortal 
Heritage, p. 66; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, pp. 126 -7. Of the 517,773 `missing' servicemen, the 
bodies of 180, 861 had been found and interred in graves marked unknown. See also Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard), House of Lords, Fifth Series, Volume CXXXIV, (London: HMSO, 1945), p. 
1022. 
45 
The Times, 10 November 1928. 
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Ware was certain that it would not, but by 1938 his faith in this regard had begun to 
waver and, in September of the following year, he found himself preparing the 
IWGC for what he termed `a new harvest of death'.46 
Section II: The IWGC and its Second World War Task 
Starting Again 
Although the IWGC had been formed with the specific purpose of providing for the 
remembrance of the Great War dead, when the Second World War began there was 
an expectation that it should be involved. In a letter to Neville Chamberlain in 
December 1939, the organisation's chairman, Leslie Hore- Belisha, wrote that the 
government would save money and labour if responsibility for the permanent care of 
any new battlefield cemeteries were vested in the IWGC. He added: 
experience indicates that it would be of comfort to the relatives of the 
dead to be in communication with such an experienced body as the 
Imperial War Graves Commission as soon as possible after the reception 
of the news of their loss, rather than that they should have to wait for the 
cessation of hostilities to know what steps were being taken for the 
permanent marking of the graves or for the commemoration of ̀ missing' 
who had no known grave 47 
The prime minister advised Hore- Belisha to secure a Supplemental Charter for the 
IWGC authorising it to provide for the remembrance of the Second World War 
dead.48 
The IWGC began working on this task without waiting to receive this formal 
imprimatur. During the winter of 1939 -40, its officials convinced the French 
46 Twentieth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 3; Ware, `War Graves and the 
British Commonwealth', 631 -41. 
47 TNA, PRO PC 8/1390, Hore -Belisha to Chamberlain, 6 December 1939. 
48 TNA, PRO PC 8/1390, Chamberlain to Hore -Belisha, 8 December 1939. The Supplemental Charter 
was awarded in February. See TNA, PRO WO 32/9439, IWGC Supplemental Charter, 6 February 
1940. 
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government to sanction the use of French land for new British cemeteries, and in 
Britain canvassed opinion regarding the form of headstones. It was agreed that the 
type used to commemorate the Great War dead should be employed again.49 Yet for 
all this purpose and efficiency, most IWGC staff did not believe that a major 
undertaking was at hand. The work of the caretakers and gardeners who tended the 
Continental cemeteries had not been interrupted by hostilities, and the bodies of the 
few casualties suffered by the British military in north -west Europe had been 
interred in extant IWGC burial grounds.50 This quasi peace ended in May with the 
German invasion of the Low Countries and France. IWGC employees resident in 
north -west Europe were forced to flee and `the work of a generation', Longworth 
writes, `was abandoned to the enemy.'51 
The Quiet Years 
Excluded from much of the Continent from this time, the IWGC attended mainly to 
administrative tasks. Acting on information provided by the DGRE, headquarters 
staff sent letters to the bereaved asking them to confirm the personal details of dead 
relatives so that no mistakes were made when it came to inscribing headstones, and 
inviting them to compose an epitaph for the grave marker.52 Ware knew that it was 
49 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September, November 1939, January 1940; TNA, PRO 
ADM 1/24243, IWGC Pamphlet, February 1942; CWGC, 3002, Ware to War Office, 7 February 
1940; CWGC, 3002, Ware to Frank Higginson, 13 February 1940; CWGC, 2033, Cemetery Design 
Memorandum, 26 February 1943; Twentieth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, 
pp. 6 -8; Twenty-first Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 4; Their Name Liveth, 
Volume I, p. 1; Hussey, The Life of Sir Edwin Lutyens, p. 566; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, pp. 
161 -3. See also Appendix Eight. 
50 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, November 1939; CWGC, 2035, Unknown to Ware, 9 
October 1939; Twenty-first Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 2; Longworth, 
The Unending Vigil, pp. 162 -3; Gibson and Ward, Courage Remembered, pp. 59, 61. 
51 Longworth, The Unending Vigil, p. 163. See also pages 164 -72 in the same volume. 
52 TNA, PRO WO 165/35, DGRE War Diary, September- October 1939; TNA, PRO WO 165/35, 
IWGC Memorandum on Casualties, circa March 1940; TNA, PRO ADM 1/24243, IWGC Pamphlet, 
242 
best to complete as much as possible of this work before greater demands were made 
of the IWGC. 
This relatively quiet existence continued until 1943 when, the course of the war 
having turned decisively against the enemy, the IWGC began to make preparations 
for transforming the battlefield cemeteries into permanent memorials to the dead.53 
Early that year Lieutenant Colonel Sir Herbert Ellissen, previously a senior IWGC 
employee, was lured from retirement to advise the organisation on such subjects as 
cemetery construction, and in the summer Professor Edward Salisbury, director of 
the Royal Botanic Gardens, agreed to advise it on horticultural matters.54 Also 
during this period, the commissioners resolved to accord to the Second World War 
burial grounds `the same general architectural and horticultural treatment' that had 
been applied to the graveyards of the 1914 -18 conflict, and to engage a principal 
architect to design the cemeteries in the Middle East and North Africa.55 
A Principal Architect on Tour: North Africa, 1943 
The highly- regarded Hubert Worthington was selected for this position.56 The 
holder of the Royal College of Art chair in architecture, he possessed a suitable 
professional pedigree having been apprenticed once to Lutyens, while he was looked 
February 1942; CWGC, 4028, Verification Form; Twenty-first Annual Report of the Imperial War 
Graves Commission, p. 10; Twenty- second Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 
2; Twenty-third Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 5. 
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Twenty-ninth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 7; Daily Telegraph, 23 July 
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243 
upon favourably also because of his status as a First World War veteran.' His 
appointment was made on the recommendation of the eighty -year -old Kenyon, who 
had always advocated that the IWGC employ, wherever possible, architects who 
were ex- servicemen on the basis that those `whose comrades lie in these cemeteries, 
are best qualified to express the sentiment which we desire the cemeteries to 
convey.' 58 
Following his appointment, Worthington was instructed to tour North Africa 
to decide which of the battlefield cemeteries established there should be preserved 
and developed.59 Although these officially were not decisions for the IWGC, the 
commissioners were unwilling to accept responsibility for a large number of burial 
grounds in the region on the basis that it would be difficult and expensive to organise 
a widespread building programme in a 450,000 square mile area comprised mostly 
of desert, and thereafter to maintain numerous sites.60 Thus they advised 
Worthington to designate ten or fewer cemeteries in North Africa as permanent - the 
AGS would be ordered to alter its concentration programme according to his 
57 Ridley, Edwin Lutyens, pp. 228, 244; Hussey, The Life of Sir Edwin Lutyens, p. 226; John H. G. 
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Memorandum, 5 July 1943; Kenyon, War Graves, p. 20; Bell, `Sir Frederic George Kenyon' in 
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recommendations - and to favour those that were located near to harbours, railways 
and roads to facilitate access for post -war visitors.61 
Throughout his seven -week 13,000 mile tour, Worthington spoke with 
diplomats and generals, members of the AGS, and frontline servicemen. These 
discussions helped him to recommend which cemeteries to reject as unsuitable and 
which to retain for development.62 Of those which he chose to preserve, some 
stirred in him particular interest and excitement. He thought that the `historic' 
cemetery at Tobruk, despite the many impracticalities associated with the site, 
should be made permanent because it possessed `poignant and heroic associations of 
the highest order', while of the graveyard at Sollum he wrote: 
250 miles from El Alamein and 85 miles from Tobruk, this cemetery will 
be one of the largest of the Western desert, and with Hellfire Pass on one 
side, and Sollum pass on the other, it has a remarkably impressive setting, 
in the centre of Sollum Bay, with the sea in front as a base, and the chain 
of hills between the passes as a background. As you look South, the 
Cross of Sacrifice will tell against the hills, with their ever changing 
lights and shadows, as you look North, the White Cross will stand out 
against the brilliant coloured sea. The site possesses both beauty of 
natural setting, and the irresistible appeal of a historic battleground. The 
harbour gives facilities for cruising ships bringing visitors, and it is 
beside the main, through, Pilgrimage road.63 
As for Tunisia, Worthington explained to Ware that its `European cultivation', along 
with `the beauty of the country -side, the ease of communications, the many villages 
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and prosperous farms ... suggests a larger number of smaller cemeteries, for smaller 
cemeteries have a greater charm, where circumstances justify their use.'64 
Worthington proposed that the IWGC retain and develop seventeen 
battlefield burial grounds in North Africa: nine in Tunisia, two in Algeria, and six on 
the Mediterranean coast between Tripoli and Alexandria.65 The largest site selected 
was at El Alamein, and the smallest at Thirbar Seminary near Beja in Tunisia where 
there were 120 interments.ó6 For the graveyards in the desert Worthington wanted to 
build pergolas in which visitors could shelter from the heat, and to install irrigation 
systems to allow for growing grass and temperate flora. Around these sites he 
advocated the erection of high stone walls to block drifting sand.ó7 Acknowledging 
the need to uphold `a great tradition', Worthington assured the commissioners that 
his designs would accord to the architectural principles of the IWGC and that the 
cemeteries would be without ostentation in the manner of those built after the First 
World War.68 
64 CWGC, 2035, Worthington Tour Report, 20 October 1943. 
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 Moving into Europe 
Several months after Worthington returned from his tour, the IWGC appointed 
another two principal architects. In the spring of 1944 the Canadian-born Briton 
Louis de Soissons was selected to design the cemeteries in Italy.69 A British army 
First World War veteran, he had studied at the Royal Academy and in Paris and 
Rome, and favoured classical architecture.70 His appointment was followed in the 
autumn by that of Philip Hepworth as the architect responsible for planning the 
cemeteries in France.71 He too had fought in the 1914 -18 conflict, been schooled in 
Paris and Rome, and was a classicist.72 de Soissons, who was fifty -three at the time 
of his appointment, and Hepworth, at fifty four, were also thought by the IWGC to 
be of the right age for principal architects, sufficiently young to cope with the rigours 
of extensive travelling, but old enough to have established excellent professional 
reputations.73 Once their contracts were confirmed, de Soissons and Hepworth 
toured Italy and France respectively to study the battlefield cemeteries and make 
plans. Soon afterwards their remits were broadened, the former given responsibility 
for designing the cemeteries throughout the Mediterranean and southern Europe, the 
latter all those in north -west Europe.74 
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In the meantime, Worthington's proposals were judged too expensive. With 
work set to begin at Massicault, Tobruk and Sollum, the IWGC declared that it could 
not afford what he was planning - the cost of implementing his design for the Tobruk 
graveyard was estimated at a prohibitive forty pounds per grave, while the twenty 
pounds per grave figure for Sollum was also too high - and building operations were 
suspended while he simplified his proposals.75 
The Difficult Post -War Years 
The work of the IWGC in the immediate post -war period was defined by a constant 
push for economy. de Soissons and Hepworth were, like Worthington, made to 
modify their cemetery designs.76 Altering plans which had been months in 
conception was a time -consuming task, and the frustration this engendered among 
the architects was exacerbated when the organisation rejected their revised designs 
because the cost of raw materials and skilled labour had risen in the interim.77 The 
shortages that were forcing higher construction prices also affected other industries 
on which the IWGC relied. For instance, it took the organisation until 1946 to find a 
firm capable of manufacturing and engraving some of the 300,000 plus headstones it 
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required, and it was only in that year that the first water pipelines and concrete 
headstone beams were laid beneath cemeteries.78 
With little tangible evidence that the IWGC was attending to its Second 
World War task, the British public began to voice its concerns. In September 1946 
Reverend Colin Cuttell wrote to the Daily Telegraph from Southwark Cathedral to 
ask why the `sacred' graveyard at Arnhem had not been transformed `into a worthy 
memorial to brave Englishmen.'79 He observed that `the ground is waterlogged, the 
paths between the graves are rutted sandy tracks, and there is no fencing of any kind 
to keep out cattle. Flowers planted by the Dutch people alone redeem the 
situation.'80 In a letter to The Times in the same month, Mr G. E. Ballyn of Bath 
wondered whether the lack of progress in developing the cemeteries were a reflection 
of official apathy.81 As a former newspaper editor and a keen student of public 
relations, Ware was cognisant of the dangers of adverse publicity.82 He used his 
regular Armistice Day broadcast on the BBC Home Service to refute this charge, and 
to announce that it could take ten years to complete the cemeteries because of the 
magnitude of the task and the difficulties caused the IWGC by economic and other 
factors beyond its contro1.83 Nonetheless, there was a feeling among senior civil 
servants that the organisation was operating inefficiently and that Ware was to 
blame. 
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 The Retirement of Ware 
By the autumn of 1946 Ware was seventy- seven, weak from phlebitis, and no longer 
the force he once had been.84 That something was amiss with his leadership of the 
IWGC was evident when lazy and underperforming officials were not removed from 
important posts, and other staff became so frustrated with the organisation that they 
resigned.85 The permanent secretaries at the War Office and the Treasury wanted 
Ware replaced and together resolved to force his retirement, but he was able to 
stymie their plotting by invoking the support of important acquaintances. For 
example, J. J. Lawson, the IWGC chairman, refused to act against his old friend and 
colleague.86 Despite the continued efforts of the civil servants to oust Ware, whose 
pride and reluctance to forfeit a £3000 annual salary made him a formidable 
opponent, he remained vice -chairman until his retirement from the IWGC in June 
1948 when he was replaced by Admiral Sir Martin Dunbar- Nasmith.87 
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 The Second World War Cemeteries 
The new administration inherited an organisation distracted by this saga and affected 
by manifold difficulties.88 The cost of raw materials and skilled labour remained 
high, approximately 80,000 next -of -kin had yet to be contacted about epitaph 
inscriptions, and by November 1948 only 40,000 headstones had been 
manufactured.89 In the Middle East and Greece the movement of IWGC officials 
was restricted by political and civil unrest, the organisation was barred from the 
newly -Communist countries of southern Europe, and in North Africa the discovery 
of mines, a cholera outbreak, the theft of materials, and the desecration of graves by 
anti -imperialist protestors had interfered with operations.90 It was not until 1949, 
when much of the building programme was sub -contracted to construction firms, that 
significant progress was made in developing the battlefield burial grounds of the 
Second World War.91 
As work at sites was completed, the success of Worthington, de Soissons and 
Hepworth in creating well -planned and picturesque cemeteries from limited 
resources was revealed. At Ancona, for example, de Soissons used attractive pebbles 
collected from the seaside to adorn paths and benches and thus enliven the 
architecture.92 Careful use was made of the natural contours of each site, and of 
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horticulture, to create symmetry and perspective in the cemeteries, with evenly - 
spaced avenues of trees used to define borders and entrances and to screen unwanted 
vistas.93 In the Salerno graveyard de Soissons had liquidambars and poplars planted 
in a semi- circle behind the Cross of Sacrifice to create a spectacular natural frame for 
the feature, while at the Bruyelle burial ground in Belgium, Hepworth had a row of 
willows and poplars grown to hide an unattractive house and telegraph poles.94 
The principles which informed the choice of trees and the horticulture 
programme generally were the same as those followed after the First World War.95 
Growing miniature roses alongside headstones was again favoured - 250,000 rose 
bushes were planted in the cemeteries in north -west Europe alone - with small and 
attractive perennial species used similarly.96 Aside from their inherent beauty, these 
roses and perennials were ideal for adorning graves as they were long -blooming, and 
their roots were too short to become entwined around the subterranean beams by 
were aligned.97 Large flowering bushes that could be trained 
to develop in a particular direction were planted behind the headstones for variety, 
and compact and easily- shaped shrubs such as rosemary were grown at the end of 
each row of graves further to enhance the sense of ordered spacing.98 Lawns were 
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used for effect, with horticulturists interlacing certain species of grass and clover to 
produce, in the words of one, `that vivid emerald green which forms such a desirable 
background against which to see the border plants and Portland headstones.'99 
Healthy lawns were such an important feature of the cemeteries that precautions 
were taken to prevent rabbits and goats destroying them, and where there was sandy 
earth it was excavated and replaced with tonnes of fertile soil to facilitate grass 
growth.100 
Only in the driest parts of Africa were the cemeteries not made reminiscent of 
England.101 The IWGC had wanted to irrigate the desert burial grounds so that 
grasses and a wide variety of plants could be cultivated, but the logistics and costs 
involved, along with the discovery that highly- saline water damaged headstones, 
forced it to moderate these plans.102 By 1953 Worthington was advocating planting 
indigenous flora, hardy acacias and olive trees at such sites as El Alamein.103 The 
effect was not as calming as that imparted by the green and wooded cemeteries on 
the Continent, yet the desert shrubs did have their own stark attraction that was in 
keeping with the surrounds.'°4 
Not everyone shared the conception of these cemeteries as beautiful, or 
believed that money should be spent on the memorialisation of the war dead. In a 
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letter to R. A. Butler, the Chancellor, in October 1954, one member of the public 
outlined his objections: 
[w]hy not debunk the Imperial War Graves Commission as soon as it can 
be closed down and use the money for the living, widows and orphans 
and dependants and poor maimed relics of the war[ ?] The Imperial War 
Graves Commission started on that wave of emotion which shouted `War 
to end War' `Dig out the Rats' `Hang the Kaiser' squeeze the pips out etc. 
The gallant officers and staff who were given the job of spending the 
millions a year have done a fine job aesthetically and romantically and 
like the B.B.C. have acted as a fairy godmother to architects, contractors, 
ex- servicemen as gardeners, wardens and office staff. I have consulted 
many ex- servicemen who agree that the money wrung from us taxpayer 
[sic] (who all served in the wars) should be spent on the living not on 
stones and cemeteries that look like dummies on parade `No. 6 there, get 
back in line'. I have consulted Sir Ian Fraser [president of the British 
Legion] and others; not one dare hurt the feelings of sentimental relations 
and of the few who love a Sunday visit to a Cemetery by suggesting a 
rational Humane view.105 
Although such criticisms prompted discomfort at the IWGC, the organisation was 
not deterred from its task.1 °6 
As progress was made with developing the cemeteries, the IWGC 
endeavoured to provide for their ongoing protection and maintenance by concluding 
war graves agreements with foreign governments.107 Authorities in Communist 
countries, reluctant as they were to provide foreign organisations with permanent 
rights of entry into their territories, did not prove amenable in this regard and thus 
IWGC officials continually had to negotiate for access to war graves in the Eastern 
Bloc.108 Outside this region, countries were willing to recognise the IWGC as the 
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official custodian of the British and Dominion dead, and enshrining this 
acknowledgment in international law proved straightforward. For example, France 
simply updated the corresponding treaty it had signed with Britain after the First 
World War.1 °9 
The End of the Task 
By the summer of 1956, the IWGC had nearly completed its Second World War 
task.11 ° In the Netherlands thirty -six of thirty -eight cemeteries were complete; in 
Italy thirty -three of forty burial grounds were finished; in France the corresponding 
figure was fifty -two of sixty- seven, and operations in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt 
continued at just three sites." More remained to be done in Germany, although 
even there it was hoped to conclude work within eighteen months.112 
Cassino War Cemetery, containing more than 4000 graves and a monument 
to the memory of servicemen killed in the Italian campaign and without known 
eighth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 11; Thirtieth Annual Report of the 
Imperial War Graves Commission, pp. 9 -10; Thirty-first Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves 
Commission, pp. 22, 26; Daily Telegraph, 3 June 1946; Manchester Guardian, 21 March 1951. 
Ostensibly Czechoslovakia provided an exception to the rule given that an agreement was reached 
with the government in Prague, but the securing of this treaty needed a British promise to care for 
Czechoslovakian war graves in IWGC cemeteries. See Agreement Between the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Czechoslovak 
Republic for the Mutual Upkeep of War Graves, 3 March 1949; Longworth, The Unending Vigil, pp. 
196, 220; and files in TNA, PRO FO 369/3859 and TNA, PRO FO 369/4098. 
109 Agreement Between the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, India and Pakistan of the one 
part and the Government of the French Republic of the other part regarding British Commonwealth 
War Graves in French Territory, 31 October 1951. 
11° TNA, PRO FO 371/124702, Meeting Briefing Notes, 1 October 1956; CWGC, 2004, Unknown to 
Worthington, 13 December 1954; Thirty- seventh Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves 
Commission, pp. 6, 17. 
111 Thirty- seventh Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, pp. 11, 31, 57 -9. 
112 Ibid., p. 58; TNA, PRO FO 371/130595, Commonwealth -German- French Joint Committee 
Meeting Minutes, 25 October 1956; Thirty- eighth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves 
Commission, p. 31. 
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graves, was officially opened in the autumn of 1956.13 It was a grand occasion. 
Conducted in the presence of British and Dominion representatives and led by Field 
Marshal Earl Alexander, the erstwhile commander of most of the 8000 men buried or 
commemorated on the memorial at Cassino, the inauguration ceremony included the 
reading of prayers and the laying of wreaths.l 14 The event was all the more poignant 
for the rugged surrounds and the positioning of the cemetery within this landscape, 
de Soissons having aligned the features at the centre of the burial ground - the 
memorial, the Cross of Sacrifice and the Stone of Remembrance - on an axis with 
the iconic battlefield of Monte Cassino. " 5 Ware would have approved. 
113 TNA, PRO FO 371/124241, Cassino Ceremony Plans, 2 July 1956; TNA, PRO FO 371/124241, 
Sir Ashley Clarke to Selwyn Lloyd, 4 October 1956; Thirty- seventh Annual Report of the Imperial 
War Graves Commission, pp. 7, 57 -60; Thirty- eighth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves 
Commission, pp. 7, 34, 67; The Times, 25 September 1956; Daily Telegraph, 26 September 1956. 
114 TNA, PRO FO 371/124241, Cassino Ceremony Plans, 2 July 1956; TNA, PRO FO 371/124241, 
Sir Ashley Clarke to Selwyn Lloyd, 4 October 1956. 
115 TNA, PRO FO 371/124241, Cassino Ceremony Plans, 2 July 1956; Thirty- seventh Annual Report 
of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 7; Evening News, 26 September 1956; Research Trip by 



















































































































The cemetery soon after completion, circa late 1950s. 
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Figures 38 -45: Cassino War Cemetery 
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The cemetery in transition (1). 
The cemetery in transition (2), January 1956. 
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The inauguration ceremony. 
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Figure 62 
Dumbach War Cemetery, Germany. Where the remains of servicemen could not be 
separated and individually identified, they were buried together and the headstones 
placed side -by -side. See, for example, the eleven headstones in the foreground. 




Visiting the Dead: Pilgrimages to British Second World War Graves 
The Prospect of Consolation 
In the House of Commons in April 1945, Winston Churchill was asked for an 
assurance that Britons would be able to visit war graves overseas after the cessation 
of hostilities, and whether the government intended to provide funds for this purpose. 
He replied that careful consideration would be given to these matters, but at a later 
date.' There were two principal reasons for the prime minister to be non -committal. 
First, the government knew of the continuing demand for provisions and 
accommodation in the areas containing battlefield cemeteries, and that to allow 
British civilians into these regions in the near future would exacerbate an already 
difficult situation.2 Second, it did not want to devote ships and vehicles to 
transporting while demobilised servicemen, displaced persons 
and essential goods needed urgent carriage.3 
These considerations determined the official attitude towards war graves 
pilgrimages over the following months. For example, when Rosanna Norman of 
Bournemouth wrote to the War Office in the summer to ask when it `would be 
possible to go over to Normandy to visit the graves of relatives', an official replied 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 409 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1945), p. 1672. See also 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 403 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1944), p. 931. 
2 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, War Office to Commander 1 Airborne Division, 3 October 1945; TNA, 
PRO WO 32/12462, Clode to Mr Woods, 18 January 1946. (The name of the officer commanding 1 
Airborne Division is not known.) 
3 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, War Office to Commander 1 Airborne Division, 3 October 1945; TNA, 
PRO WO 32/12462, Clode to Mr Woods, 18 January 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Internal 
Memorandum, 25 February 1946. 
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that `transport and other difficulties' precluded her being given a definite answer.4 
The commander of 1 Airborne Division also was sent a version of this standard reply 
when he enquired in the autumn about the possibility of organising a trip to Arnhem 
for relatives of men killed there.5 The Air Ministry, meanwhile, simply informed 
prospective pilgrims that exit visas were required for overseas travel and that these 
were not granted to civilians for the purpose of visiting military cemeteries.6 
Not until exit visas were abolished later in 1945 did the subject of war graves 
pilgrimages became a matter for debate in government and military circles. War 
Office and Air Ministry officials became concerned that as there was no longer 
anything preventing Britons from travelling to non -military zones on the Continent - 
effectively all of western Europe excluding Germany - visitors to war graves might 
witness the handling of human remains, or think that the incomplete state of the 
battlefield cemeteries reflected a lack of concern for the dead.8 Accordingly, it was 
resolved to draw as little attention as possible to the subject of war graves 
pilgrimages in the hope of deferring them until the graves services and the IWGC 
had completed their tasks.9 
It was misguided to think that public interest in the matter could be thus 
contained. For thousands of Britons who grieved for servicemen buried on foreign 
battlefields, the prospect of visiting the grave of a relative or friend, and there finding 
4 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Norman to War Office, 18 July 1945; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
Courtown to Norman, 8 August 1945. 
5 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Commander I Airborne Division to DGRE, 12 September 1945; TNA, 
PRO WO 32/12462, War Office to Commander 1 Airborne Division, 3 October 1945. 
6 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, IWGC to Passport and Permit Office, 30 May 1945; TNA, PRO WO 
32/12462, J. W. Stafford to IWGC, 9 June 1945; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Courtown to Captain F. 
Tyrrell, 26 June 1945; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Mr Woods to Captain Turner, 16 January 1946. 
7 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Mr Woods to Captain Turner, 16 January 1946. 
B Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Clode to Mr Woods, 18 January 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
Internal Memorandum, 25 February 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, McNair Memorandum, 26 
March 1946; Daily Telegraph, 8 April 1947. 
9 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Clode to Mr Woods, 18 January 1946. 
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consolation, was a sustaining hope. Many of the bereaved saw such a trip as central 
to the mourning process and to achieving some kind of catharsis. It was, therefore, 
unsurprising that over the winter of 1945 -46, ministers frequently were questioned 
by MPs about what financial and logistical help the government would afford their 
constituents in undertaking pilgrimages. 1° In reply to one of these enquiries, J. J. 
Lawson, the Secretary of State for War, declared that no assistance could yet be 
provided and that continuing transport difficulties would exclude anything being 
done for this purpose for at least six months." While the position adopted by the 
government did not affect those Britons who could afford to journey overseas, and 
who were content to arrange visits to graves themselves, for the majority of the 
bereaved it was unsatisfactory since travel in post -war Europe was an expensive and 
difficult undertaking. As Ware observed in a letter to McNair at the time, `there may 
be serious trouble if some steps are not taken immediately to examine the question 
[of government assistance for pilgrimages] and to decide on some public 
pronouncement.' 12 
Action and Inaction 
The subject was discussed in the War Office in the early spring. Those involved in 
the deliberations generally agreed on the need for the government to help civilians 
wanting to visit war graves, but were aware that it lacked the resources to oversee the 
10 For examples, see Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 415 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1945), p. 
1239; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 419 HC, DEB 5S, pp. 798 -9; Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard), 421 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1946), p. 297. 
I' Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 419 HC, DEB 5S, pp. 369 -70. 
12 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Ware to McNair, 28 February 1946. 
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provision of any such aid.13 This recognition prompted recollections of post -First 
World War practice when the government had provided some money and instituted 
other measures to facilitate pilgrimages, but had devolved their administration to 
reputable voluntary organisations.14 One mandarin recalled this arrangement had 
worked well, not least because the organisations concerned had been given the time - 
consuming task of assessing who among the bereaved needed financial assistance to 
travel abroad.15 McNair favoured adopting a similar system and in March he 
proposed that an inter- departmental committee, comprised of War Office, Air 
Ministry, Admiralty, Ministry of War Transport, Treasury and Foreign Office 
representatives, be established immediately to consider what assistance could be 
afforded, with a view to announcing this to placate the war bereaved.16 
In the meantime, Jennie Laurel Adamson, a Labour MP whose younger son 
had been killed while serving with the RAF in 1944, raised the subject directly with 
Clement Attlee: 
[v]arious Government Commissions are now abroad on official business 
and all expenses are paid by the State and I think that the time has come 
when a certain measure of consideration should be extended to the 
bereaved to visit, under an organised scheme, the last resting places of 
those who gave their lives in the country's cause. In my official capacity 
it may be that I should experience little difficulty in visiting my own 
son's grave but I feel that I would not be justified in taking advantage of a 
privilege which is denied to others. It is, of course, my natural desire to 
make the journey as soon as possible but I cannot do so in the present 
absence of a scheme applicable to all other wives and parents. May I, 
therefore, recommend for your sympathetic consideration the setting up 
of an organisation which could deal with this matter, with a view to 
securing that visits will be authorised at a cost which will not cause 
13 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Internal 
Internal Memorandum, 25 February 1 
14 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Internal 
Ware to McNair, 28 February 1946. 
15 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Internal 
16 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, McNair 
Memorandum, 21 February 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
946. 
Memorandum, 25 February 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
Memorandum, 25 February 1946. 
Memorandum, 26 March 1946. 
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hardship to the large majority of the people concerned and that all 
necessary facilities will be afforded to them.17 
The prime minister, who previously had not expressed a direct interest in the 
pilgrimage issue, requested that his ministers, including Lawson, look into the 
matter.18 
Other developments at this time presaged the need for government action. 
First, several independent travel agencies and touring associations announced they 
would conduct trips to cemeteries in north -west Europe from the summer. This drew 
attention to official inaction in this regard.19 Second, articles and letters began to 
appear in national newspapers about certain civilian organisations on the Continent, 
such as the Federation du Calvados de l'Association France - Grande -Bretagne and 
the Netherlands War Graves Committee (NWGC), which were tending war graves.20 
As a correspondent explained to readers of the Manchester Guardian, the purpose of 
the latter organisation was to ensure that: 
every Allied grave in Holland is looked after, not as part of a big, semi- 
official scheme but by the efforts of individuals who will make 
themselves responsible for single graves. The individuals themselves, 
whenever possible, will get in touch with the families of the dead men, 
send them pictures of the graves and their surroundings, tell them what is 
being done to care for the graves, and later, when it becomes possible for 
civilians to travel in numbers to Holland, will give hospitality to parties 
of relatives coming to visit the individual graves for which they care. 
There has been no lack of volunteers for the committee's work; 12,000 of 
the graves at Margraten, for instance, have already been adopted by 
individuals, and the rest are cared for by school children. Volunteers are 
still coming in.21 
12 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Adamson to Attlee, 10 May 1946; David Doughan, `Janet Laurel 
Adamson' in Matthew and Harrison (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Volume 1, pp. 
284 -5. 
18 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, J. M. Addis to A. C. W. Drew, 14 May 1946. 
19 Daily Mail, 23 May 1946; News Chronicle, 23 May 1946; Sunday Pictorial, 26 May 1946. 
20 Daily Telegraph, 10 June 1946; The Times, 10 June 1946; Daily Mirror, 14 June 1946; Daily 
Herald, 17 June 1946. Federation du Calvados de l'Association France- Grande -Bretagne translates 
as the Calvados Federation of the France -Great Britain Association. 
21 Manchester Guardian, 8 May 1946. 
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As news spread of these acts of care, the public was quick to express its appreciation. 
One bereaved father, whose son was buried at Arnhem, declared that: [t]hose of us 
who are anxiously awaiting the time when we can visit the graves of our sons owe a 
deep debt of gratitude to the children of Arnhem for the loving care they are 
bestowing upon the graves of our dear ones.'22 
Despite the growing demand for action, the committee proposed by McNair 
to consider the provision of government assistance for war graves pilgrimages had 
not been formed by the summer.23 As Clode explained to an Air Ministry 
counterpart in July, in the previous month the War Office had decided `that it was 
too early to do anything in the matter and that it would be reviewed again at the end 
of the summer.'24 He added: [i]n this case it is doubtful if any decision will be taken 
before the autumn. By then, the spate of enquiries will probably have fallen as the 
weather for visits abroad will not be so good.'25 This stance bothered the Air 
Ministry, which was anxious to alleviate the pressure being exerted upon it by the 
bereaved and by service associations.26 Furthermore, Slessor was concerned that the 
Air Ministry and the War Office were being duplicitous in discouraging some 
civilians from visiting war graves while advising others `that although no official 
organised arrangements have been made facilities can be obtained through travel 
agencies.'27 As he remarked in August to O'Connor, his War Office counterpart: `I 
feel that this sort of approach is likely to lay us open to sharp and justifiable 
22 Daily Telegraph, 15 July 1946. See also Daily Telegraph, 11 July 1946. 
23 
See Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 423 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1946), p. 310. 
24 
TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Clode to E. Cowan, 16 July 1946. 
25 Ibid. 
2 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, E. Cowan to Clode, 12 July 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Beckess to 
Clode, 1 August 1946. 
2 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Slessor to O'Connor, 23 August 1946. 
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criticism, particularly in view of the previous references to the subject in the House 
[of Commons]' 28 
In the hope that an official war graves visits scheme could be made 
operational by the spring of 1947 if they acted promptly, Slessor and O'Connor 
resolved to form an inter -departmental committee to consider its implementation.29 
However, the ostensibly simple task of convening this advisory body soon became a 
palaver. It was accepted that its leadership should be provided by the War Office, 
but no army department was willing to host its meetings or to provide its chairman 
and secretary, primarily out of concern that to do so would beget additional and more 
demanding work in the future.30 Thus commenced an extended period of squabbling 
during which time senior War Office authorities argued that their section was ill - 
equipped to sponsor the advisory body.3 
The First Pilgrimage 
While the War Office was embroiled in this debate, the Airborne Forces Security 
Fund organised and led, independently of the government, the first large pilgrimage 
of British civilians to the graves of the Second World War dead. In September 1946, 
200 pilgrims, all of whom had a connection to the First Airborne Division, travelled 
to Arnhem at the invitation of the Dutch government to mark the anniversary of the 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, O'Connor to Slessor, 29 August 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
Slessor to O'Connor, 9 September 1946. 
3° TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, McNair Memorandum, 26 March 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
O'Connor to Slessor, 29 August 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Clode Minute, 4 November 1946; 
TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Holbrook Minute, 13 November 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, ACS 
Minute, 19 November 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Internal Memorandum, 27 November 1946. 
31 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Holbrook Minute, 13 November 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, ACS 
Minute, 19 November 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Internal Memorandum, 27 November 1946. 
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engagement fought there in 1944.32 The visitors, who were billeted where possible 
with local families that had aided British servicemen during the battle, attended a 
civic commemoration ceremony on the banks of the Rhine River, and Anglican and 
Roman Catholic services conducted in Arnhem cemetery in the presence of Queen 
Wilhelmina and 5000 local people.33 
While these were significant occasions - it was particularly moving that so 
many Dutch civilians braved very poor weather to attend the ceremonies at the 
cemetery - for many of the pilgrims they were a prelude to what was most important 
to them: standing by the graves of their next- of- kin.34 Mr and Mrs Baskeyfield of 
Stoke -on -Trent had journeyed to Holland for this reason. However, they failed to 
find the burial place of their son, John, who had been awarded the Victoria Cross 
posthumously for singlehandedly defending a bridge against German tanks. Mr 
Baskeyfield lamented: `[m]y wife and I were informed officially that our son was 
buried here at Arnhem. But tonight we have been told that his name is not among 
the records of those buried here.'35 `We are distressed beyond words', he 
continued.36 `The authorities here say that they will do their best to clear up the 
mystery and find out where our son is buried, but that is no comfort to us at the 
moment. We have had a wasted journey and a most bitter disappointment.'37 
Other pilgrims were more fortunate in that they found what they sought. 
Among the many wives and mothers on the Arnhem pilgrimage was Lylie Gronert 
32 Twenty- eighth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 13; Manchester 
Guardian, 23 August 1946; The Times, 16 September 1946; Daily Mail, 18 September 1946. 
33 Ibid. A later pilgrim to Arnhem commented: '[o]f the kindness extended to my wife, my son's 
fiancée and myself I cannot sufficiently express my appreciation. The hospitality was at times almost 
embarrassing.' See Yorkshire Post, 26 June 1947. 
34 Twenty- eighth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 13; Daily Mail, 18 
September 1946. 
35 Daily Mail, 18 September 1946. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. See also Daily Telegraph, 10 September 1946. 
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from Cornwall. The Daily Mail reported that she `found the place where, under 
closely blooming dahlias and glowing petunias, lay her twin sons, John and Claude - 
both paratroopers who ... died side by side and were buried together. "This is all I 
came to see, "' she commented, adding ""[n]ow I can rest. "'38 
The general success of this trip to Arnhem, coupled with the announcement 
made later in the autumn that the Dutch people intended to use the proceeds raised 
from their `Poppy Day' to pay for impoverished Britons to visit the war graves of 
their next -of -kin in Holland, further highlighted the tardiness of the British 
government in affording its citizens such opportunities.39 There was increasing 
impatience at its inaction in this regard.40 For example, frustration among the 
bereaved led to the formation of the National War Grave Visit Association 
Fraternity. In December its General Secretary, W. E. Bennett, wrote to the Foreign 
Secretary: 
we ask your help and assistance in this our `Sacred Cause' ... Most of us 
`Working Class People['] who cannot afford to visit our loved ones [sic] 
Graves Overseas, and with no help forthcomi[ng] from `Our 
Government' for whom most of us Believed in. It must strike those who 
are fortunate enough to have their loved ones returned from war Safely 
that there are others less fortunate and who's [sic] heartbreak this 
Christmas is a `Vacant Chai[r.'] We have one here and the best son in 
the World is lost to us for ever with no pension, no mention, and no 
thought from his Government for whom he fought in the P.B.I. [Poor 
Bloody Infantry] and voted for ... [w]e want our first Party to leave here 
1947 Spring possibly France, Italy, Holland etc: and ask your 
subscription and as Foreign Secretary help in foreign countries to where 
we might send Parties.41 
38 Daily Mail, 18 September 1946. 
39 The Times, 1 November 1946. 
4° See Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 427 HC, DEB 5S, pp. 11, 20; Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard), 428 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1946), p. 113. 
41 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Bennett to Aneurin Bevan, 22 December 1946. Bennett intended his 
letter to go to Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, but he addressed it to Aneurin Bevan, the health 
and housing minister. The underlining is Bennett's. 
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Bennett received a reply from the Foreign Office in January, informing him that his 
letter would be considered by the Interdepartmental Committee on Relatives' Visits 
to War Cemeteries (ICRV), this body finally having been formed under the direction 
of the Army Council the previous month.42 
The ICRV 
The ICRV convened for the first time in February 1947.43 In attendance were 
officials from the War Office, the Admiralty, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of 
Transport, and the Control Office for Germany and Austria, as well as Beckess and 
McNair, representing the Air Ministry and the IWGC respectively.44 Chaired by 
Major General V. Blomfield, the director of the DGRE, the inaugural meeting began 
with those present affirming the need for the government to provide some form of 
assistance to civilians wishing to visit war graves.45 The ICRV members then 
expressed support for implementing a revised version of the scheme adopted 
between 1921 and 1923 when the government had reimbursed seven -eighths of the 
money, to a maximum of £25,000, expended by each of the Salvation Army, the 
Church Army, the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and St Barnabas's 
42 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, ACS Minute, 4 December 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Army 
Council Memorandum, December 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Foreign Office to Bennett, 17 
January 1947; TNA, PRO WO 163/313, ICRV Meeting Minutes, 14 February 1947; TNA, PRO WO 
32/12462, ICRV Draft Report, March 1947; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 433 HC, DEB 5S, 
(London: HMSO, 1947), p. 100. 
43 TNA, PRO WO 163/313, ICRV Meeting Minutes, 14 February 1947. 
441bid. McNair took a job with the IWGC after leaving the War Office. 
45 TNA, PRO WO 163/313, ICRV Meeting Minutes, 14 February 1947; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
Army Council Memorandum, December 1946; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Meeting Minutes, 29 
January 1947. The ACS provided the ICRV secretary. See TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, ICRV Draft 
Report, March 1947. 
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Hostels on transporting persons of limited financial means to First World War 
cemeteries.46 
After a second meeting in March, at which detail was added to the principles 
agreed previously, the ICRV submitted its recommendations to the armed service 
ministers in May.47 The most important of these was the proposal not to provide 
assistance to persons wishing to visit graves in the Middle East, Africa, and 
Mediterranean countries other than Italy because it would be particularly difficult to 
arrange accommodation and transport for them once there, and inconvenient to ship 
civilians to these regions for at least eighteen months.48 The committee members 
acknowledged that it was iniquitous to discriminate against people on the basis of 
where their relative had been killed, but believed that `equal treatment for all is quite 
impossible.'49 In any case, it was thought `that the number of relatives excluded by 
this recommendation will, in practice, be very small, since there can be few who 
would qualify for assistance who at the same time could face with equanimity the 
domestic upheaval, and loss of wages, which would result from a long absence from 
this country.'5° 
The ICRV recommended that voluntary organisations be made responsible 
for subjecting applicants to means tests to determine whether they required a 
monetary subsidy in order to travel abroad, and for ensuring that no person was aided 
46 TNA, PRO WO 163/313, ICRV Meeting Minutes, 14 February 1947; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
Report on Post -First World War Pilgrimage Scheme, circa February 1947. The £25,000 cap had 
applied to each of the voluntary organisations with the exception of St Barnabas's Hostels, which was 
given a £5000 reimbursement limit. 
47 TNA, PRO WO 163/313, ICRV Meeting Minutes, 28 March 1947; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
ICRV Draft Report, March 1947; TNA, PRO FO 369/3976, ICRV Report, 9 May 1947. 
48 TNA, PRO FO 369/3976, ICRV Report, 9 May 1947. 
49 Ibid. See also Daily Telegraph, 8 April 1947. 
5° TNA, PRO FO 369/3976, ICRV Report, 9 May 1947. 
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in this way more than once.51 It also proposed that financial assistance be made 
available for two persons to visit each grave, but on the proviso that they knew the 
person interred as either widow, widower, child, step -child, foster child, parent, step- 
parent, foster parent, sister, step- sister, adopted sister, brother, step- brother, adopted 
brother or grandparent. For pilgrimage purposes, the government would regard only 
those people who belonged to one of these categories as relatives of the war dead.52 
Parliamentary Questions 
The week after the ICRV submitted its recommendations, Harry Truman, the United 
States president, declared that his government would pay for war graves pilgrimages 
for those Americans who had elected not to repatriate the remains of their next-of- 
kin.53 It was reported in Britain that these trips, which would cost millions of dollars, 
were expected to begin within two years, after the United States administration had 
repatriated the bodies of 94,000 servicemen whose return had been requested by their 
families.54 
It was in this context that Bellenger, the Secretary of State for War, was 
asked in the House of Commons in June 1947 if the government were ready to 
declare what assistance it would afford to civilians wanting to visit military 
cemeteries overseas. He replied that it was not.55 Dissatisfied with this response, 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. It is thought that in 1949 it was agreed to class grandchildren as relations of the war dead. See 
TNA, PRO T 231/554, M. D. Montgomery to E. T. Ruddle, 26 January 1949; TNA, PRO T 231/554, 
E. T. Ruddle to M. D. Montgomery, 8 February 1949. 
5' Daily Mirror, 14 May 1947. See also Manchester Guardian, 14 May 1947. 
54 Daily Mirror, 14 May 1947. See also Evening Standard, 25 August 1947. 
55 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 438 HC, DEB 5S, p. 1778. See also Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard), 433 HC, DEB 5S, p. 100; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 436 HC, DEB 5S, (London: 
HMSO, 1947), pp. 72 -3, 92 -3; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 437 HC, DEB 5S, (London: 
HMSO, 1947), pp. 1268 -9; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 438 HC, DEB SS, p. 73; Manchester 
Guardian, 14 May 1947. 
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one MP demanded that Bellenger `get something done about this very important 
matter'.56 Over the following weeks MPs from across the political spectrum 
continued to press the Secretary of State on the subject.57 
In July Bellenger announced that the government, having considered the 
recommendations of the ICRV, would provide some aid to facilitate war graves 
visits, but not before the summer holiday season.58 The lack of detail in this 
statement, and Bellenger's subsequent refusal to specify when this help would be 
proffered, drew further criticism from MPs and calls for more immediate action. He 
replied that civilians were not yet permitted entry into the British Zone in Germany 
because of an ongoing lack of transport and accommodation in the region -a remark 
which caused one MP to observe that tourists were allowed into the American Zone 
- and that fairness dictated that the government not render assistance to any pilgrims 
until this situation changed.59 
Further Delays 
Over the following weeks little was done to act on the ICRV recommendations.6° 
For instance, it was decided to defer until the autumn consideration of the financial 
arrangements to be made between the government and the voluntary organisations 
56 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 438 HC, DEB 5S, pp. 425, 1778 -9. 
57 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 439 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1947), pp. 189 -90, 207, 
2008 -9. 
58 Ibid., p. 189; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 440 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1947), p. 119. 
59 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 440 HC, DEB 5S, pp. 1032 -3. War graves pilgrims had also 
been allowed into the French Zone in Germany by this time. See also Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard), 443 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1947), p. 1521; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 
444 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1947), pp. 122 -3. 
60 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Martin Lindsay to Major John Freeman, 29 
August 1947. 
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that would implement its pilgrimage scheme.ó1 Then, as one of a series of measures 
designed to stabilise the British economy, in August the government announced a 
ban on private travel to places beyond the sterling area - effectively all non - 
Dominion and non -Commonwealth countries - in order to conserve supplies of 
foreign currencies after a run on the pound that month.62 
This news sparked further protest from the bereaved. In September the Daily 
Graphic published the views of a woman who was identified only as a mother from 
the Isle of Wight: 
I am only one of thousands who lost all personal happiness because of the 
war. But my case is typical. My elder son was burned to ashes in his 
tank, leading a night charge which got the 5151 Highlanders through to 
avenge St. Valery ... when I wrote nearly two years later to the War 
Graves Commission asking if any arrangements were being made for 
relatives to go to the Normandy battlefields and cemeteries, I received a 
brusque circular letter saying that if I wished to see my son's grave I had 
better apply to a Tourist Agency. I suppose I could have done this and 
gone with a gay crowd of tourists. I never tried ... This summer some 
friends who were doing a motor tour of France took a snap for me. The 
same wooden crosses without inscription, the grass uncut and the next 
cross leaning over sideways ... The point is that although arrangements 
can be made for visitors from America to Normandy, none can be made 
for us who live but a few miles away.63 
Another aggrieved civilian, C. B. A. Greenfield, informed Treasury mandarins that 
he and other bereaved should, on compassionate grounds, `be allowed up to £35 [in 
foreign currency] per annum per person expressly for the purpose of visiting the 
cemeteries in which our beloved lie.'64 This, he argued, was the least the 
61 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Meeting Minutes, 20 October 1947. See also TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
War Office to Church of Scotland Committee, 14 July 1947; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 441 
HC, DEB 5S, pp. 139 -40, 241. 
62 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Meeting Minutes, 20 October 1947; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 
443 HC, DEB 5S, pp. 267 -8; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 444 HC, DEB 5S, p. 43. 
63 Daily Graphic, 24 September 1947. 
64 TNA, PRO T 231/554, Greenfield to Treasury, 12 September 1947. 
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government could do, having denied its citizens the opportunity to repatriate their 
dead. 
A Long -awaited Announcement 
The view that exemptions should be made for the war bereaved gathered support 
throughout the autumn and winter, and in January 1948 the government consented to 
overseas war graves visits on the basis that civilians be permitted only £10 worth of 
foreign currency for this purpose and not more than once each year, and that 
Germany remained closed to them.ó5 This development prompted the Labour 
administration finally to settle the details of the official pilgrimage scheme. It 
determined that the British Legion, the Church Army, the Church of Scotland 
Committee on Hut and Canteen Work for His Majesty's Forces, the Salvation Army, 
and the YMCA would lead parties of the war bereaved to north -west Europe from 
the summer, with the government to defray seven -eighths of the cost, up to a pre- 
determined maximum amount, for those who could not afford to pay their own 
way.66 A travel document of temporary validity that was cheaper and easier to obtain 
than a regular passport would be made available to all relatives who joined these 
trips, with the voluntary organisations obtaining these, as well as foreign currency, 
65 TNA, PRO T 231/554, E. C. Shee to J. M. Tipper, 14 November 1947; TNA, PRO T 231/554, J. R. 
Griffin to Mr Hunter, 20 November 1947; TNA, PRO T 231/554, F. C. Barker to O. J. Hubbert, 26 
April 1948; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 446 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1948), pp. 21 -2, 
116; British Legion Journal, 27, 11 (1947), 247. 
66 TNA, PRO FO 369/3976, ICRV Report, 9 May 1947; TNA, PRO T 231/554, Internal 
Memorandum, 13 October 1947; TNA, PRO T 231/554, E. C. Shee Memorandum, 26 January 1948; 
TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Meeting Minutes, 20 October 1947; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Meeting 
Minutes, 18 February 1948; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 449 HC, DEB 5S, pp. 774 -5; 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 475 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1950), p. 39; British Legion 
Journal, 28, 1 (1948), 12; British Legion Journal, 28, 2 (1948), 22; British Legion Journal, 28, 3 
(1948), 41; British Legion Journal, 28, 5 (1948), 87; The Church Army 66`x' Annual Report, (London, 
1948), p. 8. 
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accommodation and transport, on their behalf.67 The pilgrimages would also be open 
to those whom the government did not class as relatives of the war dead, but these 
visitors would be required to secure their own foreign exchange and would not be 
eligible for the special travel document.68 
With the parameters of government assistance thus established, Emanuel 
Shinwell, the Secretary of State for War, announced in April 1948 that from the 
following month civilians could apply directly to one of the voluntary organisations 
to make a war graves pilgrimage to France, Belgium or Holland. In doing so they 
were to state their name and address, the location of the cemetery they wanted to 
visit, and the dates when they could travel.69 He made it clear that financial 
assistance would be given where necessary - the cost of these three or four day 
pilgrimages was expected to vary between £12 and £17 depending on destination - 
and that this official scheme would eventually be expanded to include other western 
European countries.70 
The Problem of Germany 
The decision to exclude the British Zone in Germany from the first stage of the 
scheme concerned Shinwell, as nearly three years had passed since the end of the war 
and no British civilian pilgrims yet had visited the region. The War Office had 
wanted to allow at least a limited number of the bereaved to travel there in order to 
67 TNA, PRO FO 369/3976, ICRV Report, 9 May 1947; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Meeting Minutes, 
18 February 1948; TNA, PRO T 231/554, British Legion Form; British Legion Journal, 28, 9 (1948), 
175; Glasgow Herald, 17 April 1948. It is thought that the £ 10 limit on foreign exchange each 
individual was allowed for war graves visits was later increased. See TNA, PRO T 231/554, Foreign 
Exchange Form, May 1949; TNA, PRO T 231/554, M. D. Montgomery Memorandum, 14 December 
1949. 
68 TNA, PRO T 231/554, Foreign Exchange Form, May 1949; TNA, PRO T 231/554, M. D. 
Montgomery Memorandum, 14 December 1949. 
69 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 449 HC, DEB 5S, p. 775. 
70 Ibid., pp. 774 -5; TNA, PRO T 231/554, British Legion Form; Glasgow Herald, 
17 April 1948. 
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diffuse what had become a febrile political issue, but British authorities in Germany, 
with the concurrence of mandarins at the Foreign Office, had eventually opposed this 
out of concern that neither they nor a weak German economy could cope with an 
influx of visitors.71 Furthermore, these officials did not want civilians seeing 
cemeteries that were unfinished, particularly those where German- erected wartime 
grave markers had yet to be replaced, and thus it had been agreed to defer 
pilgrimages to the British Zone until 1949.72 
However, public and political interest in the matter did not abate and, in July 
1948, the government was forced to consider the issue anew.73 It agreed to allow 
some relatives to visit war graves in the British Zone for a period in the autumn 
provided that they did not draw on local petrol and food supplies, stay in the region, 
travel by public transport, or venture more than fifty miles inside the border, 
stipulations which resulted in access being possible to six cemeteries only, all of 
which were in reasonable condition.74 The five voluntary organisations responsible 
for administering the pilgrimage scheme agreed not to publicise these trips widely so 
71 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, BAOR Memorandum, 31 January 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
Meeting Minutes, 18 February 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, BAOR to ACC Germany, circa 
February 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Foreign Office Telegram, 19 March 1948; TNA, PRO WO 
32/12462, War Office Telegram, March 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, BAOR Telegram, circa 
early April 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Brigadier P. R. Antrobus to Vale, 29 April 1948; 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 446 HC, DEB 5S, pp. 21 -2, 116; Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard), 448 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1948), pp. 1874 -5. 
72 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, BAOR Headquarters to DGRE, 7 June 1947; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
DGRE to War Office, 22 January 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, War Office Telegram, March 
1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, BAOR Telegram, circa early April 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
DGRE to British Legion, 22 April 1948; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 449 HC, DEB 5S, p. 775. 
73 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Brigadier P. R. Antrobus to Vale, 16 July 1948; Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard), 452 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1948), p. 49. 
74 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Brigadier P. R. Antrobus to Vale, 16 July 1948; TNA, 
PRO WO 
32/12462, Meeting Notes, 22 July 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, H. A. Cridland 
to Catherine 
Edwards, 17 August 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Procedures for War Graves 
Visits. 
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that the few places available could be given to those people whom bereavement had 
rendered particularly emotionally unstable.75 
Towards the End 
By July 1948 applications were being accepted for war graves visits to Luxembourg 
and Denmark, with Norway and Italy added to the official list of pilgrimage 
destinations by the following spring.76 In June 1949 the restrictions on civilians 
entering the British Zone in Germany were abandoned, making large -scale war 
graves visits to this region feasible for the first time.77 Immediately this news was 
announced, the British Legion received nearly 1000 applications from relatives 
wishing to travel to cemeteries in western Germany.78 
In May 1950 the Labour government declared that the provision of public funds 
for war graves visits was to be reduced before ceasing completely on 31 March 
1951.79 For those people who hoped for government assistance to visit graves in the 
Middle East, Africa, and certain Mediterranean countries, this news was particularly 
75 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Meeting Notes, 22 July 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Meeting Notes, 
26 July 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, H. A. Cridland to Catherine Edwards, 17 August 1948; 
TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, Internal Memorandum, 28 October 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, 
Procedures for War Graves Visits. 
76 TNA, PRO T 231/554, British Legion Form; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 459 HC, DEB 5S, 
(London: HMSO, 1949), p. 1015; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 463 HC, DEB 5S, (London: 
HMSO, 1949), pp. 250 -1, 1025 -6; British Legion Journal, 28, 9 (1948), 175; British Legion Journal, 
29, 2 (1949), 24; Sunday Chronicle, 30 May 1948. 
77 TNA, PRO AIR 55/60, Policy on Visits of Next -of -Kin, 1 July 1949; TNA, PRO AIR 55/59, Civil 
Labour Memorandum, 18 July 1949; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 466 HC, DEB 5S, (London: 
HMSO, 1949), p. 83; Manchester Guardian, 3 June 1949; News Chronicle, 3 June 1949. 
78 British Legion Journal, 29, 7 (1949), 132; Manchester Guardian, 3 June 1949; News Chronicle, 3 
June 1949. These pilgrimages began before RAF missing research operations had been completed. 
As one MRES officer noted in September: `[w]ork was suspended in the cemeteries covered by No. 2, 
M.R.G.R.S. on account of visits by next -of -kin sponsored by the British Legion.' See TNA, PRO 
AIR 29/1598, Number 4 MREU (Headquarters) Operations Record Book, September 1949. 
79 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 474 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1950), p. 178. See also 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 475 HC, DEB 5S, pp. 38 -9; Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 
491 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1951), p. 37; The Observer, 10 December 1950. 
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disappointing.80 Other bereaved, however, were less affected by the end of the 
official pilgrimage scheme. Its conclusion spurred the Dutch people to pledge even 
more money, through the auspices of the NWGC, to provide for Britons to visit the 
graves of their next -of -kin in Holland, while organisations such as the Airborne 
Forces Security Fund continued to assist the war bereaved to travel to north -west 
Europe.81 
Catharsis 
For the tens of thousands of Britons who embarked on war graves pilgrimages, their 
journeys stirred varying emotions and satisfied different needs.82 Some wished to 
see where relatives had been killed or to stand in their presence: one MP remarked 
that many people derive `an indefinable comfort in being able to go to that spot of 
ground which holds the remains of those whom one loves'.ß3 Other bereaved wanted 
to satisfy themselves that the cemeteries in which their next -of -kin were interred 
were in good order and pleasing aesthetically. Mrs Branson of Northampton, who 
with her husband travelled to Italy on a British Legion pilgrimage, observed: `[t]he 
resting place of our loved one, our only child, is all that we could wish for; the 
80 For example, see correspondence in CWGC, 2087. 
81 Birmingham Post, 17 August 1951; Daily Mail, 17 April 1952; The Times, 7 July 1954; The 
Scotsman, 15 September 1954. The British Legion also arranged for war graves pilgrimages under its 
own auspices after the end of the official scheme in March 1951. It later coordinated war graves visits 
to countries beyond the Continent. See Thirty -fifth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves 
Commission, p. 27; and files in TNA, PRO FO 371/138547. 
82 TNA, PRO WO 32/12462, British Legion to DGRE, 6 October 1948; TNA, PRO T 231/554, M. D. 
Montgomery Memorandum, 14 December 1949; British Legion Journal, 28, 9 (1948), 175, 180; 
British Legion Journal, 29, 2 (1949), 24; British Legion Journal, 29, 10 (1949), 194 -5; Twenty-ninth 
Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 10; Thirty-first Annual Report of the 
Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 9; Daily Telegraph, 30 March 1949; Daily Telegraph, 1 June 
1949; Manchester Guardian, 3 June 1949. It is not known exactly how many Britons made war 
graves visits, although it is known such visits were popular. By the beginning of October 1948, the 
British Legion alone had taken 4000 relatives on pilgrimages. 
83 Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 488 HC, DEB 5S, (London: HMSO, 1951), pp. 969 -70; 
Thirtieth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 9. 
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splendid way in which it is laid out and the growing of our own English flowers 
doesn't make it seem they are in quite such strange surroundings.'84 Many pilgrims 
derived great consolation from these reminders of home, and from hearing that these 
links to Britain would be perpetuated. The relatives of seventy -five British airmen, 
who in 1950 visited Denmark at the invitation and expense of its government, were 
assured by the Danish Foreign Minister that the cemeteries at Copenhagen and Svino 
would remain English in character. In making this promise, he pledged also that his 
countrymen would `keep and maintain those graves as if they held the remains of our 
own soldiers.'85 
For those Britons whose next -of -kin had no known grave, travelling to where 
they were commemorated could be as important an act as visiting a grave, albeit 
rarely as cathartic. For example, more than 1500 relatives, the majority of whom 
were wives and mothers, attended the 1957 unveiling of the Hepworth- designed 
Dunkirk Memorial on which are inscribed the names of 4700 British servicemen who 
went missing during the Continental campaign of 193940.86 Following the 
ceremony, many of the visitors searched the memorial for the name of their missing 
person, while others laid wreaths at its base. Although years had passed since their 
relatives had disappeared, some people collapsed with emotion, overwhelmed by the 
meaning of the occasion; the sense of finality.87 
Rarely did time diminish the need for the bereaved to find consolation. Ten 
years after their son Jack, aged sixteen, had been killed in Normandy while serving 
84 British Legion Journal, 29, 7 (1949), 125. 
85 CWGC, 3, Salvation Army Memorandum, 4 April 1950. See also Sunday Express, 20 November 
1949; The Times, 26 November 1949; Daily Telegraph, 18 March 1950. 
86 Thirty- eighth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 7; Daily Telegraph, 29 
June 1957; Daily Telegraph, 1 July 1957; The Times, 1 July 1957; CWGC, Dunkirk Memorial. 
ß7 Daily Telegraph, 1 July 1957; The Times, 1 July 1957. 
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with the Durham Light Infantry, Mr and Mrs Banks of Lancashire, accompanied by 
their daughter Jean, went to Jerusalem cemetery near Bayeux to visit his grave.88 
Mrs Banks, who was dressed in black, had seldom travelled beyond the borders of 
her home county. The News Chronicle reported that as she placed red roses by 
Jack's headstone, `the tears she had not shed since the War Office letter 10 years 
back found release.'89 `I can't say in words,' Mrs Banks said, `what today has 
meant.'90 
88 News Chronicle, 12 July 1954; CWGC, Jerusalem War Cemetery 
(Chouain, France). 




Reflections on the Burial of Second World War British Military Dead 
Retrospection 
In August 1948 the outgoing director of the DGRE, Brigadier C. S. Vale, declared 
`that the Graves Service and especially the Graves Directorate have never been 
properly organised and staffed and that if hostilities occur in the future the whole 
question must be dealt with more effeciently [sic].' ' That the AGS and the MRES 
were still at work more than three years after the end of hostilities in Europe was, he 
reasoned, evidence enough for this statement.2 Vale's observations immediately 
drew support from Blomfield, his predecessor at the DGRE and now the Director of 
Personal Services at the War Office, who observed: '[i]f we are to have an 
improvement in the organisation and method for the care of graves in the next war, 
now is the time to make preparations.'3 `I do not think', Blomfield added, `that the 
Graves Directorate .. had a fair "do" during the last war, and when I was appointed 
Director in 1946 I was told that the Directorate had always been the "Cinderella" of 
the War Office. Unfortunately they had, to a large extent, accepted this status.'4 
Soon after these comments were made, the War Office and the Air Ministry, in 
conjunction with the IWGC, began to review military burial policy and Second 
World War graves operations. 
TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale Minute, 23 August 1948; The Quarterly Army List: August 1948, p. 
15B. 
2 TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale Minute, 23 August 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Meeting 
Minutes, 9 September 1948. 
3 TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Blomfield Minute, 25 August 1948; The Quarterly Army List: December 
1948, p. 15. 
4 TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Blomfield Minute, 25 August 1948. 
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 Policy and Culture 
It was inevitable that the treatment of British military dead was beset by difficulties 
for burial policy lacked cohesion and instructive detail. Army and IWGC officials 
came to agree that [t]he inadequacy and lack of clearness in reference to the Graves 
Service and its work in both F.S.R. I. [Field Service Regulations Volume I] and the 
F.S.P.B. [Field Service Pocket Book]' had precluded the frontline dead being 
attended efficiently.5 The dictates which governed the interment of bodies, the most 
crucial stage in the burial process in that it was the foundation for each subsequent 
phase, were particularly vague and ill- formed. A reading of these gave some officers 
the impression that the collection and burial of corpses was the duty of non- 
combatant personnel, engendered in others a belief in a type of amorphous war 
graves organisation that fulfilled these tasks, and confused those who attempted and 
performed interment.6 
That British burial policy was unclear throughout the war - although an 
improvement on Field Service Regulations, the instructions issued for the Normandy 
invasion were still deficient - reflected that the War Office ascribed relatively little 
importance to interring the frontline dead. Its authorities blithely tended to accept 
that many officers were ignorant of their burial responsibilities and that others never 
attempted to discharge them. Nor did they question why burial policy was often 
5 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser Report, 30 March 1944; MA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott Report, 15 
June 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Hoffman Report, 18 June 1945; CWGC, 2033, Lieutenant 
Colonel H. F. Chettle to Ware, 4 April 1944. 
6 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser Report, 30 March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott Report, 15 
June 1945; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Hoffman Report, 18 June 1945; CWGC, 2033, Hoffman 
Report, 15 December 1943; CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware, 23 October 1944; The Administrative 
History of the Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of Europe, p. 142. For examples 
pertaining to this concept of a war graves organisation, see Blake, Mountain and Flood, p. 216; Alex 
Bowlby, Countdown to Cassino: The Battle of Mignano Gap, 1943, (London: Leo Cooper, 1995), pp. 
70, 80, 129; Stockman, Seaforth Highlanders, pp. 58 -9; Wallis, With God's Blessing and a Green 
Beret, p. 40; Peter White, With the Jocks: A Soldier's Struggle for Europe 1944 -45, (Stroud: Sutton, 
2001), p. 217. 
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ignored by those who did attend to the dead, or act to revise the relevant stipulations 
in Field Service Regulations when this was suggested by Hoffman and Fraser. As 
Hoffman later observed, `[t]he Dominion forces and Governments, quite rightly, take 
a much more lively interest in their respective dead, and set a much higher standard 
of G. R. & E. status and requirements than those imposed, or [th]ought necessary, by 
the Imperial Army.'8 Collectively British authorities recognised, albeit in a limited 
way, that the interment of the military dead fulfilled a need for bereaved civilians, 
but they did not appreciate the extent to which morale at the frontline was boosted 
when the remains of servicemen were buried promptly and efficiently, or the 
economies in time and effort which this produced.9 
It was the practice of the United States army to attend to the frontline dead in 
the same manner as for the wounded and to evacuate bodies from the battlefield as 
soon as possible, whereupon corpses were moved quickly along specified channels to 
pre- designated sites for interment. This method was initially labour- intensive, but it 
minimised the possibility of identities and remains being lost, and made the work of 
the AGRS immeasurably easier.10 In north -west Europe, frontline units, including 
elite formations such as 82nd Airborne Division, had designated officers whose tasks 
7 CWGC, 2033, Hoffman Report, 12 June 1943; CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware, 2 August 1943; 
CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware (Appendix B), 2 August 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War 
Diary, August 1943. 
8 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser Report, 30 March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Hoffman Report, 
18 June 1945; CWGC, 1137, IWGC Meeting Minutes, circa October 1943. 
9 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser Report, 30 March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser 
Memorandum, 25 April 1944; TNA, PRO WO 208/3111, Current Reports from Overseas Number 61, 
1 November 1944; TNA, PRO WO 171/3926, Stott Report, 15 June 1945; TNA, PRO CAB 106/454, 
Operations in Italy, 31 March 1946; CWGC, 1137, IWGC Meeting Minutes, circa October 1943; 
CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware, 23 October 1944; The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 
Army Group on the Continent of Europe, pp. 25, 137; Ross and Romanus, United States Army in 
World War II, pp. 213 -4, 680. 
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included supervising interment and liaising with the AGRS, and high -ranking 
commanders took a direct interest in graves operations." Under George Patton, the 
Third Army became so efficient and devoted in dealing with its casualties that 99.42 
per cent of these were identified before interment.12 In the British army, in which 
there was often a significant interval between the death and the burial of a 
serviceman, the corresponding figure regularly was lower than ninety per cent.13 
Rather than adopting proven American methods, or completely overhauling 
burial policy in another way, British officials in their post -war review chose to make 
only limited alterations to existing regulations.14 For example, it was recommended 
that in future AGS units should not be attached to armies, in order to afford graves 
personnel greater freedom of movement, while the revisions made in 1949 to the 
RAF War Manual also were mostly cosmetic.15 This suggested that military 
authorities still did not attach much importance to the interment of the frontline dead, 
or understand the extent to which policy helped determine the burial culture of the 
armed services. It is telling that most of those involved in the review were 
II Ross and Romanus, United States Army in World War II, pp. 214, 216, 684 -8, 690, 698; Ambrose, 
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PRO WO 32/12968, Beckess to War Office, 9 April 1949; The Administrative History 
of the 
Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of Europe, p. 142. In 1949 the ICRC 
revised the 
Geneva Conventions to take account of the experiences of the Second World War. 
Four separate 
Conventions were issued, with the articles relating to burial and the 
treatment of the dead contained in 
the first of these. See Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, Geneva, 12 August 1949. 
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institutionalised officers and civil servants of middling rank and that no fresh or 
alternative opinions were sought. 
Identity Discs 
This failure to learn from experience had disturbing corollaries with events in the 
inter -world war period when important lessons about graves operations in the 1914- 
18 conflict were overlooked. Most crucially, nothing was done following the First 
World War to improve the durability of British identity discs despite their manifest 
inadequacies. Not until 1942 was consideration given to producing them from 
stainless steel, the substance from which American military identification tags had 
long been fashioned, or from asbestos.16 A lack of material led the Casualty Branch 
to exclude these possibilities.17 The War Office gave the matter even less thought. It 
chose to ignore the numerous reports it received during the Second World War 
concerning the poor quality of identity discs.' s 
The extent of the mistake made in not issuing British servicemen with 
sturdier identity discs was realised after the conflict ended. In a February 1946 letter 
to Slessor, Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur Harris, formerly the head of Bomber 
Command, recounted a conversation he had had recently with a member of the 
wartime Dutch resistance: `[h]e [the Dutchman] said that providing our aircrews with 
identity discs which were inflammable was a certain means of losing identities & 
"incredibly foolish ". I rather agree'.19 Harris's statement prompted an Air Ministry 
16 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part VII; Ross and Romanus, United States Army in World War II, p. 213. 
17 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Burges Minute, 15 February 1946. 
18 For example, see TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, June, November 1943; TNA, PRO 
WO 165/36, Major V. H. Dixon to War Office, 19 June 1943. 
19 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Harris to Slessor, 11 February 1946; R. J. Overy, `Sir Arthur Travers 
Harris' in Matthew and Harrison (eds.), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Volume 25, pp. 
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mandarin to comment: `it does seem the most incredible bit of folly and must be put 
right.'20 However, not until the late 1940s was there widespread agreement among 
military officials that all British servicemen should be issued with stainless steel 
identity discs and their constant wearing of these be policed.21 
Leadership 
A second profoundly significant failure of the inter -war period was not to consider 
the formation of a future military graves organisation. As Hoffman stated, `the 
Graves Service in peace time was overlooked, entirely forgotten, and relegated to an 
obscure pigeon hole at the War Office.'22 Consequently, when the reconvention of 
the DGRE was mooted, the only person who feasibly could head the nascent 
department was Ware, who was sixty -nine at the time and reticent about reprising his 
military role for longer than six months.23 The extent to which the Army Council 
was dependent on his filling this role was evident from the nature of his contract, the 
length of which he was free to determine, and by its permitting him to serve as 
director of the DGRE while remaining vice -chairman of the IWGC.24 The official 
rationale for this compromise, echoing First World War practice, was to allow for 
one person to coordinate the operations of both organisations, but this aim was 
illusory. Both these positions merited a full -time commitment and Ware, whose 
401 -5. Burges observed: `[i]t is an exaggeration to say that identity discs are inflammable [but] they 
will undoubtedly burn under some conditions.' See TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Burges Minute, 15 
February 1946. 
20 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Internal Minute, 14 February 1946. 
21 TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale Minute, 23 August 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale to Frank 
Higginson, 2 September 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Meeting Minutes, 23 March 1950; TNA, 
PRO WO 32/14817, British Joint Services Mission Memorandum, 11 September 1950; TNA, PRO 
WO 32/14817, Beckess to F. J. Stephens, 26 November 1953; TNA, PRO WO 32/14817, Marking 
War Graves Memorandum, Undated; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part VII. 
22 
TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Hoffman Report, 18 June 1945. 
23 CWGC, 2017, Ware to Kenyon, 8 August 1944. 
24 Ibid. 
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main concern and interest was the IWGC, could not provide this to the War Office. 
The significant `economy' he promised would result from his twin appointments 
never eventuated, and he later conceded that `[n]o man ought to try to shoulder the 
dual responsibility.'25 
The selection of a part-time army employee to head the DGRE was doubly 
damaging for it contributed to the perception, fostered initially by the unusual 
wartime -only status of the department, that it was not an integral part of the War 
Office - the `Cinderella' complex identified by Blomfield. This sense of the DGRE 
being atypical was reinforced when Ware appointed friends and colleagues to 
important positions within the army graves organisation. Not only did this make it 
difficult for the DGRE to play anything other than a reactive and subordinate role, 
but inevitably it also retarded AGS operations. Graves officers initially found it 
difficult to secure equipment and resources as `A' staff either ignored their requests 
or accorded them very low priority, and while this situation could have been relieved 
through the intervention of army commanders, Hoffman noted that they `were 
entirely ignorant of, and apathetic to, the very minimum requirements necessary to 
make the Service even partially effective'.26 Only after the senior posts in the AGS 
began to be filled by full -time officers were the damaging effects of this isolation 
mitigated. 
The first and most important of these new leaders was Hoffman. Through his 
actions he made clear his rejection of the concept that the AGS was inferior to other 
25 
Ibid.; Twentieth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, p. 7; Longworth, The 
Unending Vigil, pp. 161 -2. 
26 
TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman Letter on Transport, 11 August 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, 
Fraser Report, 30 March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Hoffman Report, 18 June 1945. 
303 
branches of the army, and in so doing he instilled among his men a hitherto -unknown 
sense of professionalism and comradeship.27 He once observed that: 
[u]nlike all the other Services ... the G. R. & E Service does not exist in 
peacetime and has no individual Service Badge or Corps tradition to bind it 
together. The personnel ... come from different Regiments, Corps, and 
Branches of the various Services, as well as from the Dominions and India, 
and it is for this reason that I have always called it a `Pool' or a `Team', in an 
endeavour to attain a Corps or Regimental outlook, and even esprit de corps, 
amongst the scattered units and staffs of G. R. & E[.].28 
Among those to benefit from Hoffman's example was Fraser, who proved a 
particularly good AAG, not least because he was not intimidated by Ware. It is 
instructive that Hoffman and Fraser were the most effective servants of the Second 
World War army graves organisation and its most vociferous critics. 
The leadership they provided, along with Colonels Lawson and Stott, was 
especially important given the lack of interest shown by successive Adjutants 
General in the DGRE and the AGS.29 Adam, who was Adjutant General from June 
1941 to June 1946, was no particular supporter of graves operations, while his 
successor, O'Connor, ascribed them little value and appeared even to resent the 
existence of the AGS.30 Their ambivalence is all the more marked considering the 
strong leadership Slessor and Saunders afforded the MRES. Slessor, in particular, 
paid remarkable attention to his MRES responsibilities. For example, he once 
ordered an investigation into matters which a distressed member of the public had 
27 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to Ware, 10 June 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser 
Report, 30 March 1944. 
28 TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Hoffman Victory Statement, 9 May 1945. 
29 
All mentions to Lawson in this chapter are to Colonel A. B. Lawson. 
30 The Quarterly Army List: July 1941, p. 15; The Quarterly Army List: August 1946, Part I, p. 15. 
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raised with him and then, better to assuage the concerns of his correspondent, wrote a 
personal reply explaining what the MRES had established.31 
Enterprise and the Limits of Tradition 
The leaders of the RAF missing research organisation can be credited also with 
encouraging their men to be bold and to experiment with new techniques and 
procedures in their work to name the dead. Search Officers engaged hypnotists to 
obtain information from people whose memory of events had faded -at least one 
problematic investigation was solved in this way - and made use of infra -red 
photography to reveal markings on damaged clothing and objects.32 Several MRES 
personnel were even given leave from their duties in Germany to visit Scotland Yard 
in London to learn more about methods the British police were using to identify 
bodies.33 This ethos of enterprise stemmed from 1945 when the missing research 
organisation was invented anew. 
Had authorities at the DGRE been as open to change, systemic faults in AGS 
operations, and in the administration of military graves matters as a whole, could 
have been corrected at an early juncture and with considerable benefit.34 For 
instance, separating the tasks of graves registration and graves concentration meant, 
as Vale admitted in 1948, that much of the work done by GRU personnel was 
wasted: GCU servicemen had to cover the same ground and check what had been 
31 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, W. O. Clark to Slessor, 10 March 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Slessor 
to W. O. Clark, 29[ ?] March 1947. 
32 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part V; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 4 MREU (`G' Section) 
Operations Record Book, October 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 4 MREU (20/22 Sections) 
Operations Record Book, September 1948. 
33 TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Berlin Detachment Operations Record Book, November 1947; TNA, 
PRO AIR 20/9050, MRES North -West Europe Report, February 1948. 
34 TNA, PRO WO 165/36, Fraser Report, 30 March 1944. 
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established already before proceeding with their own duties, and in the period 
between operations numerous graves were destroyed or disappeared into the 
landscape.35 Amalgamation of the registration and concentration tasks also would 
have been beneficial in that it would have allowed for the pooling of supplies and 
equipment, and lessened the administrative burden on the AGS: the fewer times 
bodies were handled, the fewer forms there were to complete.36 This latter 
consideration was doubly significant given that clerical errors did affect the 
identification of the dead.37 
While the separation of registration and concentration duties restricted the 
efficacy of the AGS, an even greater hindrance to graves operations was the 
arrangement where, under normal circumstances, the DGRE permitted MRES 
servicemen to perform only the first of these tasks. It was difficult for AGS 
commanders, understaffed as their formations almost always were, to accommodate 
MRES requests to exhume and concentrate the bodies of airmen, while RAF Search 
Officers found it frustrating having to wait, sometimes for several weeks, for 
assistance from a GCU. This arrangement was particularly unsatisfactory given that 
MRES personnel, with the concurrence of the Air Ministry, were willing to effect 
exhumations and concentrations.38 
35 TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale Minute, 23 August 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale to Frank 
Higginson, 2 September 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Meeting Minutes, 9 September 1948. 
36 Ibid. 
37 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part VII. 
38 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 170/9124, Lawson to War Office, 18 March 1946; TNA, PRO AIR 55/73, 
Yugoslavia Memorandum, circa January 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Minutes, 14 February 
1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/54, Conference Minutes, 14 March 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 
3 MREU Operations Record Book, February-May 1947. 
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 Cooperation 
These problems could have been avoided through the creation of inter -service graves 
units, and certainly there was much to recommend closer interaction between the 
army and the RAF in this regard.39 Commenting in 1947 on the difficulties the 
MRES was encountering in gaining entry to Communist countries in southern 
Europe, one of its officials lamented: `where British Army Graves personnel have 
been into a country it has been very difficult for the R.A.F. to follow behind, as the 
governing powers state that as one British unit has already entered and covered the 
area, why should another unit wish to go in again ?'40 The MRES never convinced 
the Albanian, Bulgarian and Romanian governments otherwise, and missing research 
operations were not pursued in these countries. This vexed authorities at the 
Casualty Branch who believed that DGRE officials could have done more to aid the 
MRES, particularly in the crucial first year after its deployment.41 
Although their superiors in London did not always recognise it, AGS and MRES 
personnel in the field understood that their organisations shared a common purpose.42 
A member of Number 4 MREU recorded in his Operations Record Book in May 
1947: `[t]he cooperation from Units of 39 G.C.U. give extreme satisfaction[,] in 
particular `A' Section under command of Capt. H. Butcher which was responsible 
for concentrating over 500 bodies.'43 That same month the officers of Number 1 
39 TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale Minute, 23 August 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale to Frank 
Higginson, 2 September 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Meeting Minutes, 9 September 1948. 
40 TNA, PRO AIR 55/73, Yugoslavia Memorandum, circa January 1947. 
41 Ibid.; TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Minutes, 14 February 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/54, 
Conference Minutes, 14 March 1947. 
42 TNA, PRO AIR 55/67, Meeting Minutes, 14 February 1947; TNA, PRO AIR 55/63, Officer 
Commanding Number 4 MREU to Hawkins, 13 June 1948. 
43 TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 4 MREU (20/22 Sections) Operations Record 
Book, May 1947. 
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MREU invited their colleagues from Number 79 GCU to attend a dance they had 
organised.44 
The Role of the IWGC 
Just as military graves operations could have been better orchestrated, so too were 
there failures of cooperation between the DGRE and the IWGC. In the late 1940s a 
War Office official observed: 
during the culminating stages, and after the cessation of hostilities the 
I.W.G.C. were unable to provide personnel, in adequate numbers, to take 
over the war cemeteries as expeditiously as would have been desirable; 
through shortage of manpower they could not give early technical advice 
on the layout of permanent war cemeteries. This had the natural 
repercussion of slowing down the work done by the Army Graves Service 
and eventual handover of cemeteries.45 
While this did not represent the IWGC view, which was that these difficulties were 
primarily the fault of the army graves organisation, the IWGC and the DGRE did 
admit to certain problems in their relationship. For instance, both parties 
acknowledged that the transfer of casualty records had been so poorly managed - 
there were no rules governing the interaction of the organisations - as to occasion an 
extensive and unnecessary duplication of effort.46 
The inequitable nature of the relationship which existed between the 
institutions was the cause of other difficulties. In the early years of the war, the 
operations of the army graves organisation were tailored to suit IWGC rather than 
military requirements, and the undue representation the civilian institution was 
afforded in DGRE and AGS affairs continued after 1944, courtesy of Ware being 
44 TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 1 MREU Operations Record Book, May 1947. 
45 TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, War Office and IWGC Cooperation, circa 1949. 
46 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Hoffman Report, 18 June 1945; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, 
Meeting Minutes, 9 September 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Frank Higginson to War Office, 28 
October 1948. 
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made Honorary Advisor to the DGRE upon his retirement from the War Office and 
through his long -standing connections to senior army and RAF authorities.47 Most of 
these men, including the Adjutant General, who it was customary to appoint as an 
unofficial member of the IWGC, were inclined to defer to Ware on subjects 
concerning the dead. The skewed character of the relationship between the IWGC 
and the army graves organisation was manifest also when, in the post -war period, 
Ware did little to correct the widespread belief that the military alone was to blame 
for the delays in completing the battlefield cemeteries.48 Forever mindful of the 
value of reputation, in public he was content to distance the IWGC from the military 
graves organisation, something that was easily done given the relative anonymity of 
the DGRE, the AGS and the MRES, and the extensive profile and esteemed 
reputation of the IWGC.49 
The fact that interactions between the DGRE and the IWGC were not always 
mutually constructive or well- managed led eventually to the proposal that in future 
wars the latter organisation should be wholly responsible for attending to the British 
military dead.50 The advocates of this arrangement, who were from the armed 
services, suggested that its benefits would include savings in manpower and better 
communications on graves matters, most importantly with the bereaved. As a War 
Office authority reasoned: `[tNhe general public would only have to deal with one 
department to ascertain burial information and any general particulars appertaining to 
47 CWGC, 2033, Fraser to Ware, 28 March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, War Office and IWGC 
Cooperation, circa 1949. 
48 The Times, 13 December 1946; The Times, 10 November 1947. 
49 Twenty- eighth Annual Report of the Imperial War Graves Commission, pp. 4 -5; The Times, 10 
November 1947. 
50 TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale Minute, 23 August 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Blomfield 
Minute, 25 August 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale to Frank Higginson, 2 September 1948; 
TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Meeting Minutes, 9 September 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Vale to 
Frank Higginson, 20 September 1948. See also TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, War Office and IWGC 
Cooperation, circa 1949; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Meeting Minutes, 23 March 1950. 
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War Graves, up to date next -of -kin have been puzzled by having to deal with so 
many different departments, they cannot understand the relationship between War 
Office and I.W.G.C.'.51 However, this proposal was not developed further because 
of the civilian status of the IWGC, and by 1950 officials reviewing the conduct and 
administration of graves operations had reverted to discussing how to improve the 
Second World War system.52 
Forsaken and Forgotten 
Developments since then have rendered academic much of the detail of the post - 
Second World War review of burial policy and graves procedures. The military has 
not raised a specialised graves organisation, nor has the IWGC /CWGC been 
requested to fulfil functions other than those stipulated in its charters. This is 
unlikely to change for modern conflicts, when compared to the world wars, are 
relatively small in scale. Certainly, no role is envisaged now for the CWGC other 
than preserving the memory of the 1,695,156 names which are inscribed on the 
gravestones and memorials in its care.53 The AGS and the MRES, meanwhile, are all 
but forgotten. 
In February 1948 an Air Ministry official suggested that a history of the 
MRES should be written so that the public might be informed `of the cost, effort and 
scrupulous care taken to account for our missing dead'.54 The Chief Information 
Officer at the Air Ministry demurred, noting that such a publication would probably 
51 TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, War Office and IWGC Cooperation, circa 1949. 
52 Ibid.; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Meeting Minutes, 9 September 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, 
Frank Higginson to War Office, 28 October 1948; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Lieutenant Colonel F. 
C. Hallowes to A. S. Laing, 28 July 1949; TNA, PRO WO 32/12968, Meeting Minutes, 23 March 
1950. 
53 Commonwealth War Graves Commission Annual Report 2007 -2008, p. 53. 
54 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, MRES North -West Europe Report, February 1948. 
310 
not sell well and that `[t]he story, though fine, is very grim and could not be held to 
be good publicity as such for the R.A.F. and its recruiting campaign. Parents, 
schoolmasters etc. who read it would tend to turn their sons and pupils' thoughts 
elsewhere.' 55 It was deemed unwise, as Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke - 
Popham observed in 1949, `to alarm nervous mothers' whose sons were 
contemplating careers in the RAF.56 Thus the account of missing research operations 
compiled by Hawkins for the Air Ministry was not made available to civilians, and 
nor was a proposed monograph on the DGRE and the AGS. In fact, there is no 
evidence that this work was written for the War Office, as originally was mooted.57 
Given that the United States army produced full and frank accounts of the Second 
World War operations of the AGRS -a large American committee dedicated six 
years to reviewing its performance in an endeavour further to improve national burial 
policy and practice - it seems unlikely that recruitment was the sole reason for the 
reticence to publicise information about the British military graves organisation.58 
Another explanation is that high -ranking military officers and officials were reluctant 
to publish a story which revealed that their apathy and inaction had resulted in the 
identities and remains of thousands of servicemen being lost. 
It is a profound shame that the British public was denied the opportunity to 
learn more about the military graves services. It was because of the dedication of 
AGS and MRES personnel that so many of the war bereaved were able to stand by 
55 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Chief Information Officer Memorandum, 5 March 1948. The name of the 
Chief Information Officer is not known. 
56 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, Brooke -Popham to Saunders, 31 July 1949. 
57 TNA, PRO WO 366/5, Meeting Minutes, 7 May 1945. See also additional files in TNA, PRO WO 
366/5; and documents in TNA, PRO WO 32/11560. 
58 Ross and Romanus, United States Army in World War II, p. 700. For accounts of AGRS operations 
in the Second World War and related matters, see Ross and Romanus, United States Army in World 
War II; Edward Steere, The Graves Registration Service in World War II, (Washington DC: Office of 
the Quartermaster General, 1951); Edward Steere and Thayer M. Boardman, Final Disposition of 
World War I1 Dead 1945 -51, (Washington DC: Office of the Quartermaster General, 1957). 
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identified graves to mourn their dead. Vale wrote that the AGS `succeeded in 
completing its task far more successfully than might have been expected', and it is 
likely that bereaved Britons, who had been effusive in acknowledging the service 
rendered them by the civilians of north -west Europe, would have appreciated the 
chance to thank AGS and MRES personnel for their efforts.59 
Most graves service commanders would have welcomed public recognition 
for their men, but of greater concern to these officers was the manner in which their 
personnel were regarded by the wider military establishment. For example, it irked 
Lawson that his men were not treated as the equals of other soldiers. In 1945 he 
wrote: 
[a] hard working officer of a Graves Unit is entitled to the sympathy and 
respect of all those whose duty is different. The Other Ranks ... have a 
record of a minimum of cases requiring disciplinary action which cannot 
be excelled in any other Service. They do their difficult duty with an 
efficiency and respect for the dead which does them credit.6° 
Ironically, the respect which Lawson sought for his men they did not seek 
themselves. They and other graves personnel were content to labour in the 
knowledge that their work relieved the torment of people who agonised about the 
missing and provided solace to those who mourned the dead. As one AGS officer 
remarked: `[w]hen I come back after weeks of search and have not found a grave, 
I'm filled with sadness ... I'm happy that I've brought comfort to some people, but 
when it's impossible, I tell you it makes me unhappy.'61 
59 CWGC, 3031, Vale to Frank Higginson, 30 September 1948. 
6o TNA, PRO WO 170/7365, Lawson to War Office, 16 November 1945. 

























































































































































































In common with this officer, many members of the graves services came to 
regard their work, as Longworth has observed, as something of a `vocation'.62 
Unwavering belief in the worth and importance of their task helped them to confront 
the horrors of destroyed and decomposing bodies - one officer supervised the 
exhumation and concentration of 434 corpses during a twenty -six day period and his 
feat was not exceptional - and to do so without complaint.63 Men willingly risked 
their health and handled bodies without protective apparel rather than wait for new 
supplies of gloves and aprons.64 This determination to identify the dead and accord 
them honourable burial is even more extraordinary given that there were no tangible 
or obvious benefits to service in the AGS and the MRES. The structure and small 
size of the organisations meant the chances of promotion were almost non -existent, 
the numbers of honours awarded to staff were few, the work was dangerous - mines, 
booby -traps, unexploded bombs and unstable ordnance were encountered regularly - 
and it was only in April 1946 that military authorities consented to paying a stipend 
to servicemen who performed exhumations.65 
Yet for the remarkable personnel of the AGS and the MRES, the successful 
identification of a body or the correct marking of a grave was incentive enough. In 
this regard, the statement issued by a MRES commander to his Search Officers is 
fitting testament to the efforts of all those who, without hope or expectation of 
thanks or reward, staffed the British military graves services between 1939 and 
62 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9050, MRES North -West Europe Report, February 1948; TNA, PRO AIR 
55/63, Officer Commanding Number 4 MREU to Hawkins, 13 June 1948; Longworth, The Unending 
Vigil, p. 178. 
63 TNA, PRO AIR 29/1598, Number 4 MREU (20/22 Sections) Operations Record Book, May 1947. 
64 TNA, PRO AIR 20/9305, Part VII. 
65 TNA, PRO WO 169/13802, Hoffman to War Office, 11 June 1943; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, 
Fraser 
Report, 30 March 1944; TNA, PRO WO 169/18049, Mentions and Awards Memorandum, 
13 April 
1944; TNA, PRO WO 165/36, DGRE War Diary, May 1944; TNA, PRO WO 
171/3926, Stott to 
Deputy Adjutant General, 21 Army Group, 30 May 1945; TNA, PRO WO 
170/9124, CMGRE 
Headquarters War Diary, April 1946. 
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1949. He wrote: `you might feel a bit uncomfortable about messing around with a 
dead body, but remember this body has a mother or father and/or wife who is 
waiting in England or other parts of the world hoping that come day he or she will be 
able to see the grave of the one they lost during this struggle for freedom - SO DO 
YOUR BEST.'66 
The People's War 
The Second World War has been described as a People's War in which Britons 
participated in an unprecedented fashion. As part of the collective war effort, 
millions of citizens were recruited into the armed forces and hundreds of thousands 
were killed.67 In the historiography of the conflict it is recognised that the People's 
War brought with it the expectation of a better future for those who survived.68 What 
this thesis has shown is that public expectations of fitting treatment extended to the 
The ethos of Beveridge was not just for the living. 
66 TNA, PRO AIR 55/64, Number 3 MREU Advice Booklet, Undated. 
67 W. Franklin Mellor (ed.), Casualties and Medical Statistics, (London: 
HMSO, 1972), pp. 829 -39. 
68 Angus Calder, The People's War: Britain 1939 -1945, (London: Pimlico, 
1992), pp. 530 -6; Arthur 
Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War: War, Peace and Social 
Change 1900 -1967, (London: 
Bodley Head, 1968), pp. 308 -9, 313; Arthur Marwick, British Society 
Since 1945, (London: Penguin, 
2003), p. 28. 
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Appendix Two: MRES Tooth Chart2 
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Appendix Three: MRES Civilian Questionnaire (Translation)3 
QUESTIONNAIRE, 
information asked for in this questionnaire is urgently required by the 
'Research & Enquiry Service to enable them to trace missing R.A.F.casualties. 
Complete the tarin as soon as possible and return it without delay to:- 
H.Q., MED /ME, Missing Research & Enquiry Service, R.A.F., 
c/o AIR DIVISION, ALLIED COMMISSION for AUSTRIA, (B.E.). 
via Local Military Government. 
,Complete one of these papers for each Allied aeroplane which crashed in your 
`:t any time during the war DO NOT include particulars of more than one 
-d aeroplane on the same sheet of paper 
ate of the crash 
(During the day 
241me of the aeroplane crash 
(At Night. (Cross out the words that do not apply) 
3 :'Place where the aeroplane crashed. (a) Commune . . . . . . . 
(b) Name of the nearest 
town or village 
:(Please be as accurate as possible) (c) Direction and Distance 
in kilometres from (b) . . . 
(d) How can we reach by car /on foot/ by mule 
the site 
4. (British (a red.,white and blue roundel 
Was the aeroplane (American Was it marked with (a white star, 
(Russian (a red star 
(Cross out the words that do not apply) 
5 (Heavy four motored bomber 
Type of aeroplane (Light two motored bomber 
(Single engined fighter 
(Cross out the words that do not apply) 
6. Were there any large letters or numbers marked on the aeroplane? 
If so, show them here 
and state on what part of the plane they were painted 
(Every aeroplane has large letters and numbers painted on it. If these are 
known, write them in under question 6 and state their position on the aero- 
plane. For example: BEW.205 on the side of the fuselage near the tail). 
7. State the target or place where the aeroplane was going: - 
If known . . . . . . . . . . . . . . If suspected 
(Refers to the place the aeroplane was going to bomb. Unless this is known 
or you have good reason to suspect. please do not fill it in). 
8. Number of airmen in the crew of the aeroplane 
(State the number of airmen that you know or believe to have been in the aero- 
plane when it crashed). 
9. (Descended by parachute Evaded . . . . . . . . . 
Fate of the crew (Taken prisoner . . . . . . . . , Wounded . . . . . . . . 
(Died in hospital . . . . _ . . Killed on 
the spot 
(Fill in against each phrase the number of crew to which each phrase is 
applicable. For example; suppose a four engined bomber has crashed with a 
crew of eight, the question might be completed as follows:- 
4 Descended by parachute 1 Evaded capture 
3 Taken prisoner 0 Wounded 
1 Died in Hospital 3 Killed on the spot. 
It must be realised that the total of the above numbers will not necessarily 
agree with the total number of crew as stated in question 8 
because, for 
instance, some of the airmen who descended by.parachute 
may also have been 
taken prisoner or evaded capture.) 
3 TNA, PRO AIR 55/69. 
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10. Names and military numbers of Pate of each member if known,as 
members of crew, if known:- in question 9 above:- 
(In this space write in the personal numbers, names and initials of any 
of the crew which you may know, and opposite their names state what 
happened to them. For example:- Taken prisoner, killed on the spot etc.) 
11. Bodies of crew buried at:- 
Commune Cemetery 
Grave No 
(If possible, return with this paper, burial certificate for each airman 
or grave.) 
12. Has the crash already been investigated by Allied Military authorities. 
If so, state by whom and approximately on what data, if known. (Please 
give full details.) 
13. Names and addresses of local people who may able to give information 
about the fate of the crew: - 
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Appendix Four: MRES Area Search Certificate4 
No. 4 Miedng Research and Enquiry Unit 
Area.,5earch Certificates. 
To: The Landkreis Director of 
An den Herrn Landrat des Kreises 
APPENDIX Be 1 
In pursuance of the scheme in operation throughout the entire British Zone of Germany for the purpose of obtaining 
all available information relating . to the burial places of Allied airmen and details of aircraft crashes you are hereby 
informed that the Burgomeisters responsible for the undernamed Gemeinde have submitted to the British Military 
authorities negative reports in respect of their areas. 
In der Britischen Zone von Deutschland läuft augenblicklich eine Operation, die dem Zweck dient, alle verfügbaren 
Informationen, die sich auf Grabstellen alliierter Flieger und Einzelheiten von Flugzeugabstürzen beziehen, einzuholen. 
Sie werden hiermit davon in Kenntnis gesetzt, daß von den Bürgermeistern der unten angegebenen Gemeinden, ala 
Antwort auf die englischen Anfragen, in bezug auf ihren Gemeindebereich negative Berichte an die britische Militär - 
Behörde abgegeben wurden. 
The importance of these returns cannot be overstated and you are, therefore instructed to verify their accuracy and 
sign the declaration hereunder. 
Es wird auf die Wichtigkeit des genauen Ausfüllen dieses Schreibens hingewiesen und Sie werden hiermit unter- 
richtet, ihre Genauigkeit zu bestätigen und die untenstehende Erklärung zu unterzeichnen. 
DECLARATION 
I._ ..................._......................................... ............................... being Landkreis Director for Landkreis........._.,..............._.............................. ....._........._............... 
do hereby declare that the Gemeinde named above are under my jurisdiction and that I confirm the accuracy of the 
returns made by the Burgomeisters of those Gemeinde. 
Note:-If an inaccuracy is discovered the correct information is to be attached to this declaration which can then 
be duly completed. 
ERKLÄRUNG 
Ich ...... ............................... der Landrat des Kreises ............................................... ............................... .................._..._. erkläre 
hiermit, dass die oben angeführten) Gemeinde(n) unter meiner Verwaltung stehen und bestätige, dass die Angaben 
jener Gemeinden) auf Wahrheit beruhte(n). 
Vermerk: Wird eine Unrichtigkeit bei der Überprüfung entdeckt, so sind die richtigen Informationen mit dieser 
Erklärung abzugeben, welche dann vorschriftsmässig vervollständigt wird. 
Signed (Unterschrift) 
at(Ort) .... ............................... 
Date (Datum) .............................. 
This Declaration must be handed to the Royal Air Force Investigation Officer, 
together with any further informa- 
tion, by the Landkreis Director concerned. 
Diese Erklärung muss von denn betreffenden Landrat an den Untersuchungsoffizier 
der Royal Air Force, zusammen 
?nit sonstigen Informationen, ausgehändigt werden. 
rss(HQ)s8o2120M1e -4? Ds 1501 87 
r192nnu,aennronor-.r ' 
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7 CWGC, 2017. Part of a 19 October 1918 letter in which Lutyens explained to Kenyon ideas for the 
Stone of Remembrance. 
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Appendix Eight: Second World War Headstone8 





6TH JUNE 1944 AGE 22 
E SPACE FOR 4 LINES ] 
E OF INSCRIPTION ] 
CHOSEN BY 
RELATIVES 
THE HEADSTONE STANDS 2 FEET 8INGHES ABOVE GROUND; 
15 1 FOOT 3 INCHES BROAD AND 3 INCHES THICK. 
IT 15 INSCRIBED WITH A BADGE AND RELIGIOUS EMBLEM 
AND THE SERVICE PARTICULARS OF THE DECEASED. 
AT THE FOOT OF THE STONE IS A SPACE IN WHICH CAN BE 
ENGRAVED AN INSCRIPTION CHOSEN BY THE RELATIVES . THIS 
INSCRIPTION MUST NOT EXCEED 60 -LETTERS IN LENGTH. 
IMPEÍtIAL WAR GRAVES COMMISSION 
GREEN - JAN. 31 . 194S. DRAWN . BY M. NEWELL. 
P3096. P2341, 3250, /000,(7y. P 1 aigG 
8 TNA, PRO WO 32/17366. Epitaphs on Second World War headstones were limited to sixty letters, 
six fewer than had been afforded First World War next -of -kin. Otherwise the headstones of the two 
conflicts were identical in design. 
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Appendix Nine: Percentage of CWGC Funds Supplied by Member Countries, 
2007 -089 
Country Percentage 
United Kingdom 78.43 
Canada 10.07 
Australia 6.05 
New Zealand 2.14 
South Africa 2.11 
India 1.2 
9 Commonwealth War Graves Commission Annual Report, 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ADM 1. Admiralty Correspondence. 
AIR 2. Registered Papers. 
AIR 10. Publications and Reports. 
AIR 20. Historical Branch Papers. 
AIR 29. Operations Record Books. 
AIR 55. Germany and Austria Air Division Papers. 
AN 13. British Transport Commission Papers. 
CAB 21. Cabinet Office Papers. 
CAB 106. War Cabinet Papers. 
CO 323. Colonies Correspondence. 
CO 1032. Colonies Correspondence on Defence. 
DO 170. Commonwealth Relations Office. 
FO 141. Foreign Office Correspondence with Embassies. 
FO 369. Foreign Office Consular Department Correspondence. 
FO 371. Foreign Office Political Department Correspondence. 
MT 9. Board of Trade and Ministry of Transport Maritime Papers. 
PC 8. Privy Council Correspondence. 
T 1. Treasury Board Papers. 
T 220. Treasury Correspondence on Imperial and Foreign Matters. 
T 231. Treasury Exchange Control Division Papers. 
WO 24. Papers Concerning Establishments. 
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WO 32. War Office Papers. 
WO 73. Army Monthly Returns. 
WO 106. Military Operations and Intelligence Papers. 
WO 123. Army Circulars, Memoranda, Orders and Regulations. 
WO 163. Army Council Papers. 
WO 165. War Office Directorates War Diaries. 
WO 166. Home Forces War Diaries. 
WO 167. BEF War Diaries. 
WO 169. MEF War Diaries. 
WO 170. Central Mediterranean Force War Diaries. 
WO 171. Allied Expeditionary Force War Diaries. 
WO 175. BNAF War Diaries. 
WO 199. Home Forces Papers. 
WO 204. Military Headquarters (Mediterranean) Papers. 
WO 208. Military Operations and Intelligence Papers. 
WO 219. SHAEF Papers. 
WO 267. BAOR Quarterly Historical Reports. 
WO 287. War Office Confidential Papers. 
WO 293. Army Council Instructions. 
WO 309. Papers of the Judge Advocate General. 
WO 366. Memoranda on Historical Monographs. 
CWGC 
(The archives of the CWGC are not sufficiently well -arranged to allow for a 








































87/35/1. R. R. Ryder file. 
93/32/1. Wing Commander B.O. Dias file. 
99/16/1. Major A. F. Flatow file. 
2667/19/162. XXX Corps Information Booklet. 
9293/30/554. J. J. Berg Correspondence. 
9736/112/1778. Air Ministry Notification of Death. 
TCD 
Series: 
P 49. The Papers of the Earls of Courtown. 
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Books 
Brine, Stan, One Up, Two Up, Brew Up. 
Driscoll, Jim, Stand to Your Horses: Recollections of a Tank Driver in the 4'h /7rh 
Royal Dragoon Guards. 
Newton, Cecil, A Trooper's Tale. 
Stirling, John, D -Day to VE -Day from my Tank Turret: A Personal Account, Written 
Between D -Day 1944 and May 1945. 
The Administrative History of the Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of 
Europe: 6 June 1944 - 8 May 1945. 
Personal Correspondence 
Bruce McCay to the Author, 16 May 2003. 
Stan Brine to the Author, 27 May 2003. 
Stan Brine to the Author, 13 June 2005. 
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